Christmas v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada

Filing 23

ORDER granting 11 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; denying 12 Motion for Summary Judgment. Please see attached Memorandum of Decision. The clerk is directed to enter Judgment and close this file in accordance therewith. Signed by Judge Kari A. Dooley on 12/13/18. (Dooley, Kari)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
MEGHAN CHRISTMAS,
Plaintiff,
v.
SUN LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY
OF CANADA,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CIVIL NO. 3:17-CV-1568 (KAD)

December 13, 2018

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE:
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 12] AND
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS [ECF NO. 11]
Statement of the Case
The Plaintiff, Meghan Christmas, (“Plaintiff” or “Christmas”) pursuant to the Employee
Retirement and Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §1001 et seq., challenges the denial of
her claim for Long Term Disability (“LTD”) benefits by the Defendant, Sun Life Assurance
Company of Canada (“Defendant” or “Sun Life”). Before the Court are Christmas’s motion for
summary judgment and Sun Life’s motion for judgment on the record, both of which the Parties
have agreed should be treated as motions for a trial “on the papers.” The Court has reviewed the
parties’ submissions, the administrative record, the applicable statutory scheme and controlling
appellate authority on the issues presented. For the reasons that follow, Christmas’s motion for
summary judgment is DENIED, and Sun Life’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is
GRANTED.
Factual and Procedural Background
Christmas worked for ISGN Corporation (“ISGN”) as a “Manager – Global Solutions
Integration” until April 9, 2014. ISGN had a LTD benefits plan for its employees that is covered
by the provisions of ERISA and insured by Sun Life (the “Plan”). ISGN is the Plan administrator,

1

but it delegated to Sun Life “its entire discretionary authority” to review and to decide claims for
LTD benefits as follows:
The Plan Administrator has delegated to Sun Life its entire
discretionary authority to make all final determinations regarding
claims for benefits under the benefit plan insured by this Policy.
This discretionary authority includes, but is not limited to, the
determination of eligibility for benefit, based upon enrollment
information provided by the Policyholder, and the amount of a
benefits due, and to construe the terms of this Policy.
Any decision made by Sun Life in the exercise of this authority,
including review of denials of benefit, is conclusive and binding on
all parties. Any court reviewing Sun Life’s determinations shall
uphold such determination unless the claimant proves that Sun
Life’s determinations are arbitrary and capricious.
In this case:
Total Disability or Totally Disabled means during the Elimination
Period and the next 24 months, the Employee, because of Injury or
Sickness, is unable to perform the Material and Substantial Duties
of his Own Occupation. . . . To qualify for benefits, the Employee
must satisfy the Elimination Period with the required number of
days of Total Disability, Partial Disability or combination of Days
of Total and Partial Disability.
Christmas stopped working on April 9, 2014. She filed a claim for LTD benefits on June
3, 2014. Thereafter, Christmas submitted multiple medical records from multiple treatment
providers in support of her claim, including the records of Dr. Christopher Skola, her
rheumatologist, and Dr. Michael Karasik, her gastroenterologist. Ultimately, Sun Life denied
Christmas’s claim for LTD benefits on July 28, 2014. Christmas appealed the denial on December
31, 2014. During the appeal process, Sun Life engaged National Medical Review, Co. Ltd.
(“NMR”) to provide a records review by three physicians — D. Dennis Payne, M.D, Board
Certified in Internal Medicine and Rheumatology; David Hoenig, M.D., Board Certified in
Neurology and Pain Medicine; and Steven Channick, M.D., Board Certified in Internal Medicine.
After reviewing the medical records provided by Christmas, each reviewing physician provided
2

