Inkel et al v. Conneticut et al

Filing 50

For the reasons set forth in the attached, the 28 & 30 motions to dismiss are GRANTED; the 45 & 46 motions to strike are GRANTED; the 20 omnibus motion is DENIED AS MOOT; the 26 motion for hearing and preliminary restraining order is DENI ED AS MOOT; the 39 motion for change of venue is DENIED; the 42 motion for articulation is DENIED; and the 49 motion to appoint counsel is DENIED AS MOOT. Accordingly, the Clerk is directed to close this case.Signed by Judge Michael P. Shea on 3/15/2019. (Ram, Megha)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

PHILIP INKEL ET AL,
Plaintiffs,

No. 3:17cv1400 (MPS)

v.
STATE OF CONNECTICUT ET AL,
Defendants.

RULING
Philip Inkel and George Corey (jointly, “the Plaintiffs”) filed the operative complaint on
September 26, 2018, alleging a series of claims against a long list of defendants.1 ECF No. 24.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) states that the “title of the complaint must name all the
parties.” The initial complaint in this case listed the State of Connecticut, Governor Dannel
Malloy, the United States of America, and President Donald Trump in the caption. ECF No. 1.
The September 26, 2018 amended complaint did not include a caption, but listed the following
individuals as defendants in the body of the document: Attorney General George Jepsen, the
Head of the Connecticut State Police, Office of Public Safety, the Commissioner of the
Department of Corrections, the Commissioner of the Department of Social Services, Chief
State’s Attorney Kevin Kane, the Head of the Court Operations Division of the Connecticut
Judicial Branch, the “Chief governing authorities of Town of East Haddam, Selectman Mark
Walters, Chief governing authorities of Town of Haddam, Chief governing authorities of Town
of Colchester,” the Commanding Officer of Connecticut State Police Troop K, the Commanding
Officer of Connecticut State Police Troop F, Patricia Williams, George Crouch, Connecticut
State Police Trooper Michael Hassett, four Connecticut State Police Troopers referred to as John
Doe, Attorney Sharon Peters, Connecticut State Police Trooper Patrick Hawes, Connecticut State
Trooper Supervisor John Doe, Supervisory Assistant State’s Attorney Peter A. McShane,
Supervisory Assistant State’s Attorney Barbara Hoffman, the Honorable David P. Gold,
Assistant Attorney General Robert B. Fiske III, Attorney Michael F. Dowley, Attorney Katherine
Rule, Judge Joan Margolis, Court Reporter Irma Sanchez Farnham, Court Reporter Kiersten
Tielhard, Laura Falzrano, Attorney John Williams, Assistant State’s Attorney Dean Hannafin,
Supervisory State’s Attorney at New Haven John Doe, two additional Connecticut State
1

1

The State of Connecticut and all Connecticut defendants (collectively, “State Defendants”) filed
a motion to dismiss on November 5, 2018. ECF No. 28. The United States and President Donald
Trump (together, “Federal Defendants”) filed a motion to dismiss on November 6, 2018. ECF
No. 30. For the reasons set forth below, the motions to dismiss, ECF Nos. 28 & 30, are
GRANTED. In addition, for the reasons set forth below, all claims against the private defendants
and any other defendants who have not appeared or moved to dismiss are also dismissed.
Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[W]e hold
that district courts may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even when the plaintiff has paid
the required filing fee.”).
On January 4, 2019, Mr. Inkel filed a second amended complaint, a “supplement to
complaint,” and a “supplement to amended complaint.” ECF Nos. 40, 43 & 44. The State
Defendants filed a motion to strike the amended complaint, ECF No. 46, and a motion to strike
the supplements, ECF No. 45. For the reasons set forth below, the motions to strike, ECF Nos.
45 & 46, are GRANTED.
The Plaintiffs also filed an omnibus motion regarding a host of issues, ECF No. 20, a
motion for a hearing and preliminary restraining order, ECF No. 26, a motion for a hearing
regarding change of venue, ECF No. 39, a motion for clarification regarding the order
transferring the case, ECF No. 42, and a motion to appoint counsel, ECF No. 49. For the reasons
set forth below, these motions, ECF Nos. 20, 26, 39, 42 & 49, are DENIED.

Troopers John Doe, Meredith Labella Inkel, Janet Labella, Warden of the Hartford Correctional
Center, Attorney John Durham, and Attorney John Hughes. ECF No. 24. The Plaintiffs state that
“[a]ll governmental agents are sued in their individual, official, administrative and authoritative
capacities.” ECF No. 24 at 5. Although the amended complaint did not name all the added
parties in the caption as required by Rule 10(a), I treat all of these individuals as defendants in
this action in light of the Plaintiffs’ pro se status.
2

I.

