In re: Reddy

Filing 10

ORDER granting 9 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Victor A. Bolden on 03/18/19. (Ryan, Sarah)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

No. 3:17-cv-1067 (VAB)

In re: WALTER B. REDDY

RULING AND ORDER ON BANKRUPTCY APPEAL
Walter B. Reddy (“Appellant”), pro se, appeals three orders of the United States
Bankruptcy Court (“Bankruptcy Court”), Notice of Appeal, ECF No. 1; Mem. and Order on Obj.
to Claim 3 and Second Am. Mot. for Relief from Automatic Stay (“Bankruptcy Court Order on
Claim 3 and Automatic Stay”), In re Reddy, 16-bk-50689 (JAM), Dkt. 130; Order Denying Mot.
for Stay Pending Appeal, id., Dkt. 152; Order Granting Trustee’s Mot. to Dismiss with a One
Year Bar to Filing a Case, id., Dkt. 161.
Mr. Reddy alleges that the Bankruptcy Court erred in: (1) allowing three attorneys,
Patricia Davis, Bruce Bennett, and Benjamin Staskiewicz, to file documents and appear in the
case before filing a formal Appearance on the docket; (2) refusing to consider the affidavit of an
expert, Michael Porzio; (3) granting relief from the automatic stay to Deutsche Bank;
(4) granting the Chapter 13 trustee’s motion to dismiss the case; and (5) denying a stay pending
his appeal. Statement of Issues to be Presented, ECF No. 8.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s orders.
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.

Factual Allegations

On July 15, 2005, Mr. Reddy obtained a home mortgage for $542,400.00. Mot. to
Reconsider Scheduling of Trial (“Mot. Reconsider”), In re Reddy, 16-bk-50689 (JAM), Dkt. 52

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¶ 1. Four years later, Deutsche Bank1 initiated a foreclosure action in Connecticut Superior
Court. Mot. Reconsider ¶ 2.
After nearly seven years of litigation,2 the Superior Court issued a strict foreclosure
judgment in favor of Deutsche Bank in the amount of $873,748.17. Mot. Reconsider, Ex. B
[Order of the Superior Court for the Judicial District of Stamford, J. Povodator (“Superior Court
Order” April 11, 2016)], id., Dkt. 52-2, Ex. B.
Six weeks later, on May 26, 2016, Mr. Reddy filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 13
bankruptcy. Petition, In re Reddy, 16-bk-50689 (JAM), Dkt. 1. In that petition, Mr. Reddy
estimated his liabilities to be $100,001-500,000 and his assets to be $500,001-1,000,000. Id. at 6.
On August 25, 2016, Mr. Reddy agreed to make payments of $100 per month to his
creditors. Debtor’s Chapter 13 Plan, id., Dkt. 22 at 1. He also disputed an “obligation claimed by
the Creditor Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, As Trustee, for Morgan Stanley Mortgage
Loan Trust 2005-10.” Id.
On November 1, 2018, Patricia Davis, counsel for Specialized Loan Servicing LLC, the
servicer for Deutsche Bank National Trust Company,3 filed an objection to Mr. Reddy’s Chapter
13 plan on the grounds that Deutsche Bank has a “valid secured claim and deserves proper
treatment in the Plan.” Objection to Plan, id., Dkt. 32, at 1.

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As trustee for Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-10, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2005-10.
Mot. Reconsider ¶ 2.
Deutsche Bank alleges that Mr. Reddy “fully participated and was represented by counsel” during this litigation.
Mot. Reconsider ¶ 3.
2

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I.e., Specialized Loan Servicing LLC is the servicer for Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, which is the
trustee for Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-10, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2005-10
(together with its predecessors, successors, affiliates, principals, and assigns, “Creditor”). Objection to Plan at 1.

