Davis v. Giles

Filing 20

ORDER: The defendant's motion to dismiss this action (Doc. No. 14 ) is hereby GRANTED as set forth in the attached document. The Clerk shall enter judgment for the defendant and close this case. The plaintiff's Motion to Compel/Default Judgment (Doc. No. 19 ) is hereby DENIED as moot. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 5/10/18. (Mata, E.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
CURTIS DAVIS,
Plaintiff,

:
:
:
:
:
:
:

v.
CHARLETON GILES,
Defendant.

Case No. 3:17cv1176(AWT)

RULING AND ORDER
The plaintiff, Curtis Davis, is incarcerated at the Enfield
Correctional Institution in Enfield, Connecticut.

He has filed

a civil rights complaint against Charleton Giles, Chairperson of
the State of Connecticut Board of Pardons and Paroles.
defendant has moved to dismiss this action.

The

For the reasons set

forth below, the complaint is being dismissed.
The complaint includes Fourteenth Amendment due process and
equal protection claims, a Fifth Amendment due process claim and
a deliberate indifference claim.

The defendant moves to dismiss

the Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection
claims.

The court reviews the remaining claims in the complaint

sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
I.

LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), a district court must
review prisoner civil complaints against governmental actors and

“dismiss ... any portion of [a] complaint [that] is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted,” or that “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.”

Id.

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure requires that a complaint contain “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

When considering a motion to dismiss, the court “accepts as
true all of the factual allegations set out in [the] complaint,
draw[s] inferences from those allegations in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, and construes the complaint
liberally.”

Roth v. Jennings, 489 F.3d 499, 510 (2d Cir. 2007)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

In addition to

the facts set forth in the complaint, the court may also consider
documents either attached to the complaint or incorporated into
it by reference, “and matters of which a court may take judicial
notice.”

Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S.

308, 322 (2007).
In reviewing a complaint sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b) or in connection with a motion to dismiss, the court
applies a “plausibility standard, which is guided by “two working
principles.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
2

First, the requirement that the court accept as true the
allegations in the complaint is inapplicable to “labels and
[legal] conclusions or . . . naked assertion[s] devoid of further
factual enhancement . . . [or] [t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted).

Second, to survive dismissal, the

complaint must “state[] a plausible claim for relief.”

Id. at

679 (citation omitted).
Determining whether the complaint states a plausible claim
for relief is “a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.”

Id.

“Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely

consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the
line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to
relief.”
omitted).

Id. at 678 (internal quotation marks and citation
Even under this standard, however, the court liberally

construes a pro se complaint.

See Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d

399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff
“must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the
strongest arguments that they suggest”) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted); Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101-02
3

(2d Cir. 2010) (discussing special rules of solicitude for pro se
litigants).
II.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

The plaintiff alleges that law enforcement officials
arrested him on a murder charge on November 15, 1978.
¶ 11.

See Compl.

He states that a judge subsequently sentenced him to life

with the possibility of parole.

See id. ¶ 12.

State of

Connecticut Department of Correction records reflect that the
plaintiff is serving a maximum term of imprisonment of 999 years,
999 months and 999 days pursuant to a sentence imposed on March
14, 1980 for murder.1
The plaintiff claims that the parole board eventually
released him on parole.

See Compl. ¶ 13.

On December 14, 2011,

law enforcement officials arrested him for absconding, a parole
violation.

See id. ¶¶ 14, 23.

He participated in a parole

revocation hearing on February 16, 2012, and a judge revoked his
parole because he had engaged in violations of the conditions of
his parole, including absconding.

See id. ¶¶ 14-15, 23.

The parole board scheduled the plaintiff for a hearing on
March 18, 2015, to review his future eligibility for release on

Information regarding the plaintiff’s conviction may be
found on the Department of Correction’s website under Inmate
Search using his CT DOC Inmate Number 89047. See
4
1

parole.

See id. ¶¶ 16-17.

On that date, the plaintiff

participated in a “discretionary proceeding.”
The parole board denied him release on parole.

Id. ¶ 17.
See id. ¶ 18.

The plaintiff claims that he has no new date for a hearing
to consider his release on parole.

See id. ¶ 19.

He seeks both

declaratory and injunctive relief from the defendant in his
official capacity.

See id. at 5 (Relief Requested – A, B & C).

III. DISCUSSION
The defendant construes the complaint as raising a
Fourteenth Amendment due process claim related to the March 2015
parole hearing and a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim
related to the March 2015 parole hearing.

