Chapman v. Ring's End, Inc.

Filing 69

ORDER denying 67 Motion for Reconsideration. For the reasons outlined in the attached Order, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED. This case shall remain closed. Signed by Judge Victor A. Bolden on 5/28/2021. (Tisdale, I.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

DONALD CHAPMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.

No. 3:17-cv-01084 (VAB)

RING’S END, INC.,
Defendant.

RULING AND ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS
Donald Chapman (“Plaintiff”) has sued Ring’s End, Inc. (“Ring’s End” or “Defendant”),
alleging violations of the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) and state statutes prohibiting
discrimination and retaliation against individuals with disabilities. See 2d Am. Compl., ECF No.
28-2 (Feb. 21, 2018). During the course of this litigation, Mr. Chapman suffered from a stroke,
which prompted the Court to issue an order requiring that Mr. Chapman to demonstrate his
capacity to move forward with this lawsuit, Order to Show Cause, ECF No. 37 (June 18, 2018)
(“Show Cause Order I”), and later to provide proper medical evidence to have a guardian ad
litem appointed or to have the proper party substitute as a plaintiff in Mr. Chapman's place,
Order on Mot. to Show Cause, ECF No. 60 (June 23, 2020) (“Show Cause Order II”).
Mr. Chapman failed to meet the deadline set by the Court’s second Order, and therefore
the case was dismissed. Order Dismissing Case, ECF No. 61 (Sept. 30, 2020) (“Dismissal”). Mr.
Chapman has moved for the Court reconsider this judgment and proceed with this lawsuit. Pl.’s
Renewed Mot. to Open J. / Mot. to Reconsider Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b), 59(e) & 60(b) &
Local R. 7(e), ECF No. 67 (Dec. 11, 2020) (“Pl.’s 2d Mot.”).
For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider is DENIED.
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
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A. Factual Allegations
The Court assumes familiarity with the factual background of this case. See Show Cause
Order II.
B. Procedural History
On June 5, 2017, Mr. Chapman sued Ring’s End in Connecticut Superior Court for the
Judicial District of New London. Ex. A to Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1 (June 29, 2017).
On June 29, 2017, Ring’s End removed the case to this Court. Notice of Removal, ECF
No. 1 (June 29, 2017).
On October 4, 2017, Mr. Chapman filed an Amended Complaint. Am. Compl., ECF No.
21 (Oct. 4, 2017).
On February 21, 2018, Mr. Chapman filed a motion to amend his Amended Complaint,
Mot. to Amend/Correct, ECF No. 28 (Feb. 21, 2018); Mem. in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. to Amend,
ECF No. 28-1 (Feb. 21, 2018), and simultaneously filed his proposed Second Amended
Complaint. 2d Am. Compl., ECF No. 28-2 (Feb. 21, 2018).
On May 21, 2018, the Court granted Mr. Chapman’s motion to amend. Order, ECF No.
31 (May 21, 2018).
On June 6, 2018, the parties jointly moved for a discovery conference “to seek the
Court’s guidance regarding how to proceed in light of concerns over the Plaintiff’s health,
including his capacity to sit for a deposition . . . and to engage in settlement negotiations.” Joint
Mot. for Disc. Conf., ECF No. 32, at 1 (June 6, 2018).
On June 18, 2018, the Court held a telephonic status conference. Min. Entry, ECF No. 36
(June 18, 2018).

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On the same day, the Court ordered Mr. Chapman to show cause as to “why this lawsuit
should continue and address whether he is legally capable of continuing to prosecute this case,”
noting that “Mr. Chapman’s capacity to continue this lawsuit ha[d] been raised, following a
stroke and his subsequent inability to participate fully in court proceedings,” Show Cause Order,
at 1. The Court set a briefing schedule and set a show cause hearing for July 18, 2018. Id.
On July 6, 2018, Mr. Chapman filed a response to the Court’s order to show cause, Pl.’s
Donald Chapman’s Resp. to the Ct.’s Order to Show Cause, ECF No. 42 (July 6, 2018), along
with an affidavit from Mr. Chapman’s spouse, Denise Chapman, Ex. A of Pl.’s Donald
Chapman’s Resp. to the Ct.’s Order to Show Cause, ECF No. 42-1 (July 6, 2018).
On the same day, Ring’s End filed a motion for order, stating that Mr. Chapman had not
responded to its request that he “produce all medical records related to his mental capacity and
update his responses to discovery requests related to Plaintiff’s health records and medical
treatment.” Mot. for Order, ECF No. 41, at 1 (July 6, 2018). Ring’s End stated that it had
“subpoenaed and/or intend[ed] to subpoena” several medical providers identified by Mr.
Chapman during discovery to obtain copies of Mr. Chapman’s medical records, but that “[i]n
light of Plaintiff’s counsel’s representations as to Plaintiff’s lack of capacity, Defendant is unable
to secure authorizations from Plaintiff.” Id. at 1-2. Defendant therefore sought an order from the
Court authorizing those medical providers covered under HIPAA to disclose Mr. Chapman’s
medical records to Defendant’s counsel. Id. at 2. Defendant attached its e-mails sent to Plaintiff’s
counsel containing copies of the subpoenas. Exs. 1, 2, &, 3 to Mot. for Order, ECF No. 41-2
(July 6, 2018).
On July 9, 2018, the Court denied Defendant’s motion for order without prejudice to
renewal following the hearing scheduled for July 18, 2018. Order, ECF No. 43 (July 9, 2018).