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Shortly thereafter, the Bankruptcy Court scheduled a hearing on Deutsche Bank’s claim
for December 20, 2016. Notice of Hearing, id., Dkt. 36.
On November 23, 3016, Ms. Davis filed a motion for relief from a stay on the foreclosure
of Mr. Reddy’s home, asserting that Deutsche Bank had a valid interest in the property and that
the property was “not necessary for an effective reorganization.” Mot. for Relief from Stay, id.,
Dkt. 40.
On December 7, 2016, Mr. Reddy objected, explaining that he had “contested the
underlying foreclosure matter vigorously” and did not believe that Deutsche Bank had a rightful
claim to the property, and that Deutsche Bank was not entitled to relief from the automatic stay.
Debtor’s Obj. to Deutsche Bank Nat’l. Trust Co. as Trustee Mot. For Relief from Automatic
Stay, id., Dkt. 42.
On December 20, 2016, the Bankruptcy Court held a hearing at which Mr. Reddy
asserted that the note and mortgage submitted by Deutsche Bank was a fraud. Audio Recording
of Hearing, id., Dkt. 51. He requested an evidentiary hearing and permission to bring an
authentication expert. Id. The Court granted Mr. Reddy’s request and scheduled a follow-up
hearing for January 12, 2017. Id.
On December 23, 2016, Ms. Davis filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that Deutsche
Bank had already produced the note and mortgage to the Superior Court during the foreclosure
action, and proved that [Deutsche Bank] was “entitled to enforce said documents.” Mot.
Reconsider, id., Dkt. 52 ¶ 3–4.
On January 12, 2017, Ms. Davis filed a Notice of Appearance for herself and another
attorney, Bruce Bennett. Notice of Appearance and Request for Notice, id., Dkt. 60.
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Later that day, the Bankruptcy Court held another hearing. Audio Recording of Hearing,
id., Dkt. 62. Mr. Reddy alleged that his expert was unavailable to attend the hearing. Id. The
Court instructed both parties to file amended briefs related to the disputed stay. Id.
Within six weeks, the parties filed their amended pleadings. Mot. for Relief from Stay,
id., Dkt. 72; Debtor’s Obj. to Mot. for Relief from Stay, id., Dkt. 80.
On March 2, 2017, the Bankruptcy Court held another hearing. Audio Recording of
Hearing, id., Dkt. 86–87. At that hearing, the Court permitted Mr. Reddy’s alleged expert to
testify. Id. Mr. Reddy also produced a 2009 assignment of the mortgage to Deutsche Bank. Id.
Deutsche Bank suggested that another attorney, Benjamin Staskiewicz, might have additional
relevant information about the assignment. Id. The Court ordered Deutsche Bank to file the
Superior Court foreclosure documents on the docket. Audio Recording of Hearing. The next day,
the Court ordered Mr. Staskiewicz to appear and testify at an evidentiary hearing regarding the
2009 assignment. Scheduling Order, id., Dkt. 88 at 3.
On April 4, 2017, Deutsche Bank submitted a 285-page filing, including the alleged note,
title documents, and exhibits submitted to the Superior Court. Second Am. Mot. for Relief from
Stay, id., Dkt. 94.
On May 2, 2017, the Bankruptcy Court held a status conference. Audio Recording of
Conference, id., Dkt. 107.
On May 31, 2017, the Bankruptcy Court held another hearing. Audio Recording of
Hearing, id., Dkt. 124–26.

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On June 8, 2017, the Bankruptcy Court issued an order overruling Mr. Reddy’s objection
to Deutsche Bank’s claim. Bankruptcy Court Order on Claim 3 and Automatic Stay at 10. The
Court also waived the automatic stay. Id.
Later that day, Molly Whiton, the Bankruptcy Trustee, moved to dismiss Mr. Reddy’s
case. Mot. to Dismiss Chapter 13 Case, id., Dkt. 129. She alleged that Mr. Reddy’s debt
schedules showed a net income of -$1,970.00, rendering him unable to “make all payments
under the Plan within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. 1325(a)(6).” Id.
The Court held two hearings on the motion to dismiss. Audio Recording of Hearing, id.,
Dkt. 151, 155.
On January 24, 2018, the Bankruptcy Court dismissed Mr. Reddy’s case, with prejudice
because of “unreasonable delay.” Order, id., Dkt. 161; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c).
B.

Procedural Background

On June 22, 2017, Mr. Reddy filed his notice of appeal. Notice of Appeal.
On August 23, 2017, the Bankruptcy Court denied Mr. Reddy’s request for a stay
pending his appeal to this Court. Order Denying Mot. for Stay Pending Appeal, id., Dkt. 152.
On February 20, 2018, the Court ordered Mr. Reddy to submit a “designation of the items
to be included in the record on appeal” by March 9, 2018. Order, ECF No. 7; see also FED. R.
BANKR. P. 8009.
On March 9, 2018, Mr. Reddy submitted his statement of issues. Statement of Issues to
be Presented.
On November 26, 2018, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company filed a motion to
dismiss Mr. Reddy’s appeal. Mot. to Dismiss Appeal, ECF No. 9.

