Gaines v. Wright et al

Filing 12

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER of Proposed Amended Complaint. The Clerk is directed to reopen the case in compliance with the Orders set forth in the attached decision. The Proposed Amended Complaint is now the operative Amended Complaint. The parties are directed to review and comply with the Orders in the decision. Discovery due by 5/20/2018; Dispositive Motions due by 6/19/2018. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 10/19/2017. (Lee, E.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

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NORMAN GAINES,
Plaintiff,
v.
DOCTOR WRIGHT, et al.,
Defendants.

No. 3:17-cv-1513 (VLB)

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER OF AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff,

Norman

Gaines,

currently

confined

at

MacDougall-Walker

Correctional Institution in Suffield, Connecticut, filed the original complaint pro
se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he was denied adequate medical care. On
September 15, 2017, the Court dismissed the complaint without prejudice for
failure to state a plausible claim. Plaintiff sought, and was granted, an extension
of time to file a motion for reconsideration. Instead of doing so, he has filed a
proposed amended complaint.

Plaintiff states that the proposed amended

complaint is intended to cure the deficiencies identified in the order dismissing
the complaint. The Court considers the allegations in the proposed amended
complaint and will determine whether the case should be reopened as to the
claims against any of the defendants.
In the original complaint, plaintiff named eight defendants: Doctors Wright,
Ruiz, Freston, Farinella, John Doe and Naqvi and Nurses Hollie and Jane Doe.
Plaintiff list all of these defendants except Nurse Jane Doe in the body of the

proposed amended complaint.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (2000), the court must review prisoner civil
complaints and dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or
malicious, that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. In
reviewing a pro se complaint, the court must assume the truth of the allegations,
and interpret them liberally to “raise the strongest arguments [they] suggest[].”
Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). Although detailed allegations
are not required, the complaint must include sufficient facts to afford the
defendants fair notice of the claims and the grounds upon which they are based
and to demonstrate a right to relief. Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56
(2007). Conclusory allegations are not sufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). The plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

Nevertheless, it is well-

established that “pro se complaints ‘must be construed liberally and interpreted
to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.’” Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723
F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470
F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006)); see also Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101-02 (2d
Cir. 2010) (discussing special rules of solicitude for pro se litigants).
I. Allegations
On December 8, 2014, while confined at Northern Correctional Institution,
Plaintiff injured his right knee. He was taken to the medical unit where Nurse Doe
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noted the swelling and diagnosed a sprained knee. She gave Plaintiff an ace
bandage and ibuprofen. Doc. #11, ¶¶ 12-14. Between December 20, 2014, and
January 20, 2015, Plaintiff submitted several requests to the medical unit
complaining of swelling and loss of motion in his knee and an inability to support
his body weight on the knee. The requests were not answered. Id., ¶ 15.
On February 18, 2015, at Osborn Correctional Institution, Plaintiff’s knee
gave out, causing him to fall. Dr. Wright examined Plaintiff’s knee. Although
Plaintiff stated that his knee seemed to be moving in and out of place, Dr. Wright
concluded that Plaintiff had a sprain. Dr. Wright recommended strengthening the
muscles around the knee but did not prescribe any specific exercises to be
performed after the swelling resolved. Plaintiff requested pain medication but Dr.
Wright told him that the medical unit did not prescribe medications, such as
ibuprofen, that could be purchased in the commissary. Id., ¶¶ 16-19.
Plaintiff began doing stretching and strengthening exercises. On March 1,
2015, Plaintiff’s knee again failed causing him to experience severe pain. Id., ¶¶
20-21. Plaintiff asked a custodial officer to call the medical unit, but the officer
told Plaintiff to submit a sick call request. Id., ¶¶ 22-23.
Plaintiff wrote to Dr. Wright that day, asking for an immediate examination
because his knee was getting worse. Plaintiff stated that it felt as if he had torn
something and was in severe pain. By March 20, 2015, Plaintiff had received no
response from Dr. Wright or any medical staff member.

