Guilford v. Berryhill

Filing 26

ORDER denying 23 plaintiff's Motion to Reverse the Decision of the Commissioner and granting 24 defendant's Motion to Affirm the Decision of the Commissioner. See attached ruling. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 9/24/2018. (Constantine, A.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
GUILDA GUILFORD,

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY BERRYHILL,
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

CASE NO.

3:17cv1384(DFM)

RULING AND ORDER
The
pursuant

plaintiff,

Guilda

to

42

U.S.C.

Commissioner

of

Social

§

Guilford,

405(g)

Security

of

a

seeks

judicial

final

decision

("Commissioner")

application for disability insurance benefits.
the

court

to

alternatively,

reverse
remand

for

the
a

by

the

denying

her

The plaintiff asks

Commissioner's
rehearing.

review

(Doc.

decision

or,

#23.)

The

Commissioner, in turn, seeks an order affirming the decision.
(Doc. #24.)

For the reasons set forth below, the plaintiff's

motion is denied and the defendant's motion is granted.1
I.

Administrative Proceedings
In May 2014, the plaintiff applied for disability insurance

benefits alleging that she was disabled as of September 24, 2012

1This

is not a recommended ruling. The parties consented to
the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge. (Doc. #18.)

due to "menorhagia2, anemia, 4 uterine fibroid tumors, 20 breast
adenomas, tachycardia,3 high blood pressure, severe depression and
anxiety."
2017.

(R. at 183.)
Her

Her last date insured is December 31,

application

reconsideration.

was

denied

and

upon

She requested a hearing before an Administrative

Law Judge ("ALJ").

On May 23, 2016, the plaintiff, represented by

counsel, testified at the hearing.
testified.

initially

A vocational expert also

On June 20, 2016, the ALJ issued a decision finding

that the plaintiff "was not under a disability, as defined in the
Social Security Act, from September 24, 2012 through the date of
this decision."

(R. at 26.)

On June 15, 2017, the Appeals Counsel

denied review, making the ALJ's decision final.
followed.

This action

On February 2, 2018, the plaintiff filed a motion for

reversal or remand and on March 8, 2018, the defendant filed a
motion to affirm.
II.

Factual Background
The plaintiff, born in 1968, was 44 years old at the time of

her alleged onset4 date of September 24, 2012.

She graduated high

2Menorrhagia

refers to "abnormally long, heavy periods."
The Gale Encyclopedia of Medicine 1613 (5th ed. 2015).

1

3Tachycardia

Stedman's Medical

refers to rapid heartbeat.
Dictionary 1931 (28th ed. 2006).
4The

onset date is the first day an individual is disabled as
defined in the Social Security Act and the regulations. SSR 83–
20, 1983 WL 31249, at *1 (1983).
2

school and completed two years of college.
employed

as

a

customer

service

(R. at 184.)

representative,

the

Last

plaintiff

states that she lost this job in September 2012 after she left
work to "go to the hospital and get a blood transfusion."

(R. at

44.)
A.

Medical Evidence

In February 2009, the plaintiff saw Dr. Klein of Shoreline
Medical for complaints of fatigue and chest pains on exertion. (R.
at 445.)

The plaintiff had a history of anemia.

that the plaintiff had "normal" menses.
with hypertension.

Dr. Klein noted

Dr. Klein assessed her

She was next seen in April 2010 by Dr. Nina

Inamdar for ear pain. (R. at 446.)
2012
On September 26, 2012, the plaintiff was seen for complaints
of backache, bodyache and fatigue.

(R. at 272.)

Blood work

indicated that her hemoglobin was 4.7.5 The next day, the plaintiff
presented to the Bridgeport Hospital with complaints of feeling
lightheaded for the past week, requiring time off from work.
at 366.)

(R.

She also reported sinus congestion, headaches, and

increased urinary frequency.

Notes states that the plaintiff has

a "long history of iron deficient anemia initially secondary to

5The

normal range for hemoglobin for women is 12 to 16.5 grams
per deciliter. 2 The Gale Encyclopedia of Medicine 1259 (5th ed.
2015).
3

heavy menses and now in combination with a vegetarian diet."
at 367.)
she

(R.

She did not take recommended "iron treatments" because

was

concerned

diarrhea.

about

(R. at 366.)

side

effects

of

constipation

and/or

The plaintiff reported that her menses

were regular, occurring every 28 days and lasting approximately 4
days.

She had had heavy menses in the past but this "changed after

she lost weight."

(R. at 366.)

The plaintiff explained that she

had followed a strict diet to lose 60 pounds and stopped eating
meat.

The plaintiff was given a transfusion.

She was assessed

with severe symptomatic anemia with reactive thrombosis.
367.)

She also was noted as tachycardic which was thought to be

due to her anemia.
On

(R. at

September

consultation.

(R. at 367.)
29,

2012,

(R. at 292.)

the

plaintiff

had

a

hematology

She explained that she discontinued

iron therapy because of her concern regarding side effects.

She

also stated that although physicians had recommended she take birth
control medication to address her heavy menses, she elected not do
so.

The plaintiff was given intravenous iron.

(R. at 294.)

On October 11, 2012, the plaintiff was seen by internist Dr.
Nina Inamdar of Shoreline Medical.

The plaintiff reported that

she was anxious and stressed over losing her job but declined
treatment for anxiety.

Dr. Inamdar prescribed Atenolol, a beta

blocker, for the plaintiff's hypertension.
The next medical record is dated more than a year later.
4

2013
On October 31, 2013, the plaintiff went to the emergency room
after hitting her head.
consciousness.

(R. at 337.)

She denied loss of

She reported a history of anemia.

She stated that

her menses "usually lasts 5 days with the heaviest day [being] day
2." (R. at 361.) She was alert, oriented, and had normal strength.
Her hemoglobin was 3.2.
and diet.

Her anemia was thought to be due to menses

The plaintiff was admitted to the hospital and given

blood transfusions and an iron infusion.
she

reported

"feeling

much

better"

After the treatments,

and

denied

any

fatigue.

Hormonal therapy was recommended to address her menorrhagia.
at 362.)

She left the hospital against medical advice.

(R.

