Armor All/STP Products Company v. TSI Products, Inc.

Filing 60

ORDER. For the reasons set forth in the attached, the 24 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction is DENIED. Signed by Judge Michael P. Shea on 8/30/2018. (Guevremont, Nathan)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
ARMOR ALL/STP PRODUCTS COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
No. 3:17-cv-1131 (MPS)
v.
TSI PRODUCTS, INC., MICHAEL QUEST, and
WILLIAM QUEST,
Defendants.

RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Plaintiff, Armor All/STP Products Company (“Plaintiff”), brings this action against
Defendants TSI Products, Inc., Michael Quest, and William Quest (collectively, “Defendants”) for
allegedly deliberately copying Plaintiff’s trademarks, trade dress, and creative works in order to
compete with Plaintiff in the market for “do-it-yourself” refrigerant kits for vehicle air
conditioners. Plaintiff brings claims for trademark infringement, trademark counterfeiting, unfair
competition, trade dress infringement, and false advertising under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1051 et seq., and copyright infringement under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 501 et seq. Plaintiff
also brings claims for trademark infringement, unfair competition, and unjust enrichment under
Connecticut common law, and for unfair competition under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices
Act (“CUTPA”), Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 42-110a, et seq. Finally, Plaintiff brings a claim for false
patent marking under 35 U.S.C. § 292. (See Amended Complaint, ECF No. 9.)
Defendants Michael and William Quest (“the Quests”) move to dismiss the complaint for
lack of personal jurisdiction (ECF No. 24.)1 Because the complaint alleges in-state tortious conduct

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The Defendants have also moved to compel arbitration (ECF No. 22) and to transfer venue to the
Northern District of Texas (ECF No. 26). I address those motions in separate rulings.
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and Connecticut’s long-arm statute confers jurisdiction over such conduct, and because exercising
jurisdiction would comport with due process, the motion is DENIED.
I.

Factual Allegations
The relevant jurisdictional facts are taken from the amended complaint (ECF No. 9) and

the exhibits attached to the parties’ briefs. The factual allegations are set out more fully in another
ruling issued today in this case, familiarity with which is assumed. (ECF No. 59.) What follows is
a summary of the allegations pertinent to this motion.
A. Plaintiff’s Brand and Products
Plaintiff Armor All/STP Products Company is a corporation organized under the laws of
Delaware with its principal place of business in Danbury, Connecticut. (ECF No. 9 ¶ 2.) Plaintiff
is “the recognized leader” in the industry of “do-it-yourself” kits for replenishing lost chemical
refrigerant in vehicle air conditioners. (ECF No. 9 ¶ 12.) Plaintiff’s products allow consumers to
add refrigerant to their own vehicles, avoiding the need to take the car to be serviced by a
professional mechanic. (Id.) Plaintiff sells its products at major hardware and automotive supply
retail stores throughout the United States. (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff also maintains three websites that
provide consumers with instructions for using its kits and other information about its products. (Id.
¶ 17.)
Plaintiff’s brands of do-it-yourself refrigerant kits and refill products are sold under several
trademarks, including “HIGH MILEAGE,” “A/C PRO,” “ARCTIC FREEZE,” “SUB-ZERO,”
“EZ CHILL,” and “BIG CHILL.” (Id. ¶ 14.) The United States Patent and Trademark Office has
issued Plaintiff two federal trademark registrations for the “HIGH MILEAGE” mark, one for the
word mark HIGH MILEAGE for use in connection with “refrigerant chemical preparations for use
in connection with automobile air conditioners,” and one for a stylized mark displaying the word

