Lewis v. Erfe et al

Filing 97

ORDER denying 54 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, and granting in part and denying in part 56 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court denies Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and grants in part and denies in part Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as set forth in the attached ruling and for the reasons set forth there. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 3/30/2020. (Dannenmaier, Katherine)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
KACEY LEWIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
SCOTT ERFE, ET AL.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 3:17cv1764(VLB)

March 30, 2020

RULING ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff, Kasey Lewis, is currently incarcerated at Garner Correctional
Institution.

He initiated this action by filing a civil rights complaint against

Warden Scott Erfe, Deputy Warden Robert Martin, Freedom of Information Act
(“FOIA”) Liaison Michelle King, Nurses Kate Barnas, 1 Alan Wood and Sarah Baker
and Lieutenants Champion, Colvin, Perez and Hackett regarding his placement on
in-cell restraints at Corrigan-Radgowski Correctional Institution (“CorriganRadgowski” for almost three days due to his refusal to submit to a visual body
cavity strip search in October 2017. The parties have filed cross-motions for

Plaintiff listed Nurse Kate Barnas as Kate Barnes in the complaint. See
Compl., Doc No. 1, at 1-2. The Clerk was unable to serve the complaint on Barnes
because the Department of Correction Legal Affairs office had no record of a Kate
Barnes working at Corrigan-Radgowski in October 2017. The Court instructed
Plaintiff to provide the correct name of Nurse Barnes to the Clerk. Upon the filing
of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, it became clear that Nurse Kate
Barnes was in fact Nurse Kate Barnas. See Ex. R, Doc. No. 56-21, at 4. On
December 30, 2019, the Court directed the Clerk to attempt to effectuate service
of the complaint on Defendant Kate Barnas at her last known address. See Order,
Doc. No. 93, at 4-5, 13. On January 3, 2020, the Clerk sent a copy of the
complaint, the IRO and waiver of service of summons forms to the Department of
Connecticut Legal Affairs office to be forwarded to Kate Barnas at her last known
address.
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summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the defendants’ motion will
be denied in part and granted in part and Plaintiff’s motion will be denied.
I.

Procedural Background
On October 23, 2018, the Court reviewed the complaint in accordance with

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) and dismissed all official capacity claims asserted against
the Defendants, the FOIA and First Amendment claims against Liaison King in her
individual capacity, the First Amendment and all other federal constitutional and
federal statutory claims against Warden Erfe and Deputy Warden Martin in their
individual capacities and the Eighth Amendment claims of deliberate indifference
to medical needs, health and safety against Nurse Wood in his individual capacity
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

See IRO, Doc. No. 11, at 21. The Court

permitted the following claims to proceed against the remaining defendants in
their individual capacities: the Eighth Amendment claims of excessive force
against Lieutenants Perez, Hackett, Champion and Colvin and Warden Erfe, the
Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to medical needs against
Nurses Barnas and Baker and the Eighth Amendment claims of deliberate
indifference to health and safety against Nurses Baker and Barnes, Lieutenants
Perez, Hackett, Champion and Colvin and Warden Erfe. Id. at 21-22.
Defendants Erfe, Baker, Champion, Colvin, Perez and Hackett have
appeared and have filed an answer to the complaint. Both Plaintiff and
Defendants Erfe, Baker, Champion, Colvin, Perez and Hackett have moved for
summary judgment on all remaining claims.
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II.

Standard of Review
When filing a motion for summary judgment, the moving party bears the

burden of demonstrating “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and [that it] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see
also Nick’s Garage, Inc. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 875 F.3d 107, 113-14 (2d Cir.
2017) (citations omitted). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the
suit under the governing law,” and is “genuine” if “a reasonable jury could return
a verdict for the nonmoving party” based on it. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The moving party may satisfy its burden “by showing –
that is pointing out to the district court – that there is an absence of evidence to
support the nonmoving party’s case.” PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 315 F.3d
101, 105 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curium) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
If a motion for summary judgment is supported by documentary evidence
and sworn affidavits and “demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact,” the nonmoving party must do more than vaguely assert the
existence of some unspecified disputed material facts or “rely on conclusory
allegations or unsubstantiated speculation.”

Robinson v. Concentra Health

Servs., Inc., 781 F.3d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Thus, the party
opposing the motion for summary judgment “must come forward with specific
evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact.” Id.
In reviewing the record, the court must “construe the evidence in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party and… draw all reasonable inferences in

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its favor.” Gary Friedrich Enters., L.L.C. v. Marvel Characters, Inc., 716 F.3d 302,
312 (2d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). The court may not, however, “make
credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. . . . [because] [c]redibility
determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate
inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.” Proctor v.
LeClaire, 846 F.3d 597, 607–08 (2d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
“The same standard applies where, as here, the parties filed crossmotions for summary judgment and the district court granted one motion but
denied the other.” Morales v. Quintel Entm't, Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2001)
(citation omitted). “[E]ach party’s motion must be examined on its own merits,
and in each case all reasonable inferences must be drawn against the party
whose motion is under consideration.” Id. (citation omitted). Even if “both parties
contend that there are no genuine issues of material fact [in dispute]” a district
court “is not bound to enter judgment for either of the parties, because th[e] court
may discern material factual disputes on its own.”

BWP Media USA Inc. v.

Polyvore, Inc., 922 F.3d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing Morales, 249 F.3d at 121).
The court reads a pro se party’s papers liberally and interprets them “to
raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Willey v. Kirkpatrick, 801 F.3d
51, 62 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Despite this
liberal interpretation, however, allegations unsupported by admissible evidence
“do not create a material issue of fact” and cannot overcome a properly
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supported motion for summary judgment. Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d
33, 41 (2d Cir. 2000).
III.

Facts 2
As of October 24, 2014, Plaintiff was a sentenced inmate within the custody

of the State of Connecticut Department of Correction.

Defs.’ Corrected L.R.