Facts

The initial complaint was filed on August 17, 2017 and alleges that the Plaintiffs were
denied equal protection of the laws, access to courts, and the ability to “live free and raise a
family.” ECF No. 1 at 2. It contains no specific factual allegations but includes a request to
enjoin Dannel Malloy and Donald Trump from taking various actions. ECF No. 1. It states that
“this complaint is not complete and will be continued.” Id. at 4. Mr. Inkel and Mr. Corey then
filed an amended complaint on September 26, 2018. ECF No. 24. The amended complaint
alleges the following facts:
In May 1993, Mr. Inkel witnessed two Colchester Police Officers punch and choke a
teenager in a McDonalds. ECF No. 24 at ¶ C. He reported this incident in June 1993. Id. at ¶ D.
In retaliation, police officers forcibly entered his home on July 3, 1993, and threatened his
family. Id. at ¶¶ E-H. Law enforcement filed false reports to cover up their illegal conduct and
continued to harass, threaten, and arrest Mr. Inkel. Id. at ¶¶ I, P. In August 1993, Melody Wolf
conspired with law enforcement to punish Mr. Inkel and was rewarded with custody of their
children. Id. at ¶¶ M-O. Based on advice from Attorney Richard Gifford, Mr. Inkel began
investigating police violence and fraud. Id. at ¶ K. In April 1994, he provided evidence of police
misconduct to various authorities and subsequently faced more retaliation. Id. at ¶¶ Q, R. Also in
April 1994, he provided information about police brutality and dishonesty to Assistant United
States Attorney John Durham, who advised him to continue collecting evidence, but alerted law
enforcement officers about Mr. Inkel’s investigation. Id. at ¶¶ S-X. A number of Colchester
officers assaulted, falsely arrested, and imprisoned Mr. Inkel in March 1994. Id. at ¶ Z. They
stole and destroyed his evidence documenting their misconduct. Id. at ¶¶ AA, CC, GG. While
incarcerated in May 1994, Mr. Inkel was denied medical care, denied bail, and threatened with

3

violence. Id. at ¶¶ DD-FF. Witnesses to police violence against Mr. Inkel were beaten,
threatened, and falsely arrested in an effort to cover up crimes against Mr. Inkel. Id. at ¶¶ HH, JJ.
In subsequent months, various authorities sanctioned Mr. Inkel’s murder. Id. at ¶¶ II, KK-MM.
In September 1994, Mr. Inkel traveled to Alaska for his safety. Id. at ¶ RR. In Alaska, he learned
information related to a rape and murder, and shared that information with law enforcement. Id.
at ¶ SS. Connecticut officials gave false information about him to Alaska officials. Id. In 1996,
Attorney John Schoenhorn represented Mr. Inkel in a civil rights lawsuit. Id. at ¶¶ TT-UU. Mr.
Inkel then learned that Attorney Schoenhorn was corrupt and destroyed evidence. Id. at ¶ VV.
In March 2013, a group of private citizens and police officers in the Town of East
Haddam conspired to violate Mr. Corey’s rights. Id. at ¶ XX. On March 9, 2013, they kidnapped,
restrained, and unlawfully charged him with criminal activity. Id. at ¶ YY. These events arose
out of a dispute regarding Mr. Corey’s shared driveway with neighbors and his subsequent arrest.
See Corey v. Hawes, 2015 WL 5472507 (D. Conn. Sept. 17, 2015). In 2014, Mr. Corey filed suit
in the District of Connecticut against his neighbors, various individuals associated with the East
Haddam Police Department, and the Town of East Haddam based on this dispute. Id.; ECF No.
24 at ¶ AAA. In the course of that litigation, Mr. Corey filed an application for prejudgment
remedies against his neighbors. Corey, 2015 WL 5472507 at *1. In 2015, Judge Meyer referred
this motion to Magistrate Judge Margolis, who held a three-day hearing and then denied the
motion. Id. In 2016, Judge Meyer granted the defendants’ summary judgment motions and
closed the case. Civil Action No. 3:14cv1266(JAM), Dkt No. 168. Mr. Corey filed an appeal that
was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at Dkt No. 195. Some of the Plaintiffs’ allegations in
this case arise from their dissatisfaction with the decisions by Judge Meyer and Judge Margolis.
They allege that the Defendants “filed false pleadings before this court, suborned perjuries,

4

destroyed official documents and engaged in numerous misprisons of felonies to conceal
numerous unlawful governmental and organizational acts.” ECF No. 24 at ¶ BBB. They further
allege that there was a “counterfeit or void judgment,” that they “were denied their rights to
present their claims in this Court to be heard and honestly adjudicated,” and that there was a
“miscarriage of justice” in the earlier action brought by Mr. Corey. ECF No. 24 at ¶ CCC.
II.

Legal Claims

The plaintiffs assert the following legal claims: (1) claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and
1985 for violation of plaintiffs’ First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment Rights, ECF No. 24 at
1-2, ECF No. 1 at 4; (2) claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
(RICO) Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964, ECF No. 24 at 5; and (3) claims of common-law fraud, ECF No.
24 at ¶¶ BBB-CCC.
III.

Motions to Dismiss

The State and Federal Defendants filed motions to dismiss this action pursuant to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), (b)(5), and (b)(6). ECF Nos. 28 & 30.2
A. Legal Standards
1. Rule 12(b)(1)
A “case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1)
when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Nike, Inc. v.