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HIGH in diagonal, upward sloping letters above the word MILEAGE, which is also displayed in
diagonal, upward sloping letters in “an odometer style format.” (Id. ¶ 18.) The HIGH MILEAGE
marks were registered in 2011 and 2012, respectively, but Plaintiff and its predecessor IDQ have
sold refrigerant products under the marks since at least as early as 2004, using online, print, and
in-store advertising. (Id. ¶ 20.) The HIGH MILEAGE marks were originally registered to IDQ but
were acquired by Plaintiff during its merger with IDQ in 2015. (Id. ¶ 23.)
Plaintiff also uses certain trade dress on its “A/C PRO” and “HIGH MILEAGE” families
of products. (Id. ¶ 24.) Plaintiff’s A/C PRO trade dress includes a black canister with a large black
and white A/C PRO logo along the top of the front face of the canister with a black and white
image of a man positioned behind the logo, a blue banner along the middle of the canister, and a
set of icons and short phrases along the bottom of the canister summarizing the benefits of the
product. (Id. ¶ 25.)
Plaintiff has sold do-it-yourself refrigerant products featuring its BIG CHILL and ARCTIC
FREEZE marks since 2005. (Id. ¶ 28.) Plaintiff’s BIG CHILL product line features a “prominent
mountain design mark and trade dress,” displaying a snow-covered mountain behind the BIG
CHILL logo on the face of the product. (Id.) Plaintiff’s ARCTIC FREEZE products have featured
a blue trade dress since 2005. (Id. ¶ 29.) In 2014, Plaintiff commissioned the design of new
ARCTIC FREEZE product labels and advertising materials featuring images of snow-covered
mountains. (Id. ¶ 30.) Plaintiff began distributing ARCTIC FREEZE products with the redesigned
label featuring the snow-covered mountain design mark in 2016. (Id. ¶ 32.)
In 2017, Plaintiff filed applications with the U.S. Copyright Office to register as creative
works the labels featured on its A/C PRO and HIGH MILEAGE-branded products. (Id. ¶ 35.)
B. Defendants’ Brand and Products

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Defendant TSI Products, Inc. (“TSI”) is a Texas corporation with its principal place of
business in Texas. (Id. ¶ 3.) Defendants William and Michael Quest together founded the
“Avalanche” division of TSI Products, Inc. in 2014. (ECF No. 9 ¶ 38.) The Avalanche division
produces automotive refrigerant products. (Id.) Defendant Michael Quest is the president of the
Avalanche division of TSI. (Id. ¶ 5.) He resides in Tennessee, and has also resided in North
Carolina and Texas at times relevant to this dispute. (ECF No. 31 ¶ 4.) Defendant William Quest
is co-founder of the “Avalanche” division of TSI and is Chairman of TSI’s Board of Directors.
(ECF No. 9 ¶ 6; ECF No. 30 ¶ 2.) He has resided in Texas at all times relevant to this dispute.
(ECF No. 9 ¶ 6.)
Plaintiff alleges that in January 2015, the Quests caused TSI to launch a family of
Avalanche refrigerant products featuring a blue and white trade dress with a label design and snowcovered mountain design mark similar to those used by Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 43.) Since 2015, Avalanche
products have competed directly with Plaintiff’s BIG CHILL and ARCTIC FREEZE products.
(Id. ¶ 43.)
Defendants launched a new line of premium refrigerant products, the Avalanche Black
Diamond products, in April 2016. These products allegedly compete directly with Plaintiff’s A/C
PRO line of premium products. (Id. ¶ 47.) Plaintiff alleges that one of these products uses a
“counterfeit imitation of Plaintiff’s HIGH MILEAGE Marks,” and replaced the blue and white
color scheme used on Defendants’ mid-tier refrigerant products with a dark grey or black label
resembling Plaintiff’s A/C Pro and High Mileage trade dress. (Id. ¶¶ 47-48.) Plaintiff alleges that
these products feature a stylized snow-covered mountain logo resembling Plaintiff’s ARCTIC
FREEZE mountain mark and compete directly with Plaintiff’s ARCTIC FREEZE products. (Id. ¶
47.) The products also feature the words “HIGH MILEAGE” in upward-sloping diagonal lettering