56(a)1 ¶ 1. On that date, prison officials at MacDougall-Walker Correctional
Institution transferred Plaintiff to Corrigan-Radgowski. Id. ¶ 2. Plaintiff arrived at
Corrigan-Radgwoski at approximately 8:00 p.m. Id. ¶ 3; Ex. R, Incident Report at
1, Doc. No. 56-21. Scott Erfe was the Warden at Corrigan-Radgowski from July
2010 until November 2014. Ex. B, Erfe Aff. ¶ 3, Doc. No. 56-5.
Having been transferred between correctional facilities, Plaintiff was
required to undergo a strip search upon his arrival at Corrigan-Radgowski
pursuant to State of Connecticut Administrative Directive 6.7(7)(A)(1) & (4),
Searches Conducted in Correctional Facilities, Inmate Strip-Searches When
Reasonable Suspicion is not Required.

Defs.’ Corrected L.R. 56(a)1 ¶ 3.

Administrative Directive 6.7 defines a strip search as “a visual body cavity search
which includes a systematic visual inspection of an unclothed person’s hair,

The relevant facts are taken from the Defendants’ Corrected Local Rule
56(a)1 Statement (“Defs.’ Corrected L.R. 56(a)1”), [Doc. No. 78], Exhibits B
through G and R, [Doc. Nos. 56-5 through 56-10, 56-21], Ex. S, [Doc. No. 57]
(Plaintiff’s Medical Records filed under Seal) and Exs. H-P, Q, [Doc. No. 58] (DVDs
filed under Seal), that are referenced in the Corrected Local Rule 56(a)1
Statement. The facts are also taken from Pl.’s Local Rule 56(a)2 Statement (“Pl.’s
L.R. 56(a)2”), [Doc. No. 77-2], filed in opposition to Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, Exhibits 1-4, [Doc. Nos. 77-3 through 77-6], Pl.’s Local Rule
56(a)1 Statement (“Pl.’s’ L.R. 56(a)1”), [Doc. No. 54-2], filed in support of his own
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body cavities []to include the individual’s ears, nose, mouth, under arms, soles of
the feet and between the toes, rectum and genitalia. . . . [and] a physical search of
the clothing and any personal effects.” Id. ¶ 4; Ex. E, Admin. Directive 6.7(3)(Q),
Doc. No. 56-8.
A correctional officer escorted Plaintiff to the shower area in the admitting
and processing area for a strip search. Ex. R at 1, 3, 11, Doc. No. 56-21. As part
of the visual body cavity strip search, the officer instructed Plaintiff to bend over
at the waist and spread his buttocks to permit the officer to view Plaintiff’s rectal
area. Pl.’s Dep. at 30:10 – 31:1, Doc. No. 77-4. Plaintiff refused to engage in this
part of the strip search process. Id.; Defs.’ Corrected L.R. 56(a)1 ¶ 5. After
securing Plaintiff in handcuffs, an officer placed Plaintiff in a holding cell in the
admitting and processing area and summoned Lieutenant Perez. Defs.’ Corrected
L.R. 56(a)1 ¶ 5.
Compliance with all aspects of the strip search process, including a visual
inspection of the rectal area to rule out the possibility that an inmate has
dangerous contraband secreted in that area, is important to preserving the safety
and security of the prison facility, prison staff members and other inmates. Id. ¶
6. Upon his arrival at Plaintiff’s cell in the admitting and processing area,
Lieutenant Perez spoke to Plaintiff and attempted to gain his compliance with the
strip search order requiring him to bend over at the waist and spread his buttocks
to permit an officer to view his rectal area. Id. ¶ 7. Plaintiff informed Lieutenant

motion for summary judgment and Plaintiff’s notarized Complaint, [Doc. No. 1].
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Perez that he had already stripped and had performed the squat and cough
portion of the strip search twice in front of another officer before Lieutenant
Perez arrived and that any visual inspection of his rectum would require the use
of force by prison officials because he was not going to voluntarily bend over and
expose his rectum. Id. ¶¶ 8-9; Ex. H, DVD, Oct. 24, 2014, at 3:45 – 4:20; Pl.’s Decl.
¶ 8, Doc. No. 77-3.
Because Plaintiff would not agree comply with the strip search order
requiring a visual inspection of his rectal area, Lieutenant Perez directed several
officers to enter Plaintiff’s cell and apply in-cell restraints to his ankles, wrists
and waist. Defs.’ Corrected L.R. 56(a)1 ¶¶ 9-10. In-cell restraints are defined in
Administrative Directive 6.5 as “Restraint within a cell of an acutely disruptive
inmate utilizing one or more of the following restraining devices as appropriate:
handcuffs, leg irons, security (tether) chain, belly chains, flex cuffs and/or black
box.” Id. ¶ 11; Ex. D, Admin. Directive. 6.5(3(F), Doc. No. 56-7. In-cell restraints
typically include handcuffs applied to the inmate’s wrists in the front of his body,
leg irons applied to the inmate’s ankles and a tether chain connected between the
leg irons and the handcuffs. Defs.’ Corrected L.R. 56(a)1 ¶ 14. The tether chain
must be long enough to permit the inmate to stand upright. Id. In-cell restraints
may be used by prison officials when an inmate refuses a direct order, such as an
order to undergo a strip search as required by Administrative Directive 6.7. Id. ¶
15.
The black box device is a small metal or plastic device that is fitted over the
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keyholes in the handcuffs to prevent an inmate from picking the locks securing
the handcuffs. Id. ¶ 12. When applied, the black box forms a rigid link between
the cuff on each wrist. Id. If the black box is not applied to cover the key holes in
the handcuffs, the inmate is free to turn his hands and wrists and could
manipulate the handcuffs or pick the locks securing the handcuffs to his or her
wrists. Id. ¶ 13.
A controlled strip search is defined as a “strip-search in which Department
personnel maintain physical, hands on control of an inmate through the use of
restraints or approved restraint techniques for the purposes of safety and
security.”

