Dixon v. Faucher et al

Filing 11

ORDER DISMISSING CASE. The Clerk of the Court is instructed to enter judgment for Defendants and close this case. Signed by Judge Victor A. Bolden on 8/14/2018. (Riegel, J.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

JAMES DIXON,
Plaintiff,
v.

No. 3:17-cv-01716 (VAB)

WARDEN FAUCHER, et al.,
Defendant.

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER
James Dixon (“Plaintiff”) is incarcerated at the Corrigan-Radgowski Correctional
Institution in Uncasville, Connecticut (“Corrigan”), and proceeding pro se, has sued Warden
Faucher, Deputy Warden Cotto, Lieutenant Stadalnik and Correction Officer Ocasio (collectively
“Defendants”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
For the reasons that follow, the Court DISMISSES the Complaint.
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURE BACKGROUND
A.

Factual Allegations

On July 12, 2017, Mr. Dixon allegedly attended a hearing at Hartford Superior Court.
Compl. at ¶ 1, ECF No. 1. Upon arriving back to Corrigan-Radgowski Correctional Center
(“Corrigan”), he and four other inmates were allegedly held in a room adjacent to the “bullpen.”
Id. ¶¶ 3–4. The strip and search room is located within the “bullpen.” Id. ¶ 4. An Admitting and
Processing Correctional Officer allegedly called each inmate into the strip-search room to be
searched. Id. ¶ 5. On that day, the stripsearches were allegedly conducted by Officer Ocasio. Id.
Another Admitting and Processing Officer allegedly stood in the area near the entrance of the
strip-search room, but did not completely block the entrance from inmates standing outside of
but within view of the room. Id.

Mr. Dixon alleges that he could see other inmates being strip-searched by Officer Ocasio.
Id. He also alleges that, when he entered the strip-search room, he could see the other inmates
outside the room. Id. ¶ 6. Mr. Dixon alleges that it was impossible for the Admitting and
Processing Officer standing in the door to obstruct the view of the inmates outside the stripsearch room because the officer allegedly was six feet tall and weighed between 180–190
pounds. Id. ¶ 7. Mr. Dixon alleges that he is six feet and four inches tall and weighs between
250–260 pounds. Id.
On July 31, 2017, Mr. Dixon alleges that he submitted an inmate request to Warden
Faucher about the incident, which Warden Faucher allegedly forwarded to Lieutenant Stadalnik.
Id. ¶ 8. Mr. Dixon alleges that Lieutenant Stadalnik stated he would remedy his inmate request
by requiring the Admitting and Processing Officers to place a piece of tape on the floor, a certain
distance from the strip-search room, for the inmates, who are not involved in the search, to stand
behind so the inmates being searched could not be seen. Id. Lieutenant Stadalnik allegedly did
not promise to implement any other remedy to provide inmates privacy during the strip searches.
Id. Mr. Dixon alleges that he did not file another inmate request form or pursue further an
administrative remedy, in light of Lieutenant Stadalnik’s representation that he would remedy
the issue. Id. ¶ 10.
A.

Previous Litigation

Mr. Dixon previously filed an action against several Corrigan Officers in December
2015, alleging that correctional officers improperly strip-searched him on various dates in 2015.
Id. at 3–4; see also Dixon v. Santiago, et al., No. 3:15-cv-1575 (JAM), 2015 WL 95822729, at
*1–2 (D. Conn. Dec. 30, 2015). On January 13, 2017, the Court dismissed that case under Local

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Rule 41(b) because the parties had settled. Order of Dismissal, Dixon v. Santiago, No. 3:15-cv1575 (JAM) (D. Conn. Jan. 13, 2017), ECF No. 46.
The Settlement Agreement required that the Warden of Corrigan (1) implement a roll-call
and revive the training program for the correctional staff regarding the requirements of
Administrative Directive 6.7 pertaining to non-emergency strip searches of inmates, and (2)
ensure that inmate searches in the Admitting and Processing area and the gym or the exercise
room at Corrigan be conducted in areas out of view of individuals not involved in the searches.
Settlement Agreement and General Release at 10–16, ECF No. 1-1.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), prisoner civil complaints against governmental actors must

be reviewed any portion of the complaint that “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted,” or that “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief,”28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2), must be dismissed.
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint contain “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2). A court must accept as true all factual matters alleged in a complaint, although a
complaint may not survive unless its factual recitations state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face. See, e.g. Ascroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d
170, 177 (2d Cir. 2014). “A claim has facial plausibility when a plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A complaint that only
includes “‘labels and conclusions,’ ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action’ or