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and the word “MILEAGE” in an “odometer format.” (Id. ¶ 50.) Plaintiff alleges that TSI copied
its trade dress and trademarks and used them on Avalanche products with the intent to trade on
Plaintiff’s recognition in the market and goodwill. (Id. ¶ 45.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants sell products, including the infringing Avalanche
products, at AutoZone retail stores throughout Connecticut. (ECF No. 9 ¶ 54.) Plaintiff points to a
display at an AutoZone retail store in Danbury, Connecticut, where Defendants’ allegedly
infringing product is located directly next to Plaintiff’s own genuine product. (ECF No. 9 ¶ 53.)
Plaintiff also claims that, in a recent purchase of the Defendants’ counterfeit product at the
Danbury AutoZone location, the name of Plaintiff’s genuine product erroneously appeared on the
receipt, thereby evidencing “actual confusion.” (ECF No. 9 ¶ 54.) Defendants’ products may be
ordered online through the AutoZone website and picked up at AutoZone retail locations in
Connecticut. (Id.; see also ECF No. 9-3.) Defendants also allegedly market products imitating A/C
Pro Trade Dress at the Danbury AutoZone (id. ¶ 54), at other AutoZone stores in Connecticut (id.),
and through a website that allegedly markets the infringing products (id. ¶ 60.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Michael and William Quest are personally involved “in
causing and orchestrating the sale and marketing of Avalanche products,” including those that
infringe on Plaintiff’s trademarks and imitate Plaintiff’s trade dress. (Id. ¶ 58.) Plaintiff alleges
that Defendants deliberately copied Plaintiff’s trademarks and trade dress, and that the Quests each
acquired specific knowledge of Plaintiff’s trademarks and trade dress from their previous
association with Plaintiff’s corporate predecessors and long before they assumed their current
positions with Defendant TSI Products. (ECF No. 9 ¶¶ 57-58.)
II.

Legal Standard

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On a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing that the Court has jurisdiction over each defendant. Bank Brussels Lambert v. Fiddler
Gonzalez & Rodriguez, 171 F.3d 779, 784 (2d Cir. 1999). Where, as here, the court has not held
an evidentiary hearing, “the plaintiff need make only a prima facie showing of jurisdiction through
its own affidavits and supporting materials.” Bank Brussels, 171 F.3d at 784. At this stage, “all
allegations are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and doubts are resolved in the
plaintiff's favor.” Whitaker v. Am. Telecasting, Inc., 261 F.3d 196, 208 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted). “Eventually, of course, the plaintiff must establish
jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence, either at a pretrial evidentiary hearing or at trial.
But until such a hearing is held, a prima facie showing suffices, notwithstanding any controverting
presentation by the moving party, to defeat the motion.” Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Miller, 664
F.2d 899, 904 (2d Cir. 1981).
Because none of the federal statutes invoked by Plaintiff’s claims provides for nationwide
service of process, I must look to the law of Connecticut, as the forum state, to determine personal
jurisdiction. Am. Wholesalers Underwriting, Ltd. v. Am. Wholesale Ins. Grp., Inc., 312 F. Supp.
2d 247, 251 (D. Conn. 2004). More specifically, in this case, assessing personal jurisdiction
requires a two-step inquiry. Chloe v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC, 616 F.3d 158, 163 (2d Cir.
2010). “First, we apply the forum state’s long-arm statute.” Id. “If the long-arm statute permits
personal jurisdiction, the second step is to analyze whether personal jurisdiction comports with the
Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.” Id. at 164.
III.

Discussion
A. Connecticut’s Long-Arm Statute

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The Quests argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction under any provision of the applicable
Connecticut long-arm statute. That statute grants jurisdiction over an individual “who in person or
through an agent:
(1) [t]ransacts any business within the state;
(2) commits a tortious act within the state . . . ; [or]
(3) commits a tortious act outside the state causing injury to person or property within the
state . . . .”
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-59b(a).2 Under subsection (a)(3), which applies to a defendant’s allegedly
tortious conduct occurring entirely outside the state, a plaintiff must also show that “such person
or agent . . . regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct,
or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state, or
. . . expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives
substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce . . . .” Id.
The Quests focus on these additional requirements of subsection (a)(3), arguing that
Plaintiff cannot satisfy them and, therefore, that the Court lacks jurisdiction. This argument rests
on a flawed premise, which is that the infringement alleged in the complaint constitutes “a tortious
act outside the state” and thus implicates subsection (a)(3). But “in cases of trade-mark
infringement and unfair competition, the wrong takes place not where the deceptive labels are
affixed to the goods . . . , but where the passing off occurs, i.e., where the deceived customer buys
the defendant's product in the belief that he is buying the plaintiff's.” Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T.
Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1956); see also Broad. Mktg. Int’l, Ltd. v. Prosource Sales