Ex. E at 2, Admin. Directive 6.7(3)(F). A prison staff member may

conduct a hands-on controlled strip search of an inmate for various reasons
including when an “inmate refuses to comply with a strip search as defined in
Section 3(Q) of . . . Directive [6.7].” Id. 6.7(7)(D)(1). A controlled strip search,
which requires staff members to put their hands on an inmate, may expose staff
members and the inmate who is being searched to injury. Defs.’ Corrected L.R.
56(a)1 ¶ 16.
Pursuant to the order of Lieutenant Perez, on October 24, 2014, officers
placed handcuffs on Plaintiff’s wrists and leg irons around his ankles, attached a
tether chain between the handcuffs and the leg irons and applied the black box
device over the handcuffs. Defs.’ Corrected L.R. 56(a)1 ¶ 18. The application of
in-cell restraints, including the black box device, ensures that an inmate’s hands
and wrists are restricted and limit his or her ability to access any contraband
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items that may be in his or her rectum. Id. ¶ 19. At approximately 9:15 p.m., after
applying the in-cell restraints to Plaintiff’s limbs, officers, under the supervision
of Lieutenant Perez, escorted Plaintiff to a cell in the restrictive housing unit. Id.
¶ 20.
Lieutenant Perez returned to the restrictive housing unit at 9:59 p.m. and
spoke to Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 22. Plaintiff asked Lieutenant Perez for a shirt and socks
and Lieutenant Perez agreed to provide those items to Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 23. A nurse
then spoke to Plaintiff through the trap in the cell door and Plaintiff stated that he
would not perform the strip search requiring him to bend at the waist and spread
his buttocks because he believed that it violated his right to decency and was
degrading. Id. ¶ 24.
The following morning, October 25, 2014, at 10:00 a.m., Nurse Baker and
Lieutenant Colvin arrived at Plaintiff’s cell in the restrictive housing unit to check
his restraints. Id. ¶ 25. Later that day, at approximately 11:25 p.m. on October 25,
2014, Lieutenant Champion arrived at Plaintiff’s cell to assess his restraints. Id. ¶
26. Plaintiff informed Lieutenant Champion that he was experiencing pain in his
wrists because the restraints were too tight.

Id. ¶ 28.

Lieutenant Champion

observed that the handcuffs seemed to have moved up on Plaintiff’s arms. Id.
Lieutenant Champion escorted Plaintiff to the hallway outside of his cell,
instructed officers to remove the handcuffs and permitted a nurse to treat the
blisters and lacerations on Plaintiff’s wrists and forearms. Id. ¶¶ 29-30. After the
nurse had treated Plaintiff’s injuries, Lieutenant Champion instructed officers to
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reapply and readjust the restraints. Id. ¶ 29. After officers had reapplied the
handcuffs and black box device to Plaintiff’s wrists, Lieutenant Champion
instructed the nurse to monitor Plaintiff’s restraints to make sure they did not ride
up on Plaintiff’s forearms. Id. ¶ 33.
During her interaction with Plaintiff, Lieutenant Champion asked Plaintiff if
he wanted to comply with the strip search process requiring him to bend at the
waist and spread his buttocks. Id. ¶ 27; Ex. J, DVD, Oct. 25, 2014, at 0:35 – 1:01.
Plaintiff indicated that he would do the squat and cough search but would not
bend at the waist and spread his buttocks. Id.
Later that night, at approximately 1:00 a.m. on October 26, 2014, Lieutenant
Hackett visited Plaintiff’s cell to conduct a check of Plaintiff’s restraints. Id. ¶ 36.
Lieutenant Hackett removed the restraints and took photographs of the injuries
on Plaintiff’s wrists. Id. ¶ 37.
The following morning, October 26, 2014 at approximately 10:00 a.m.,
Lieutenant Colvin entered Plaintiff’s cell to conduct a restraint check. Id. ¶ 38.
Lieutenant Colvin asked Plaintiff if he would comply with the strip search process
requiring him to bend at the waist and spread his buttocks. Id.; Ex. J, DVD, Oct.
26, 2014, at 0:40 – 4:10. Plaintiff indicated that he understood the strip search
policy described in Administrative Directive 6.7, but he would not bend at the
waist and spread his buttocks as part of the strip search because doing so would
violate his right to bodily privacy. Id.
Officers removed the restraints from Plaintiff’s wrists and Nurse Baker
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cleaned Plaintiff’s injuries and applied new bandages to the injured areas. Id. ¶
41. Officers reapplied the handcuffs and black box device to Plaintiff’s wrists and
Nurse Baker and Lieutenant Colvin checked the leg irons and handcuffs to
ensure that there was ample space between the restraints and Plaintiff’s ankles
and wrists. Id. ¶ 43. Nurse Baker informed the Plaintiff that she thought the
blisters on his wrists and arms would open up again if he remained in handcuffs
and the black box device and encouraged Plaintiff to agree to the visual cavity
strip search because it was her understanding that officers would remove the incell restraints if he did so. Id. ¶ 44. Lieutenant Colvin informed Plaintiff that he
could notify an officer if he changed his mind about undergoing the strip search
that involved bending over and spreading his buttocks to permit a visual
inspection of his rectal area. Id.
At approximately 11:30 a.m. on October 26, 2014, Lieutenant Colvin
informed Warden Erfe that Plaintiff was continuing to refuse to comply with the
strip search order and that he and Nurse Baker had observed injuries on
Plaintiff’s wrists that had been caused by the in-cell restraints. Id. ¶ 45. Warden
Erfe instructed Lieutenant Colvin to remove the in-cell restraints from Plaintiff’s
limbs and waist, including the black box device, and to transition Plaintiff to full
stationary restraints in order to prevent further harm to Plaintiff from the in-cell
restraints and to ensure the safety and security of staff members and the facility.
Id. ¶¶ 46, 48. A Full Stationary Restraint is defined as “[s]ecuring an inmate by
the four (4) points of the arms and legs to a stationary surface” using soft, wide
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and flexible straps. Id. ¶ 46; Ex. D, Admin. Directive. 6.5(3)(E) & 8(C)(2), Doc. No.
56-7.
At approximately 1:00 p.m., Lieutenant Colvin and Nurse Baker entered
Plaintiff’s cell and Lieutenant Baker asked Plaintiff if he would agree to the strip
search requiring him to bend at the waist and spread his buttocks. Id. ¶ 49; Ex. L,
DVD, Oct. 26, 2014, at 1:00 – 1:10. Plaintiff indicated that he would not agree to
do so. Id. Lieutenant Colvin supervised officers while they removed the in-cell
restraints from Plaintiff’s limbs and then secured Plaintiff to the bed frame using
straps attached to his ankles and wrists. Id. ¶ 50. Before officers applied the full
stationary restraints, Nurse Baker removed the bandages from Plaintiff’s wrists,
cleaned his wounds, applied fresh bandages and gave him medication to treat the
pain and swelling in his wrists. Id. ¶ 51. Nurse Baker checked the full stationary
restraints and noted that one restraint was too tight. Id. ¶ 52. An officer adjusted
that restraint. Id.
Plaintiff remained in full stationary restraints until approximately 11:30 a.m.
on October 27, 2014. Id. ¶ 54. On eleven occasions during Plaintiff’s 22-hour
confinement on stationary restraints, medical staff members visited Plaintiff’s cell
to treat Plaintiff’s injuries and assess the restraints, and correctional staff
members permitted Plaintiff to engage in range of motion exercises and adjusted
and reapplied the restraints on his four limbs. Id. ¶ 55.
At some point during the morning of October 27, 2014, Warden Erfe visited
Plaintiff to check on his status. Id. ¶ 57. Later that morning, Warden Erfe
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instructed Lieutenant Colvin to perform a controlled strip search on Plaintiff
because he thought is was in the best interest of Plaintiff to remove him from full
restraints and the best interest of the facility to determine whether Plaintiff had
any contraband in his rectal area. Id. ¶ 58.
Prior to performing the controlled strip search on Plaintiff, Lieutenant
Colvin asked Plaintiff if he would agree to undergo the strip search that required
him to bend over and spread his buttocks. Id. ¶ 60; Ex. Q, DVD, Oct. 27, 2014, at
11:00 – 11:35, 17:00 – 17:35. Plaintiff indicated that he would not. Id. From
approximately 11:15 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. on October 27, 2014, Lieutenant Colvin
supervised four officers as they performed a controlled strip search on Plaintiff in
the restrictive housing unit. Id. ¶¶ 59, 62; Ex. Q, DVD, Oct. 27, 2014, at 29:40 –
37:30.