an assessment of Christmas’s medical conditions particular to his specialty. Based largely on these
assessments, Sun Life determined that the denial of benefits was the appropriate decision and
denied Christmas’s appeal on March 3, 2015. This action was filed thereafter on September 20,
2017.
As noted above, Sun Life’s motion is captioned a motion for “judgment on the record”
while Christmas’s motion is styled as a motion for summary judgment. “Sometimes in ERISA
cases parties make a ‘motion for judgment on the administrative record,’ which we have observed
is a motion that does not appear to be authorized in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. . . . If
such a motion is treated as a summary judgment motion, the district court must limit its inquiry to
determining whether questions of fact exist for trial. . . . In some circumstances, it may be
appropriate for the district court to treat such a motion as requesting essentially a bench trial ‘on
the papers’ with the District Court acting as the finder of fact. . . . In that scenario, the district
court may make factual findings, but it must be clear that the parties consent to a bench trial on the
parties’ submissions, . . . and the district court must make explicit findings of fact and conclusions
of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).” O’Hara v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co.
of Pittsburgh, PA, 642 F.3d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted). Here, the Parties have explicitly advised the Court, citing O’Hara, that they seek a trial
“on the papers.” Joint Report of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting, ECF No. 9; Joint Status Report,
ECF No. 22; Pls.’ Mem. Supp. Summ. J., ECF No. 12-1.
Standard of Review
The Court must first determine the appropriate standard of review to be applied to Sun
Life’s determination to deny Christmas’s claim for LTD benefits. Christmas contends that de novo
review applies here, while Sun Life contends that an arbitrary and capricious standard applies.

3

“[ERISA] permits a person denied benefits under an employee benefit plan to challenge
that denial in federal court.” Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 108 (2008). “In
‘determining the appropriate standard of review,’ a court should be ‘guided by principles of trust
law’; in doing so, it should analogize a plan administrator to a trustee of a common-law trust; and
it should consider a benefit determination to be a fiduciary act (i.e., an act in which the
administrator owes a special duty of loyalty to the plan beneficiaries).” Id. 111 (quoting Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489, U.S. 101, 111–13 (1989)). Under principles of trust law, a plan
administrator’s denial of benefits will generally be reviewed de novo, unless the plan itself
provides otherwise. Id. See also, Hobson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 574 F.3d 75, 82 (2d Cir. 2009)
(“a administrator’s decision to deny benefits is reviewed de novo” except “where, . . . written plan
documents confer upon a plan administrator the discretionary authority to determine eligibility.”)
However, where the plan documents give the plan administrator discretion to review and
to decide benefit claims, a reviewing court will not disturb the plan administrator’s decision
denying benefits “unless it is arbitrary and capricious.” Hobson, 574 F.3d at 82 (internal quotations
omitted). Under this deferential level of review, a court will overturn an administrator’s decision
to deny benefits only where the decision “was without reason, unsupported by substantial evidence
or erroneous as a matter of law.” Id. at 83. Substantial evidence “is such evidence that a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion reached by [the decisionmaker] . . . and
requires more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Miller v. United Welfare Fund, 72
F.3d 1066, 1072 (2d Cir. 1995) (alterations in original). The scope of review is narrow, and this
Court cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the plan administrator. Hobson, 574 F.3d at
83-84; Pagan v. NYNEX Pension Plan, 52 F.3d 438, 442 (2d Cir. 1995).

4

Here, the Parties agree that the Plan at issue gives the Plan administrator, ISGN,
discretionary authority to review and to decide benefit eligibility for Plan enrollees. ISGN
delegated its “entire discretionary authority” to review and to decide benefit eligibility to Sun Life.
Thus, the arbitrary and capricious standard of review applies in this case.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Christmas urges this Court to apply a de novo standard of
review. She relies upon the fact that Sun Life was operating under a conflict of interest insofar as
it was both deciding eligibility and funding benefits. Where an employer both funds a plan and
determines eligibility thereunder, a clear conflict of interest exists. Glenn, 554 U.S. at 112.
Similarly, a conflict exists where the plan administrator is not the employer but rather an insurance
company selected both to review and decide claims and to pay them where an employee is found
eligible. Id. at 114–15. Under these circumstances, however, the standard of review is not
revisited. Rather, the conflict becomes one of the factors considered when applying the arbitrary
and capricious standard of review. Id. 115–16. See also McCauley v. First Unum Life Ins. Co 551
F.3d 126, 133 (2d Cir. 2008) (“a plan under which an administrator both evaluates and pays
benefits claims creates the kind of conflict of interest that courts must take into account and weigh
as a factor in determining whether there was an abuse of discretion but does not make de novo
review appropriate”); Hobson, 574 F.3d at 82–83 (same).
Christmas also avers that de novo review is appropriate insofar as Sun Life did not comply
with Department of Labor regulations that require a claim administrator “take into account all
comments, documents, records, and other information submitted by the claimant related to the
claim.” 29 C.F.R. 2560.503-1(h)(2)(iv). See Halo v. Yale Health Plan, 819 F.3d 42, 57–58 (2d
Cir. 2016) (holding that failure of plan administrator to adhere strictly to the labor regulations
subjects the denial of coverage to de novo standard of review, even where the plan gives discretion