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These are the subsections Plaintiff invokes to support personal jurisdiction over the
Quests. (ECF No. 42 at 4.)
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& Mktg., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1058 (D. Conn. 2004) (“Under Connecticut law, trademark
infringement is considered a ‘tort’ for the purposes of determining personal jurisdiction pursuant
to the state long-arm statute.”). The same is true of copyright infringement, which Plaintiff also
alleges here. Evergreen Media Holdings, LLC v. Warren, 105 F. Supp. 3d 192, 198 (D. Conn.
2015). As discussed below, Plaintiff’s complaint includes allegations that “deceived customer[s]”
bought TSI’s product in Connecticut as a result of confusion with the Plaintiff’s product.
Therefore, the relevant provision of the long-arm statute is § 52-59(a)(2), covering tortious acts
inside the state. Further, “[t]he plaintiff's burden of showing where a passing off occurs is low,
requiring only an offering for sale of even one copy of an infringing product in the state, even if
no sale results.” Am. Wholesalers Underwriting, Ltd., 312 F. Supp. 2d at 253.
The Plaintiff carries its burden here. Plaintiff points to a specific AutoZone retail store in
Danbury, Connecticut, where two of TSI’s allegedly-infringing products are offered for sale. (ECF
No. 9 ¶¶ 53-54.) In one instance, Plaintiff alleges, TSI’s counterfeit product was confusingly
placed next to the Plaintiff’s genuine product. Id. at ¶ 53. In another, due to “actual confusion”
between Plaintiff’s products and TSI’s products, the name of the Plaintiff’s product incorrectly
appeared on a receipt in a purchase of TSI’s product. Id. at ¶ 54. Each of these allegations suffices
to establish a prima facie case that Defendants’ wrongful conduct constituted a tort within
Connecticut, satisfying the jurisdictional requirement of the long-arm statute. Conn. Gen. Stat. §
52-59b(a)(2).
Ordinarily, jurisdiction lies under the in-state tort provision of the long-arm statute only if
the defendant was physically present when committing the tort. See, e.g., Bank Brussels, 171 F.3d
at 790 (noting that the analogous provision in New York “reaches only tortious acts performed by
a defendant who was physically present in New York when he performed the wrongful act”)

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(quotations omitted); see also Zartolas v. Nisenfeld, 184 Conn. 471, 474 (1981) (“[I]n enacting §
52-59b, the [Connecticut] legislature used New York Civil Practice Law § 302 (McKinney 198081 Supp.) as a model. . . . We therefore find pertinent the judicial interpretation given to that New
York statute.”) (citations omitted). However, courts routinely hold that the Connecticut provision
and the analogous New York provision apply as long as the defendant’s agent was physically
present, with “agent” being interpreted broadly in this context. See Evergreen Media Holdings,
LLC, 105 F. Supp. 3d at 198 (collecting cases); Communico, Ltd. v. DecisionWise, Inc., No. 3:14CV-1887 (RNC), 2018 WL 1525711, at *3 (D. Conn. Mar. 28, 2018) (holding that third-party
distributors were agents for the purposes of the Connecticut long-arm statute); see also Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 52-59b(a) (referring to acts committed “in person or through an agent”). Plaintiff alleges
that TSI “offers for sale products in the United States that are regularly sold to retailers and
customers” in Connecticut and that those products are “sold through AutoZone retail stores.” (ECF
No. 9 ¶¶ 7, 55.) Plaintiff alleges that such sales activities “are directed by Defendants Michael
Quest and William Quest.” (Id. ¶ 7.) Defendants acknowledge contracts with AutoZone that
resulted in the sale of their products in the state. (ECF No. 31 ¶ 31.) Thus, Plaintiff has made out
a prima facie case that Defendants acted through an agent to commit a tort in Connecticut.
Next, the Quests contend that they are not subject to the Court’s jurisdiction because the
complaint does not allege that they personally directed AutoZone to commit torts in Connecticut,
and TSI’s conduct cannot be imputed to them. While it is true that the acts of a corporation are not
“automatically attributed to top level employees,” (ECF No. 53 at 3), the Quests’ “status as
employees does not somehow insulate them from jurisdiction,” Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790
(1984); see also Bankers' Bank Ne. v. Ayer, No. 3:11-CV-262 (JBA), 2012 WL 1067677, at *4 (D.
Conn. Mar. 30, 2012) (collecting recent Connecticut cases rejecting the “fiduciary shield” doctrine