Plaintiff’s knee was

swollen and his leg was stiff. His pain prevented him from walking to the dining
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hall, approximately two or three city blocks from the housing unit. Id., ¶¶ 24-25.
Plaintiff remained in his cell eating only items he purchased at the commissary.
As he was assigned to the top bunk in a cell on the top tier, Plaintiff left his cell
only for showers and phone calls. Id., ¶¶ 26-27. Plaintiff asked custodial staff to
be moved to the lower tier and a bottom bunk. He was told that there were no
empty cells and he did not have a bottom bunk pass. Id., ¶ 28.
Through March and April 2015, Plaintiff’s cellmate helped him get into and
out of the top bunk and to the showers. His cellmate also assisted Plaintiff on the
stairs and picked up Plaintiff’s commissary bags. Id., ¶ 29.
On April 1, 2015, Plaintiff’s knee gave out as he was coming down from the
bunk, causing severe pain. Plaintiff asked a correctional officer to contact the
medical unit. The officer told Plaintiff that the medical unit would call him down
later in the day, and that he should elevate the knee and stay off his leg. Plaintiff
was not called to the medical unit. Id., ¶¶ 30-32.
The following day, the officer again called the medical unit, but Plaintiff was
not called down. On April 3, 2015, Plaintiff submitted an administrative remedy
complaining that he was left in extreme pain and his complaints were ignored.
Plaintiff asked to be permitted to eat in his cell as he could not walk to the dining
hall, for an examination and pain medication. He did not receive a response. Id.,
¶¶ 35-36.
In June 2015, Plaintiff saw Dr. Wright, who stated that he could not
prescribe pain medication that was available from the commissary. Dr. Wright
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told Plaintiff that he could issue him an “ace bandage like brace” but would not
submit a request to the Utilization Review Committee (“URC”) for an orthopedic
consult because, as Plaintiff had only been suffering for a few months, any
request would be denied. Dr. Wright also stated that the URC would not approve
an MRI as the procedure was too costly. Plaintiff requested an order that he be
housed on the bottom tier in a bottom bunk and be permitted to eat in his cell.
Dr. Wright refused to issue such an order. Id., ¶¶ 37-39.
At some time after the examination by Dr. Wright, Plaintiff went to the
University of Connecticut Health Center for treatment of a ruptured bicep. His
arm was in a cast and sling.

While there, Plaintiff was examined by an

orthopedist, Dr. Doe, and underwent an x-ray of his right knee.

Dr. Doe

diagnosed a sprained knee. Id., ¶¶ 41-44.
On July 1, 2016, Plaintiff’s knee was swollen and he was in severe pain.
Plaintiff wrote to the medical unit complaining that he was experiencing difficulty
walking up and down the stairs because his arm was in a sling from the bicep
surgery and the knee pain caused him to have to hop up and down the stairs.
Plaintiff requested movement to the lower tier, permission to eat in his cell,
braces to support his knee, an MRI and pain medication. The request was not
answered. Plaintiff alleges that he submitted medical requests at least once per
month since he injured his knee and only received two responses. Id., ¶¶ 45-47.
On September 23, 2016, Plaintiff again went to the University of
Connecticut Health Center for his bicep injury. While there, he saw Dr. Doe for a
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follow-up consultation on his knee. Id., ¶ 48. Dr. Doe asked Plaintiff whether he
had ever undergone a knee exam. Plaintiff said no. Dr. Doe asked about the last
time Plaintiff’s knee gave out. Plaintiff stated that it was a few weeks earlier while
he was on the basketball court attempting to rehabilitate his bicep injury. Dr. Doe
examined Plaintiff’s knee, determined that the knee was unstable and
recommended an MRI. He also ordered that Plaintiff wear a hinged knee brace.
Id., ¶¶ 49-52.
The URC, comprised of Drs. Ruiz, Freston, Farinella and Naqvi, declined
to follow the recommendation. Id., ¶ 53. Following the denial, Plaintiff’s knee
gave out while he was walking causing swelling and severe pain. Id., ¶ 54.
In October 2016, Plaintiff saw Dr. Wright for a routine check-up for the
bicep injury. When Plaintiff questioned him about the lack of response to his
many requests, Dr. Wright told Plaintiff that he had not received many of the
requests. He also told Plaintiff that the URC denied the MRI for financial reasons.
Dr. Wright examined Plaintiff’s knee and appealed the URC denial. On November
1, 2016, the URC granted the appeal and approved the MRI.

