Brown v. Santiago et al

Filing 10

ORDER. For the reasons stated in the attached, the 9 Amended Complaint is DISMISSED as to Defendant Maldonado. The Clerk shall verify the current work address for defendants Santiago and Maiga, mail a waiver of service of process request pa cket to those defendants within 21 days, and report to the Court on the status of the waiver request on the 35th day after mailing. Defendants Santiago and Maiga shall file their response to the Amended Complaint within 60 da ys from the date the notice of lawsuit and waiver of service of summons forms are mailed to them. Discovery shall be completed within 6 months from the date of this order. All motions for summary judgment shall be filed within 7 months from the date of this order. Signed by Judge Michael P. Shea on 12/28/2017. (Mac Dougall, S.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
CHRISTOPHER BROWN,
Plaintiff,
v.
ANTONIO SANTIAGO, et al.
Defendants.

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CASE NO. 3:17-cv-1427 (MPS)

December 28, 2017

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RULING ON AMENDED COMPLAINT (ECF No. 9)
On August 23, 2017, plaintiff Christopher Brown, an inmate currently housed at
Cheshire Correctional Institution in Cheshire, CT, brought a civil complaint (ECF No. 1)
pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Warden Antonio Santiago, Warden Faucher,
Director of Offender Classification and Population Management David Maiga, District
Administrator Edward Maldonado, and Captain Daniel Dauherty in their individual and
official capacities for damages and injunctive relief. The plaintiff alleged that the
defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his safety, in violation of his Eighth
Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment, for events that occurred
while he was housed at Corrigan-Radgowski Correctional Institution (“Corrigan”) in
Uncasville, Connecticut. On August 24, 2017, this Court granted his motion to proceed
in forma pauperis. See Order #6.
On October 17, 2017, this court dismissed the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment
claim against defendants Santiago, Faucher, Maiga, and Maldonado under 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Initial
Review Order (ECF No. 8) at 5. The court dismissed without prejudice the plaintiff’s
claim against defendant Dauherty but permitted him the opportunity to submit an

amended complaint with additional factual allegations supporting a deliberate
indifference to safety claim against Dauherty. Id. at 6, 8.
On November 15, 2017, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. Am. Compl.
(ECF No. 9). However, rather than allege additional facts against defendant Dauherty, he
withdrew his claim against Dauherty, and restated his claim against defendants Santiago,
Maiga, and Maldonado. Although it does not comply with the instructions in the Initial
Review Order, the court will construe the amended complaint as seeking reconsideration
of the order dismissing the claim against Santiago, Maiga, and Maldonado. The amended
complaint seeks damages against Santiago, Maiga, and Maldonado but does not specify
in what capacity the plaintiff is suing them. For reasons stated below, the plaintiff’s
amended complaint may proceed against defendants Santiago and Maiga in their
individual capacities, but his claim against defendant Maldonado is dismissed.
I.

Relevant Legal Principles
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must review prisoner civil complaints and

dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, that fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. Although detailed allegations are not required, the
complaint must include sufficient facts to afford the defendants fair notice of the claims
and the grounds upon which they are based and to demonstrate a right to relief. Bell
Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007). Conclusory allegations are not
sufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The plaintiff must plead “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 570.
Nevertheless, it is well-established that “[p]ro se complaints ‘must be construed liberally

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and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.’” Sykes v. Bank of
Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470
F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006)); see also Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101-02 (2d Cir.
2010) (discussing special rules of solicitude for pro se litigants).
II.

Factual Allegations
On May 18, 2011, the plaintiff was involved in a physical altercation with another

inmate, Jose Torres, while housed at Garner Correctional Institution (“Garner”) in
Newtown, Connecticut. See Am. Compl. At 10; Pl.’s Ex. (ECF No. 9-1) at 26. The
plaintiff later pled guilty to a disciplinary report that was issued as a result of that
incident. Pl. Ex. (ECF No. 9-1) at 28.
Defendant Maiga is the Director of Population Management and determines
where an inmate will be housed based, in part, on whether there exist any documented
“profiles” between that inmate and another inmate that would warrant separation.
On January 9, 2017, defendant Maiga transferred the plaintiff to Corrigan1
“knowing that [the plaintiff] had a profile with Jose Torres,” who at that time was also
housed at Corrigan. Defendant Santiago, the Warden of Corrigan, placed the plaintiff in
the H-Pod unit, the same housing unit as Torres, despite knowing that he had an existing
separation profile with Torres. The plaintiff claims that he has “an abundance of proof
and records that there was a profile between [Torres and him].” Pl.’s Ex. (ECF No. 9-1)
at 23. On January 12, Torres and another inmate, both of whom were members of the
Latin Kings gang, assaulted the plaintiff in his cell in the H-Pod unit.