The court construes

the complaint as also asserting a Fifth Amendment due process
claim related to the February 2012 parole revocation hearing and
the March 2015 parole hearing, a Fourteenth Amendment claim
related to the February 2012 parole revocation hearing and a
deliberate indifference claim.
In support of his motion to dismiss, the defendant argues
that the plaintiff has failed to serve him in his official
capacity; the requested injunctive and declaratory relief are
unavailable; the plaintiff failed to state a claim for violation

http://www.ct.gov/doc/site/default.asp.
5

of procedural due process rights because he has no liberty
interest in parole or a parole hearing; and the plaintiff has
failed to state a claim for violation of his equal protection
rights.

The plaintiff has filed a response to the motion to

dismiss.
A.

Fifth Amendment Due Process Claim

The plaintiff challenges the process that the defendant
afforded him during the parole revocation hearing in February
2012 and the review of future parole hearing held in March 2015.
He claims that the defendant violated his Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights because the defendant did not permit
him to question his parole officer during the hearings.
The Fifth Amendment applies to the federal government, not
to the states.

See Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167

(2003) (holding Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects
citizens against only federal government actors, not State
officials); Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 21 n.3 (2d Cir.
2017) (noting Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
applicable to claims of “state pretrial detainees who are seeking
to vindicate their constitutional rights” and Due Process Clause
of Fifth Amendment “applicable to claims brought by federal
detainees”).

Because the plaintiff is not a federal prisoner and
6

has not alleged any deprivation of his rights by the federal
government or federal employees, any Fifth Amendment claims
against the defendant are being dismissed.

See 28 U.S.C. §

1915A(b)(1).
B.

Deliberate Indifference Claim

On page four of the complaint, the plaintiff includes a
section titled “deliberate indifference.”

He states generally

that the defendant’s treatment of him has been reckless or
indifferent.

He does not otherwise offer any facts to explain

how the defendant treated him with deliberate indifference.
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides protection to inmates from deliberate indifference by
state employees to their health, safety and medical/dental/mental
health needs.

See e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834

(1994) (To establish an Eighth Amendment violation based on a
claim that an inmate’s conditions of confinement were inhumane,
the inmate must establish that 1) he or she was incarcerated
under conditions that posed a risk of serious harm, and 2) state
officials acted with deliberate indifference to his or her
health or safety) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)(deliberate
indifference by prison officials to a prisoner’s serious medical
7

need constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment).

The allegations asserted by the plaintiff are

conclusory and do not state a claim of deliberate indifference by
the defendant under the Eighth Amendment.

See Green v. Martin,

224 F. Supp. 3d 154, 177 (D. Conn. 2016) (“[B]ecause [plaintiff]
has no constitutional or inherent right to be released prior to
the expiration of his sentence, there is nothing cruel or unusual
about requiring him to serve the full term of his
sentence.”) (citing Smith v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 814 F. Supp.
246, 248 (D. Conn. 1993).

Nor does the plaintiff explain how the

defendant’s alleged deliberate indifference violated any of his
other federal constitutional rights.

Accordingly, the claim for

deliberate indifference is being dismissed.

See 28 U.S.C. §

1915A(b)(1).
C.

Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim
2012 Parole Revocation Hearing

The plaintiff concedes that he participated in the parole
revocation hearing in February 2012 and that the defendant or
the Board of Pardons and Paroles revoked his parole because he
had violated at least one condition of his parole by absconding.
He claims, however, that the defendant failed to provide him
with all of the process that he was due because he did not have
the opportunity to confront his parole officer during the
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hearing.

He contends that the defendant violated his procedural

due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.”
§ 1.

U.S. Const. amend. XIV,

In Connecticut, the general three-year personal injury

statute of limitations period set forth in Connecticut General
Statutes § 52–577 is the limitations period for civil rights
actions asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Jeffries, 25 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 1994).

See Lounsbury v.

this action in July 2017.

The plaintiff filed

Thus, the procedural due process

challenge to the 2012 parole revocation hearing is barred by the
statute of limitations.

The allegations regarding the February

2012 parole revocation hearing are being dismissed as barred by
the statute of limitations.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1); Pino

v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that a complaint
may be dismissed sua sponte based on a defense that appears on
the face of the complaint).
D.

Injunctive Relief – Release from Confinement

In his request for injunctive relief, the plaintiff seeks
an order directing the defendant to release him immediately or
to immediately review him for release on parole “with
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articulation submitted to this Court.”

Compl. at 5.