2

Local Rule 12(a) requires any represented party moving to dismiss the complaint of a selfrepresented party to file and serve, as a separate document, a “Notice to Self-Represented
Litigant Concerning Motion to Dismiss” along with the text of Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and Local Civil Rule 7. The State Defendants fully complied with this rule. ECF
No. 29. The Federal Defendants filed and served the Notice, but did not file and serve the text of
FRCP 12 or LR 7. ECF No. 30-2. The Federal Defendants’ incomplete compliance with Local
Rule 12(a) did not prejudice the Plaintiffs, however, because they received all the required
documents from the State Defendants.
5

Already, LLC, 663 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). The party
“asserting subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that it exists.” Luckett v. Bure, 290 F.3d 493, 497 (2d Cir. 2002). “In resolving a motion
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), a district court . . . may
refer to evidence outside the pleadings.” Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir.
2000). The court construes the complaint liberally and accepts all factual allegations as
true. See Ford v. D.C. 37 Union Local 1549, 579 F.3d 187, 188 (2d Cir. 2009).
2. Rule 12(b)(5)
Under Rule 12(b)(5), a party may move for dismissal of a complaint based on inadequate
service of process. When proof of service is challenged, “the plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing that service was sufficient.” Khan v. Khan, 360 Fed. Appx. 202, 203 (2d Cir. 2010).
In deciding the issue, “a Court must look to Rule 4, which governs the content, issuance, and
service of a summons.” DeLuca v. AccessIT Group, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 54, 64 (S.D.N.Y.
2010). “Technical errors in a summons generally do not render service invalid,” but “where the
error actually results in prejudice to the defendant or demonstrates a flagrant disregard of Rule 4,
service will be considered invalid and amendment need not be allowed.” Id. at 65.
The plaintiff can avoid dismissal if he can demonstrate good cause for his failure to effect
proper service. Lab Crafters, Inc. v. Flow Safe, Inc., 233 F.R.D. 282, 284 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
“Two factors are considered to determine whether good cause exists: (1) the reasonableness and
diligence of Plaintiff’s efforts to serve, and (2) the prejudice to the Moving Defendants from the
delay.” Id. “Good cause is generally found only in exceptional circumstances where the
plaintiff’s failure to make timely service was the result of circumstances beyond his control.”

6

Myers v. Sec. of the Dept. of the Treas., 173 F.R.D. 44, 46 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
3. Rule 12(b)(6)
Rule 12(b)(6) permits a party to move for dismissal based on “failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation and quotation marks
omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. A court need not accept legal conclusions as true and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
In reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion, a court must “construe the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff[s], accepting the complaint’s allegations as true.” York v. Assn. of B. of
City of New York, 286 F.3d 122, 125 (2d Cir. 2002). And when a plaintiff is pro se, the court
“must liberally construe his pleadings, and must interpret his complaint to raise the strongest
arguments it suggests.” Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). In addition to the
complaint, the court may consider “any written instrument attached to the complaint as an
exhibit, any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference, and any document upon
which the complaint heavily relies.” In re Thelen LLP, 736 F.3d 213, 219 (2d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted). In addition, “[m]atters judicially noticed by the District Court are not considered
matters outside the pleadings.” Id. (citation omitted). “A court may take judicial notice of a
document filed in another court not for the truth of the matters asserted in the other litigation but

7

rather to establish the fact of such litigation and related filings.” Glob. Network Commc’ns, Inc.,
458 F.3d at 157 (citation omitted).
Although statutes of limitations and the doctrine of res judicata are affirmative defenses,
and therefore not typically considered in a motion to dismiss, they “may be raised by a preanswer motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . if the defense[s] appear[] on the face of the
complaint.” Pani v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, 152 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Day
v. Moscow, 955 F.2d 807, 811 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[W]hen all relevant facts are shown by the
court’s own records, of which the court takes notice, the [res judicata] defense may be upheld on
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion without requiring an answer.”); Ghartey v. St. John's Queens Hosp., 869
F.2d 160, 162 (2d Cir. 1989) (“Where the dates in a complaint show that an action is barred by a
statute of limitations, a defendant may raise the affirmative defense in a pre-answer motion to
dismiss.”).
B. Rule 12(b)(1): Eleventh Amendment and Sovereign Immunity
1. State of Connecticut and Connecticut Officials
The Eleventh Amendment provides states and state agencies immunity from suit for
monetary damages. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984).
“Eleventh Amendment immunity, however, is not absolute.” Close v. State of N.Y., 125 F.3d 31,
36 (2d Cir. 1997). There are two ways a state may be subject to suit: “(1) Congress may abrogate
a state’s sovereign immunity through a statutory enactment, and (2) a state may waive its
immunity and agree to be sued in federal court.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
“Congress, in passing § 1983, had no intention to disturb the States’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity.” Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). And
Connecticut has not waived its sovereign immunity under Section 1983. Wagner v. Connecticut

8

Dept. of Correction, 599 F. Supp. 2d 229, 238 (D. Conn. 2009). Although there is limited case
law regarding immunity to RICO claims, the RICO statute contains no express abrogation of
Eleventh Amendment immunity, 18 U.S.C. § 1964, and courts in this circuit have held that the
immunity applies to such claims. See, e.g., Jones v. King, 10 CIV. 0897 PKC, 2011 WL
4484360, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2011); Molina v. State of N.Y., 956 F. Supp. 257, 260
(E.D.N.Y. 1995). As such, the Eleventh Amendment protects both the State of Connecticut and
Connecticut officials, acting in their official capacity, from claims for money damages brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and RICO. All such claims against the State of Connecticut and all
official capacity claims against state officials are therefore dismissed. In any event, if these
claims were not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, they would nonetheless be dismissed for
reasons discussed below.
2. Federal Government and President Trump
To the extent that the Plaintiffs assert § 1983 claims for damages against the Federal
Government, President Trump in his official capacity, and other federal officials identified in the
September 26, 2018 complaint (such as Christopher Droney and John Durham), the Court
construes them as Bivens claims.3 “Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal
Government and its agencies from suit.” F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). “Because
an action against a federal agency or federal officers in their official capacities is essentially a
suit against the United States, such suits are also barred under the doctrine of sovereign