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It is unclear from the amended complaint whether the plaintiff was transferred
from Garner to Corrigan or whether he was housed at another facility in between the two.
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After the assault, the plaintiff was taken to the restrictive housing unit at Corrigan
for one day and issued a disciplinary report for fighting. Correctional staff later
determined that the plaintiff merely defended himself during the attack, and the report
was dismissed.
Shortly after he was released from the restrictive housing unit, the plaintiff began
suffering from headaches and blackouts. He repeatedly filed requests for medical
assistance. It was not until the plaintiff threatened legal action that medical staff
responded to his requests and treated him for his injuries.
After the assault, the plaintiff submitted a request to Counselor Supervisor Lacy
seeking information on any known profiles concerning Torres and him. Lacy informed
the plaintiff that there were no known profiles regarding the two of them. The plaintiff
believes that Lacy lied to him. He then filed grievances with “the warden”2 and other
supervisory staff regarding any documented information on Torres and him, followed by
a “Level 2 grievance” to defendant Maldonado in March of 2017 stating his concerns
about his placement in the H-Pod and the subsequent assault. Maldonado denied the
plaintiff any form of relief.
On March 27, 2017, defendant Santiago responded to one of the plaintiff’s
grievances stating that the staff at Corrigan “would have no knowledge of any prior
incidents [with Torres] if no profiles were entered into the computer.” Pl.’s Ex. (ECF
No. 9-1) at 25. Santiago instructed the plaintiff to forward to him any documentation he

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It is unclear whether the plaintiff is referring to Warden Santiago or a
subsequent warden in this instance.
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had stating otherwise.3 Id. He also stated that “[i]t wasn’t until the incident that occurred
on 1/27/17 [that Corrigan staff learned] from a comment that was made from one of the
other inmates, that [the plaintiff] may have had a previous altercation with them while
housed at another facility.” Id.
III.

Analysis
To state a claim for deliberate indifference to safety, the plaintiff must show that

the alleged conduct is sufficiently serious and that the defendants acted with a sufficiently
culpable state of mind, that is, that they acted maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.
See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The defendants must have been aware
that the plaintiff faced an excessive risk to his health and safety and ignored that risk. See
id. at 837. To determine whether the defendants were aware that the plaintiff faced an
excessive risk of serious harm, the courts “look at the facts and circumstances of which
the official was aware at the time he acted or failed to act.” Hartry v. County of Suffolk,
755 F. Supp. 2d 422, 436 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
After reviewing the amended complaint and construing the allegations in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, the court concludes that the plaintiff has alleged sufficient
facts to support an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to safety against
defendants Santiago and Maiga. He alleges that Maiga transferred him to the same
facility and that Santiago placed him in the same housing unit as Torres even though they
both knew that he had an existing profile with Torres warranting their separation. He

The plaintiff’s amended complaint does not allege whether he forwarded to
Santiago his documented records showing a known profile with Torres.
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also claims that he has written proof of the profile despite Santiago’s assertion that there
were no documented profiles regarding the two inmates. The plaintiff has not, however,
alleged any facts supporting a claim against Maldonado. He only alleges that Maldonado
denied his March 2017 grievance seeking “remedial action” for his placement in the HPod unit and subsequent assault. See Am. Compl. at ¶ 40. This allegation is insufficient
to support a claim for deliberate indifference to safety. See Jusino v. Mark Frayne, 16
Civ. 961, 2016 WL 4099036, *5 (D. Conn. Aug. 2, 2016) (denial of grievance
insufficient to establish personal involvement of supervisory defendant). The plaintiff
does not allege that Maldonado had any prior knowledge of the profile he had with
Torres or had any involvement in his placement in the H-Pod unit at Corrigan. Thus, his
Eighth Amendment claim may proceed against Santiago and Maiga but is dismissed
against Maldonado.
The plaintiff does not specify in his amended complaint whether he is suing the
defendants in their individual capacities, official capacities, or both. To the extent he
seeks damages against Santiago and Maiga in their official capacities, such a claim is
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985);
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979). Because the plaintiff only seeks monetary
relief, any claim against Santiago and Maiga in their official capacities is dismissed. See
Watson v. Doe, 15 Civ. 1356 (BKS) (DEP), 2016 WL 347339, *41 n.5 (N.D.N.Y. Jan.
28, 2016) (dismissing all claims against defendants in official capacities when plaintiff
does not seek declaratory or injunctive relief). His Eighth Amendment claim may
proceed against Santiago and Maiga in their individual capacities.

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ORDERS
(1) The plaintiff’s amended complaint (ECF No. 9) is dismissed as to defendant
Maldonado. His Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to safety as stated
in the amended complaint may proceed against defendants Santiago and Maiga in their
individual capacities for damages.
(2) The Clerk shall verify the current work address for defendants Santiago and
Maiga with the Department of Correction Office of Legal Affairs, mail a waiver of
service of process request packet containing the amended complaint (ECF No. 9) to those
defendants at the confirmed address within twenty-one (21) days of this Order, and
report to the court on the status of the waiver request on the thirty-fifth (35) day after
mailing. If Santiago and/or Maiga fail to return the waiver request, the Clerk shall make
arrangements for in-person service by the U.S. Marshals Service on them, and they shall
be required to pay the costs of such service in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d).
(3) Defendants Santiago and Maiga shall file their response to the amended
complaint, either an answer or motion to dismiss, within sixty (60) days from the date the
notice of lawsuit and waiver of service of summons forms are mailed to them. If they
choose to file an answer, they shall admit or deny the allegations and respond to the
cognizable claim recited above. They may also include any and all additional defenses
permitted by the Federal Rules.
(4) Discovery, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26–37, shall be completed within six
months (180 days) from the date of this order. Discovery requests need not be filed with
the court.
(5) All motions for summary judgment shall be filed within seven months (210 days)

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from the date of this order.
It is so ordered.
Dated at Hartford, Connecticut this 28th day of December 2017.

/s/
Michael P. Shea, U.S.D.J.

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