The

defendant argues that the request for relief seeking immediate
release may only be granted in a habeas petition.

The court

agrees.
“Habeas is the exclusive remedy . . . for the prisoner
who seeks “immediate or speedier release” from confinement.”
Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 525 (2011) (noting that the
Court had reaffirmed this holding in Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544
U.S. 74, 82 (2005)).

Because a request directing the defendant

to release the plaintiff from his sentence or confinement cannot
be granted in section 1983 action, this claim for injunctive
relief is subject to dismissal without prejudice.

In addition,

it would be inappropriate for the court to construe this action
as a habeas petition because the plaintiff has not alleged that
he has met the exhaustion requirement for filing a section 2254
petition.

A prerequisite to habeas corpus relief in federal

court is the exhaustion of all available state remedies.

See

O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999); 28 U.S.C.
§2254(b)(1)(A).

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is being

granted and the request for injunctive relief seeking the
plaintiff’s release from confinement is being dismissed without
prejudice.
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E.

Declaratory Relief

The plaintiff seeks a declaration that the defendant
violated his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.

The defendant argues that such declaratory relief

is not available.

The plaintiff does not address or respond to

this argument.
Declaratory relief serves to “settle legal rights and
remove uncertainty and insecurity from legal relationships
without awaiting a violation of the rights or a disturbance of
the relationships.”

Colabella v. American Institute of

Certified Public Accountants, No. 10-cv-2291(KAM)(ALC), 2011 WL
4532132, at *22 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2011) (citations omitted).
Thus, it operates in a prospective manner to allow parties to
resolve claims before either side suffers great harm.

See In re

Combustion Equip. Assoc. Inc., 838 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1988).
In Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908), the Supreme
Court held that an exception to the Eleventh Amendment’s grant
of sovereign immunity from suit existed to permit a plaintiff to
sue a state official acting in his or her official capacity for
prospective injunctive relief for continuing violations of
federal law.

The exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity,

however, does not apply to claims against state officials
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seeking declaratory or injunctive relief for prior violations of
federal law.

See Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v.

Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993) (the Eleventh
Amendment “does not permit judgments against state officers
declaring that they violated federal law in the past”); Green v.
Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (“We have refused to extend the
reasoning of Young . . . to claims for retrospective relief”)
(citations omitted).
The plaintiff’s request for a declaration that the
defendant violated his federal due process rights during the
parole hearings held in 2012 and 2015 cannot be properly
characterized as “prospective” because the plaintiff does not
allege how such relief would remedy a future constitutional
violation by the defendant.

Thus, the plaintiff’s request for

declaratory relief does not satisfy the requirements for the
exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity set forth in Ex Parte
Young.

The motion to dismiss is being granted as to the request

for declaratory relief.

The request for prospective injunctive

relief relating to a new hearing to determine the plaintiff’s
eligibility for release on parole, however, is available against
the defendant in his official capacity and is addressed below.
F.

Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim
2015 Release on Future Parole Hearing
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The plaintiff states that he appeared at a hearing held by
the Board of Pardons and Paroles on March 18, 2015.

He

describes the hearing, as discretionary and not “another
revocation proceeding.”

Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 17.

He states

that the Board of Pardons and Paroles denied his release on
parole at the hearing.

He claims that the defendant did not

provide him with the opportunity to confront his parole officer
at the hearing, in violation of his due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment.

The plaintiff seeks an order directing

the defendant to schedule him for a hearing in order to review
him for release on parole.
“The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects
persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and
those who seek to invoke its procedural protection must
establish that one of these interests is at stake.”
v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005).

Wilkinson

The defendant argues that

the plaintiff has no liberty interest in a parole hearing to
determine his eligibility for release on parole.

The plaintiff

does not address or respond to this argument.
The Supreme Court has held that the United States
Constitution provides inmates no constitutionally protected
liberty interest in parole, or any other conditional release
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from prison, prior to the expiration of a valid sentence.
See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442
U.S. 1, 7 (1979).

Nor are States under an obligation to

“establish a parole system” for their prisoners.

Id.

Although Connecticut has established a system of parole,
the language of the statutes governing an inmate’s eligibility
for parole does not create a legitimate expectancy of release on
parole.

There is no mandatory language in the statutes, rather

the language is discretionary.
54-125a, 54-128.

See Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-125;

Thus, the statutory language does not create a

protected liberty interest in parole.