Section 1983 provides for a private right of action for violations of constitutional rights “under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). To the extent that the federal
defendants acted under color of law, it was federal and not state law. Thus, in light of the
Plaintiffs’ pro se status, I construe any § 1983 claims against the federal defendants as Bivens
claims. See Daloia v. Rose, 849 F.2d 74, 75 (2d Cir. 1988) (construing pro se Section 1983
claims against federal defendants as Bivens claims).
3

9

immunity, unless such immunity is waived.” Robinson v. Overseas Mil. Sales Corp., 21 F.3d
502, 510 (2d Cir. 1994). Here, the Plaintiffs’ Bivens claims are premised on alleged violations of
the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. ECF No. 24 at 1-2, ECF No. 1 at 4. However,
“the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity with respect to . . . constitutional
torts.” Castro v. U.S., 34 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 1994). As such, the Plaintiffs’ Bivens claims
against the United States, President Trump, Christopher Droney, John Durham, and any other
federal officials in their official capacities, are dismissed. And even if these claims were not
barred by sovereign immunity, they would nonetheless be dismissed for reasons discussed
below.
C. Rule 12(b)(5): Service
The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs did not properly serve any of the State or Federal
Defendants in their individual capacity. ECF No. 28-1 at 13-14; ECF No. 30 at 14-15. I agree.
Indeed, the docket contains no evidence that the Plaintiffs properly served any of the Defendants.
The Plaintiffs must serve a copy of the summons and complaint on each Defendant
personally, at the individual’s abode with someone of a suitable age and discretion who resides
there, or by delivering a copy to an agent authorized to receive it. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e); Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 52-57. Although the Court issued summons forms for “Daniel Malloy” and “Donald
Trump,” ECF Nos. 13 & 14, the Plaintiffs never filed proof of service with respect to them. As to
the remaining defendants, except George Crouch and Patricia Williams, the docket indicates that
proof of service was not filed with respect to any of them. And the proof of service forms for
Patricia Williams and George Crouch, ECF Nos. 47 & 48, were untimely. They indicate that
service took place on January 25, 2019, which is more than 90 days after the operative complaint
was filed on September 26, 2018. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (“If a defendant is not served within 90 days

10

after the complaint is filed, the court--on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff--must
dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a
specified time.”).4
Therefore, the Plaintiffs can avoid dismissal only if they demonstrate good cause for their
failure to effect proper service. Lab Crafters, Inc. v. Flow Safe, Inc., 233 F.R.D. 282, 284
(E.D.N.Y. 2005). “Two factors are considered to determine whether good cause exists: (1) the
reasonableness and diligence of Plaintiff’s efforts to serve, and (2) the prejudice to the Moving
Defendants from the delay.” Id. Here, the Plaintiffs were well aware of the importance of
service, and have not demonstrated good cause for failure to effect proper service. At an April
11, 2018 hearing, Judge Richardson informed them about the importance of service, and the
Plaintiffs stated that they were aware of the need to serve the Defendants. ECF No. 11. Further,
by challenging the adequacy of service in their motions to dismiss, filed in early November
2018, the State and Federal Defendants further notified the Plaintiffs of service defects. ECF
Nos. 28 & 30. Thus, the Plaintiffs have failed to show that they made reasonable, diligent efforts
to effectuate service. Indeed, the Plaintiffs have so clearly failed to show good cause for the
defective service that they could not avoid dismissal even if the Defendants would not be
prejudiced by the delay. Thus, all claims are dismissed for insufficient service of process. In any
event, even if service were proper, the Plaintiffs’ claims would fail for reasons discussed below.
D. Rule 12(b)(6)
1. Statutes of Limitations

4

The Plaintiffs were afforded adequate notice that service was defective by the filing of
defendants’ motions on November 5 and 6, 2018, respectively. ECF Nos. 28 & 30. In addition, it
is unclear whether the Plaintiffs served the first amended complaint, which is the operative
complaint in this case, or the second amended complaint on these Defendants.
11

The Plaintiffs allege that various officials and private individuals deprived them of their
constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. ECF No. 24 at 1-2, ECF No. 1
at 4. They also assert claims under RICO, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962 and 1964. ECF No. 24 at 5 (“All
private and governmental defendants are sued as violating the conspiracy to engage in
racketeering activity laws, including but not limited to Title 18 United States Code section
1962.”). All such claims arising from events occurring before September 26, 2014 are timebarred.
“The statute of limitation for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is generally the
statute of limitations for the analogous claim under the law of the state where the cause of action
accrued.” McDonough v. Smith, 898 F.3d 259, 265 (2d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In Connecticut, § 1983 actions are subject to a three-year statute of limitations, Walker
v. Jastremski, 159 F.3d 117, 119 (2d Cir. 1998), as are § 1985 claims, Meyer v. Frank, 550 F.2d
726, 727 (2d Cir.1977). When a claim accrues, however, is a question of federal rather than state
law. McDonough, 898 F.3d at 265 (2d Cir. 2018). Under federal law, “an action accrues when
the wrongful act or omission results in damages and once the plaintiff knows or has reason to
know of the injury which is the basis of his action.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). As to civil RICO claims, the Supreme Court announced a uniform four-year limitations
period. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 156 (1987). “The
limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the RICO
injury.” In re Merrill Lynch Ltd. Partnerships Litig., 154 F.3d 56, 58 (2d Cir. 1998).