(R. at

365.)
A CAT scan of the plaintiff's abdomen showed "multiple uterine
masses

which

may

represent

large

necrotic

fibroids,"

ovarian

cysts, multiple large gallstones, splenomegaly,6 multiple breast
nodules, and a small right pleural effusion."

(R. at 416.)

On December 5, 2013, the plaintiff was seen by Dr. Inamdar.
(R.

at

263.)

She

palpitations.

Dr.

denied

chest

Inamdar's

pain,
notes

dyspnea,
state

fatigue,

"negative"

depression, syncope, bone pain, joint pain and weakness.
264.)

and
for

(R. at

Dr. Inamdar noted that the plaintiff's hypertension was

6Splenomegaly

refers to an enlarged spleen. Stedman's Medical
Dictionary 1811 (28th ed. 2006).
5

poorly controlled.

She renewed the prescription for Atenolol and

prescribed hydrochlorothiazide, a diuretic.
the

plaintiff

improved.

a

few

weeks,

the

When Dr. Inamdar saw

plaintiff's

hypertension

had

(R. at 266.)

2014
In

January

2014,

a

bilateral

breast

ultrasound

revealed

"multiple circumscribed ovoid structures" that appeared benign and
"likely represent[ed] fibroadenomas."7 (R. at 404.) The plaintiff
was told to follow up in six months.

(R. at 406.)

On February 20, 2014, the plaintiff had a gynecological
appointment with Wilheelmina Thomas-Jackson, a certified nurse
midwife ("CRN").

(R. at 611.)

The plaintiff reported that she

was taking an iron supplement daily as directed and that her last
hemoglobin

was

9.

CRN

Thomas-Jackson

treating the plaintiff's menorrhagia.

discussed

options

for

The plaintiff declined

hormonal medication due to weight gain concerns but expressed
interest in an embolization treatment.

(R. at 611.)

On March 12, 2014, Dr. Inamdar completed a Medical Source
Statement

for

the

State

Services.

(R. at 313.)

of

Connecticut

Department

of

Social

On the one page form, Dr. Inamdar listed

the plaintiff's conditions as severe chronic anemia, menorrhagia,

7Breast

fibroadenomas are benign growths of glandular and
fibrous tissues. 3 The Gale Encyclopedia of Medicine 1613 (5th
ed. 2015).
6

fibroid tumors, and fibroadenomas. (R. at 313.)

Dr. Inamdar

checked a box on the form indicating that the conditions prevented
the plaintiff from working for "6 months or more."

Dr. Inamdar

also indicated that the plaintiff did not have a mental health
problem.

(R. at 313.)

On September 2, 2014, the plaintiff underwent a consultative
physical examination by Dr. Joseph Guaranaccia.

(R. at 314-17.)

The plaintiff told him that her menses lasted 10 days, during which
she experienced severe bleeding.

She also said that her breast

fibroadenomas caused her "severe pain in her chest" and that the
medication

she

lightheadness.

took

for

hypertension

caused

fatigue

and

(R. at 314.)

Upon examination, Dr. Guaranaccia noted that the plaintiff's
affect was normal and that she was not anxious.
she was a "good historian."
was unremarkable.

(R. at 316.)

He remarked that

Her physical examination

Under the "Assessment" section of his report,

Dr. Guaranaccia stated:
46 year old woman with heavy menses due to fibroid
tumors, and discomfort due to breast tumors. Until these
issues are resolved she is limited in her ability to be
consistent in a work setting.
(R. at 317.)
State

agency

physician

Dr.

Jeanne

Kuslis

reviewed

the

plaintiff's medical records and completed a physical residual
functional capacity assessment.

Dr. Kuslis determined that the

7

plaintiff

could

frequently

lift

and/or

carry

20

pounds;

occasionally lift and/or carry 10 pounds; stand and/or walk 6 hours
in an 8 day; and sit 6 hours in an 8 hour day.

(R. at 61.)

On September 17, 2014, the plaintiff underwent a consultative
psychological examination by Dr. Dana Martinez. The plaintiff
reported difficulty sleeping "due to frequent urination as a result
of water pills and a tumor pressing on her bladder."

She stated

that "when she has her menses she is literally awake for two days
straight since it requires so much care due to the heavy bleeding."
(R. at 320.)

She reported anxiety, panic attacks, and depression.

Dr. Martinez observed that the plaintiff was well spoken and
that her speech was clear and organized.
time and person.

She was oriented to date,

The plaintiff's affect was sad and she disclosed

current suicidal ideation due to her financial stressors and
illness.

She denied auditory and visual hallucinations and Dr.

Martinez saw no evidence of delusional ideation.

Dr. Martinez

assessed the plaintiff's "insight and introspective abilities" as
"good."

Her attention was good and her "effort and concentration"

were "very good." (R. at 320.)

Dr. Martinez noted that the

plaintiff "appeared to be intently focus[ed] and "attempting to do
as well as possible."

The plaintiff was able to recall three out

of four words after fifteen minutes.
Dr. Martinez's diagnostic impressions were Major Depressive
Disorder, severe, single episode; Generalized Anxiety Disorder;
8

and Panic Disorder.

(R. at 320.)

According to Dr. Martinez, the

plaintiff "will require direction to needed social services and
monitoring to ensure attendance."
plaintiff
evaluation

"would
to

benefit"

determine

from

if

Dr. Martinez stated that the
therapy

medication

and

a

would

"psychiatric

ameliorate"

her

symptoms. (R. at 320.)
On September 30, 2014, State agency physician Dr. Warren Lieb
reviewed the plaintiff's medical record.

Dr. Lieb found that the

plaintiff had no restrictions in the activities of daily living;
mild

difficulties

in

maintaining

social

functioning;

mild

difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace;
and no repeated episode of decompensation.

(R. at 60.)

In October 2014, State agency consultant Russell Phillips,
Ph.D, completed a mental residual functional capacity assessment.
Dr.

Phillips

found

that

the

plaintiff

had

no

significant

limitations in her ability to: carry out very short and simple
instructions; carry out detailed instructions; and sustain an
ordinary routine without special supervision.