See Conn. Gen. Stat. §§

54-125; 54-125a, 54-128; Taylor v. Robinson, 171 Conn. 691, 697–
98 (1976) (“[t]here is no statutory requirement that the panel
[of the board] actually consider the eligibility of any inmate
for parole, the statute does not vest an inmate with the right
to demand parole, and there is no statutory provision which even
permits an inmate to apply for parole.... For even if the inmate
has complied with the minimum requirements of [the parole
statute], the statute does not require the board to determine
his eligibility for parole.”) (Citations omitted);
Vincenzo v. Warden, 26 Conn. App. 132, 141–43 (1991) (no
protected liberty interest in parole release created under
14

language of Connecticut’s parole statute); Sidney Wade #317280
v. Carlton Giles, Bd. of Pardons & Paroles et al., No.
CV165006825S, 2017 WL 7053750, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 28,
2017) (“The legislature has delegated broad discretionary
authority to the Board to make all parole eligibility
determinations.”).
Because there is no liberty interest in release on parole,
the plaintiff was not entitled to procedural due process
protections in connection with the parole release hearing held
in March 2015.

See e.g., Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d

Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (evaluating New York’s parole statutes
and holding that “New York parole provisions do not create an
entitlement to release, “[prisoners] have no liberty interest in
parole, and the protections of the Due Process Clause are
inapplicable.”)

Thus, the plaintiff being denied the

opportunity to question his parole officer at the hearing held
on March 18, 2015 does not state a claim for violation of his
Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights.2

The court notes that even if the plaintiff had a liberty
interest in being released on parole, he has not provided any
statutory or regulatory authority to support his claim that an
inmate must be permitted to question his or her parole officer
at a parole hearing. Nor has research revealed any such
procedural requirement.
2

15

The plaintiff also complains that the defendant has not
scheduled him for any future hearing to determine his
eligibility for release on parole.

Because there is no liberty

interest in release on parole, the fact that defendant may not
have set a new date for a parole hearing does not violate the
plaintiff’s procedural due process rights.

The court notes,

however, that the Connecticut Board of Pardons and Paroles
website reflects that although the Board denied the plaintiff
release on parole on March 18, 2015, it scheduled a new parole
hearing date in March 2020.3

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss

is being granted on the ground that allegations related to
Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process violations in
connection with the March 2015 parole hearing and the alleged
decision not to schedule a future parole hearing fail to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
G.

Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Claim

The plaintiff asserts that other similarly situated
inmates, who have been sentenced to life imprisonment and whose

This information is available on the Board or Paroles and
Pardons website at: http://www.ct.gov/bopp/site/default.asp and
may be reached by clicking on the following tabs:
Hearing/Meetings, Parole Hearing Information, Parole Hearing
Dockets/Minutes, March 2015, and 03-18-2015 – Enfield CI Full
Panel (Video).
3

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terms of parole have been revoked, have been re-released on
parole, yet he still remains confined in prison.

He contends

that the defendant has discriminated against him in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by
denying him release on parole.
The Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no
State shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws,’ which is essentially a direction
that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439
(1985) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)).

“This

provision does not mandate identical treatment for each
individual.”

Muhmmaud v. Murphy, 632 F. Supp. 2d 171, 178 (D.

Conn. 2009) (citing City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439–40).
In Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000),
the Supreme Court held that an individual may state an equal
protection violation under a “class of one” theory.
Id. at 564.

Under this theory, the plaintiff must allege that

“she [or he] has been intentionally treated differently from
others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis
for the difference in treatment.”
17

Id.

The plaintiff must

allege an “extremely high degree of similarity” with the person
to whom he is comparing himself.

Clubside v. Valentin, 468 F.3d

144, 159 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

The plaintiff’s

circumstances and the other person's circumstances must be
“prima facie identical.”

Neilson v. D'Angelis, 409 F.3d 100,

105 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted), overruled on other grounds by Appel v. Spiridon, 531
F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2008).
The plaintiff states that during the five years that he has
been in prison pursuant to the 2012 decision revoking his
parole, “other lifers” have been re-incarcerated on violations
of parole, including committing new crimes, and the Board of
Pardons and Paroles has then re-paroled or released those
inmates.

Compl. ¶ 22.

He claims that these “lifers” are

similarly-situated to him, but have been treated more leniently
by the defendant.

The plaintiff does not otherwise describe the

other “lifers.”
The defendant argues that the plaintiff has not asserted
facts demonstrating that any of the other inmates who have been
sentenced to life were prima facie identical to him.