12

The operative complaint in this case was filed on September 26, 2018, and recounts
incidents that were known to the Plaintiffs at the time they occurred. ECF No. 24.5 Indeed, as
discussed below, these events were the subject of earlier lawsuits brought by the Plaintiffs.
Therefore, the Court may entertain only those claims arising on or after September 26, 2015 with
respect to the § 1983 claims and on or after September 26, 2014 with respect to the RICO
claims.6
Mr. Inkel’s claims against Colchester Police Officers James Nardella and Mark Gendron
arise from an incident of alleged police brutality in 1993. ECF No. 24 at ¶ C. Claims against the
State of Connecticut, State Police Troop K, Jenny Contois, and the Police Board Commission
arise from Mr. Inkel’s arrest on July 3, 1993. Id. at ¶¶ D-J. Claims against Melody Wolf arise
from her alleged conspiracy with various governmental authorities in August 1993. Id. at ¶¶ MO. Claims against the Town of Colchester, Trooper Frederick Briger, and Police Officer Charles
Scott Thomas arise from the same alleged conspiracy in August 1993. Id. at ¶ N. Claims against
Robert Balaban arise from Mr. Inkel’s arrest in September 1993. Id. at ¶ P. Further claims
against the Town of Colchester and the State of Connecticut arise from alleged retaliation, false
arrest, and police brutality around April 1994. Id. at ¶¶ Q-R. Claims against John Durham arise

5

The original complaint dated August 17, 2017 is so bare—it consists of seven pages in large
handwriting setting forth a series of legal conclusions, no specific facts, and a request to enjoin
Dannel Malloy and Donald Trump from taking various actions, ECF No. 1,—that I do not find
that the September 26, 2018 amended complaint relates back to it. The original complaint sets
forth no specific “conduct, transaction, or occurrence,” and thus the September 26, 2018
amended complaint could not relate back to it even with respect to the few defendants named in
both complaints. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B) & (c)(1)(C). Nonetheless, even if the September
26, 2018 complaint did relate back to the August 17, 2017 filing, it would not matter: here, all of
the plaintiffs’ allegations except for those contained in ¶¶ XX-DDD of the amended complaint
occurred well before August 17, 2013 and would therefore still be time-barred.
6
The Plaintiffs do not allege any facts to suggest that they are entitled to equitable tolling or
tolling under any other doctrine. In fact, most of their allegations were made in previous
lawsuits, as discussed more fully below.
13

from a conversation in April 1994. Id. at ¶ S & U.7 Further claims against Police Officers
Nardella and Thomas, and claims against Police Officers Joseph Jones and Norman Seney, arise
out of Mr. Inkel’s arrest on May 21, 1994 and subsequent pretrial detention. Id. at ¶¶ Z-GG.
Further claims against Police Officers Nardella, Thomas, Gendron, Briger, the Town of
Colchester, the State of Connecticut, and the United States of America, and claims against Police
Officer Ostrowski, Todd Vachon, and Joseph Drum, arise out of an alleged conspiracy between
May 21, 1994 and July 28, 1994 to murder Mr. Inkel. Id. at ¶ II-MM. Further claims against
Durham, and claims against Kevin Kane, James Dignotti, Steven Fields, Christopher Droney,
and Ron Apter, arise from an alleged cover-up of police misconduct; although it is unclear when
this alleged cover-up took place, it appears to be in the mid-1990s as it appears after the 1994
events and before the 1996 events detailed in the amended complaint. Id. at ¶ NN. Claims against
Attorney John Schoenhorn arise from his representation of Mr. Inkel in a 1996 civil suit. Id. at ¶¶
TT-VV. Mr. Corey’s claims against Patricia Williams and George Crouch arise from his arrest in
March 2013. Id. at ¶¶ XX & YY.
All of the incidents just described occurred before September 26, 2014, and even before
August 17, 2013 (if the date of the original complaint is used, see supra note 5). Therefore, the §
1983 and § 1985 claims, as well as the RICO claims, arising from these incidents are dismissed.8
2. Res Judicata

Although Mr. Inkel notes that “Inkel would never hear from Durham again until early 2017,”
ECF No. 24 at ¶ S, there is no more information about what happened in 2017. Thus, there is no
allegation of any claims against Durham arising from 2017.
8
While virtually all of the factual allegations in the September 26, 2018 amended complaint
describe events occurring before September 26, 2014, paragraph CCC refers to events related to
the prosecution of Mr. Corey’s earlier lawsuit that occurred in July 2015. As discussed below,
however, any claims arising from these events are barred by res judicata.
7