The plaintiff was

"moderately limited" in her ability to: maintain attention and
concentration for extended periods; perform activities within a
schedule;

maintain

regular

attendance

and

be

punctual

within

customary tolerances; work in coordination with or in proximity to
others without being distracted by them; and make simple workrelated decisions.

Dr. Phillips opined that the plaintiff could
9

"maintain attention for two hours at a time and persist at simple
tasks over eight and forty hour periods with normal supervision."
(R. at 78.)

He further found that the plaintiff could "tolerate

the

social

minimum

demands

of

simple-task

settings"

"sustained contact with the general public."

but

(R. at 79.)

not
Dr.

Phillips stated that the plaintiff was "able to persist at simple,
repetitive tasks over time under ordinary conditions." (R. at 79.)
The plaintiff had a consultation with Dr. Richard Garvey, a
surgeon, on October 22, 2014 regarding the "[m]ultiple masses" in
her breasts.

(R. at 327.)

The plaintiff reported that she was

taking iron supplements and felt better.
unremarkable.

Her examination was

(R. at 328.)

In November 2014, the plaintiff began individual therapy with
Jennifer Lockshier, a licensed clinical social worker ("LCSW").
She treated with LCSW Lockshier through September 2015.
On November 20, 2014, the plaintiff was seen by Dr. Dorothy
Zachmann, a psychiatrist, at the Bridgeport Hospital Intensive
Outpatient Program.

(R. at 324.)

The plaintiff was noted as

having "significant mood instability."
the

plaintiff's

impulse

control

was

Dr. Zachmann observed that
impaired;

her

mood

was

"discouraged, irritable and depressed"; and her affect was labile.
The plaintiff's speech was normal and her thought process was
organized and coherent.

She was oriented, her attention and

concentration were normal, and her judgment was good.
10

She had

limited insight into her illness.

Dr. Zachmann diagnosed the

plaintiff with "bipolar I disorder depressed and panic disorder."
(R. at 326.)

The plaintiff was prescribed Abilify.8

(R. at 327.)

When seen on December 8, 2014, LCSW Lockshier observed that
the plaintiff's mood and affect were improved.
reported that she was taking medication.

The plaintiff

On December 11, 2014,

the plaintiff reported that she was part of a "paid focus group."
(R. at 674.)
work.

She said she felt better and wanted to return to

(R. at 674.)

On December 23, 2014, the plaintiff indicated

she had stopped taking her medication.

She presented with blunted

affect and depressed mood. (R. at 672.) The plaintiff "express[ed]
difficulty" with Dr. Zachmann's diagnosis of bipolar and felt that
"maybe she could use it as an excuse."

She indicated she planned

on moving to Bridgeport and was "uncertain where to find a job
because she does not want a long commute."

(R. at 672.)

2015
On January 8, 2015, the plaintiff told LCSW Lockshier that
her living situation was stressful and she planned to move shortly.
She expressed uncertainty about getting a job due to her health
issues.

She "is uncertain and feels that she is an unreliable

employee and should maybe not work."

8Abilify

LCSW Lockshier noted that

is an atypical antipsychotic used in the treatment
of schizophrenia, psychosis, and depression.
Physicians' Desk
Reference S2 (71st ed. 2017).
11

despite recommendations, the plaintiff was not seeking treatment
for her medical issues.

(R. at 670.)

The next week, the plaintiff

stated that she felt "unprepared to go to work" due to her medical
issues.

She was concerned that she "will be unreliable and they

will fire her so why [should she] even try."

(R. at 669.)

Lockshier recommended a higher level of care.

LCSW

In February, the

plaintiff continued to present with a blunted affect and depressed
mood.

In March 2015, the plaintiff expressed anger at her family

for their lack of support.

She expressed feeling "conflicted"

about not being married with children.

(R. at 661.)

In a letter to plaintiff's counsel dated March 31, 2015, LCSW
Lockshier stated that she had seen the plaintiff since November
2014.

The plaintiff had presented with "symptoms consistent with

panic attacks when in public."
plaintiff

suffered

from

LCSW Lockshier stated that the

uterine

fibroids

and

anemia,

which

"contribute to her feelings that she will be unsuccessful in the
workplace.

She was residing with one of her sisters with the hope

that she could be able to work soon."

LCSW Lockshier further

stated that the plaintiff
attend[ed] weekly sessions for psychotherapy to address
the issues she has been experiencing. The sessions were
increased to twice weekly for several weeks when she
reached a critical phase and was more acute.
The
recommendation has been made to begin a higher level of
care with the possibility of psychotropic intervention
to address her depression and feelings of suicidality.
An appointment to Intensive Outpatient Services (IOP)
[at] Bridgeport Hospital REACH was made. Her symptoms
12

and these feelings most certainly inhibited her ability
to work. She was unable to commit to the requirements
of the IOP due to multiple reasons, including [that she
moved]. They had prescribed two medications, however,
client felt uncomfortable taking the medication due to
side effects and that she was not feeling that they will
be effective.
Client remains in a time of transition and has been
essentially homeless.
She resided with a sister in
Bridgeport but moved in with her niece in Darien due to
family obligations and an argument with the Bridgeport
sister. Her Darien sister has indicated that she will
need to move out of the home very soon. Referrals and
recommendations have been made to outpatient community
resources to assist her in becoming more stable and to
address her basic needs.
It is apparent that [the plaintiff] has been
declining emotionally over the past few years. She has
insight into her mental health but has poor judgment on
how to overcome these obstacles and barriers in her life.
Her coping skills have worsened since losing her job and
she had become more socially isolated. Her social
supports have been more limited and certainly less
supportive of her now that she is [in] need of []
assistance.
Her overall mood is generally depressed
with anxious distress.
Her affect is flat and her
appearance is well groomed. No known hallucinations or
delusions have been identified.
Her current diagnosis in DSM V format is Major
Depressive Disorder, Recurrent Episode, Moderate with
Anxious Distress.
There is strong consideration that
she may meet the criteria of Bipolar I Disorder but at
this point and under careful consideration and
assessment she has not fully met the criteria.
(R. at 440-41.)
In her April 2015 session with LCSW Lockshier, the plaintiff
presented with a blunted affect and a depressed, anxious mood.
The plaintiff stated that she did not go to her primary care
physician

for

healthcare

treatment
13

because

she

did

not

have

transportation and because it was raining.