The

plaintiff has not included any facts regarding his own parole

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history or the nature of the crimes of the other “lifers” or
their parole histories.
The facts as alleged are not sufficient to show the
necessary degree of similarity of the plaintiff to other inmates
sentenced to life in prison and who have been re-released on
parole after having been found in violation of the conditions of
their terms of parole.

Thus, the plaintiff has not stated a

class of one equal protection claim.

See Ruston v. Town Bd. for

the Town of Skaneateles, 610 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir.
2010)(affirming dismissal of equal protection claim on ground
that mere allegation of less favorable treatment than “similarly
situated” persons failed to state plausible “class of one” equal
protection claim) (citation omitted); Riley v. Roycroft, No. 16
CV 2227 (VB), 2017 WL 782917, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28,
2017)(conclusory allegation that inmate was denied medical care
that was provided to other similarly situated inmates did not
state viable equal protection claim because inmate “fail[ed] to
allege facts that demonstrate[d] a substantial similarity
between himself and the other inmates with whom he compare[d]
himself”); Page v. Lantz, No. 3:03cv1271(MRK), 2007 WL 1834519,
at *6 (D. Conn. June 25, 2007) (holding class of one equal
protection claims fails as matter of law where the plaintiff did
19

not allege that similarly situated inmates were treated
differently under similar circumstances).
In response to the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff
identifies three inmates by name and states that they are “all
lifers, [who] have come and gone during [his] present
incarceration.”

Reply Mem. Opp’n Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 15 at 2.

He claims that none of the three inmates were incarcerated for
more than two and one-half years before the Board of Pardons and
Paroles released them on parole again.

The plaintiff contends

that there was no rational basis for treating him differently
than these other three inmates, and that the conduct of the
defendant in denying him release on parole in March 2015 was
arbitrary and capricious.
The plaintiff may not amend his complaint using a
memorandum in opposition to a motion to dismiss.

See

Chamberlain v. City of White Plains, 986 F. Supp. 2d 363, 390
n.19 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“a complaint may not be amended by the
briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss”); Walia v.
Napolitano, 986 F. Supp. 2d 169, 184 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)
(“Plaintiff cannot amend [his] complaint by asserting new facts
or theories for the first time in opposition to Defendants’
motion to dismiss”) (internal quotation marks and citations
20

omitted).

Moreover, even if the plaintiff could amend his

complaint to add the information from his reply memorandum, the
information he provides is still insufficient to show the
necessary degree of similarity between himself and the other
inmates who have been sentenced to life and re-released on
parole.

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is being granted as

to the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim.
H.

Service of Process

The defendant argues that the plaintiff has not properly
served him in his official capacity.

The court has granted the

plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

Thus, the

plaintiff is not required to serve the complaint on the
defendant.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).

Consequently, the fact

that the defendant has not yet been served in his official
capacity is not a basis to dismiss the complaint.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The court enters the following orders:
The Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 14] is GRANTED as to the
request for declaratory relief, the Fourteenth Amendment due
process claim related to the 2015 parole hearing and the
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim related to the 2015
parole hearing, GRANTED without prejudice as to the request for
21

injunctive relief seeking release from confinement4, and DENIED
with respect to the argument that the complaint has not been
served on the defendant in his official capacity.

The court

DISMISSES the Fifth Amendment due process claim, the Fourteenth
Amendment due process claim related to the 2012 parole
revocation hearing and the deliberate indifference claim
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

Thus, all claims have been

DISMISSED.
The court notes that in his memorandum in opposition to the
motion to dismiss, the plaintiff stated that he intends to seek
information regarding the three “lifer” inmates in order to show
that those inmates are similarly situated to him.
Mem. Opp’n Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 15 at 2.

See Reply

If the plaintiff

seeks to clarify and provide support for his class of one equal
protection claim, he may file a motion to reopen and for leave
to file an amended complaint that is accompanied by a proposed
amended complaint.

The plaintiff is reminded that to state a

class of one equal protection claim, he must allege an
“extremely high degree of similarity” with the person or persons
to whom he is comparing himself.

Clubside v. Valentin, 468 F.3d

If the plaintiff seeks to pursue his request for release
from confinement, he may do so in a petition for writ of habeas
corpus.
22
4

144, 159 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

The proposed

amended complaint should be limited to the equal protection
claim.
The Clerk is directed to enter judgment for the defendant
and close this case.
It is so ordered.
Signed this 10th day of May, 2018, at Hartford,
Connecticut.

______
/s/AWT
_______
Alvin W. Thompson
United States District Judge

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