Plaintiff fully cooperated with the search and the officers found no

contraband. Id. ¶ 62; Ex. R at 42-49, Doc. No. 56-21. After the search, Lieutenant
Colvin ordered officers to remove all restraints from Plaintiff’s limbs. Id.
IV.

Discussion
Defendant Baker argues that she was not deliberately indifferent to

Plaintiff’s medical needs or his health or safety, Defendants Perez, Hackett,
Champion, Colvin and Erfe argue that they were not deliberately indifferent to
Plaintiff’s health or safety and did not use excessive force against Plaintiff and all
of the Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. In support of
his own motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff submitted a declaration that
essentially mirrored the allegations in the complaint. See Decl., Doc. No. 54-3.
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He argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because the Defendants
cannot dispute the facts asserted in the complaint.

In opposition to the

Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff initially argued that it was untimely. See Doc. No.
60. In his second response, Plaintiff argues that the Defendants are not entitled
to judgement as a matter of law or qualified immunity as to the claim of deliberate
indifference to a serious risk of harm. See Doc. No. 77.
Pursuant to the deadlines set forth in the Initial Review Order, [Doc. No.
11], discovery was to be completed within six months and motions for summary
judgment were to be filed within seven months. Defendants filed their motion for
summary judgment on May 23, 2019. Given that the Clerk set the deadline for
filing summary judgment motions as May 23, 2019, the Defendants’ motion was
not untimely. See Defendants’ Resp. Obj., Doc. No. 62, at 5.
At the end of his memorandum in opposition to the Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, Plaintiff includes a statement indicating that facts essential
to justify his opposition are unavailable to him. See Pl.’s Mem. Opp’n Mot. Summ.
J. at 9 (citing Rule 56(d), Fed. R. Civ. P.), Doc. No. 77-1.

In support of this

contention, Plaintiff claims that he did not receive Exhibit S that Defendants filed
in support of their motion for summary judgment. The court has placed Exhibit S,
which contains copies of medical incident reports pertaining to treatment
provided to Plaintiff, under seal. See Doc. No. 57.
Rule 56(d), Fed. R. Civ. P. requires that the party seeking relief “show by
affidavit or declaration, that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts
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essential to justify its opposition. . . .” Id. On June 12, 2019, in response to
Plaintiff’s Notice that he had not received the documents designated as Exhibit S,
Defendants’ counsel represented to the Court that he had remailed Exhibit S to
Plaintiff at his current address.

See Doc. No. 74. Plaintiff has not otherwise

informed the Court that he did not receive the documents designated as Exhibit S
in support of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

Nor has he filed a

declaration or affidavit pursuant to Rule 56(d), Fed. R. Civ. P. indicating that he is
unable to present evidence or facts that are “essential to justify [his] opposition”
to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Id. Given that Counsel for the
Defendants remailed a copy of the documents designated and placed under seal
as Exhibit S to Plaintiff and Plaintiff has not informed the court that he did not
received the documents, there is no basis to defer considering or to deny the
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(d)(1), Fed. R. Civ.
P.
A.

Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs

“The Eighth Amendment forbids deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs of prisoners.” Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Servs., 719 F.3d 127, 138
(2d Cir. 2013) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). To state a claim
for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, two requirements must be
met. Under the objective prong, the inmate’s medical need or condition must be
“a serious one.”

Brock v. Wright, 315 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 2003) (citations

omitted). In determining the seriousness of a medical condition or need, district
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courts should consider whether “a reasonable doctor or patient would find [it]
important and worthy of comment,” whether the condition “significantly affects
an individual's daily activities,” and whether it causes “chronic and substantial
pain.” Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
The second prong is subjective. Under this prong, a prison official must
have been actually aware that his or her actions or inactions would cause a
substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate. See Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d
263, 279-80 (2d Cir. 2006). Mere negligent conduct does not constitute deliberate
indifference.