LCSW Lockshier told

the plaintiff she was putting up "blockades" and holding "herself
back."

(R. at 658.)

On April 15, 2015, the plaintiff told LCSW

Lockshier that she had a job interview the next day but was not
going to go due to transportation issues.

The therapist observed

that the plaintiff "continued to vacillate on her goals."
656.)

In a subsequent session, the plaintiff "talked about her

boredom and how she comes to treatment to vent."
the

(R. at

plaintiff

"vacillates

between

physical

Notes state that

and

mental

health

issues on why she can't work but is not making strides to change
things."

(R. at 653.)

In May 2015, the plaintiff told LCSW Lockshier that she wanted
to move out of her sister's home and was considering "going to the
Bridgeport Hospital ER" for an evaluation of her anemia.

"She is

considering this as a plan she can manipulate to get good food,
housing and a referral to [a] shelter[]."

(R. at 652.)

In June

2015, the plaintiff presented in an irritable, defensive mood.
Notes state that she continues to "waver" on whether to take
medication.

(R. at 647.)

The plaintiff subsequently said that

the fact that LCSW Lockshier was in a "settled life" as compared
to her own "made her feel badly."

(R. at 645.)

July notes state

that the plaintiff "vacillates between her thoughts about if she
should work and how she can't because of her menstrual cycle."
(R. at 643.)

She reported that she thought her "iron level" was
14

low but was not going to go to the doctor.

(R. at 641.)

LCSW

Lockshier questioned the plaintiff's desire and motivation for
change.

(R. at 640.)

In July 2015, the plaintiff presented at Bridgeport Hospital
for medication management.

(R. at 589.)

She stated that she had

been argumentative with her therapist who recommended that she be
seen for treatment.

She indicated difficulty getting out of the

house, mood swings, and decreased motivation.

She also reported

passive suicidal thoughts such as "why are you still living, you
are not productive" but denied any attempt.

She said that she

"sometimes feels like hitting her niece with a pan to knock her
out of her stupidity."

APRN Katherina Bajda noted that the

plaintiff's attention and concentration were good and that she was
cooperative,

although

somewhat

guarded.

The

plaintiff

was

oriented, her speech was normal, her thought process was organized
and associations were normal.

Her memory was intact. She had

passive suicidal thoughts but denied that she would ever act on
them and her risk level was assessed as low.

(R. at 594-95.)

Her

impulse control and judgment were poor and her insight into her
illness was limited.

(R. at 595.)

APRN Bajda thought that the

plaintiff "appears to struggle with her anger and mood."
plaintiff was prescribed Abilify.

15

The

LCSW Lockshier subsequently noted that the plaintiff was
resistant to taking the medication because she was concerned about
side effects.

(R. at 639.)

When the plaintiff seen by Dr. Inamdar on August 6, 2015, the
plaintiff's hypertension was stable.

(R. at 460.)

noted

compliant

that

the

plaintiff

was

not

Dr. Inambar

with

her

iron

supplements and had not followed up with her gynecologist regarding
her uterine fibroids.

The plaintiff reported depression and

indicated that functioning was "somewhat difficult."

(R. at 460.)

She presented with "depressed mood, difficulty concentrating,
difficulty falling asleep, diminished interest or pleasure" but
denied

anxious/fearful

thoughts,

fatigue,

loss

restlessness, irritability, and suicidal thoughts.

of

appetite,

(R. at 460.)

On August 26, 2015, LCSW Lockshier noted that the plaintiff
had "a fair amount of energy" and reported that her depression had
"improved."

She was not taking Abilify. (R. at 636.)

In September 2015, the plaintiff stopped treating with LCSW
Lockshier because she wanted treatment closer to her residence.
(R. at 621.)
In

December

2015,

the

plaintiff

sought

treatment

for

depression at St Vincent's Intensive Outpatient Program. (R. at
515.)

She reported "feeling more down and depressed over the past

few years."

(R. at 522.)

She explained that she had lost her job

in 2012 and "[t]hroughout 2013, she was looking for employment"
16

but was unsuccessful.

(R. at 522.)

Her difficulty in finding

work "contributed to her increased depression to the point where
she was virtually unable to get out of bed and was isolating."
(R. at 522.)

She denied any suicidal ideation.

(R. at 522.)

Dr.

Gianetti observed that the plaintiff was neat, appropriate, and
oriented.

Her recent and remote memory was "adequate."

no evidence of thought disorder.

(R. at 523.)

There was

Her insight and

judgment were fair. Dr. Gianetti prescribed Abilify. (R. at 524.)
On January 13, 2016, she was admitted to St. Vincent's
Behavioral Health Services after she expressed suicidal ideation
by

taking

an

overdose

of

her

hypertension

medication.

The

plaintiff stated "I don't know why I'm here to be honest" and
explained that her statement was "misconstrued - she never was
suicidal."

(R. at 517, 519.)

She acknowledged "feeling depressed

but mostly she says she is bored."

(R. at 517.)

She "denie[d]

that she is isolative, rather she has no money to do things."

(R.

at 521.) She was oriented, "interacted on approach with staff,"
had

intact

memory

and

concentration

and

was

cooperative

but

Her insight and judgment were fair.

(R.

guarded.

(R. at 520.)

at 521.)

She described her mood as "bored" and "complain[ed] that

she has no money to do things."

(R. at 521.)

She denied any

psychotic symptoms and denied any past suicide attempts.

She

reported impaired sleep and "feeling ups and downs" but denied
"any euphoria or mania." (R. at 517.)
17

Dr. Surapaneni, a psychiatrist, noted that the plaintiff was
cooperative and appropriate.
were good.

Her personal grooming and hygiene

Her thought process was coherent and goal-directed.

She was oriented, her memory was intact for recent and remote
events, and her insight and judgment were fair. (R. at 517.)
mood was depressed.

While inpatient, the plaintiff "actively

participated" in treatment activities and therapeutic groups.
at 517.)

Her

(R.

Dr. Surapaneni noted that the plaintiff "made progress"

and "became stable in her mood as well as her behavior."
improved and she was discharged a few days later.

Her mood

(R. at 518.)

