Rivera v. JetBlue Airways Corp

Filing 31

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR REMAND AND GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. For the reasons discussed in the attached opinion, plaintiff Riveras motion to remand (Doc. # 29 ) is DENIED. Defendant JetBlues motion for summary judgment (Doc. # 28 ) is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment for defendant JetBlue and close this case. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Jeffrey A. Meyer on 8/22/2019. (Webley, A)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

ANNEMARIE RIVERA,
Plaintiff,
No. 3:17-cv-00960 (JAM)

v.
JETBLUE AIRWAYS CORPORATION,
Defendant.

RULING DENYING MOTION TO REMAND AND
GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Annemarie Rivera alleges that she had a bad flight experience with defendant
JetBlue Airways Corporation. On an outbound flight from New York to California, Rivera had to
sit in a center seat where she could not get up and move around. On her return flight to New
York, Rivera had an allergic reaction to a couple of dogs who were near her. And all this
happened, Rivera alleges, even though JetBlue assured Rivera that she would receive an
accommodation after she informed JetBlue of her medical needs.
Rivera has sued JetBlue for breach of contract. Doc. #19. JetBlue has moved for
summary judgment, contending there are no disputed issues of material fact and they are entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Doc. #28. Rivera does not oppose JetBlue’s motion, but has
instead moved to remand this action to state court on the basis of her amended complaint, which
now alleges less than the $75,000 minimum needed to sustain federal diversity jurisdiction. Doc.
#29.
I will deny Rivera’s motion to remand on the ground that the Court’s diversity
jurisdiction may not be ousted by a change of circumstances that occurs after the initial filing of
an action. I will otherwise grant JetBlue’s unopposed motion for summary judgment on the

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ground that there are no genuine issues of fact to support Rivera’s claim for breach of contract.
Accordingly, judgment shall enter for JetBlue on Rivera’s contract claim.

BACKGROUND
The following facts are stated in the amended complaint, Doc. #19, as supplemented by
facts set forth in Jet Blue’s Local Rule 56.1 statement of undisputed facts, Doc. #28-1.
Rivera resides in Connecticut; JetBlue is an airline incorporated in Delaware with a
principal place of business in New York. Rivera has three disabilities relevant to air travel: she
has a blood clot disorder, a need to get up and move about during a flight, and a severe allergy to
fur-bearing animals. Rivera booked a flight from JFK airport in New York to LAX airport in Los
Angeles on August 5, 2016, and then a return trip several days later on August 9, 2016. When
she booked her flights, she did not note any of these medical conditions, but on the morning of
her JFK-LAX flight, she called JetBlue and told the representative that she had a blood clot
disorder and a need to get up and walk around the aircraft during flight. She did not, on this call,
alert the representative about her allergies. The JetBlue agent noted her medical conditions, but
Rivera never expressly asked for a disability seat, and the JetBlue agent simply noted her
conditions without indicating that Rivera wanted or needed a disability seat.
Rivera believed the agent had promised her a disability seat, and learned otherwise, to her
dismay, only when she checked in at JFK—by which time the entire flight had been booked
solid. Rivera was assigned a middle seat, which did not meet her medical needs. Although
JetBlue subsequently upgraded her, for free, to an “Even More Space Seat,” which was,
according to Rivera, also a middle seat. Nonetheless, Rivera took the seat rather than cancel her
trip, and the outbound flight took off without incident.

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Further problems awaited on the return trip. Rivera, apparently assuming that the incident
at JFK had alerted JetBlue of her need of a disability seat, discovered upon check-in at LAX that
JetBlue had made no such arrangements and the regular seats on the return flight were, once
again, booked solid. This time, Rivera paid $90 for an “Even More Space Seat.” Unfortunately
for Rivera, this flight had a new complication: a standby passenger without a flight reservation
was seated in front of Rivera and carried with her—unbeknownst to anyone, including JetBlue—
two small dogs in her carry-on baggage. Rivera rapidly had a severe allergic reaction because of
the presence of the dogs and, at her behest, the flight crew moved the passenger and her dogs to
the rear of the aircraft, away from Rivera. These efforts were either insufficient or came too late;
on her return to New Haven, Rivera had to be immediately hospitalized.
Rivera initially filed this action against JetBlue in Connecticut state court, claiming
JetBlue engaged in disability discrimination under State law and violated the Connecticut Unfair
Trade Practices Act (CUTPA). JetBlue timely removed the action to this Court on grounds of
federal diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and then JetBlue moved to dismiss
Rivera’s claims. I granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that Rivera did not have a private
right of action under the state disability law and that her CUTPA claim was preempted by federal
law. See Rivera v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 2018 WL 264735 (D. Conn. 2018), but granted Rivera
leave to file an amended complaint alleging a cause of action for breach of contract. Id. at 2.
Rivera duly filed an amended complaint, alleging a single claim for breach of contract
and seeking compensatory damages in an amount greater than $15,000 but less than $75,000,
exclusive of interest and costs. JetBlue has moved for summary judgment on this contract claim.
Rivera has not opposed this motion but instead has moved to remand the action to Connecticut