14

The doctrine of res judicata provides that “a final judgment on the merits of an action
precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised
in that action.” St. Pierre v. Dyer, 208 F.3d 394, 399 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted). Later litigation is therefore barred if an earlier decision was “(1) a final
judgment on the merits, (2) by a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) in a case involving the same
parties or their privies, and (4) involving the same cause of action.” EDP Med. Computer Sys.,
Inc. v. U.S., 480 F.3d 621, 624 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
a)

1993 McDonalds Incident

Although I have already determined that the claims stemming from the 1993 McDonalds
incident should be dismissed for other reasons, I agree with the Federal Defendants that they are
also barred by the doctrine of res judicata. ECF No. 30-1 at 8.
Mr. Inkel has brought suit against the Town of Colchester and various officers, including
James Nardella, Mark Gendron, Charles Thomas, Frederick Briger, Jenny Cortois, Lawrence
Slyman, Norman Seney III, Cooke, and Joseph Jones, multiple times based on the 1993 incident
in McDonalds. First, in 2000, “Judge Squatrito rendered judgment in Inkel’s favor against
Colchester Police Officers Thomas and Nardella” on claims arising from the McDonalds
incident. Inkel v. Bush, 2004 WL 2381747, at *5 (D. Conn. Oct. 19, 2004); see Civ. No.
3:96CV935(DJS). Several years later, Mr. Inkel raised the same claims in a suit before Judge
Arterton, who dismissed them as time-barred. Inkel, 2004 WL 2381747, at *6. In 2014, he again
raised the same claims, and they were again dismissed. Inkel v. Connecticut, 2015 WL 4067038,
at *3 (D. Conn. July 2, 2015). Judgment was entered in each of the three prior cases before this

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lawsuit was filed. 9 Accordingly, Mr. Inkel’s claims related to the 1993 McDonalds incident are
barred by res judicata.
b)

2013 Driveway Dispute & Arrest

The claims stemming from Mr. Corey’s 2013 dispute with neighbors, and his subsequent
arrest, are also barred by res judicata.
The Plaintiffs allege that in March 2013, a group of private citizens and police officers in
the Town of East Haddam conspired to violate Mr. Corey’s rights. ECF No. 24 at ¶ XX.
Specifically, they allege that on March 9, 2013, Patricia Williams, George Crouch, Mark
Creighton, and Patrick Hawes kidnapped, restrained, and unlawfully charged him with criminal
activity. Id. at ¶ YY. However, in a previous civil action stemming from the same events, and
involving the same parties, Judge Meyer granted summary judgment to Patricia Williams,
George Crouch, Mark Creighton, Patrick Hawes, Mark Walters, and the Town of East Haddam.
Civil Action No. 3:14cv1266(JAM), Dkt No. 168. This prior case was clearly a final judgment
on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction involving the same parties and causes of
action. As such, the Plaintiffs’ claims arising from the March 2013 dispute and arrest are barred
by res judicata.
Moreover, Mr. Corey’s claims of fraud during the adjudication of the prior case
(including those dating to July 2015 set forth in paragraph CCC of the September 26, 2018
complaint) could have been addressed by filing a Rule 60(b) motion in the prior action. His

The 2015 case dismissed Mr. Inkel’s claims arising from the 1993 incident for lack of standing.
The Court notes that “dismissal for lack of Article III standing is a dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction,” and “a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not an adjudication
of the merits, and hence has no res judicata effect.” St. Pierre v. Dyer, 208 F.3d 394, 400 (2d Cir.
2000). Nevertheless, the Court includes this dismissal to underscore the frequency with which
Mr. Inkel has raised the same claims.
9

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claims of fraud include allegations that the Defendants “filed false pleadings before this court,
suborned perjuries, destroyed official documents and engaged in numerous misprisons of
felonies to conceal numerous unlawful governmental and organizational acts.” ECF No. 24 at ¶
BBB. He further alleges that there was a “counterfeit or void judgment,” that they “were denied
their rights to present their claims in this Court to be heard and honestly adjudicated,” and that
there was a “miscarriage of justice.” Id. at ¶ CCC. Rule 60(b) provides relief from a final
judgment when there is “fraud . . . misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party” or for
“any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3) & (b)(6). A Rule 60 motion,
however, is properly addressed to the court that issued the judgment and must be filed within one
year of the judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c). Judgment was entered in the earlier case on July 19,
2016. Civ. Action No. 3:14cv1266(JAM), ECF No. 168. The deadline for filing such a motion in
that case thus expired on July 19, 2017, i.e., before this lawsuit was filed. Nonetheless, because
Mr. Corey could have pursued such relief in the prior action, he is barred from doing so now.
Bank of New York v. First Millennium, Inc., 607 F.3d 905, 918 (2d Cir. 2010) (explaining that res
judicata bars a subsequent action “from asserting claims that were, or could have been, raised in
a prior action that resulted in an adjudication on the merits”) (emphasis added).
Because the federal claims have all been dismissed, to the extent that the Plaintiffs’
claims regarding the adjudication of the prior case may be construed as common law fraud
claims, I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them.
E. Injunctive and Declaratory Relief
The Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief. ECF No. 1 at 7 (“We pray that the Court award an
injunction restraining both President Trump and Governor Malloy from continuing to engage in
practices and patterns of allowing their persons working on their behalf from engaging in