Upon discharge, her mood was "fairly stable" and she "did not
appear depressed or anxious."

(R. at 518.)

Thereafter from January 19, 2016 until February 27, 2016, the
plaintiff participated in the Intensive Outpatient Program at St.
Vincent's. (R. at 515.)

She regularly attended various groups

although she was reticent.

(R. at 516.)

Dr. Magid noted that the

plaintiff had "contradictory presentations.

[She] reported early

in her treatment that she often was not honest and would manipulate
others to get what she wanted."

She subsequently stated that she

wanted to open up more but would not share the specifics of what
she wanted to share.
continue therapy.

When discharged, she was encouraged to

(R. at 516.)

In February 2016, she sought care from Catholic Charities
Behavioral Health Services.

She reported feeling depressed and
18

worthless.

(R.

at

575.)

On

mental

status

examination,

the

plaintiff was well groomed and cooperative with normal psychomotor
behavior and coherent speech.

Her mood was depressed and her

affect was flat but appropriate.

The plaintiff's thought process

was normal, she was fully oriented, and her judgment and impulse
control were good.
The

plaintiff

Moderate."

was

(R. at 580.)
diagnosed

She had no memory impairment.

with

"Major

Depressive

Disorder,

(R. at 574.)

In March 2016, therapist Inger Sjogren at Catholic Charities
completed a "Medical Opinion Questionnaire (Mental Impairments)."
(R. at 566.)

She indicated that she had seen the plaintiff seven

times from February 23, 2016 to March 22, 2016.
Therapist

Sjogren

Depressive

listed

Disorder

"good/excellent."

and

the

plaintiff's

opined

that

(R. at 566.)

diagnosis
her

as

prognosis

Major
was

The form asked the provider to assess the

plaintiff as to 25 "Mental Abilities and Aptitude Needed to Do Any
Job."
ability

Therapist Sjogren found that the plaintiff had a "good"
to:

interact

appropriately

with

the

general

public;

maintain socially appropriate behavior; adhere to basic standards
of neatness and cleanliness; travel in unfamiliar places; use
public transportation; remember work-like procedures; understand
and

remember

very

short/simple

instructions;

carry

out

very

short/simple instructions; sustain an ordinary routine without
special supervision; work in coordination with or proximity to
19

others without being unduly distracted; make simple work related
decisions;
instructions

ask

simple

and

questions/request

respond

appropriately

assistance;
to

accept

criticism

from

supervisors; get along with co-workers or peers without unduly
distracting

them

or

exhibiting

behavioral

extremes;

respond

appropriately to changes in a routine work setting; be aware of
normal hazards and take appropriate precautions; and carry out
detailed instructions.
Therapist Sjogren found that the plaintiff had a "fair"
ability to: maintain attention for two hours segments; maintain a
regular

attendance

and

be

punctual

within

customary,

usually

strict, tolerances; complete a normal workday and workweek without
interruptions from psychologically-based symptoms; perform at a
consistent pace without an reasonable number and length of rest
periods;

understand

and

remember

detailed

instructions;

set

realistic goals or make plans independently of others; and deal
with stress of skilled or semi-skilled work.

Finally, therapist

Sjogren opined that the plaintiff would be absent from work twice
per month. (R. at 568.)
B.

Plaintiff's Testimony

At the hearing, the plaintiff testified that she last worked
in September 2012 as a customer support representative.

She was

fired when she left work to have a blood transfusion.

20

She

subsequently received unemployment compensation and looked for
another customer service position.

(R. at 44.)

The plaintiff testified that she is unable to work due to
menorrhagia.

She said that her menstrual cycle "lasts like three

weeks."

The plaintiff also testified that she suffers from severe

anemia.

She had a blood transfusion in 2012 and 2013 but none

since.

She explained that she is taking "a very strong iron pill

which is maintaining [her]", although "at a low level."
48.)

(R. at

As a result of her anemia, she is "tired all the time."

(R.

at 48.)
She has uterine fibroids that "press against [her] back" and
as a result she "can't sit or stand for long periods of time."
(R. at 47.)

She also suffers from bipolar disorder and major

depression.
The plaintiff can engage in personal care "when not severely
depressed."

(R. at 46.)

of the anemia."

She is unable to cook or clean "because

(R. at 46.)

to therapy twice a week.
because she is depressed.

She has a driver's license and drives
She stays "in bed most of the time"

(R. at 47.)

III. Statutory Framework
The Commissioner uses the following five-step procedure to
evaluate disability claims9:

9To

be "disabled" under the Social Security Act and therefore
entitled to benefits, a claimant must demonstrate an "inability to
21

First, the [Commissioner] considers whether the
claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful
activity. If he is not, the [Commissioner] next
considers whether the claimant has a "severe impairment"
which significantly limits his physical or mental
ability to do basic work activities. If the claimant
suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is
whether, based solely on medical evidence, the claimant
has an impairment which is listed in Appendix 1 of the
regulations. If the claimant has such an impairment, the
[Commissioner] will consider him disabled without
considering vocational factors such as age, education,
and work experience.... Assuming the claimant does not
have a listed impairment, the fourth inquiry is whether,
despite the claimant's severe impairment, he has the
residual functional capacity to perform his past work.
Finally, if the claimant is unable to perform his past
work, the [Commissioner] then determines whether there
is other work which the claimant could perform.
Rosa

v.

Callahan,

168

F.3d

72,

77

(2d

Cir.

1999)

(internal

alterations and citation omitted). "The applicant bears the burden
of proof in the first four steps of the sequential inquiry; the
Commissioner bears the burden in the last."

Talavera v. Astrue,

697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012).
IV.

The ALJ's Decision
Following the five step evaluation process, the ALJ first

found that the plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since September 24, 2012, her alleged onset date. (R. at
18.) At step two, the ALJ determined that the plaintiff had severe

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected
to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
22

impairments of anemia, uterine fibroids, depressive disorder, and
bipolar disorder.

(R. at 18.)

At step three, the ALJ found that

the plaintiff's impairments, either alone or in combination, did
not meet or medically equal the severity of a listed impairment in
20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. at 19.)