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II.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), district courts have jurisdiction to hear appeals “from final

judgments, orders, and decrees” of United States bankruptcy courts. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). “[I]n
bankruptcy appeals, the district court reviews the bankruptcy court’s factual findings for clear
error and its conclusions of law de novo.” In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 691 F.3d 476, 482-83
(2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 2021 (2013); see also Papadopoulos v. Gazes, No. 14CIV-3713 (KPF), 2014 WL 3928940, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2014) (“In general, a district
court reviews a Bankruptcy Court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de
novo.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The Court construes pro se filings “liberally” and interprets them “to raise the strongest
arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir.
2006); see also Ruotolo v. I.R.S., 28 F.3d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1994) (explaining that pro se litigants
should be afforded “special solicitude” because they are not represented by counsel).
III.

DISCUSSION
Mr. Reddy has asked the Court to review five Bankruptcy Court actions or orders:

(1) allowing three attorneys, Ms. Davis, Mr. Bennett, and Mr. Staskiewicz, to file documents and
appear in the case before filing a formal Appearance on the docket; (2) refusing to consider the
affidavit of an expert, Michael Porzio; (3) granting relief from the automatic stay to Deutsche
Bank; (4) granting the Chapter 13 trustee’s motion to dismiss the case; and (5) denying a stay
pending appeal. Statement of Issues to be Presented.

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1.

Appearances in Court

A party appears in court when it “takes any action, other than objecting to personal
jurisdiction, that recognizes the case is pending in court.” 4 AM. JUR. 2d Appearance § 1.
“Appearances in federal court are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1654, which provides ‘[i]n all
courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by
counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct such
causes therein.’” In re Ideal Mortg. Bankers, Ltd., 539 B.R. 409, 422 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2015),
aff’d sub nom. Holzer v. Barnard, No. 15-CV-6277 (JFB), 2016 WL 4046767 (E.D.N.Y. July 27,
2016), citing 28 U.S.C. § 1654. The statute does not prescribe punishments for failure to meet
local appearance rules. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (The entire statute reads: “In all courts of the United
States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules
of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.”).
Local Bankruptcy Court Rule 9010-1 advises attorneys to file an appearance. LOCAL
BANKR. R. 9010-1 (“An attorney entering an appearance in a case under the Bankruptcy Code. . .
shall first file an appearance with the Court and serve the same upon the Debtor or the debtor-inpossession, any trustee, any committee and its counsel, the United States Trustee [etc.].”). The
rule does not specify what form the appearance must take. Id. Under Local Bankruptcy Court
Rule 9036-1, notices may be served electronically, through the Court’s electronic docketing
system (i.e., CM/ECF), except for “service of process for a summons and complaint in an
adversary proceeding under FRBP 7004 or of a subpoena under FRBP 9016[.]”). LOCAL BANKR.
R. 9036-1 (“Subject to applicable rule or statute, parties are authorized to serve notices through
the Court’s CM/ECF system.”).

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On November 1, 2018 , Patricia Davis filed Deutsche Bank’s objection to Mr. Reddy’s
debt collection plan. Objection to Plan. She identified her client as “Specialized Loan Servicing
LLC as servicer for Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Morgan Stanley
Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-10, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2005-10[.]” Id. She
then provided the name, address, and telephone number for her law firm, and her personal e-mail
address. The January 12, 2017 Notice of Appearance included similar identifying information for
Ms. Davis and Bruce Bennett, as well as both attorneys’ state bar numbers (i.e., “Juris”
numbers). Notice of Appearance and Request for Notice. Dkt. 60.
On March 3, 2017, the Bankruptcy Court ordered Benjamin Staskiewicz to appear.
Scheduling Order, id., Dkt. 88 at 3. That same day, a court employee docketed a Certified Mail
Receipt that included attorney Staskiewicz’s law firm and address. Certified Mail Receipt to
Benjamin Staskiewicz, id., Dkt. 90.
These documents and docket entries serve as appearances for two reasons. First, the
Bankruptcy Court rules permit electronic service through CM/ECF. Second, these submissions
provided Mr. Reddy and the Bankruptcy Court with contact information for the attorneys.
Neither Mr. Reddy nor the Bankruptcy Court were left to guess who was representing Deutsche
Bank or how to reach those counsel. Because the Bankruptcy Court’s actions did not violate a
Local Rule and Mr. Reddy has shown no prejudice, the Court finds that the Bankruptcy Court
did not err in permitting Patricia Davis, Bruce Bennett, or Benjamin Staskiewicz to file and
appear throughout the case.