5

to the administrator). The factual predicate for this argument is that certain source statements
submitted by Christmas’s treating physicians, Dr. Skola and Dr. Karasik, were not provided to Sun
Life’s three reviewing physicians. A review of the record, however, belies this claim.
The records at issue are Dr. Karasik’s “Crohn’s Disease Source Statement,” dated
November 21, 2014, and Dr. Skola’s “Physical Medical Source Statement,” dated November 6,
2014. As indicated above, in evaluating Christmas’s claim, Sun Life engaged three physicians —
Dr. Payne, Dr. Hoenig, and Dr. Channick — to conduct an independent records review. Attached
to each of these physicians’ assessments, is a cover page indicating the “records provided for
review.” Each cover page lists records from Dr. Karasik dated from March 6, 2013 through
January 21, 2015. Dr. Karasik’s source statement falls squarely within this timeframe. Each cover
page also lists records from Dr. Skola dated from February 7, 2014 through November 6, 2014.
Dr. Skola’s November 6, 2014 source statement falls within this timeframe as well. Indeed, Dr.
Skola’s source statement is the only document from Dr. Skola dated November 6, 2014. It is
therefore the only possible record referenced by the reviewing physicians on their list of records
provided for review.
Moreover, Dr. Channick and Dr. Hoenig specifically included the content of Dr. Karasik’s
source statement in their assessments, and Dr. Channick further included the content of Dr. Skola’s
source statement in his assessment. Because the record reflects that each of the reviewing
physicians received the same materials, the Court infers that all three reviewing physicians
received the statements at issue, even if they did not all include the content of each of those
statements in their assessments. Christmas’s reliance upon Halo v. Yale Health Plan, 819 F.3d 42
(2d Cir. 2016) as requiring de novo review is therefore misplaced. Sun Life’s denial of benefits
shall be reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard as set forth above.

6

Discussion
As noted throughout the records, between 2012 and 2015 Christmas was diagnosed at
various times with gastrointestinal issues (including Crohn’s disease, irritable bowel syndrome,
and reflux), psoriasis, arthritis, back pain, joint pain, fatigue, and fibromyalgia. Sun Life’s
reviewing physicians each opined, within their respective specialty, that Christmas’s medical
records did not support a claim of disability as of April 9, 2014 or thereafter. In their assessments,
the reviewing physicians each opined that there was no substantial change in Christmas’s condition
prior to or after April 9, 2014, that the objective findings in Christmas’s medical records were not
consistent with Christmas’s subjective complaints, and that there was insufficient information to
support the claimed diagnoses, disabilities, or limitations on Christmas’s ability to work. On
appeal, Christmas argues that Sun Life’s reliance upon these assessments was arbitrary and
capricious because the reviewing physicians did not adequately address in their assessments the
opinions of Dr. Skola and Dr. Karasik concerning the nature and severity of her medical conditions.
“ERISA and the Secretary of Labor’s regulations under the Act require ‘full and fair’
assessment of claims and clear communication to the claimant of the ‘specific reasons’ for benefit
denials. . . . But these measures do not command plan administrators to credit the opinions of
treating physicians over other evidence relevant to the claimant’s medical condition.” Black &
Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 825 (2003). Although a plan administrator may not
arbitrarily refuse to credit a claimant’s reliable evidence, “courts have no warrant to require [plan]
administrators automatically to accord special weight to the opinions of a claimant’s physician;
nor may courts impose on plan administrators a discrete burden of explanation when they credit
reliable evidence that conflicts with a treating physician’s evaluation.” Id. at 834 (footnote
omitted); Hobson, 574 F.3d at 85. As discussed above, if there is substantial evidence in the record