The ALJ

next determined that the plaintiff had
the residual functional capacity10 to perform light work11
as defined in 20 CFR § 404.1567(b) except that she can
never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds.
She can
occasionally climb stairs and ramps as well as balance,
stoop and crouch. She can never kneel or crawl. The
claimant can frequently handle and there are no
fingering limitations. The claimant should not work in
exposure to temperature extreme or wetness.
The
claimant can perform simple routine and repetitive
tasks. She can sustain concentration, persistence and
pace for two-hour segments. The claimant is limited to
brief and superficial interaction with co-workers and
supervisors but should not interact with the public.
The claimant should not perform any work that requires
independent
judgment
making
(no
setting
work
duties/schedules for others, no responsibility for the
safety of others). The claimant is limited to work that
has little to no change in work duties.
(R. at 20.)
At step four, the ALJ concluded that the plaintiff was not
capable of performing her past relevant work. (R. at 25.)
five,

after

considering

plaintiff's

age,

At step

education,

work

A claimant's residual functional capacity is the most she
can still do despite her limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1).
10

11Light

work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time
with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10
pounds. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b).
23

experience and RFC, as well as the testimony of a VE, the ALJ found
that the plaintiff could perform the jobs of cleaner (DOT code
323.687-014), price marker (DOT code 209.587-034), and mail sorter
(DOT code 222.687-022). (R. at 26.) Accordingly, the ALJ determined
that the plaintiff was "not under a disability, as defined in the
Social Security Act, from September 24, 2012, through the date of
this decision [June 20, 2016]." (R. at 26.)
V.

Standard of Review
This court's review of the ALJ's decision is limited.

"It is

not [the court's] function to determine de novo whether [the
plaintiff] is disabled."
Cir. 1996).

Pratts v. Chater, 94 F.3d 34, 37 (2d

The court may reverse an ALJ's finding that a

plaintiff is not disabled only if the ALJ applied the incorrect
legal standards or if the decision is not supported by substantial
evidence.
2012).

Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 683 F.3d 443, 447 (2d Cir.

"Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. . .

. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion." Brault, 683 F.3d at 447
(quotation marks and citations omitted). It is "a very deferential
standard of review — even more so than the clearly erroneous
standard. . . . The substantial evidence standard means once an
ALJ finds facts, [the court] can reject those facts only if a
reasonable factfinder would have to conclude otherwise."
447–48.

Id. at

See also Genier v. Astrue, 606 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 2010)
24

("Even where the administrative record may also adequately support
contrary findings on particular issues, the ALJ's factual findings
must be given conclusive effect so long as they are supported by
substantial evidence.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
VI.

Discussion
The plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in weighing the

medical

opinion

evidence

and

in

determining

her

residual

functional capacity.
A.

Medical Opinion Evidence
The plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred in assessing

the opinion of the plaintiff's primary care physician, Dr. Inamdar.
"[T]he opinion of a claimant's treating physician as to the
nature and severity of the impairment is given controlling weight
so long as it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical
and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with
the other substantial evidence in [the] case record."
Colvin, 802 F.3d 370, 375–76 (2d Cir. 2015).
physician's

opinion

is

not

given

Greek v.

When a treating

controlling

weight,

SSA

regulations require the ALJ to consider, inter alia: (1) the
frequency, length, nature, and extent of treatment; (2) the amount
of medical evidence supporting the opinion; (3) the consistency of
the opinion with the remaining medical evidence; and (4) whether
the physician is a specialist.

Greek, 802 F.3d at 375.

"The

Second Circuit does not require a 'slavish recitation of each and
25

every factor [of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)] where the ALJ's reasoning
and adherence to the regulation are clear."

Whitley v. Colvin,

No. 3:17CV00121(SALM), 2018 WL 1026849, at *13 (D. Conn. Feb. 23,
2018)(citing Atwater v. Astrue, 512 F. App'x 67, 70 (2d Cir.
2013)).

The ALJ must provide "good reasons" for the weight

assigned to a treating physician's opinion.

Burgess v. Astrue,

537 F.3d 117, 129 (2d Cir. 2008).
In

March

Statement.

2014,

Dr.

(R. at 313.)

Inamdar

completed

a

Medical

Source

On the one page form, Dr. Inamdar listed

the plaintiff's conditions as "severe chronic anemia, menorrhagia,
fibroid tumors, and fibroid adenomas."
checked

a

box

indicating

that

the

(R. at 313.)
conditions

plaintiff from working for "6 months or more."

Dr. Inamdar

prevented

the

(R. at 313.)

The ALJ discussed and considered Dr. Inambar's statement.
The ALJ afforded it "little weight" because it was "conclusory"
and "not supported by the evidence in the record."

(R. at 22.)

On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred because
Dr. Inambar's opinion is "extensively supported by the record."
(R. at 19.)

In support, the plaintiff points to Dr. Guarnaccia's

assessment that due to "heavy menses" the plaintiff was "limited
in her ability to be consistent in a work-related setting."
The

ALJ

carefully

reviewed

and

considered

the

medical

evidence and the consistency of Dr. Inambar's opinion with the
medical evidence of record.

The ALJ noted that the plaintiff
26

received a transfusion in September 2012 and another a year later
in 2013.

The only treatment thereafter for her anemia was iron

supplements.

When seen in October 2014, the plaintiff stated that

she was taking her iron supplements and was feeling better.

As

for her uterine fibroids and breast adenomas, the record reflects
no treatment.

The record reflects no functional limitations.

The

ALJ further observed that the results of Dr. Guarnaccia's physical
examination were essentially normal.

As to Dr. Guarnaccia's

assessment about the plaintiff's ability to be "consistent" during
her menstrual cycle, the ALJ noted that this was unsupported by
exam findings. (R. at 22.)

On this record, substantial evidence

supports the ALJ's decision as to the weight accorded to Dr.
Inambar's opinion.
LCSW Lockshier
The plaintiff next contends that the ALJ should have accorded
the LCSW Lockshier's opinion greater weight because "no treating
source has disagreed with it" and because "it was consistent with
other evidence in the record."

(Doc. #23 at 21.)