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On July 13, 2018, Ring’s End responded to Mr. Chapman’s response to the Court’s order
to show case. Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Submission to Order to Show Cause, ECF No. 44 (July 13,
2018).
On July 18, 2018, the Court held a show cause hearing. Min. Entry, ECF No. 45 (July 18,
2018).
On the same day, the Court also directed the parties to submit additional briefing and
continued the hearing to a later date. Order, ECF No. 47 (July 18, 2018).
Also, on July 18, 2018, the Court ordered that Defendant be permitted to serve subpoenas
under Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on several named medical providers and
mandated that those providers produce such records by July 27, 2018. Order, ECF No. 46 (July
18, 2018).
On September 12, 2018, Mr. Chapman filed his response to the Court’s order for
additional briefing. Pl.’s Donald Chapman’s Suppl. Resp. to the Ct.’s Order to Show Cause, ECF
No. 49 (Sept. 12, 2018).
On October 5, 2018, Ring’s End filed its response. Def.’s Suppl. Submission in Resp. to
Order to Show Cause, ECF No. 54 (Oct. 5, 2018).
On November 18, 2019, the Court filed a notice alerting the parties that under Local Rule
41(a) the case was subject to being dismissed. Notice, ECF No. 58 (Nov. 18, 2019).
On June 23, 2020, the Court found that Mr. Chapman had failed to provide verifiable
medical evidence of his incompetence and gave counsel for Mr. Chapman until September 25,
2020, either to provide the proper medical evidence for the appointment of a guardian ad litem or
have the proper party moved to substitute as a plaintiff in Mr. Chapman's place. Show Cause
Order II. The Court stated that without such action the case was subject to dismissal. Id.

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On September 30, 2020, having not received any additional filings from Mr. Chapman,
the Court issued an order dismissing this case for failure to prosecute. Dismissal.
On October 9, 2020, Mr. Chapman filed a motion to reconsider. Mot. to Reconsider, ECF
No. 62 (Oct. 9, 2020) (“1st Mot.”).
On November, 5, 2020, the Court held a telephonic status conference with the parties.
Min. Entry, ECF No. 64 (Nov. 5, 2020) (“Nov. Status Conf.”).
On the same day, the Court denied the motion to reconsider without prejudice to renewal.
Order, ECF No. 65 (Nov. 5, 2020) (“Order 1st Mot.”).
On December 11, 2020, Mr. Chapman filed a second motion to reconsider. Pl.’s 2d Mot.,
Pl.’s Mem. of L. in Supp. of His Renewed Mot. to Reconsider / Mot. to Open J., ECF No. 67-1
(Dec. 11, 2020) (“Pl.’s Mem.”).
On December 30, 2020, Ring’s End filed a memorandum in opposition to Mr. Chapman’s
renewed motion to reconsider. Def.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Pl.’s Renewed Mot. to Open J. / Mot. To
Reconsider, ECF No. 68 (Dec. 30, 2020) (“Def.’s Mem.”).
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Rule 59(e)
Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to move to “alter or

amend a judgment” no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
Courts consider a motion made under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure a
motion for reconsideration. See Krohn v. N.Y. City Police Dep‘t, 341 F.3d 177, 179 (2d Cir.
2003) (noting that a party timely filed for reconsideration under Fed R. Civ. P. 59(e)).
The standard for granting a motion to reconsider “is strict, and reconsideration will
generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the