7

to support the plan administrator’s determination, that determination must stand. Hobson, 574
F.3d at 83–84.
The medical records supplied by Christmas in support of her claim included two statements
from Dr. Skola dated June 6, 2014 and November 6, 2014 respectively. The June 2014 statement
provided that she had psoriatic arthritis, right and left wrist synovical tenderness, bilateral hand
stiffness, foot plantar fasciitis, and low back stiffness. For limitations, Dr. Skola indicated that
Christmas could not stand or walk at all, could sit for only one to three hours a day, and could
drive for only one to three hours a day. Although he indicated she could firmly grasp objects, he
stated she was unable to perform “fine manipulating” and restricted her to lifting ten pounds. He
further opined that she was “unable to work due to active psoriatic arthritis” and gave her a Class
5 rating for her physical impairment rendering her “incapable of minimum (sedentary) activity.”
Dr. Skola also opined regarding Christmas’s mental impairment, indicating that she is “unable to
engage in stress situations or engage in interpersonal relations (marked limitation).” He indicated
that Christmas is unable to work within the limitations described in any capacity and that her
limitations are permanent.
The November 2014 statement included diagnoses of “seronegative spondylitis arthritis
related to Crohn’s,” carpal tunnel syndrome, “degenerative spondylosis, pars defect,” and
depression.

Dr. Skola described Christmas’s symptoms from her medical conditions as

“widespread achiness, stiffness and pain” with “bilateral hand numbness.” As to restrictions, he
now limited Christmas to fifteen minutes of sitting and fifteen minutes of standing a day. He stated
that she could sit, stand, or walk less than two hours in any eight-hour work day. He also restricted
her to lifting rarely ten pounds and never lifting twenty or fifty pounds. He indicated she could
never twist, stoop, crouch/squat, climb stairs, or climb ladders. He restricted the use of her hands

8

and fingers to 10 percent of an eight-hour work day and opined that she would be “off task” 25
percent or more of the time in an eight-hour work day. He estimated that she would have an
absence from work for more than four days per month.
Dr. Karasik also submitted a “Crohn’s Medical Source Statement.” Therein, he included
diagnoses of Crohn’s disease, Primary Biliary Cerhossis, GERD, and psoriatic arthritis/psoriasis.
He indicated that Christmas had constant daily abdominal and joint pain. Dr. Karasik did not
suggest any physical limitations but stated that Christmas would have to take unscheduled
restroom breaks during the working day, that she would need ready access to a restroom, and that
she would be “off task” 25 percent or more of the time during an eight-hour work day.
Notwithstanding the content of these submissions, each of the physicians who conducted an
independent review of the entirety of Christmas’s medical records reached contrary opinions. The
propriety of each physician’s assessment will be addressed in turn.
Dr. Channick’s Assessment
Dr. Channick, who is a Board Certified in Internal Medicine, concluded that Christmas did
not have “Crohn’s as was previously thought.” Instead, he concluded that she had irritable bowel
syndrome and that she had this condition prior to and after April 9, 2014. Dr. Channick’s
conclusion is amply supported by the medical records he reviewed. Although given a tentative
diagnosis of Crohn’s disease by Dr. Karasik, that diagnosis was called into question by Christmas’s
other gastroenterologist, Dr. Frederick Heis in February 2014. Dr. Heis noted that Christmas’s
“wide array of symptoms” had no “clear diagnosis.” He was “not convinced” she had Crohn’s
disease. He also observed that Christmas’s “appeared to have a somatization syndrome” and he
feared she was “over medicated.” Two months later, in April 2014, Dr. Heis further reported:
I reviewed all of her recent CT scans and her CT enterography with
the radiologist this afternoon. There is nothing convincing to