LCSW Lockshier stated in pertinent part that
[The plaintiff's] symptoms and these feelings most
certainly inhibited her ability to work. She was unable
to commit to the requirements of the IOP due to multiple
reasons, including [that she moved].
They had
prescribed two medications, however, client felt
uncomfortable taking the medication due to side effects
and that she was feeling that will not be effective.
* * *

27

It is apparent that [the plaintiff] has been
declining emotionally over the past few years. She has
insight into her mental health but has poor judgment on
how to overcome these obstacles and barriers in her life.
Her coping skills have worsened since losing her job and
she had become more socially isolated. Her social
supports have been more limited and certainly less
supportive of her now that she is [in] need of []
assistance.
Her overall mood is generally depressed
with anxious distress.
Her affect is flat and her
appearance is well groomed. No known hallucinations or
delusions have been identified.12
(R. at 440-41.)
In

his

decision,

the

ALJ

acknowledged

LCSW

Lockshier's

treatment relationship but afforded her opinion "little weight"
because it "fail[ed] to provide any functional limitations."

(R.

at 23.)
"[L]icensed

clinical

social

workers

are

not

considered

acceptable 'medical sources' pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(a),
and their opinions are not entitled to controlling weight." Cowley
v. Berryhill, 312 F. Supp. 3d 381, 383 (W.D.N.Y. 2018).

"The

amount of weight given to such opinions is based, in part, on the
examining and treatment relationship, length and frequency of
examinations, the extent of relevant evidence given to support the
opinion, and consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole.
20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)."

Id.

However, the ALJ is "free to decide

12The

plaintiff asserts that Lockshier "described [plaintiff']
symptoms and diagnosis as well as the prognosis that [the
plaintiff's] condition prevents her from working." (Doc. #23 at
21.)
A careful reading of LCSW Lockshier's opinion does not
indicate that she opined that the plaintiff's mental health issues
precluded her from working.
28

that the opinions of other sources . . . are entitled to no weight
or little weight, [though] those decisions should be explained."
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) See Mideczky
v. Colvin, No. 5:15-CV-0531(GTS), 2016 WL 4402031, at *8 (N.D.N.Y.
Aug. 18, 2016)(An opinion from a therapist "is not entitled to any
particular weight under the regulations.")
The ALJ did not err.

The ALJ considered LCSW Lockshier's

opinion and sufficiently explained his reasons for the weight he
assigned to it.

See Sanchez v. Berryhill, No. 16CV07775 (PGG)

(DF), 2018 WL 1472687, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2018) (ALJ did
not err in affording no weight to report from social worker where,
inter alia, it failed to "assess the severity of the impairments");
Smith v. Astrue, 896 F. Supp. 2d 163, 178 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (the ALJ
did not err in declining to accord weight to physical therapist's
records where they "do not set forth any professional opinion
regarding plaintiff's limitations"); Alpajon v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., No. 1:13-CV-617, 2014 WL 4626012, at *15 (S.D. Ohio Sept.
11,

2014)(ALJ

did

not

err

in

affording

"little

weight"

to

therapist's opinion's where, inter alia, it "provided no specific
functional limitations").
Therapist Sjogren
The plaintiff next argues that the ALJ should have credited
therapist Sjogren's opinion that the plaintiff would be absent
twice per month. (Doc. #23 at 22.)
29

Therapist Sjogren opined that the plaintiff had good mental
abilities and aptitude needed to do any job with only a fair
ability in some areas related to detailed work and attendance. She
also stated that the plaintiff would be absent twice a month.
The ALJ accorded therapist Sjogren's opinion "very limited
weight," explaining there were no underlying treatment notes to
support her opinion.
The ALJ did not err in failing to credit therapist Sjogren's
opinion that the plaintiff would be absent twice a month as it was
unsupported by any evidence in the record.

"It is within the

province of the ALJ to weigh conflicting evidence in the record
and credit that which is more persuasive and consistent with the
record as a whole"
(W.D.N.Y. 2013).

Banks v. Astrue, 955 F. Supp. 2d 178, 188

See Veino v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 578, 588 (2d

Cir. 2002)("Genuine conflicts in the medical evidence are for the
Commissioner to resolve.")
State Agency Physicians
The plaintiff next argues that the ALJ erred in according
"great weight" to the assessments of state agency physicians, Drs.
Lieb and Phillips.
Upon

reviewing

the

plaintiff's

medical

record,

Dr.

Lieb

determined that the plaintiff had no restrictions in the activities
of

daily

living;

functioning;

mild

mild

difficulties

difficulties
30

in

in

maintaining

maintaining

social

concentration,

persistence or pace; and no repeated episode of decompensation.
(R. at 60.)
Subsequent to Dr. Lieb's assessment, Dr. Phillips completed
a mental residual functional capacity assessment.

Dr. Phillips

found that the plaintiff had no significant limitations in her
ability to: carry out very short and simple instructions; carry
out detailed instructions; and sustain an ordinary routine without
special supervision.

The plaintiff was "moderately limited" in

her ability to: maintain attention and concentration for extended
periods; perform activities within a schedule; maintain regular
attendance and be punctual within customary tolerances; work in
coordination

with

or

in

proximity

to

others

without

being

distracted by them; and make simple work-related decisions.

Dr.

Phillips opined that the plaintiff could "maintain attention for
two hours at a time and persist at simple tasks over eight and
forty hour periods with normal supervision."

(R. at 78.)

He

further found that the plaintiff could "tolerate the minimum social
demand of simple-task settings" but not "sustained contact with
the general public."

(R. at 79.)

Dr. Phillips opined that the

plaintiff was "able to persist at simple, repetitive tasks over
time under ordinary conditions." (R. at 79.)
The plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in assigning "great
weight" to these opinions because they are contradicted by those
of Dr. Inambar, Lockshier and Sjogren.
31

"[T]he opinions of non-examining sources, when supported by
sufficient medical evidence in the record, can override the opinion
of treating sources and be given significant weight."

Montaldo v.

Astrue, No. 10 Civ. 6163, 2012 WL 893186, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
15, 2012); see also Wells v. Comm'r of Social Security, 338 Fed.
Appx. 64, 66 (2d Cir. 2009) (ALJ did not err by relying on
assessment of non-examining source of individual's functional
capacity).