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court overlooked—matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the
conclusion reached by the court.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995).
“A motion for reconsideration should be granted only when the defendant identifies an
intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a
clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov, Inc. v. YLL
Irrevocable Tr., 729 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, a
motion for reconsideration is “not a vehicle for relitigating old issues, presenting the case under
new theories, securing a rehearing on the merits, or otherwise taking a second bite at the apple.”
Analytical Surveys, Inc. v. Tonga Partners, L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1998)).
B. Rule 60(b)
Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a district court, “[o]n
motion and just terms . . . may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Generally, “[i]t is well established . . . that a
‘proper case’ for Rule 60(b)(6) relief is only one of ‘extraordinary circumstances,’ or ‘extreme
hardship.’” Harris v. United States, 367 F.3d 74, 81 (quoting United States v. Cirami, 563 F.2d
26, 32 (2d Cir. 1977).
C. Local Rule 7
The District of Connecticut’s Local Rule 7 provides that “[m]otions for reconsideration
shall not be routinely filed and shall satisfy the strict standard applicable to such motions. ” D.
Conn. L. Civ. R. 7(c)(1). This Rule explains that motions for reconsideration are generally
denied “unless the movant can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked in
the initial decision or order.” Id. Should those unique circumstances exist, Local Rule 7 requires

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that the motion be “filed and served within seven (7) days of the filing of the decision or order
from which such relief is sought.” Id.
III.

DISCUSSION
“Reconsideration is not intended for the court to reexamine a decision or the party to

reframe a failed motion.” Fan v. United States, 710 F. App'x 23, 24 (2d Cir. 2018) (citing
Questrom v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 192 F.R.D. 128, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)) “The major
grounds justifying reconsideration are an intervening change of controlling law, the availability
of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Virgin Atl.
Airways, Ltd., 956 F.2d at 1255 (internal citations omitted); see also YLL Irrevocable Tr., 729
F.3d at 108 (2d Cir. 2013) (same).
Mr. Chapman argues for the Court to reconsider its judgment dismissing this case by
alleging that “[Mr. Chapman]’s primary care physician of 24 years” conducted an “assessment of
the Plaintiff’s competency” and found “Mr. Chapman does possess the practical ability to
manage his own affairs.” Pl.’s Mem. at 2 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). As
proof of the doctor’s assessment, Mr. Chapman has filed a note from his alleged doctor. See Ex.
A to Pl.’s Mem., ECF No. 67-2 (Dec. 11, 2020). By providing this single, nearly illegible,
exhibit, Mr. Chapman argues that he has provided sufficient information under Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 6(b), 59(e), 60, and Local Rule 7(e) for “the Court [to] reconsider and set aside
its Order dismissing this case.” Pl.’s Mem. at 2.
The Court disagrees.
When a party misses a deadline without requesting an extension, the Court may only
extend such deadline and accept the late filing if the party shows that the delay was caused by
“excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B). Whether excusable neglect exists is a

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determination made at the district court’s discretion. Ford v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 43
Fed.Appx. 445, 449 (2d Cir. 2002) (upholding the district court’s refusal to accept a late filing
under Rule 6 because counsel’s explanation did not address why he could not have requested an
extension before the deadline passed); Davidson v. Keenan, 740 F.2d 129, 132 (2d Cir. 1984)
(affirming a district court’s rejection of a late filing).
The inquiry into whether the neglect was “excusable” is an “equitable inquiry” taking
into account the following four factors: “(1) the danger of prejudice to the [other party], (2) the
length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, (3) the reason for the delay,
including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and (4) whether the
movant acted in good faith.” Falls v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., No. 3:13-CV-270 JBA, 2014 WL
3810246, at *2 (Aug. 1, 2014) (citing Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship,
507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993)). The Second Circuit has focused on the third factor as critical in the
analysis. See Silivanch v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 333 F.3d 355, 366–67 (2d Cir. 2003).
The issue of whether Mr. Chapman’s delay was excusable was resolved during the
telephonic status conference held on November 5, 2020. Nov. Status Conf. During that
conference, the Court gave Mr. Chapman leave to file evidence demonstrating his competence to
proceed with this case. See Tr. of Telephonic Conf., ECF No. 66 (Dec. 1, 2020). Given the
Court’s willingness to allow Plaintiff to file supplemental records, any arguments regarding the
timeliness of the motion are moot. 1
“Rule 60(b)(1) affords a party relief from a material mistake that changed the outcome of
the court's judgment.” Matura v. United States, 189 F.R.D. 86, 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). Rule
60(b)(1), however, will not provide a movant an additional opportunity to make arguments or

1

For this reason, the Court need not further discuss Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b) and Local Rule 7.