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2.

Refusal to Consider Michael Porzio’s Affidavit

Defendant argues that neither the Bankruptcy Court nor this Court can consider issues
related to Deutsche Bank’s claim to Mr. Reddy’s home. Mem. of Law in Support of Mot. to
Dismiss, ECF No. 9-1, at 3–8.
The Court agrees.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a party “from seeking what is in substance appellate
review of the state judgment in federal district court based on the party’s claim that the state
judgment violates his or her federal rights.” Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414-15
(1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983). The
Rooker-Feldman doctrine renders certain cases beyond the reach of the federal district courts.
Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486 (“Federal district courts do not have jurisdiction, however, over
challenges to state court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if
those challenges allege that the state court’s action was unconstitutional.”).
Courts analyze Rooker-Feldman claims using a four-part test: (1) the Plaintiff lost in
state court; (2) the Plaintiff complains of injuries caused by a state-court ruling; (3) the Plaintiff
invites a district court to review and reject the state court judgment; and (4) the state-court
judgment was rendered before the district court proceedings commenced. Hoblock v. Albany
Cty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and alteration
omitted); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
These four requirements are clearly met in this case.
The Superior Court for the Judicial District of Stamford found that Deutsche Bank held a
valid note and mortgage on Mr. Reddy’s home. Superior Court Order. The state court issued a
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strict foreclosure judgment in favor of Deutsche Bank in the amount of $873,748.17. Superior
Court Order. Following his loss in state court, Mr. Reddy was not entitled to a review of
Deutsche Bank’s claim to his property by either the Bankruptcy Court or this Court. Hoblock v.
Albany Cty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2005) (Explaining that a plaintiff’s claim
will not be reviewed by the federal courts if the plaintiff lost in state court, complains of related
injuries, and invites a district court to reject the state court judgment.). Mr. Reddy’s purported
authentication expert, Michael Porzio, sought to contest the authenticity of Deutsche Bank’s
note and mortgage, Aff. of Expert Michael Porzio, In re Reddy, 16-bk-50689 (JAM), Dkt. 83, an
issue already resolved by the Superior Court in 2016. Superior Court Order.
Deutsche Bank submitted a 285-page filing, and included the alleged note, title
documents, and exhibits previously submitted to the Superior Court. Second Am. Mot. for Relief
from Stay, id., Dkt. 94. Following a review of that filing, the Bankruptcy Court properly applied
the Rooker-Feldman test and found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
authentication claim adjudicated by the Superior Court. Bankruptcy Court Order on Claim 3 and
Automatic Stay at 8. The Bankruptcy Court did not err in refusing to consider the Porzio
affidavit because the Bankruptcy Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the underlying claim.
3.

Granting Deutsche Bank Relief from the Automatic Stay

Bankruptcy courts apply a two-part test to motions for relief from an automatic stay.
First, the movant must demonstrate an entitlement to the relief under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d). In re
Zeoli, 249 B.R. 61, 63 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“[T]he grounds for relief from stay are presented
in subsections (1), (2) and (3) in the disjunctive; thus, if any one subsection applies, the Court
must grant a motion for relief from stay. In this case, both subsections (1) and (2) are applicable,
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and each requires that the stay be lifted.”). Section 362(d)(2), for example, mandates the removal
of an automatic stay in “an act against property . . . if . . . (A) the debtor does not have an equity
in such property; and (B) such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization.” 11
U.S.C. § 362(d)(2). Second, once the moving party has made a section 362(d) showing, a
bankruptcy court must grant relief from the stay unless the opposing party shows “that the
movant does not have a secured claim or that the debtor does have equity in the property.” In re
Speer, No. 14-21007 (AMN), 2015 WL 5601469, at *3 (Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 13, 2015); see
also In re Zeoli, 249 B.R. at 63 (“Section 362(d) is mandatory, not permissive. Congress has
provided that ‘the Court shall grant relief from the stay’ . . . for any of the reasons stated in the
three subsections.”).
Deutsche Bank’s 285-page filing, including the Order of strict foreclosure, demonstrated
its entitlement to relief.4 Second Am. Mot. for Relief from Stay, id., Dkt. 94. The Bankruptcy
Court then held a status conference, id., Dkt. 107, and hearing, Dkt. 124–26. Following the
hearing, the Bankruptcy Court issued an order overruling Mr. Reddy’s objection to Deutsche
Bank’s claim. Bankruptcy Court Order on Claim 3 and Automatic Stay at 10. The Bankruptcy
Court also waived the automatic stay. Id. The Bankruptcy Court explained that
[T]he Creditor need only establish that the Debtor owes it a debt and that it is a
party in interest entitled to relief from the automatic stay. Both issues were decided
in the Foreclosure Action and the Debtor produced no evidence to support any
claims to the contrary . . . . [T]he mandatory nature of 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) requires
the Court to grant the Creditor relief from the automatic stay.