17

unlawful governmental conduct which subjects the plaintiffs to deprivations of their
constitutional rights.”). Because I have dismissed all of their claims, they are not entitled to
injunctive relief. In any event, however, they would be unable to satisfy the requirements for a
permanent injunction even if their claims did not fail on the merits.
“A plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction . . . must satisfy the traditional four-factor
test before the district court may use its equitable discretion to grant such relief.” Beastie Boys v.
Monster Energy Co., 87 F. Supp. 3d 672, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (internal quotation marks
omitted). To satisfy this test, the Plaintiffs must demonstrate “(1) that [they] will suffer an
irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate
to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the
plaintiff[s] and defendant[s], a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest
would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.” Warner Bros. Ent. Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F.
Supp. 2d 513, 551–52 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
The Plaintiffs are unable to satisfy the first of the four factors – irreparable harm. As set
forth above, most of the factual allegations in the complaint and amended complaint describe
conduct that occurred years ago. As to every allegation of illegal conduct, the Plaintiffs plead no
facts that would provide a basis for believing that the Defendants might engage in such conduct
in the future. For instance, although the Plaintiffs allege that several individuals “caused George
Corey to be kidnapped, restrained, handcuffed behind his back, placed in great and long lasting
pain, imprisoned, fraudulently, publicly and maliciously charged with offenses against the
peace” in 2013, ECF No. 24 at ¶ YY, they do not allege any facts to suggest that such a
kidnapping is likely to recur. The Plaintiffs cannot establish irreparable injury “where there is no
showing of any real or immediate threat that the plaintiff[s] will be wronged again.” City of Los

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Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983). And “[w]here a plaintiff does not establish
irreparable harm, the court need not address the other factors necessary for the issuance of
injunctive relief.” Mrs. U.S. Natl. Pageant, Inc. v. Williams, 353 F. Supp. 3d 213 (W.D.N.Y.
2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). As such, the Plaintiffs would not be entitled to
injunctive relief even if any of their claims survived.
***
For the foregoing reasons, the State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 28, and the
Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 30, are GRANTED.
IV.

Motions to Strike
A. Second Amended Complaint

The Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on January 4, 2019. ECF No. 40. The
State Defendants filed a motion to strike this amendment, arguing that it is identical in all
material respects to the first amended complaint. ECF No. 46. I agree.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) permits the court to strike from a pleading “any
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” As the State Defendants note, the
second amended complaint is identical to the first amended complaint, except for the caption.
Compare ECF Nos. 24 & 40. The caption in the first amended complaint is “Inkel et al v.
Connecticut et al” while the caption in the second amended complaint is “Phillip H. Inkel, et al v.
Connecticut, et al, Patricia Williams, George Crouch, Meredith Inkel.” ECF Nos. 24 & 40. As
such, the State Defendants’ motion to strike, ECF No. 46, is GRANTED.
B. Supplements
The plaintiffs also filed two supplements to the complaint on January 4, 2019. ECF Nos.
43 & 44. The State Defendants filed a motion to strike these supplements, arguing that the Court

19

should construe them as proposed amendments, and deny leave to amend pursuant to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 15 and 16. ECF No. 45. I agree.
First, the State Defendants argue that the filings labeled “supplement” do not meet the
definition of a supplemental complaint under the Federal Rules as none of the events described
in the filings occurred after the first amended complaint was filed. ECF No. 45 at 3. “On motion
and reasonable notice, the court may, on just terms, permit a party to serve a supplemental
pleading setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the date of the
pleading to be supplemented.” Fed. R. Civ. P 15(d) (emphasis added). As far as the Court can
tell, the “supplement” filings describe allegedly false arrests and related conduct that preceded
the filing of the operative complaint and therefore do not meet the definition of a supplemental
pleading. See ECF No. 43. Therefore, the documents will be construed, instead, as attempts to
further amend the complaint and assessed under Rule 15(a). Sookoo v. Heath, 2011 WL
6188729, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2011) (“The amended petition thus exclusively references
events which occurred . . . prior to the filing of the original petition. Accordingly, the present
motion should be construed as a motion to amend the original habeas petition under Rule
15(a).”).
Rule 15(a)(2) provides that “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing
party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” Here, Mr. Inkel did not obtain the opposing party’s
written consent. And “despite the lenient standard of Rule 15(a), a district court does not abuse
its discretion in denying leave to amend the pleadings after the deadline set in the scheduling
order where the moving party has failed to establish good cause.” Parker v. Columbia Pictures
Industries, 204 F.3d 326, 340 (2d Cir. 2000). Indeed, once a schedule has been entered, it “may
be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). Here,