Id., ¶ 58.

On

November 15, 2016, Plaintiff was taken to the University of Connecticut Health
Center for the MRI. The test could not be performed on that date. The MRI was
conducted on November 30, 2016. Id., ¶¶ 59, 62.
On December 4, 2016, Plaintiff submitted a request asking about the MRI
results and when he would receive the special hinged brace he had been
prescribed. Nurse Hollie responded to the request, stating that Plaintiff had an
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appointment with Dr. Naqvi to discuss the test results and that she would check
on the status of the brace. Plaintiff submitted a follow-up request on December
16, 2016. In response, Nurse Hollie stated that Dr. Naqvi submitted a request for
an orthopedics consult and that the request had been approved with the visit
scheduled for January 1, 2017. Id., ¶¶ 63-68.
On January 9, 2017, Dr. Naqvi stated that he did not know the MRI results,
but told Plaintiff that he had been scheduled for an ortho-telemed clinic.

Dr.

Naqvi stated that he would inquire why Plaintiff had not received or been fitted for
the brace. The video clinic occurred in February 2017. Dr. Mazzocca told Plaintiff
that the MRI showed a complete tear of his anterior cruciate ligament, or ACL,
and meniscus. Plaintiff underwent corrective surgery on March 29, 2017. Id., ¶¶
69-73.
On May 19, 2017, plaintiff learned that posterior collateral ligaments were
damaged.

Dr. Doe ordered further reconstruction.

reconstructive surgery was postponed.

On June 28, 2017, the

The surgeon opined that the surgery

would do further damage to Plaintiff’s knee and ordered an additional six weeks
of evaluation. Plaintiff has heard nothing further. Id., ¶¶ 74-76.
II. Discussion
Plaintiff alleges that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his
serious medical needs in that they denied and delayed access to needed medical
care in three ways. First, from December 8, 2014, through September 22, 2016,
Drs. Wright, Naqvi and Doe failed to conduct an appropriate examination of his
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knee despite his numerous complaints of pain, swelling and instability. Second,
despite numerous requests submitted to the medical unit, Dr. Naqvi and Nurse
Hollie, Plaintiff was not provided the knee brace prescribed by Dr. Doe on
September 23, 2016. Third, the URC denied an MRI for financial reasons and not
sound medical judgment, thereby delaying access to medical care. Plaintiff also
references state law claims of medical malpractice and negligence.
A.

Eighth Amendment Claims
The Eighth Amendment forbids deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs of prisoners.” Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Servs., 719 F.3d 127,
138 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). To establish a claim for
deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, Plaintiff must allege facts
demonstrating two elements.

The first element is objective; “the alleged

deprivation of adequate medical care must be sufficiently serious.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). Under this objective element, a court must determine
first, “whether the prisoner was actually deprived of adequate medical care,” and
second, “whether the inadequacy in medical care is sufficiently serious.”
Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 279–80 (2d Cir. 2006). Adequate medical care
is reasonable care such that “prison officials who act reasonably cannot be found
liable.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 845 (1994). Plaintiff also must allege
facts showing that his medical needs, “either alone or in combination, pose an
unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health.” Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d
119, 125 (2d Cir. 2013). “There is no settled, precise metric to guide a court in its
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estimation of the seriousness of a prisoner's medical condition.”

Brock v.