Id.

4

The order granting strict foreclosure appears at page 275.

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The Bankruptcy Court properly construed the mandatory nature of 11 U.S.C. § 362(d).
Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Court granted Deutsche Bank relief from the automatic stay based
upon credible evidence that Deutsche Bank held a valid note and mortgage on Mr. Reddy’s
property and Mr. Reddy lacked equity in the property because of the strict foreclosure. As a
result, the Bankruptcy Court did not err in granting Deutsche Bank relief from the automatic
stay.
4.

Granting the Bankruptcy Trustee’s Motion to Dismiss the Case

Under 11 U.S.C. § 1307, a bankruptcy court may dismiss a case for cause, including but
not limited to one of the eleven reasons enumerated in § 1307(c). (“[O]n request of a party in
interest or the United States trustee and after notice and a hearing, the court may convert a case
under this chapter to a case under chapter 7 of this title, or may dismiss a case under this chapter,
whichever is in the best interests of creditors and the estate, for cause, including . . . .”). For
example, a bankruptcy court may dismiss a Chapter 13 case due to a debtor’s unreasonable
delay. In re Prud’Homme, 161 B.R. 747, 751 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1993) (“[I]n accordance with
§ 1307(c)(1) for the Debtor’s unreasonable delay that has prejudiced his creditors[.]”); 11 U.S.C.
§ 1307(c)(1) (Bankruptcy courts may dismiss for cause due to “(1) unreasonable delay by the
debtor that is prejudicial to creditors[.]”).
Mr. Reddy fell behind on his Chapter 13 plan payments and the Bankruptcy Court ruled
that it could not confirm Mr. Reddy’s plan. Order Denying Confirmation of Chapter 13 Plan with
Leave to Amend, In re Reddy, 16-bk-50689 (JAM), Dkt. 70. The Bankruptcy Court granted Mr.
Reddy leave to amend his plan on or before January 20, 2017, and later extended the amendment
deadline to March 31, 2017. Id. But Mr. Reddy did not amend his plan.
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The Bankruptcy Trustee then filed a motion to dismiss, arguing: “The Plan is not feasible.
The Debtor’s Schedules I and J show net income of -$1970.00. It does not appear that the Debtor
will be able to make all payments under the Plan within the meaning of 11 USC 1325(a)(6).”
Motion to Dismiss Chapter 13 Case, In re Reddy, 16-bk-50689 (JAM), Dkt. 129. Mr. Reddy did
not oppose that motion.
The Bankruptcy Court held a hearing on the motion, and Mr. Reddy did not further object
to dismissal. The Bankruptcy Court then dismissed Mr. Reddy’s case for “unreasonable delay
that is prejudicial to creditors caused by the Debtor.” Order Granting Trustee’s Mot. to Dismiss
with a One Year Bar to Filing a Case, Id., Dkt. 161.
The Bankruptcy Court properly considered a motion for dismissal and held a hearing on
the matter. Mr. Reddy never filed a revised plan or explained how he could comply with the
statutory requirements for Chapter 13 bankruptcy.
Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court properly ruled that Mr. Reddy’s Chapter 13 case
should be dismissed based upon his unreasonable delay under 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(1). As a
result, the Bankruptcy Court did not err in dismissing Mr. Reddy’s Chapter 13 case.
5.

Denying a Stay Pending Appeal

When deciding a motion for a stay pending appeal, courts consider four factors:
(1) whether the movant will suffer irreparable injury absent a stay, (2) whether a
party will suffer substantial injury if a stay is issued, (3) whether the movant has
demonstrated ‘a substantial possibility, although less than a likelihood, of success’
on appeal, and (4) the public interests that may be affected.
In re Taub, 470 B.R. 273, 277 (E.D.N.Y. 2012), quoting In re Smith, No. 09–cv–508, 2009 WL
366577, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2009); see also In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 503