See id. at 280 (reckless indifference “entails more than mere

negligence; the risk of harm must be substantial and the official's actions more
than merely negligent.”); Hernandez v. Keane, 341 F.3d 137, 144 (2d Cir. 2003)
(medical malpractice alone does not amount to deliberate indifference).
Plaintiff alleges that on October 26, 2014, Nurse Baker was deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs when she failed to treat the injuries that
he had suffered to his wrists and arms from wearing tight handcuffs and the
black box device. Nurse Baker initially argues that Plaintiff’s injuries were not
serious enough to meet the objective component of the Eighth Amendment
standard.
Plaintiff declares that his injuries involved more than just bruises and
scrapes and were painful. The video footage of Plaintiff’s arms on October 26,
2014 reflects that the handcuffs had cut into Plaintiff’s skin and had caused
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blisters and swelling. See Ex. K, DVD, Oct. 26, 2014, at 7:45 – 9:00. In addition,
the injuries were worthy of comment and treatment by a medical provider. See id.
at 9:00 – 10:25, 12:20 – 14:00. The court concludes that there is a genuine issues
of material fact in dispute as to whether the injuries caused by the restraints were
serious enough to meet the objective component of the Eighth Amendment
standard.
The evidence presented by Nurse Baker reflects that she did not ignore
Plaintiff’s injuries. Instead, the video footage depicts Nurse Baker cleaning and
applying antibiotic ointment to Plaintiff’s wounds and then covering the wounds
with bandages.

See id. at 7:05 – 9:00; 12:20 – 14:00.

In addition, the video

footage of Nurse Baker’s visit with Plaintiff at 1:30 p.m. on October 26, 2014,
reflect that she provided treatment to Plaintiff’s injuries and addressed his
medical complaints in a similar manner. See Ex. L, DVD, Oct. 26, 2014, at 15:1616,
17:30 – 18:30, 19:28 – 20:00, 27:15 – 27:53. Plaintiff has provided no evidence to
dispute the video footage of the interactions between himself and Nurse Baker on
October 26, 2014 or the treatment provided by Nurse Baker. The court concludes
that Nurse Baker has demonstrated the absence of a material fact in dispute with
regard to whether she was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs on
October 26, 2014. The Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted as
to this Eighth Amendment claim against Nurse Baker and the Plaintiff’s motion
for summary judgment is denied.
B.

Deliberate Indifference to Health or Safety
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The Supreme Court has held that to the extent that a prisoner’s conditions
of confinement are “restrictive or even harsh,” they do not violate the Eighth
Amendment because “they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for
their offenses against society.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). To
state a claim of deliberate indifference to health or safety due to unconstitutional
conditions of confinement, an inmate must demonstrate both an objective and a
subjective element. To meet the objective element, the inmate must allege that he
was incarcerated under a condition or a combination of conditions that resulted
in a “sufficiently serious” deprivation of a life necessity or a “human need[]” or
posed “a substantial risk of serious harm” to his health or safety. Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.

To meet the

subjective element, an inmate must allege that the defendants possessed
culpable intent; that is, the officials knew that he or she faced a substantial risk to
his or her health or safety and disregarded that risk by failing to take corrective
action. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 837.
Plaintiff has asserted three different deliberate indifference to health and
safety claims against the defendants. He contends that Lieutenant Perez was
deliberately indifferent to his health by failing to provide him with a shirt, socks
and bed linens during his initial placement in in-cell restraints on October 24,
2014, Warden Erfe was deliberately indifferent to his health because officers did
not adequately feed him during his confinement on in-cell restraints and
Lieutenants Perez, Hackett, Champion and Colvin, Warden Erfe and Nurse Baker
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were deliberately indifferent to his health/safety when they either failed to inspect
or check the restraints and/or continued to reapply the in-cell restraints even
though he had suffered injuries to his forearms/wrists and had experienced pain
and sleep deprivation due to his confinement in the restraints.
1.

Lieutenant Perez

Plaintiff alleges that during the application of in-cell restraints on October
24, 2017, officers dressed him in boxer shorts and a jumpsuit but did not provide
him with a shirt or socks. About an hour after officers escorted Plaintiff to a cell
in the restrictive housing unit, Lieutenant Perez visited him. At that time, Plaintiff
asked for a shirt and socks and Lieutenant Perez indicated that he would provide
those items of clothing to Plaintiff.
The video footage of the restraint check performed at approximately 11:20
p.m. on October 25, 2014 depicts Plaintiff in a shirt and a jumpsuit. In addition, it
is evident that Plaintiff’s his shoes were by his bunk. See Ex. J, DVD, October 25,
2014, at 0:35 – 15:45; 16:00 – 16:20. Plaintiff did not complain that he was cold or
that he needed socks or bed linens. Id. The video footage of the restraint check
performed at approximately 10:00 a.m. on October 26, 2014 depicts Plaintiff in a
shirt, a jumpsuit and socks and bed linens on his bunk. See Ex. K, DVD, October
26, 2014, at 0:40 – 5:00; 15:28 – 16:04; 18:20 – 18:25.
Although Plaintiff states that he was cold during the short time that he did
not have a shirt and socks, courts have held that exposure to cold temperatures
for short periods of time do not violate the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Borges
19

v. McGinnis, No. 03–CV–6375, 2007 WL 1232227, at *2, 6 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2007)
(granting defendants' motion for summary judgment where the plaintiff alleged he
suffered nothing “more than frustration and discomfort as a consequence of the
[fifty degree temperature] in his cell” for three days); Smith v. Burge, No. 03–CV–
0955, 2006 WL 2805242, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2006) (Kahn, J.) (finding, on
summary judgment, that plaintiff's allegations of being deprived of “various
property (except for a T-shirt and underwear) for less than one day while confined
to a cell that was ‘cold’ or ‘very cold’ due to some gallery windows being open in
late-March in Auburn, New York” insufficient to rise to the level of an Eighth
Amendment violation); Davis v. Buffardi, No. 01–CV–0285, 2005 WL 1174088, at *2
(N.D.N.Y. May 4, 2005) (Magnuson, J.) (granting the defendants' motion for
summary judgment where the plaintiff had failed to adduce any evidence that,
during the ten-day period in February when the prison facility's boiler broke down
and the plaintiffs were allegedly denied extra blankets and clothing, the
temperature in the facility was so cold that the plaintiffs experienced substantial
harm); McNatt v. Unit Manager Parker, No. 3:99CV1397(AHN), 2000 WL 307000, *4
(D. Conn. 2000) (no Eighth Amendment violation where the plaintiff was
denied, inter alia, “clean clothing, toiletries, bedding and cleaning supplies for
six days”).