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‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement,’” does not meet the facial
plausibility standard. Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007)).
It is well-established that “pro se complaints ‘must be construed liberally and interpreted
to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.’” Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d
Cir. 2013) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006)); see
also Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101–02 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing special rules of
solicitude for pro se litigants). The complaint, however, must still include sufficient factual
allegations to meet the standard of facial plausibility.
III.

DISCUSSION
Mr. Dixon seeks $50,000 in punitive damages and $50,000 in compensatory damages

from Defendants individually. Compl. at 7. Mr. Dixon, however, does not explain in the
Complaint how Defendants violated his federally or constitutionally protected rights.
A.

Claims Against Deputy Warden Cotto

Deputy Warden Cotto is listed as a Defendant in the title of the caption, on the first page
of the Complaint, and in the description of parties on the second page of the Complaint. Mr.
Cotto, however, is not otherwise mentioned in any other part of the Complaint. As a result, Mr.
Dixon has not sufficiently alleged that Mr. Cotto violated his federally or constitutionally
protected rights. The claims against Mr. Cotto therefore are dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)(1). Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133,138 (2d Cir. 2013) (“It is well settled
that, in order to establish a defendant’s individual liability in a suit brought under § 1983, a
plaintiff must show, inter alia, the defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional
deprivation.”).

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B.

Claims Against Defendants in Their Official Capacities

To the extent that Mr. Dixon seeks monetary damages from the defendants in their
official capacities, those claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Kentucky. v. Graham,
473 U.S. 159 (1985) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment, which protects the State from suits
for monetary relief, also protects state officials sued for damages in their official capacity);
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342–43 (1979) (stating that Congress did not intend for the Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to override “constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several
States” in civil claims against state officials acting within their official capacities). All claims for
monetary damages against Defendants while acting in their official capacities therefore are
dismissed under to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2). Abrams v. Erfe, No. 3:17-c -1570 (CSH), 2018 WL
691714, *19 (D. Conn. Fed. 2, 2018) (dismissing the claims against the defendants while acting
in their official capacities).
C.

Enforcement of Settlement Agreement

It is unclear whether Mr. Dixon has filed this action to enforce the Settlement Agreement
reached in Dixon, or to assert a new claim regarding the privacy concerns of the strip search
conducted on July 12, 2017. To the extent that Mr. Dixon is attempting to enforce the settlement
agreement, such relief is not available here because Mr. Dixon filed this action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.
A settlement agreement requires its own basis for a federal court to have jurisdiction over
the enforcement of the terms. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 378-81 (1994).
Without a basis, a federal court will only retain jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement, if
the dismissal order specifically reserves such authority or the order incorporates the terms of the

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settlement. Id.; Hendrickson v. United States, 791 F.3d 354, 358 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[A] district
court does not automatically retain jurisdiction to hear a motion to enforce a settlement
agreement simply by virtue of having disposed of the original case. Instead, a motion to enforce
a settlement agreement is fundamentally a claim of breach of a contract, part of the consideration
of which was dismissal of an earlier federal suit and therefore requires its own basis for
jurisdiction.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
If a district court does not retain jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement, any
action to enforce a provision of the agreement must be brought in a state court as a breach of
contract action. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 382 (“[E]nforcement of the settlement agreement is for
state courts, unless there is some independent basis for federal jurisdiction”).
Mr. Dixon has provided no factual detail to suggest that this Court has jurisdiction to
grant the relief he seeks. After the Stipulation of Dismissal was filed on February 6, 2017, the
Court did not enter an additional order that included language indicating that the Court would
retain jurisdiction over any issues regarding the enforcement of the settlement agreement.
Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice, Dixon v. Santiago, No. 3:15-cv-1575 (JAM) (Feb. 7,
2017), ECF No. 47. The Order of Dismissal additionally does not incorporate the terms of the
Settlement Agreement or state that this Court would retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the
Settlement Agreement. Order of Dismissal. Nor does the Settlement Agreement suggest that this
Court would retain jurisdiction over its enforcement. Settlement Agreement and General Release
at 10–16.