Wright, 315 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 2003). Nevertheless, the Second Circuit has
presented “a non-exhaustive list” of factors to consider: “(1) whether a
reasonable doctor or patient would perceive the medical need in question as
‘important and worthy of comment or treatment,’ (2) whether the medical
condition significantly affects daily activities, and (3) ‘the existence of chronic
and substantial pain.’” Id. (quoting Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d
Cir. 1998)).
As the Court previously explained, knee injuries generally have been held
insufficient to constitute serious medical needs warranting Eighth Amendment
protections. Guarneri v. Bates, No. 9:05-CV-444(GLS/DRH), 2008 WL 686809, at *7
(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2008); see, e.g., Johnson v. Wright, 477 F. Supp. 2d 572, 575
(W.D.N.Y .2007) (holding that a prisoner's torn meniscus suffered as result of a
basketball injury was not a serious medical need); Moody v. Pickles, No. 9:03-CV850 (DEP), 2006 WL 2645124, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2006) (holding that a
“medial meniscal tear, with joint effusion” which did not render plaintiff immobile
was not a serious medical need); Williamson v. Goord, No. 9:02-CV521(GLS/GHL), 2006 WL 1977438, at *9, 14, 16 (N.D .N.Y. July 11, 2006) (holding
that a prisoner's knee injuries including arthrosis, degenerative joint disease, and
partially torn anterior cruciate ligament (“ACL”), did not constitute “death or
degeneration, or [constitute the appropriate level of] extreme pain [contemplated
by] the law”); Taylor v. Kurtz, No. 00-CV-700F, 2004 WL 2414847, at *3 (W.D.N.Y.
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Oct. 28, 2004) (no “serious injury” where plaintiff suffered re-tear of surgically
repaired ACL, tear of lateral meniscus ligament, and moderate to severe
degenerative changes in knee); Culp v. Koenigsmann, No. 99 Civ. 9557(AJP), 2000
WL 995495, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2000) (no “serious injury” where plaintiff
suffered from torn meniscus and knee surgery was delayed for approximately
one year).
However, a delay in providing needed medical care can, under some
circumstances, constitute deliberate indifference. The Second Circuit has held
that a delay in treatment rises to this level where prison officials “ignored a lifethreatening and fast-degenerating” condition for three days, Liscio v. Warren, 901
F.2d 274, 277 (2d Cir. 1990), or delayed needed major surgery for over two years.
Hathaway v. Coughlin, 841 F.2d 48, 50-51 (2d Cir. 1988). But see Demata v. New
York State Correctional Dep’t of Health Servs., 198 F.3d 233 (table), 1999 WL
753142, at *2 (2d Cir. 1999) (affirming grant of summary judgment for defendants
on deliberate indifference claim where knee injury occurred in February 1994, MRI
and consultative exam performed in September 1994, and surgery performed in
March 1997).
The second element is of the deliberate indifference test is subjective; the
defendants must have been actually aware of a substantial risk that the inmate
would suffer serious harm as a result of his actions or inactions. See Salahuddin,
467 F.3d at 279-80.

Negligence that would support a claim for medical

malpractice does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference and is not
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cognizable under section 1983.

See id.

Nor does a difference of opinion

regarding what constitutes an appropriate response and treatment constitute
deliberate indifference. See Ventura v. Sinha, 379 F. App’x 1, 2-3 (2d Cir. 2010).
Plaintiff’s essential claim is that his surgery was delayed for 28 months
after his first injury.

Doc. #1, ¶ 53.

Because he received treatment, the

“sufficiently serious” prong of the objective component of the deliberate
indifference standard focuses on the effect of the delay, i.e, whether the
challenged delay was “sufficiently serious.” Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 280.
As noted above, the Second Circuit has found deliberate indifference
where a life-threatening, quickly degenerating condition is ignored for a few days,
or major surgery is delayed for over two years. Plaintiff’s condition is at neither
end of this spectrum. A torn ACL is not life threatening or quickly degenerating
and its repair is not major surgery. The alleged delay in scheduling the surgery
does not rise to the level of egregiousness that the Second Circuit has found
cognizable. See, e.g., Hathaway, 841 F.2d at 49 (broken surgical pins identified as
cause of plaintiff’s hip pain in July 1981, but plaintiff not provided corrective
surgery until October 1983); but see, e.g., Espinal v. Coughlin, No. 98 CIV.
2579(RPP), 2002 WL 10450, at *3-5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2002) (no deliberate
indifference for three-year delay in surgery for ruptured ACL while conservative
treatment attempted).
The fact that Plaintiff believes that more should have been done to treat his
injury does not support a deliberate indifference claim. Plaintiff does not allege
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that the delay in scheduling his surgery caused him to suffer any adverse effects,
or that the results of the surgery would have been different if it had been
performed sooner. See Demata, 1999 WL 753142, at *2 (2d Cir. 1999) (affirming
grant of summary judgment for defendants on deliberate indifference claim where
knee injury occurred in February 1994, MRI and consultative exam performed in
September 1994, and surgery performed in March 1997).