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F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The four factors to be considered in issuing a stay pending appeal
are well known . . . .”).
Debtors seeking stays pending appeal must demonstrate that they are likely to succeed on
the merits and that the harms they will suffer absent a stay cannot be remedied by monetary
damages. In re Taub, 470 B.R. at 278 (“In the instant case, the Debtor has not demonstrated any
harm other than alleged loss of future rental income and the loss of the properties if they are sold.
She has provided no evidence as to why, in the unlikely event she prevails on appeal, a later
grant of monetary damages would not remedy any harm . . . . In fact, the Debtor’s estate stands
to gain because the proceeds will help pay down her debts.”). A court, however, cannot grant a
stay if it lacks jurisdiction over the matter. In re Taub, 470 B.R. at 277 (“It is unnecessary for the
Court to reach the issue of whether the Debtor has satisfied the standard for the Court to issue a
stay pending appeal because it lacks jurisdiction. However, even if this matter was properly
before this Court, the Debtor still failed to satisfy her burden entitling her to a stay.”).
Here, as discussed above, the Bankruptcy Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
Mr. Reddy’s authentication claim because of the Superior Court’s order of strict foreclosure in
favor of Deutsche Bank. The application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine required the case’s
dismissal. The Bankruptcy Court’s lack of jurisdiction thus is dispositive of this issue; the
Bankruptcy Court could not order a stay pending appeal where it lacked jurisdiction. In re Taub,
470 B.R. at 277 (“It is unnecessary for the Court to reach the issue of whether the Debtor has
satisfied the standard for the Court to issue a stay pending appeal because it lacks jurisdiction.”).
In any event, the Bankruptcy Court also performed a four-factor stay analysis, see In re
Taub, 470 B.R. at 277, and determined that the balance of factors weighed against granting a
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stay. First, the Bankruptcy Court acknowledged that Mr. Reddy might suffer injury absent the
stay. Order Denying Mot. for Stay Pending Appeal, In re Reddy, 16-bk-50689 (JAM), Dkt. 137,
at 4. The Court, however, also found that Deutsche Bank would be injured by a stay because it
had been authorized but unable to foreclose on the property. Id. at 5. The Bankruptcy Court also
found that the public had an interest in the finality of foreclosure orders. Id. Most importantly,
the Bankruptcy Court determined that Mr. Reddy was not likely to succeed on appeal. In re
Taub, 470 B.R. at 278 (“The single most important factor is likelihood of success on the
merits.”), quoting In re Baker, No. 05-cv-3487 (SPG), 2005 WL 2105802, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug.
31, 2005). Indeed, for the same reasons that the court lacked jurisdiction, the Bankruptcy Court
properly determined that Mr. Reddy was unlikely to prevail on his appeal: application of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court properly held that it lacked jurisdiction to grant Mr.
Reddy’s stay. Even if the Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction, a stay was not warranted given that
Mr. Reddy had failed to show “a substantial possibility . . . of success on appeal.” In re Taub,
470 B.R. at 277 (internal quotations omitted). As a result, the Bankruptcy Court did not err in
denying Mr. Reddy’s motion to stay pending appeal.
6.

Remaining Issues

The Court has now addressed each of Mr. Reddy’s stated issues for appeal. Statement of
Issues to be Presented, ECF No. 8. Should any claims remain, however, the Court finds them to
be without merit.
The Court has carefully reviewed Mr. Reddy’s Bankruptcy Court action and found that
the Bankruptcy Court afforded Mr. Reddy hearings on the issue of Deutsche Bank’s claim to his
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property. Audio Recording of Hearing, In re Reddy, 16-bk-50689 (JAM), Dkt. 51, 62, 86–87.
The Bankruptcy Court also afforded Mr. Reddy opportunities to amend his plan and remain in
Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Order Denying Confirmation of Chapter 13 Plan with Leave to Amend,
id, Dkt. 70. Accordingly, Mr. Reddy was afforded due process by the Bankruptcy Court. As a
result, the Court holds that Mr. Reddy has been heard on his claims, including the allegation that
Deutsche Bank has no claim to his home.
Nearly a decade ago, Deutsche Bank initiated a foreclosure of Mr. Reddy’s property.
Mot. Reconsider ¶ 2. Following the Superior Court’s order of strict foreclosure, both the
Bankruptcy Court and this Court carefully reviewed Mr. Reddy’s claims and found them
meritless. As a result, to the extent that Mr. Reddy claims any further basis for relief, the Court
nevertheless affirms the decision of the Bankruptcy Court.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s orders.
The Clerk of the Court is respectfully requested to close the file.
SO ORDERED at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 18th day of March, 2019.
/s/ Victor A. Bolden
VICTOR A. BOLDEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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