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Absent an independent, jurisdictional basis for this Court to enforce the settlement, the
claims against Defendants concerning the enforcement of the Settlement Agreement therefore
are dismissed.
D.

The Strip-Search on July 12, 2017

To the extent that Mr. Dixon asserts a new claim that Warden Faucher, Lieutenant
Stadalnik, and Officer Ocasio violated his right to privacy when he was strip-searched on July
12, 2017, Mr. Dixon’s claim is foreclosed because he has not fully exhaust all available
administrative remedies.
Prisoners are required to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a federal lawsuit
related to prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“No action shall be brought with respect to
prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner
confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as
are available are exhausted.”). This includes all claims regarding “prison life, whether they
involve general circumstances or particular episodes.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524, 532
(2002).
Exhaustion of all available administrative remedies must occur, regardless of whether the
administrative procedures provide the relief that the inmate seeks. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S.
731, 741 (2001). Furthermore, prisoners are required to comply with all procedural rules
regarding the grievance process prior to commencing an action in federal court. Woodford v.
Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90–91, 93 (2006) (noting that “proper exhaustion of administrative remidies,
which ‘means using all steps that the agency holds out and doing so properly (so that the agency
addresses the issues on the merits).”) (quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th

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Cir. 2002)) (emphasis in original). Thus, completion of the exhaustion process after a prisoner
has filed an action in federal court does not satisfy the exhaustion requirement. Neal v. Goord,
267 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2001). Special circumstances also will not relieve an inmate of the
obligation to satisfy the exhaustion requirement.
An inmate’s failure to exhaust all administrative remedies is only excusable, if the
remedies are, in fact, unavailable. Ross v. Blake, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1858 (2016).
Although failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199, 216 (2007), a court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim when the
allegations on the face of the complaint establish that it is subject to dismissal, even on the basis
of an affirmative defense. Williams v. Priatno, 829 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing Jones,
549 U.S. at 215) (“[A] district court still may dismiss a complaint for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies if it is clear on the face of the complaint that the plaintiff did not satisfy
the PLRA exhaustion requirement.”).
Mr. Dixon has conceded that he has not exhausted all available administrative remedies
concerning July 2017 the strip-search. See Compl. ¶ 10 (noting that “[n]o further resolution or
Administrative Remedy was sought” because the lieutenant addressed the issue). Accordingly,
Mr. Dixon’s privacy claim is dismissed without prejudice for failure to fully exhaust
administrative remedies.
IV.

CONCLUSION
All claims against Deputy Warden Cotto and the claims against the remaining defendants

with regard to enforcement of the Settlement Agreement, Dixon v. Santiago, No. 3:15-cv-1575
(JAM) are DISMISSED under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). To the extent that Mr. Dixon claims

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that Defendants have violated the terms of the Settlement Agreement entered into by the parties
in Dixon v. Santiago, No. 3:15-cv-1575 (JAM), his remedy, if any, may be available by filing a
motion for contempt or to enforce the Settlement Agreement in state court.
The privacy claim against Warden Faucher, Lieutenant Stadalnik, and Officer Ocasio
related to the July 12, 2017, strip search of Mr. Dixon is DISMISSED without prejudice for Mr.
Dixon’s failure to fully exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing this action. To the
extent that Mr. Dixon seeks to pursue his claim related to the July 12, 2017, strip search, he may
file a new action after he has exhausted his available remedies with regard to that claim.
The Clerk of the Court is instructed to enter judgment for Defendants and close this case.
Should Mr. Dixon choose to appeal this decision, he may not do so in forma pauperis,
because such an appeal would not be taken in good faith. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).
SO ORDERED at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 14th day of August, 2018.
/s/ Victor A. Bolden
VICTOR A. BOLDEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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