Plaintiff has added

numerous allegations to his amended complaint regarding the lack of attention to
his injury by Dr. Wright in particular, damage to his posterior collateral ligaments
that was recently discovered, and that he suffers permanent ligament damage.
He has not, however, alleged any facts suggesting that the results of the surgery
would have been different if it had been performed earlier. The delay alone is
insufficient to support a plausible deliberate indifference claim.
Plaintiff also alleges, however, that he was not given pain medication to
address his injuries.

Thus, the Court also considers whether this denial of

treatment can support a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical
need.
Plaintiff first experienced an issue with his knee in December 2014. He now
alleges numerous instances of his knee failing to support his weight and causing
him to fall and experience severe pain. Plaintiff alleges various instances where
he sought and was not provided medical treatment and many requests that the
submitted directly to Dr. Wright seeking treatment that were ignored.

These

allegations are sufficient to plausibly allege that Plaintiff suffered a serious
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medical need from at least 2015 through 2017.
To proceed on his claims, Plaintiff must allege facts satisfying the
subjective element of the standard with regard to each defendant.

Dr. Doe

diagnosed Plaintiff with a sprain in May 20161 and then, upon re-examination in
September 2016, recommended an immediate MRI.

In the original complaint,

Plaintiff states that Dr. Wright noted on his consultation form that Plaintiff’s injury
could have been an MCL tear or a knee sprain. Doc. #1, ¶ 20. That he initially
misdiagnosed the knee as a sprain, rather than a tear, is not cognizable under
section 1983. The claim against Dr. Doe is dismissed.
Dr. Wright diagnosed Plaintiff as suffering a sprain in February 2015. He
prescribed pain medication for two weeks and recommended strengthening
exercises but did not identify specific exercises. Through 2015 and half of 2016,
Plaintiff submitted requests, many to Dr. Wright directly, complaining of pain,
swelling and instability, but received no proper treatment and was specifically
told that no treatment would be provided for budgetary reasons. No treatment
was provided until September 2016, when Dr. Wright successfully appealed the
MRI denial to the URC. As Plaintiff has alleged facts supporting Dr. Wright’s
subjective awareness of Plaintiff’s condition, the Court considers the allegations
against Dr. Wright sufficient to proceed on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims

1

Plaintiff does not allege when Dr. Doe first examined him in the amended
complaint. In the original complaint, however, he stated that this examination occurred
in May 2016.
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for deliberate indifference to his pain and knee instability.
Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Naqvi did not meet with him as scheduled, did not
know the MRI results when they did meet on January 9, 2017, and did not give
Plaintiff any medication at that meeting. Although Dr. Naqvi may not have met
with Plaintiff, he did review the MRI results because he scheduled an orthopedic
consult.

The remaining actions constitute, at most, negligence.

The claims

against Dr. Naqvi regarding medical treatment are dismissed.
Nurse Hollie responded to Plaintiff’s December 2016 request regarding the
knee brace and the MRI results. Plaintiff received responses regarding the MRI
results, but not the knee brace. Plaintiff also requested the brace from Dr. Naqvi.
Failure to comply with prescribed treatment can constitute deliberate indifference
to serious medical needs. Based on the allegations of the complaint, the plaintiff
has alleged a plausible deliberate indifference claim against Defendants Naqvi
and Hollie for failing to provide the prescribed knee brace, without which Plaintiff
could reasonably be expected to be, and alleges that he was, unstable and as a
result suffered an exacerbation of his knee injury and severe pain.
Drs. Ruiz, Farinella, Freston and Naqvi constitute the URC.
initially denied the request for MRI.

The URC

This decision is a disagreement over

treatment which does not constitute deliberate indifference to a serious medical
need. Accord Matos v. Gomprecht, No. 11-CV-1968(NGG)(JO), 2012 WL 1565615,
at *8 (E.D.N.Y. February 14, 2012) (no deliberate indifference where one doctor
recommends surgery while a different doctor concludes surgery is not warranted
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unless more conservative measures such as physical therapy have been proven
not effective).

Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that he was told that the MRI

request was denied initially for budgetary reasons is insufficient to state a
deliberate indifference claim. Thus, there is no cognizable claim against the URC
members.
B. State Law Claims
Plaintiff also references state law claims for medical negligence and
malpractice in his amended complaint. Connecticut law requires that, to bring a
claim for medical malpractice against medical professionals, Plaintiff must file
with his complaint an opinion letter from a qualified medical professional
certifying that there appears to have been medical negligence in the care or
treatment of Plaintiff. Telkamp v. Vitas Healthcare Corp. Atlantic, No. 3:15-CV726(JCH), 2016 WL 777906, at *8 (D. Conn. Feb. 29, 2016) (quoting Conn. Gen.
Stat, § 51-190a(a)). This requirement applies whenever the defendants are sued
in their capacities as medical professionals, the alleged actions were medical in
nature and arose from the relationship between a medical professional and
patient, and the alleged actions were related to medical diagnosis and treatment
and involved the exercise of medical judgment. Id. (quoting Jarmie v. Troncale,
306 Conn. 578, 588 (2012)).
Plaintiff has not submitted the required certificate. Accordingly, all claims
for medical negligence or malpractice are dismissed.

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CONCLUSION
The Clerk is directed to reopen this case. All Eighth Amendment claims
relating to the delay in surgery, all claims against Drs. Doe, Freston, Farinella and
Ruiz, the Eighth Amendment claims for improper medical treatment and any
claims resulting from his membership on the URC against Dr. Naqvi, and the state
law claims are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). The case will
proceed on the Eighth Amendment claim against Dr. Wright for deliberate
indifference to Plaintiff complaints of pain, and the claim against Nurse Hollie and
Dr. Naqvi regarding failure to provide the prescribed knee brace.
The Court enters the following orders.
(1)

The Clerk shall verify the current work addresses for defendants

Wright, Naqvi and Hollie with the Department of Correction Office of Legal Affairs,
mail a waiver of service of process request packets containing the amended
complaint and this order to those defendants within twenty-one (21) days of this
Order, and report to the court on the status of the waiver request on the thirtyfifth (35) day after mailing. If any defendant fails to return the waiver request, the
Clerk shall make arrangements for in-person service by the U.S. Marshal Service
on him in his individual capacity and the defendant shall be required to pay the
costs of such service in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d).
(2)

The Clerk shall send Plaintiff a copy of this Order.

(3)

The defendants shall file their response to the amended complaint,

either an answer or motion to dismiss, within sixty (60) days from the date the
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waiver forms are sent. If they choose to file an answer, they shall admit or deny
the allegations and respond to the cognizable claim recited above. They also
may include any and all additional defenses permitted by the Federal Rules.
(4)

Discovery, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 through

37, shall be completed within seven months (210 days) from the date of this
order. Discovery requests need not be filed with the court.
(5)

All motions for summary judgment shall be filed within eight months

(240 days) from the date of this order.
(6)

Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7(a), a nonmoving party must respond to

a dispositive motion within twenty-one (21) days of the date the motion was filed.
If no response is filed, or the response is not timely, the dispositive motion can
be granted absent objection.
(7)

If Plaintiff changes his address at any time during the litigation of

this case, Local Court Rule 83.1(c)2 provides that Plaintiff must notify the court.
Failure to do so can result in the dismissal of the case. Plaintiff must give notice
of a new address even if he is incarcerated. Plaintiff should write PLEASE NOTE
MY NEW ADDRESS on the notice. It is not enough to just put the new address on
a letter without indicating that it is a new address. If Plaintiff has more than one
pending case, he should indicate all of the case numbers in the notification of
change of address. Plaintiff should also notify the defendant or the attorney for
the defendant of his new address.
(8)

Plaintiff shall utilize the Prisoner Efiling Program when filing
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documents with the court.
SO ORDERED at Hartford, Connecticut, this 19th day of October 2017.

/s/
Hon. Vanessa L. Bryant
United States District Judge

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