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and holding that an employee may be subject to jurisdiction for acts taken on behalf of a
corporation). In the absence of an evidentiary hearing, the Court considers all allegations “in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Whitaker, 261 F.3d at 208 (quotation omitted). Under this
standard, there are sufficient allegations in the complaint to establish a prima facie case that the
Quests personally caused the sale of infringing products. Specifically, the complaint alleges that
each of the Quests (1) had personal knowledge, obtained prior to and independently from their
employment with TSI, of Plaintiff’s brands and products (ECF No. 9 ¶¶ 56-57); (2) personally
caused TSI to enter the refrigerant industry using trade dress and marks similar to those used by
Plaintiff (ECF No. 9 ¶ 43); (3) acted deliberately to copy Plaintiff’s trademarks and trade dress
(ECF No. ¶ 58); and (4) participated in “causing and orchestrating the sales and marketing of . . .
counterfeit imitations of Plaintiff’s” products (ECF No. 9 ¶¶ 7, 58). Taken together and construed
in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, these allegations support an inference that the Quests
were personally responsible for the sale of infringing products in Connecticut. Plaintiff thus carries
its burden of making a prima facie showing the Court has jurisdiction under Connecticut’s longarm statute.
There is some dispute in the record over William Quest’s personal involvement in the sale
and marketing of Avalanche products. While Plaintiff alleges that the Quests have both personally
orchestrated the marketing and sale of infringing products (ECF No. 9 ¶ 58), William Quest asserts
that he has not personally had any “direct role” (ECF No. 30 ¶ 27.) “Where the plaintiff's complaint
and the defendant's affidavits conflict, the Court may provisionally accept disputed factual
allegations as true” in deciding whether the plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of personal
jurisdiction. Gerber Trade Fin., Inc. v. Davis, Sita & Co., P.A., 128 F. Supp. 2d 86, 89-90 (D.
Conn. 2001) (quoting Credit Lyonnais Sec. (USA), Inc. v. Alcantara, 183 F.3d 151, 153 (2d Cir.

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1999). For purposes of this motion, I provisionally credit Plaintiff’s allegations and find it has
carried its burden to make out a prima facie case; however, I must “eventually . . . determine
whether the defendant in fact subjected itself to the court's jurisdiction. . . . either at an evidentiary
hearing or at trial.” Credit Lyonnais, 183 F.3d at 153. Where, as here, the Quests have submitted
affidavits that contest some of the Plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations, the Plaintiff retains the
burden to prove jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence, id., and the Defendants are free
to move for summary judgment on that issue after an opportunity for discovery.
B. Due Process
Given that the Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the Quests under
Connecticut’s long-arm statute, the next question is whether doing so would comport with due
process. The due process “analysis has two related components: the ‘minimum contacts' inquiry
and the ‘reasonableness' inquiry.” Chloe, 616 F.3d at 163.
1. Minimum Contacts
The minimum contacts requirement is met when “the defendant has sufficient contacts with
the forum state to justify the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction.” Id. at 164. “Where the claim
arises out of, or relates to, the defendant's contacts with the forum—i.e., specific jurisdiction—
minimum contacts exist where the defendant purposefully availed [himself] of the privilege of
doing business in the forum and could foresee being haled into court there.” Bank Brussels, 305
F.3d at 127 (quotations omitted). “So long as a commercial actor's efforts are ‘purposefully
directed’ toward residents of another State, we have consistently rejected the notion that an absence
of physical contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462, 476 (1985). Simply placing goods into the stream of commerce may not be enough to
establish “minimum contacts” without “something more,” J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564

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U.S. 873, 889 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring); however, a regular course of sales in a particular
state or other actions intentionally targeting consumers in that state are likely sufficient. Id.
In this case, the Defendants allegedly engaged intentionally in a regular course of business
in Connecticut and reached Connecticut consumers with marketing. Specifically, the Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants regularly sell their products in the United States through AutoZone (ECF
No. 9 ¶ 55), and Plaintiff points out that AutoZone’s website indicates that it has 47 locations in
Connecticut (ECF No. 42 at 3). Plaintiff’s complaint includes a photograph of Defendants’
products available at a Danbury AutoZone location. (ECF No. 9 ¶¶ 53-54.) Connecticut consumers
can also purchase Defendants’ products online through AutoZone and then pick them up at
AutoZone stores. (Id. at ¶ 54; ECFO No. 9-3.) And Defendants maintain a website marketing their
allegedly infringing products. (ECF No. 9 ¶ 60.)
The Quests argue that neither they nor TSI intentionally targets Connecticut with their
products. Rather, they contract with AutoZone in Tennessee, AutoZone picks up the products in
Texas, and the products are distributed to Connecticut through AutoZone’s warehouse in
Pennsylvania. (ECF No. 31 ¶ 31.) Even when this account is credited, however, the record as a
whole, again, when construed in Plaintiff’s favor, supports a finding of personal jurisdiction. The
Defendants assert that “only 1% of TSI’s total sales of the accused Avalanche® Products occur in
the state of Connecticut.” (ECF No. 31 ¶ 31.) Given Connecticut’s relative size, however, 1% of
total sales is consistent with an intention to target every state. The Defendants’ website similarly
suggests an intention to reach a nationwide audience, including Connecticut. (See ECF No. 9 ¶¶60,
61, 63.) Together with the website, the distribution arrangement with AutoZone is sufficient to
establish an “attempt to serve” Connecticut. See Communico, Ltd., 2018 WL 1525711 at *6
(“[C]ourts have found that although the sale of a defendant’s product by a third-party distributor