9

support the diagnosis of Crohn disease. The liver appears normal.
The patient’s laboratory tests were all normal except for mild
elevation of the ALT. The antinuclear antibody is positive. All of
her other studies are unremarkable. I told the patient she does not
have Crohn disease. She does not appear to have primary biliary
cirrhosis or any other significant liver problem.
In addition, Dr. Andrew Warner, a consulting gastroenterologist, saw Christmas one month later,
on May 22, 2014. He observed that “the patient has had 2 colonoscopies with ileal examination,
neither of which showed ulcerations, 2 sets of biopsies of the ileum that were nonspecific, and CT
enterography that was normal. With these 5 data points, not demonstrative of Crohn’s disease, I
cannot support the diagnosis of Crohn’s disease.”
In addition to concluding that Christmas did not have Crohn’s disease, Dr. Channick
concluded that, from an internal medicine perspective, Christmas was physically able to perform
full time sedentary work between her alleged onset date, April 9, 2014, and the date of the report.
He also found “no restrictions needed for the work place other than free ability for bathroom breaks
for her IBS symptoms” and that “there were no diagnoses that would cause fatigue that would
prevent sedentary employment.” The clinical findings contained in Christmas’s medical records
fully support these conclusions. Accordingly, it was not arbitrary or capricious for Sun Life to
rely upon Dr. Channick’s assessment in denying Christmas’s claim.
Dr. Hoenig’s Assessment
Dr. Hoenig conducted an independent records review within his area of expertise —
neurology and pain medicine. Based upon his review of the records, he concluded, from a
neurological perspective, that “there is no relevant neurological treatment history and any
medically supported neurological diagnoses present during the period of April 14, 2014 to the
[date of the report]. There is no documentation of neurological pathology. In addition, there is no
documentation of neurological deficits on examination.” Dr. Hoenig found no change in

10

Christmas’s health and corresponding functional capacity between when she was working and her
claimed onset date of April 9, 2014. As a result, Dr. Hoenig concluded that Christmas was not
disabled or unable to perform full time sedentary work during the relevant time period; that her
subjective complaints of pain or fatigue were not consistent with objective medical evidence; that
there was no documentation of objective cognitive or concentration deficits on neurological
examination; and that Christmas’s condition does not “appear to be primarily neurological.”
The medical record amply supports Dr. Hoenig’s neurological assessment. As noted by
Dr. Hoenig, a neurological examination was not done during the majority of Christmas’s doctor
visits. She did, however, have an MRI of her lumbar spine in February 2014 which showed a
partially healed right pars defect, a moderate disc protrusion, a mild mass effect on the thecal sac,
but there was no evidence of mass effect on adjacent nerve roots and the MRI was otherwise
normal. Five days later, Christmas saw Dr. Howard Lantner, a neurosurgeon, for her ongoing back
pain. He noted some tenderness upon palpitation and lower extremity pain. His examination also
found, however, “painless passive range of motion to bilateral hips, 5/5 motor strength,” “negative
straight leg raises,” the ability to ambulate “without difficulty,” and “[n]o evidence of lower
extremity myelopathy.” Christmas saw Dr. Lantner again on June 12, 2014. His treatment notes
reflect that Christmas had “full power in her lower extremities and ambulates without difficulty.
She has no signs of myelopathy.” Dr. Lantner determined she was not a candidate for surgery. Of
note, on both occasions, Dr. Lantner’s “assessment” of Christmas was that she had “intermittent”
low back and lower extremities symptoms.
Finally, Christmas saw Dr. Sharon Katz, a rheumatologist, on April 22, 2014 for “an
evaluation of generalized joint symptoms.” Dr. Katz’s exam revealed “[f]ull range of motion of
the cervical spine. No tenderness with palpitation of the vertebral column. No sign of any active