20

the Court’s order on pretrial deadlines set forth the following schedule: “amendment of the
pleadings shall be filed within sixty (60) days after filing of the complaint, the filing of a petition
for removal, or the transfer of an action from another District or court.” ECF No. 2. The second
amendment was filed more than 90 days after the first amended complaint and more than a year
after the initial complaint. See ECF No. 1 (initial complaint filed August 17, 2017); ECF No. 24
(first amended complaint filed September 26, 2018); ECF No. 43 (second amended complaint
filed January 4, 2019). Because the Plaintiffs have not provided any explanation for the delay,
and the most recent conduct described in the filing occurred well before the Plaintiffs filed their
first amended complaint, the Court is well within its discretion to deny leave to file this
amendment.
In addition, the second amendment would not be permitted even if assessed under Rule
15. Under Rule 15, a motion to amend may be denied if “the proposed amendment is futile.”
Agerbrink v. Model Serv. LLC, 155 F. Supp. 3d 448, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). “To determine
whether a proposed pleading is futile, courts analyze whether it would withstand a motion to
dismiss.” Id. at 456. Here, very few of the claims in the second amendment would withstand a
motion to dismiss. First, any § 1983 claims arising from the allegations of false arrests and
malicious prosecutions in 2014 and 2015 are time-barred. As shown, the original complaint
dated August 17, 2017 is so vague as to prevent relation back of any subsequent pleadings, but
the new incidents of false arrest and malicious prosecution from 2014 and 2015 would not even
relate back to the September 26, 2018 complaint, as these claims do not arise “out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set out--or attempted to be set out--in the [September 26, 2018]
pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B). Thus, because the second amendment was filed on
January 4, 2019, most of the conduct alleged in the proposed second amendment occurred more

21

than three years prior to its filing and the associated claims are time-barred. See Section III.D.1.
Second, any claims against Patricia Williams and George Crouch stemming from the same
actions at issue in Corey v. Hawes, 2015 WL 5472507 (D. Conn. Sept. 17, 2015) are barred by
the doctrine of res judicata. See Section III.D.2.
***
For the foregoing reasons, the State Defendants’ Motions to Strike, ECF Nos. 45 & 46,
are GRANTED.
V.

Motion for Hearing to Determine Change of Venue

The Plaintiffs filed a motion “calling for a hearing to determine whether or not there shall
be an Order to change the venue of this action to another U.S. District Court.” ECF No. 39 at 1.
They argue that transfer is warranted because they “have experienced overwhelming fraud,
corruption, and abuse practiced in this court in this regions government with impunity and
seriously doubts the ability of this Court and region’s law enforcement to hear and adjudicate
this case fairly.” Id. They allege “frauds upon the courts by officers of the courts,” malicious
prosecutions, alteration of transcripts, and destruction of evidence. Id. at ¶ 5. They further allege
that they have been denied equal protection of the laws at the United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut, id. at ¶ 6, and that “dishonesty and obstructions of justice” deprive them
of access to the court, id. at ¶ 7. They make additional allegations of judicial misconduct related
to the action before Judge Meyer and Judge Margolis. Id. at ¶¶ 10-12.
The Plaintiffs’ allegations, however, are conclusory assertions of bias. Such assertions,
“[w]ithout proof of improper bias,” do not justify transfer or recusal. Clesi v. Zinc Corp. of Am.,
2001 WL 225241, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2001). The fact that the Plaintiffs did not achieve their
desired outcome in the action before Judge Meyer and Judge Margolis does not indicate that the

22

District of Connecticut is biased against them. Chen v. Chen Qualified Settle. Fund, 552 F.3d
218, 227 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[A]dverse rulings, without more, will rarely suffice to provide a
reasonable basis for questioning a judge’s impartiality.”).10 In sum, neither transfer to another
district nor recusal is warranted.
VI.

“Motion for Articulation”

The plaintiffs filed a “motion for articulation” regarding the order transferring the case
from Judge Bryant to Judge Shea. ECF No. 42. This motion is DENIED.
VII.

Remaining Motions

In light of the disposition of this case, the omnibus motion, ECF No. 20, the motion for a
hearing and preliminary restraining order, ECF No. 26, and the motion to appoint counsel, ECF
No. 49, are DENIED AS MOOT.
VIII. Filing Injunction Warning
As discussed above, Mr. Inkel has filed several cases raising the same claims stemming
from the same events. See Section III.D.2.a. Indeed, he has continued to do so despite several
final judgments dismissing those claims. Id. Accordingly, Mr. Inkel is hereby warned that further
frivolous filings may result in sanctions, including an injunction requiring him to obtain leave of
the Court before filing any additional documents on the docket. See In re Martin Trigona, 737
F.2d 1254, 1261 (2d Cir.1984) (Federal courts have both the inherent power and the
constitutional obligation to protect their jurisdiction from conduct which impairs their ability to
carry out Article III functions.); see also Shafii v. British Airways, PLC, 83 F.3d 566, 571 (2d

10

Furthermore, the Court notes that Mr. Inkel actually prevailed, in part, on a § 1983 claim he
brought in the District of Connecticut. Civil Action No. 3:96-cv-935.
23

Cir.1996) (stating that a district court may impose sanctions against litigants who abuse the
judicial process).
IX.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the [ECF Nos. 28 & 30] motions to dismiss are
GRANTED; the motions to strike [ECF Nos. 45 & 46] are GRANTED; the [ECF No. 20]
omnibus motion is DENIED AS MOOT; the [ECF No. 26] motion for hearing and preliminary
restraining order is DENIED AS MOOT; the [ECF No. 39] motion for change of venue is
DENIED; the [ECF No. 42] motion for articulation is DENIED; and the [ECF No. 49] motion to
appoint counsel is DENIED AS MOOT. Accordingly, the Clerk is directed to close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ MICHAEL P. SHEA _________
Michael P. Shea, U.S.D.J

Dated:

Hartford, Connecticut
March 15, 2019

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