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is alone insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction, it can be established when a defendant has
advertised its product over the internet, a third-party distributor has sold the product in the forum
state, and an agreement between the defendant and the distributor contemplated sales in the forum
state.”). Plaintiff has thus alleged enough facts to carry its burden to make out a prima facie case
for personal jurisdiction at this stage because it “may be able to show that [Defendants] ha[ve]
attempted to serve the Connecticut market through [their] distribution arrangements with
[Autozone].” Id.
The Quests next contend that they do not have the requisite contacts with Connecticut
personally to establish minimum contacts. As discussed earlier, though, the Plaintiff alleges that
the Quests are personally responsible for the development, marketing, and sale of the allegedly
infringing products and that TSI did not even participate in the relevant market until the Quests
joined the company. (ECF No. 9 ¶¶ 38, 41-43, 56–59.) Even without physically visiting the state,
then, the Quests purposefully availed themselves of the “the privilege of doing business in
[Connecticut],” Bank Brussels, 305 F.3d at 127, by causing the corporate defendant to undertake
regular sales of its products here through a distributor and with the support of its website
advertising.
2. Reasonableness
Once a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case supporting personal jurisdiction, defendants
may still defeat jurisdiction if they can make a “compelling case that the presence of some other
considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.” Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. 462, 477
(1985). The key question is “whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction comports with
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice—that is, whether it is reasonable to exercise
personal

jurisdiction

under

the

circumstances

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of

the

particular

case.”

Chloe, 616 F.3d at 164 (quotations omitted). “Courts are to consider five factors in evaluating
reasonableness: (1) the burden that the exercise of jurisdiction will impose on the defendant; (2)
the interests of the forum state in adjudicating the case; (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most
efficient resolution of the controversy; and (5) the shared interest of the states in furthering
substantive social policies.” Bank Brussels, 305 F.3d at 129 (2d Cir. 2002) (quotations omitted).
Applying these factors, the Quests claim that retaining local counsel and traveling to
Connecticut poses a burden. They also question Connecticut’s interest in the litigation, claiming
that any tortious conduct actually occurred in Texas. These objections are unpersuasive. Most
importantly, Connecticut has significant interest in this litigation. The tort in this case occurred
in Connecticut for the purposes of personal jurisdiction. Vanity Fair Mills, Inc., 234 F.2d at 639.
The Plaintiff alleges that Connecticut consumers are being misled by the Defendants’
misappropriation of the Plaintiff’s trademark and trade dress. (ECF No. 9 ¶ 53-54.) The
trademarks and dress at issue are held by a corporation with its principal place of business in
Connecticut. (ECF No. 9 ¶¶ 18, 20, 24). Traveling to this forum may be inconvenient for
Defendants, but there is no reason to think that requiring Plaintiff to travel to Texas instead would
be more efficient. Further, granting the Quests’ motion could force the Plaintiff to file new
lawsuits against them in other jurisdictions in addition to prosecuting this action against TSI. This
would be inconsistent with both the Plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief
and the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of the
controversy. Ultimately, the Quests have not “present[ed] a compelling case” that exercising
jurisdiction over them would be unreasonable. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 477.
IV.

Conclusion

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For the reasons stated above, the Quests’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction
(ECF No. 24) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/
Michael P. Shea, U.S.D.J.
Dated:

Hartford, Connecticut
August 30, 2018

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