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state court on the ground that, because her amended complaint expressly seeks damages for less
than $75,000, the Court does not have diversity jurisdiction.
DISCUSSION
JetBlue has moved for summary judgment. Rivera has moved to remand this action to
Connecticut state court. Because the motion to remand goes to this Court’s jurisdiction, I will
first address Rivera’s motion before addressing JetBlue’s motion for summary judgment.
Motion to remand to state court
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See generally Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S.
251, 256 (2013). In general, federal courts have so-called “federal question” jurisdiction over any
claims that arise under federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Alternatively, even if a complaint does
not allege a federal law claim, a federal court may have so-called “diversity” jurisdiction if the
parties are citizens of different states, but only if the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See
28 U.S.C. § 1332.
If a plaintiff files an action in state court over which a federal court would otherwise have
jurisdiction, a defendant may timely remove the action to federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441;
Spencer v. Duncaster, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 3d 171, 174 (D. Conn. 2014). That happened here.
Rivera filed her action in Connecticut state court, and JetBlue timely removed the action to this
Court without objection. There was no doubt that the parties were citizens of different states—
Rivera is a citizen of Connecticut, and JetBlue is a citizen of Delaware and New York. Nor was
there doubt at the time that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000, especially in light of
Rivera’s complaint that she had been hospitalized and the nature of her claim under CUTPA for
which punitive damages and attorney’s fees could be awarded. See Parola v. Citibank (S.
Dakota), N.A., 2011 WL 5374146, at *2-*3 (D. Conn. 2011).

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Now that Rivera has filed an amended complaint alleging solely a breach of contract
claim and explicitly demanding less than $75,000, Rivera moves to remand this case to state
court on the ground that this action no longer satisfies the $75,000 amount-in-controversy
requirement for diversity jurisdiction. But this argument runs contrary to the long-established
rule that, for purposes of establishing diversity jurisdiction, the amount-in-controversy is
measured as of the time of filing of the lawsuit in the first instance and that “[e]vents occurring
subsequent to the institution of suit which reduce the amount recoverable below the statutory
limit do not oust jurisdiction.” Wolde-Meskel v. Vocational Instruction Project Cmty. Servs.,
Inc., 166 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303
U.S. 283, 289-90 (1938)). Accordingly, I will deny Rivera’s motion to remand this action to
Connecticut state court.
Motion for summary judgment
The principles governing the Court’s review of a motion for summary judgment are well
established. Summary judgment may be granted only if “the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a). I must view the facts in the light most favorable to the party who
opposes the motion for summary judgment and then decide if those facts would be enough—if
eventually proved at trial—to allow a reasonable jury to decide the case in favor of the opposing
party. See generally Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656–57 (2014) (per curiam); Pollard v. N.Y.
Methodist Hosp., 861 F.3d 374, 378 (2d Cir. 2017).
Even if a party does not oppose a motion for summary judgment, I must undertake my
own review of the moving papers to ensure that no genuine issue of fact remains for trial. See
Jackson v. Fed. Express, 766 F.3d 189, 194 (2d Cir.2014). Still, to the extent that a non-moving

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party does not file a local rule statement to contest any of the moving party’s well-supported
statements of material fact, I may deem these facts to be admitted for the purposes of the motion.
See D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)(1).
JetBlue’s evidentiary submissions largely negate any factual basis for Rivera’s breach of
contract claim. The evidence shows that the only written contract between Rivera and JetBlue
was the standard contract-of-carriage, which contained no assurance that Rivera would be
entitled to special seating or to seating away from any fur-bearing animals. Doc. #28-1 at 2 (¶¶ 23). As to Rivera’s outgoing flight, JetBlue’s evidence shows that she was furnished without
charge an “Even More Space” seat with extra legroom, such that she was physically able to get
up from her seat, walk around in the aircraft aisle, and access the aircraft lavatory. Id. at 6-7 (¶¶
26-27, 33); Doc. #29-2 at 5 (¶¶ 40-41).
As to Rivera’s return flight, JetBlue’s evidence shows that Rivera again occupied an
“Even More Space” seat near the front of the aircraft. Doc. #28-1 at 6 (¶ 28). While Rivera was
at the airport to board her return flight, she told JetBlue for the first time about her allergy to
animals, but there is no evidence of any agreement between her and any representative of JetBlue
that she would not be seated near an animal. Id. at 6-7 (¶¶ 29-30). Although a stand-by passenger
who was initially seated near Rivera had two small dogs stowed in her carry-on baggage, JetBlue
was not initially aware of these dogs’ presence, and the stand-by passenger with dogs was
relocated to the rear of the aircraft after Rivera alerted a crew member. Id. at 7 (¶¶ 31-32).
In short, the undisputed facts show that there was no breach of any agreement between
Rivera and JetBlue with respect to Rivera’s seating arrangements or her proximity to any
animals. Accordingly, there is no genuine issue of fact to support Rivera’s claim for breach of
contract.

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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff Rivera’s motion to remand (Doc. #29) is DENIED.
Defendant JetBlue’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. #28) is GRANTED. The Clerk of
Court shall enter judgment for defendant JetBlue and close this case.
It is so ordered.
Dated at New Haven this 22d day of August 2019.
/s/ Jeffrey Alker Meyer
Jeffrey Alker Meyer
United States District Judge

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