Here, Plaintiff was without a shirt for at most 26 hours and was

without socks and bed linens for at most thirty-six hours.
The court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to submit evidence to
demonstrate that he suffered a serious deprivation of a basic human need as a
20

result of Lieutenant Perez’s failure to provide him with a shirt for at most twentysix hours and failure to provide him with socks and bed linens for at most thirtysix hours.

The Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted on the

ground that Lieutenant Perez did not subject Plaintiff to unconstitutional
deprivations of a basic human need during his confinement on in-cell restraints
from October 24, 2014 to October 26, 2014 and the Plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment is denied. 3
2.

Nurse Baker and Lieutenant Colvin – October 25, 2014

Plaintiff declares that Nurse Baker and Lieutenant Colvin came to his cell
on October 25, 2014 to check his restraints but made no attempt to conduct a
restraint check even though Plaintiff informed Nurse Baker that the restraints
were too tight, he was experiencing pain from the restraints and his hands, wrists
and forearms were swollen. Pl.’s Decl. ¶¶ 14-15, Doc. No. 77-3; Pl.’s Dep. 57:15 –
60:1, Doc. No. 77-4. During the restraint check, Lieutenant Colvin stood at the cell
door while Nurse Baker entered Plaintiff’s cell, looked at the restraints and said
they were fine. Id. Plaintiff contends that the in-cell restraints, including the

In opposition to the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff
contends that Lieutenant Perez violated State of Connecticut Administrative
Directive 6.5 which provides that an inmate shall be provided with a shirt, socks
and bed linens as well as jumpsuit tied around the waist when placed on in-cell
restraint status. See Pl.’s Mem. Opp’n Mot. Summ. J. at 4, [Doc. No. 77-1]. This
allegation is not included in the complaint and does not state a claim that
Lieutenant Perez violated Plaintiff’s federal statutory or constitutional rights. A
violation of state law does not state a claim of a violation of an inmate’s federally
or constitutionally protected rights. See Harris v. Taylor, 441 F. App'x 774, 775
(2d Cir. 2011) (“failure to comply with a state law or administrative directive does
not by itself establish a violation of § 1983”) (citing Doe v. Connecticut
21
3

black box device, constituted a condition that exposed him to a risk of serious
harm and that in fact he suffered serious injuries to his forearms/wrists from the
application of restraints as well as permanent scarring in those areas.
Nurse Baker has submitted a Medical Incident Report, dated October 25,
2014 at 10:00 a.m., that includes notations that she inspected Plaintiff’s wrists
after removing the restraints, Plaintiff did not complain of any injuries, Nurse
Baker observed no injuries and she did not provide any treatment because it was
unnecessary. See Ex. S at 2. Nurse Baker has provided a Declaration in which
she confirms that the October 25, 2014 Medical Incident Report includes accurate
representations of her actions and the observations that she made during her
medical assessment of Plaintiff on that date. See Baker Decl. ¶¶ 9-10, Doc. No.
56-10. Neither the defendants, nor Plaintiff have submitted video footage of this
interaction between Plaintiff, Nurse Baker and Lieutenant Colvin.
The parties have submitted conflicting evidence as to whether the in-cell
restraints posed a serious risk of harm to Plaintiff’s health at the time that Nurse
Baker and Lieutenant Colvin came to inspect the restraints at 10:00 a.m. on
October 25, 2014. The court concludes that Nurse Baker and Lieutenant Colvin
have failed to demonstrate the absence of a material fact in dispute regarding
whether Plaintiff suffered from a serious risk of harm to his health at the time that
they came to his cell for a restraint check at 10:00 a.m. on October 25, 2014.
Because Nurse Baker states that she provided no treatment to Plaintiff on that

Department of Child & Youth Services, 911 F.2d 868, 869 (2d Cir. 1990)).
22

date, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether she or Lieutenant
Colvin was deliberately indifferent to a risk of harm to Plaintiff’s health. Because
disputed issues of fact exist regarding the objective and subjective elements of
the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to health and safety standard, both
Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment are denied as to the claim that Lieutenant Colvin and Nurse Baker were
deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s health or safety during the restraint check on
October 25, 2014.
3.

Lieutenant Champion – October 25, 2014

Plaintiff concedes that on October 25, 2014 at 11:30 p.m., Lieutenant
Champion ordered that his restraints be removed and permitted a nurse to clean
his wounds as well as apply antibiotic ointment and bandages to the wounds.
Plaintiff contends that Lieutenant Champion should not have reapplied the
restraints to his wrists because she should have known that the restraints would
ride up on his forearms again and cause him further injury.
The videotape of Lieutenant Champion’s encounter with Plaintiff on
October 25, 2014 reflects that she instructed officers to readjust and reapply the
restraints in a way to keep the restraints from moving up Plaintiff’s arms. See Ex.
J, DVD, Oct. 25, 2014, at 0:25 – 1:18, 13:46 – 14:45. She further directed an officer
to maintain one on one observation of Plaintiff in order to monitor his restraints
and directed medical staff to monitor plaintiff’s restraints and the injuries caused
by the restraints.

See id. at 7:20 – 7:50, 16:20 – 17:00.
23

This evidence

demonstrates that Lieutenant Champion was not deliberately indifferent to a
serious risk of harm to Plaintiff’s health.