State agency medical consultants "are highly qualified

physicians ... who are also experts in Social Security disability
evaluation." 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(e)(2)(i).
The ALJ did not err as to the weight he assigned these
opinions because they are supported by the weight of the record
evidence.

The plaintiff reported that she was independent in her

activities

of

daily

living,

shopped

for

groceries

(r.

195),

prepared meals (r. at 192), drove herself to therapy (r. at 46),
did dishes and light laundry (r. 194) and handled finances.
at 195.)

She related adequately with authority.

(R.

(R. at 196.)

The plaintiff's treaters noted intact memory and concentration.
(R. at 326, 520, 517, 544.)

The record reflects an absence of

significant psychologically based functional limitations beyond
those found by Drs. Lieb and Russell.

"It is well established

that the opinions even of non-examining sources may override
treating sources' opinions and be given significant weight, so
long as they are supported by sufficient medical evidence in the
32

record."

Camille v. Berryhill, No. 3:17CV01283(SALM), 2018 WL

3599736, at *13 (D. Conn. July 27, 2018)(quotation marks and
citations omitted).

As noted by the ALJ, the opinions of Dr. Lieb

and Dr. Phillip are consistent with the record as a whole.

Remand

is not merited on this basis.
B.

Residual Functional Capacity
The plaintiff's final argument is that the RFC is unsupported

by substantial evidence and that the ALJ should have included
additional limitations.
The plaintiff bears "the burden of proving her RFC." Kallfelz
v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:15CV1494(DFM), 2017 WL 1217089, at
*3 (D. Conn. Mar. 31, 2017).

"When determining a claimant's RFC,

the ALJ is required to take the claimant's reports of pain and
other limitations into account, but is not required to accept the
claimant's subjective complaints without question; he may exercise
discretion in weighing the credibility of the claimant's testimony
in light of the other evidence in the record." Genier v. Astrue,
606 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted).

In

assessing a claimant's RFC, an ALJ must consider "all of the
relevant
mental

medical

and

impairments.

other
Id.

§

evidence,"

including

404.1545(a)(3),

(4).

a
An

claimant's
ALJ's

RFC

determination must be supported by substantial evidence in the
record. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). If it is, that determination is

33

conclusive and must be affirmed upon judicial review. See id.;
Perez v. Chater, 77 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1996).
Here, the ALJ found that the plaintiff
can perform simple routine and repetitive tasks. She can
sustain concentration, persistence and pace for two-hour
segments.
The claimant is limited to brief and
superficial interaction with coworkers and supervisors
but should not interact with the public. The claimant
should not perform any work that requires independent
judgment making (no setting work duties/schedules for
others, no responsibility for the safety of others).
The claimant is limited to work that has little to no
change in work duties.
(R. at 20.)
The plaintiff first argues that the RFC fails to account for
the fact that she has "angry outbursts and an inability to engage."
(Doc. #23 at 25.)
The

plaintiff's

argument

is

without

merit.

The

record

reflects that the plaintiff stated that she gets along "ok" with
authority figure, has "no problems" getting along with others, and
had never been terminated because of problems getting along with
other people.

(R. at 196-97.)

Program,

plaintiff

the

While in the Intensive Outpatient

"attended

groups

regularly"

incident although she was reticent. (R. at 515.)

without

She "interacted

on approach with staff," and was cooperative but guarded.

(R. at

520.)

To the extent that the plaintiff had difficulties with

social

interaction,

the

ALJ

accommodate

34

those

by

including

limitations found by Dr. Russell in fashioning the RFC that limited
her exposure.
The plaintiff also posits that the RFC is not supported by
substantial evidence because it fails to account for the fact that
she

"cannot

sustain

concentration

and

attention

segments and would incur excessive absences."

in

two

hour

(Doc. #23 at 25.)

She contends that the ALJ failed to recognize that the plaintiff
would be off task due to fatigue, lightheadedness, weakness and
impaired concentration "arising from her anemia and from her mental
illness." (Doc. #23 at 26-27.)
The ALJ properly addressed the impact of the plaintiff's nonexertional limitations in formulating the RFC.

In reaching his

RFC determination, the ALJ extensively discussed the evidence of
record, including the plaintiff's statements, medical treatment
notes, and opinion evidence.

As to the plaintiff's subjective

complaints, the ALJ determined that the plaintiff's impairments
could reasonably be expected to cause her alleged symptoms. He
concluded, however, that her statements concerning the intensity,
persistence and limiting effects of the symptoms were not entirely
consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the
record.
The plaintiff's proposed limitations are not supported by the
record.

Various

treaters

concentration was good.

observed

that

the

plaintiff's

Dr. Martinez specifically noted that the
35

plaintiff's concentration was "very good."

(R. at 320.)

Dr. Lieb

opined that the plaintiff had only "mild" difficulties maintaining
concentration, pace and persistence.

(R. at 60.)

Dr. Phillips

found a slightly greater limitation, finding that the plaintiff
was "moderately limited" in her ability to maintain attention and
concentration for extended periods of time.
Intensive

Outpatient

Program

assessed

her

Providers at the
attention

and

concentration as "good", "normal" and "intact." (R. at 326, 594,
521.)

As to her attendance, the only evidence is therapist

Sjogren's opinion that the plaintiff would be absent twice a month,
which the court has already addressed.
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's RFC determination.
"[I]t is well established that the ALJ has both the ability and
the responsibility to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to
weigh all of the available evidence 'to make an RFC finding that
is consistent with the record as whole.'"

Carbee v. Comm'r of

Soc. Sec., No. 1:17CV0051(GTS), 2018 WL 333516, at *14 (N.D.N.Y.
Jan. 9, 2018) (citing Matta v. Astrue, 508 F. App'x 53, 56 (2d
Cir. 2013)).

The evidence as a whole provides substantial support

for the RFC finding.
VII. Conclusion
For these reasons, the plaintiff's motion to reverse and/or
remand the Commissioner's decision (doc. #23) is denied and the

36

defendant's motion to affirm the decision of the Commissioner (doc.
#24) is granted.
SO

ORDERED

at

Hartford,

Connecticut

this

24th

day

of

September, 2018.

_________/s/__________________
Donna F. Martinez
United States Magistrate Judge

37