11

synovitis.” In light of these records, it was not arbitrary or capricious for Sun Life to rely on Dr.
Hoenig’s assessment.
Dr. Payne’s Assessment
Dr. Payne conducted an independent record review in his area of expertise, rheumatology.
Dr. Payne noted:
There is extensive work-up in the file from a rheumatology
perspective including imaging of the hands, wrist, and elbows and
these studies are all normal. She has evaluations by Dr. Scola,
rheumatology, and her laboratory data are all completely normal
other than a positive ANA 1:40. The examination data in the file
from a rheumatology viewpoint never reveals changes of synovitis,
weakness, or atrophy, and there are no deformities or damage.
He also noted that the partially healed L5 pars defect did not show changes that would impair
Christmas’s function. As a result, Dr. Payne concluded that there was no rheumatological
condition which rendered Christmas unable to work or which would support significant limitations
on her functional capacity. Dr. Payne’s assessment is clearly at odds with Dr. Skola’s June 2014
and November 2014 statements.
Christmas’s medical records amply support Dr. Payne’s conclusions. As noted by Dr.
Payne in his assessment, Christmas’s lab results do not support a rheumatological diagnosis, nor
do her medical records. Christmas saw Dr. Skola on April 8, 2014, the day before her claimed
onset date, at which time she complained of “constant” but “dull” pain in her hands. Dr. Skola
ordered ultrasound imaging of Christmas’s wrists on April 8, 2014, which had normal results.
Specifically, the “synovium appeared normal” and the “median nerve was visualized and appeared
normal with normal measurement of 11 mm2. The superficial and deep flexors were normal with
no tenosynovial hypertrophy.”

On April 22, 2014, Dr. Katz, a consulting rheumatologist,

examined Christmas, noting that she was in “no acute distress,” and had a “good range of motion
of all joints examined.” With respect Christmas’s “joint symptoms,” Dr. Katz did not “see any
12

sign of active inflammation” and “[saw] no reason to resume prednisone.” Shortly thereafter,
Christmas saw Dr. Skola on two more occasions, approximately one month apart. At both visits,
Christmas reported pain in her hands and back.1 At both visits, however, Dr. Skola noted that
Christmas appeared comfortable, had a full range of motion, and had “no deformity, no nodules
and no swelling.”2
In sum, Sun Life’s reliance upon the three independent reviewing physicians’ assessments
when denying Christmas’s claim for LTD benefits, was not arbitrary and capricious. Indeed, these
assessments and the medical records that they were based upon provide well more than substantial
evidence to support Sun Life’s denial of benefits. See Hobson, 574 F.3d at 85 (holding that plan
administrator “acted within its discretion in relying upon the conclusions of its independent
consultants’ three reports”).
To the extent Christmas claims that the requirement of objective proof is not included as a
requisite under the Plan and therefore cannot be a basis upon which benefits are denied, she is
incorrect. “[I]t is not unreasonable for ERISA plan administrators to accord weight to objective
evidence that claimant’s medical ailments are debilitating in order to guard against fraudulent of
unsupported claims of disability.” Hobson, 574 at 88. Thus, Sun Life is entitled to require Plan
participants to submit objective medical evidence to support a claim of total disability. Id.; GaudFigueroa v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 771 F. Supp. 2d 207, 216 (D. Conn. 2011).
Lastly, Christmas asserts that Sun Life should have requested an Independent Medical
Examination (“IME”) of her and that its failure to do so was arbitrary and capricious. As Christmas
acknowledges, however, the Second Circuit has held that “requiring the plan administrator to order

1

At the later visit, she further reported pain in her wrist and foot.
Inexplicably, nine days after the second visit, Dr. Skola submitted the APS in which he
described Christmas as permanently disabled and unable to work.
2

13

an IME, despite the absence of objective evidence supporting the applicant’s claim for benefits,
risks casting doubt upon, and inhibiting ‘the commonplace practice of doctors arriving at
professional opinions after reviewing medical files,’ which reduces the ‘financial burden of
conducting repetitive tests and examinations.’” Hobson, 574 F.3d at 91 (quoting Davis v. Unum
Life Ins. Co., 444 F.3d 569, 577 (7th Cir. 2006)). Thus, in the absence of objective medical
evidence to support a claimant’s disability, the plan administrator is not required to request an IME
and the failure to do so is not considered arbitrary and capricious. Hobson, 574 F.3d at 91. See
also Topolian v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 945 F. Supp. 2d 294, 357 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). As discussed
above, the objective evidence plainly supports Sun Life’s conclusion that Christmas was not
disabled.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiff’s titled motion for summary judgment is
DENIED. The Defendant’s titled motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED.
Judgment shall enter in favor of the Defendant. The Clerk is directed to close this matter.
So Ordered, this 14th day of December, 2018.

____/s/___________________________
Kari A. Dooley, USDJ

14