She facilitated the treatment of

Plaintiff’s injuries to his forearms, directed staff members to reapply the
restraints in a way to reduce the possibility of the restraints sliding up on
Plaintiff’s forearms and arranged for another officer and medical staff members to
monitor Plaintiff’s injuries and restraints.

See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844-45

(Nonetheless, “prison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate
health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to
the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.... [P]rison officials who act
reasonably cannot be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause.”)
Plaintiff has submitted no evidence to contradict the video footage of the
conduct of Lieutenant Champion during the restraint check on October 25, 2014
at 11:30 p.m.

Accordingly, the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is

granted on the ground that Lieutenant Champion was not deliberately indifferent
to Plaintiff’s injuries or health on October 25, 2014 and Plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment is denied.
4.

Lieutenant Hackett – October 26, 2014

On October 26, 2014 at approximately 1:00 a.m., Lieutenant Hackett visited
Plaintiff’s cell. Plaintiff complained that the handcuffs, including the black box
device, had caused injuries to his wrists and/or forearms. Lieutenant Hackett
removed the restraints and photographed the injuries that had been caused by
24

the application of the handcuffs to Plaintiff’s forearms/wrists. Lieutenant Hackett
then reapplied the restraints to Plaintiff’s wrists. The parties do not dispute these
facts.
Plaintiff contends that his continued confinement in the restraints
constituted a serious risk of harm to his health. Lieutenant Hackett disputes the
seriousness of Plaintiff’s injuries.

It is difficult to discern the nature of the

injuries to Plaintiff’s wrists/forearms from the black and white photographs taken
by Lieutenant Hackett on October 26, 2014. See Ex. R at 104-07, Doc. No. 56-21.
Lieutenant Hackett has not submitted a declaration or affidavit, an incident report
or video footage documenting his interaction with Plaintiff on this date. In his
declaration and deposition testimony, Plaintiff states that at the time that
Lieutenant Hackett visited his cell to conduct a restraint check, the injuries to his
forearms had become worse and more painful in the two-hour time period since
Lieutenant Champion had removed and readjusted his restraints. See Pl.’s Decl.
¶¶ 30, 32-33, Doc. No. 77-3; Pl.’s Dep. 78:7 - 80:5; 134:1 – 135:1, Doc. No. 77-4.
The court concludes that material issues of fact exist with regard to
whether Plaintiff suffered from a serious risk of harm to his health at the time
Lieutenant Hackett removed and reapplied the restraints to his wrists in the early
morning hours of October 26, 2014, and whether reapplication of the restraints
without providing or facilitating the provision of any medical treatment or other
relief constituted deliberate indifference to a serious risk of harm to Plaintiff’s
health. Because disputed issues of fact exist regarding both the objective and
25

subjective elements of the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to health
standard, both Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and Defendants’ motion
for summary judgment are denied as to the claim that Lieutenant Hackett was
deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s health during the restraint check at 1:00 a.m.
on October 26, 2014.
5.

Lieutenant Colvin and Nurse Baker – October 26, 2014

On October 26, 2014 at 10:00 a.m., Lieutenant Colvin and Nurse Baker
visited Plaintiff’s cell to perform a restraint check.

Plaintiff alleges that

Lieutenant Colvin ordered officers to remove his restraints and then ordered
officers to reapply the restraints over his injured forearms and wrists. Plaintiff
contends that Lieutenant Colvin exhibited deliberate indifference to a serious risk
of harm to his health by ordering officers to reapply the restraints to his wrists
because it was clear that the restraints would continue to ride up on his forearms
and cause him further injury.

Plaintiff claims that Nurse Baker should have

indicated that his continued confinement in restraints was contraindicated due to
his injuries.
The video footage submitted by the Defendants of the encounter between
Plaintiff and Lieutenant Colvin on October 26, 2014 at 10:00 a.m. depicts officers
removing the restraints from Plaintiff’s wrists and Nurse Baker providing medical
treatment to the injuries on Plaintiff’s forearms. See Ex. K, DVD, Oct. 26, 2014, at
7:45 – 9:20; 12:20 – 14:40. When Nurse Baker finished treating Plaintiff’s injuries,
she advised Plaintiff that his injuries would continue to get worse if he remained
26

on in-cell restraints and suggested that Plaintiff agree to the strip search in order
to facilitate removal of the restraints. See id. at 17:20 – 17:35.
Within an hour of this encounter, Lieutenant Colvin contacted Warden Erfe
to report that he and Nurse Baker had observed the injuries to Plaintiff’s
forearms/s wrists and that Plaintiff had not complied with the strip search order
requiring him to bend over at the waist and spread his buttocks. See Ex. R at 14,
Doc. No. 56-21. Lieutenant Colvin recommended that Plaintiff be removed from
the in-cell restraints to prevent further injury to Plaintiff’s arms. Approximately,
two hours later, pursuant to Warden Erfe’s order, officers and Lieutenant Colvin
transitioned Plaintiff to soft full stationary restraints and Nurse Baker cleaned and
re-bandaged Plaintiff’s wounds. See Ex. L, DVD, Oct. 26, 2014, at 1:14 to 27:55.
The observations made by Nurse Baker regarding Plaintiff’s injuries and
whether the injuries would get worse if he remained in in-cell restraints, as well
as the recommendation by Lieutenant Colvin that Plaintiff be removed from in-cell
restraints to prevent further injury to his wrists and arms, do not demonstrate
deliberate indifference. Plaintiff has offered no evidence to contradict the video
footage of the restraint check performed by Lieutenant Colvin and Nurse Baker or
the documentary and video footage of his removal from in-cell restraints within
several hours after Lieutenant Colvin informed Warden Erfe of his injuries.
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted in favor of
Nurse Baker and Lieutenant Colvin on the ground that they did not exhibit
deliberate indifference to a serious risk of harm to Plaintiff’s health during and
27

after their encounter with him on the morning of October 26, 2014 and Plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment is denied.
6.

