Tangreti v. Semple et al

Filing 45

ORDER: For the reasons stated in the attached ruling, the 37 motion to amend/correct is GRANTED. Signed by Judge Michael P. Shea on 10/9/2018. (Guevremont, Nathan)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
CARA TANGRETI,
No. 3:17-cv-01420 (MPS)
Plaintiff,
v.
SCOTT SEMPLE, DAVID MCNEIL, STEPHEN
FAUCHER, ANTHONY CORCELLA, STEVEN
BATES, CHRISTINE BACHMANN, DOUGLAS
ANDREWS, and MODIKIAH JOHNSON
Defendants.
ORDER ON MOTION TO FILE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff Cara Tangreti moves to amend her complaint in order to make several minor
substantive and stylistic changes. (ECF No. 37.) Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), a party may
amend its complaint more than 21 days after service only with the consent of the opposing party
or with leave of the Court. The rule instructs that “[t]he court should freely give leave when
justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Thus, “[a]bsent undue delay, bad faith, dilatory
tactics, undue prejudice to the party to be served with the proposed pleading, or futility, the
motion should be freely granted.” Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., 71 F.3d 58, 66 (2d Cir. 1995).
Defendants consent to the majority of Tangreti’s amendments, but object to her request to
add a clause to one paragraph. The paragraph, with the contested addition italicized, reads:
The sexual abuse and harassment inflicted on Cara, and allowed and encouraged by the
defendants, did cause severe physical and psychological harm, including, but not limited
to: fear of being impregnated by Gillette; infection with vaginal herpes by one or more of
her assaulters; infection of her minor daughter with herpes; terrifying nightmares;
anxiety; depression; and severe and chronic Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.
(ECF No. 37-1 ¶ 117.)

Defendants argue that this addition would be futile because Tangreti does not have
standing to add a claim based on her minor daughter’s infection. They assert that the infection is
not an injury that Tangreti herself suffered and third-party standing is disfavored. Duke Power
Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978). Their argument is unavailing.
To meet the standing requirements of Article III, “[a] plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly
traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the
requested relief.” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997). Tangreti does not bring the claim on
her daughter’s behalf, but rather seeks damages for the psychological harm she has suffered
personally as a result of her daughter’s infection. Indeed, her daughter’s infection is listed among
six other items in the same paragraph that Tangreti alleges have caused her “physical or
psychological harm.” (ECF No. 37-1 ¶ 117.) Thus, regardless of whether Tangreti would have
standing to collect damages for her daughter’s pain and suffering, she may seek damages for the
psychological harm she herself suffered when she allegedly passed the infection she contracted
during her sexual assault on to her daughter.
Next, Defendants argue that Tangreti’s claim is futile because it does not meet the
requirements in Connecticut for bystander emotional distress. Defendants mischaracterize the
proposed amendment. “An amendment to a pleading is futile if the proposed claim could not
withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).” Lucente v. Int’l Bus.
Machines Corp., 310 F.3d 243, 258 (2d Cir. 2002). I thus apply the same standard as I would in
considering such a motion, taking the plaintiff’s factual allegations “to be true and drawing all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 71 (2d Cir. 2009). 1 A
plaintiff seeking damages for bystander emotional distress must show that he or she witnessed a

1

I do not express an opinion on the merits of any later motion to dismiss the complaint. The parties have briefed the
merits of one specific clause in isolation, and I consider only those arguments raised in their briefs.

tortfeasor causing serious bodily injury to another person with whom the plaintiff had a close
familial relationship and suffered severe distress as a result. See Squeo v. Norwalk Hosp. Ass’n,
316 Conn. 558, 571 (2015). Tangreti’s theory, however, is more direct. She alleges that
Defendants caused her to become infected with vaginal herpes by failing to prevent her sexual
assaults. She then suffered additional psychological anguish when she passed the infection to her
daughter. While Defendants contend that the chain of causation from their failure to protect
Tangreti from sexual assault to her daughter’s infection is attenuated, it is not so attenuated that
the amendment is futile. Tangreti will need to convince a jury that the Defendants’ conduct
proximately caused the psychological trauma she suffered when she passed the infection to her
daughter. She need not and does not make any recourse to Connecticut’s doctrine of bystander
emotional distress. See Krayeski v. Greenwich Hosp., No. FSTCV146022177S, 2015 WL
9595345, at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 24, 2015) (holding that plaintiff suing for emotional
distress caused by harm to her daughter from medical malpractice during childbirth did not have
to establish the elements for bystander emotional distress because the “longstanding principals
governing negligence and medical malpractice” supported defendants’ liability).
For the foregoing reasons, Tangreti’s motion to amend her complaint is GRANTED.
Defendants shall have fourteen days from the posting of this order to file a responsive pleading
or pre-answer motion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/
Michael P. Shea, U.S.D.J.
Dated:

Hartford, Connecticut
October 9, 2018