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attempt to win a point already “carefully analyzed and justifiably disposed.” Id. at 90. In other
words, even if a movant's neglect was excusable, this Court should not “reconsider issues already
examined simply because Petitioner is dissatisfied with the outcome of his case. To do otherwise
would be a waste of judicial resources.” Id.; see also Mills v. New York State, No. 1:15-CV00280 (MAT), 2016 WL 5919844, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2016) (declining relief under Rule
60(b)(1) because the alleged mistake “ha[d] no bearing whatsoever on the judgment dismissing
the Complaint in this action”).
The Court initially gave Mr. Chapman leave to file additional records “to the extent that
there [was] a sufficient legal basis for Mr. Chapman being deemed competent and capable to
proceed with this case, and for any allegedly remaining claims having merit.” Order 1st Mot.
Ring’s End argues that “[Mr. Chapman] has provided no information indicating any specialty or
qualification of Dr Yoselevsky germane to his making a relevant conclusion on the question
Plaintiff has raised in this matter, i.e., his cognition and his ability to understand, process, and
produce speech.” Def.’s Mem. at 3. Ring’s End also argues that “there is no description, or even
assertion, of any examination, testing, or interview of Plaintiff undertaken by Dr. Yoselevsky,
nor even any information about when in the 24 years Plaintiff has been his patient . . .” Id.
The Court agrees.
Mr. Chapman’s motion suffers from the same issues that led to this case’s initial
dismissal, he has failed to provide “verifiable medical evidence.” See Show Cause Order II at 16.
As noted by Ring’s End, Mr. Chapman has not proffered qualifications of his alleged doctor, the
time frame in which he evaluated Mr. Chapman, or any sufficiently detailed information on Mr.
Chapman’s condition.2 See Pl.’s Mem. Consequently, Mr. Chapman has failed to provide any

2

Significantly, neither the Federal Rules of Evidence nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide a
discernible basis for considering the statements in this document, allegedly attributable to a doctor, to be evidence.

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information that “might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.”
Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257.
Accordingly, Mr. Chapman’s motion to reconsider the judgment dismissing this case
shall be denied.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider is DENIED. This case shall

remain closed.
SO ORDERED at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 28th day of May, 2021.
/s/ Victor A. Bolden
VICTOR A. BOLDEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

See Fed. R. Evid. 702(b),(c) and (d) (requiring any expert testimony to be “based on sufficient facts or data,” and
“the product of reliable principles and methods,” as well as for the expert to have “reliably applied the principles and
methods to the facts of the case.”); Amorgianos v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 265 (2d Cir. 2002)
(“[T]he district court must determine ‘whether the proffered testimony has a sufficiently reliable foundation to
permit it to be considered.’” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993)); Fed. R. Evid. 702, Advisory Committee Notes, 2000 Amendments (noting that trial
judges have “the responsibility of acting as gatekeepers to exclude unreliable expert testimony”); Fed. R. Evid.
801(c) (defining hearsay as a statement that “(1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or
hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.”); Hernandez v.
Apple Auto Wholesalers of Waterbury LLC, 460 F. Supp. 3d 164, 179 (D. Conn. 2020) (“Without authentication, the
assertion in the Purchase Order and Contract that [the plaintiff] paid $1000 [was] inadmissible hearsay.”); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c)(4) (requiring that affidavits or declarations “to support or oppose a [summary judgment] motion must
be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or
declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated”); Disabled in Action v. City of N.Y., 437 F. Supp. 3d 298, 309
(S.D.N.Y. 2020) (“Declarations submitted to support or oppose a motion for summary judgment must be made on
personal knowledge, and set out facts that would be admissible in evidence. . . . When an affidavit doe s not comply
with these basic requirements, the offending portions should be disregarded by the court.” (internal citation,
quotation marks and alteration omitted) (citing Wahad v. F.B.I., 179 F.R.D. 429, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); United States
v. Alessi, 599 F.2d 513, 514–15 (2d Cir. 1979))). Indeed, this document is neither signed nor made under penalty of
perjury. See 28 U.S.C. § 1746 (permitting unsworn statements if subscribed by the declarant to be “true under
penalty of perjury”). As a result of all of these threshold problems with the proposed basis for reconsideration, a
hearing on this matter or any further adjudication of this case is not warranted. See D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 7 (a)(3)
(“Notwithstanding that a request for oral argument has been made, the Court may, in its discretion, rule on any
motion without oral argument.”).

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