Warden Erfe

Plaintiff claims that on October 27, 2014, he informed Warden Erfe that
officers had provided him with “inadequate food” during his confinement on incell restraints. Compl. at 16 ¶ 75. The Second Circuit has held that the Eighth
Amendment requires that prisoners be provided with “nutritionally adequate food
that is prepared and served under conditions which do not present an immediate
danger to the health and well[-]being of the inmates who consume it.” Robles v.
Coughlin, 725 F.2d 12, 14 (2d Cir.1983) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Warden Erfe argues that Plaintiff received meals during his confinement on
in-cell restraints. The video footage submitted by the Defendants depicts Plaintiff
eating several meals. See Ex. N, DVD, Oct. 26, 2014, at 5:10 – 13:55; Ex. P, DVD,
October 27, 2014, at 10:00 – 10:35, 23:15 – 26:45. Additionally, Plaintiff has not
alleged that the meals provided to him during his two and one-and-a-half-day
confinement on restraints endangered his health. Thus, Plaintiff has not met the
objective component of the Eighth Amendment standard.
Nor do the facts or evidence submitted by the Defendants suggest that on
October 27, 2014, Warden Erfe had any prior knowledge of Plaintiff’s concerns
about the food or meals that had been provided to him during his confinement on
in-cell restraints. Furthermore, as of that date, Plaintiff was no longer being held
28

in in-cell restraints and within hours of speaking to Warden Erfe, prison officials
had removed all restraints from Plaintiff’s limbs. As of that date, Plaintiff had
been removed from in-cell restraints. See Ex. L, DVD, October 26, 2014; Ex. Q,
DVD, October 27, 2019. Warden Erfe has demonstrated the absence of a material
issue of fact in dispute with regard to whether he was deliberately indifferent to a
serious deprivation of food. The Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is
granted on the ground that Warden Erfe was not deliberately indifferent to
Plaintiff’s need for nutritionally adequate food during his confinement on in-cell
restraints and Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied.
C.

Excessive Force

Plaintiff alleges that at the time of his admission to Corrigan-Radgowski,
Warden Erfe had a custom requiring officers to use the black box device when
placing inmates on in-cell restraints. He contends that the use of the black box
device was a punitive measure.

Plaintiff alleges that Lieutenant Perez used

excessive force against him by “forcefully” placing him in in-cell restraints,
including the black box device, pursuant to Warden Erfe’s custom.
In Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992), the Supreme Court established
the minimum standard to be applied in determining whether force by a
correctional officer against a sentenced inmate states a constitutional claim
under the Eighth Amendment in contexts other than prison disturbances. When
an inmate claims that excessive force has been used against him by a prison
official, he has the burden of establishing both an objective and subjective
29

component to his claim.

See Romano v. Howarth, 998 F.2d 101, 105 (2d Cir.

1993).
To meet the objective component, the inmate must allege that the
defendant’s conduct was serious enough to have violated “contemporary
standards of decency.”

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). The extent of the inmate’s injuries as a result of the defendant’s
conduct is not a factor in determining the objective component. See Wilkins v.
Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (“core judicial inquiry” is “not whether a certain
quantum of injury was sustained,” but rather whether unreasonable force was
applied given the circumstances); Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9 (“[w]hen prison officials
maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of
decency are always violated” irrespective of whether significant injury is
present).
The subjective component requires the inmate to show that the prison
officials acted wantonly and focuses on “whether force was applied in a goodfaith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to
cause harm.” Id. at 7 (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-321 (1986)). The
court considers factors including “the need for application of force, the
relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the threat
reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to temper
the severity of a forceful response.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (internal quotations
and citation omitted).
30

1.

Warden Erfe – Custom of In-Cell Restraint Placement

Plaintiff alleges that at the time of his confinement at Corrigan-Radgowski
in October 2014, Warden Erfe knew that the application of the black box over an
inmate’s handcuffs as part of the in-cell restraint process was not typical and that
it would subject an inmate to a substantial risk of harm and injury. Compl. at 17 ¶
80. Despite this knowledge, it was Warden Erfe’s custom to require officers to
use the black box device when placing an inmate in in-cell restraints. Id. at ¶ 78.
Plaintiff contends that the use of the black box device during his confinement on
in-cell restraints constituted punishment rather than a legitimate safety and
security measure.
Plaintiff has offered no evidence to support his allegation that Warden Erfe
was aware prior to his placement in in-cell restraints on October 24, 2014 that
such placement, including the black box device, would subject him to a serious
risk or harm. Thus, there is no support for Plaintiff’s conclusory contention that
his placement in in-cell restraints, including the black box device, from October
24, 2014 to October 26, 2014 constituted punishment rather than an effort to
restore order or to maintain the safety and security of the facility, inmates and
staff members.
In Shehan v. Erfe, Case No. 3:15-CV-1315 (MPS), 2017 WL 53691 (D. Conn.
Jan. 4, 2017), an inmate challenged prison officials’ use of the black box device
as part of his placement on in-cell restraints at Corrigan-Radgwoski after he
refused to engage in a strip search requiring him to bend at the waist and spread

31

his buttocks to permit a visual inspection of his rectal area. Id. at *3. In ruling on
the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Judge Shea considered the safety
and security concerns presented by an inmate who refuses to undergo a strip
search as well as the need for force, the relationship between the need for force
and the amount of force used and any efforts to temper the amount or type of
force used and concluded that the use of in-cell restraints, including the black
box device, in response to an inmate’s refusal to obey a “lawful order to undergo
a strip search does not” in and of itself “constitute excessive force.” Id. at *8-9
Plaintiff challenges Warden Erfe’s use of the same in-cell restraint system
that includes the use of the black box device. The Court is persuaded by the
reasoning of Judge Shea in upholding the identical in-cell restraint custom/
practice/policy of using the black box device in addition to handcuffs, leg irons
and a tether chain as not violative of the Eighth Amendment’s proscription
against excessive force.

Plaintiff has not presented any facts or evidence to

suggest that the same reasoning does not apply to the facts of this case or to
dispute the evidence and facts submitted by the Defendants in support of Warden
Erfe’s custom/practice/policy of using in-cell restraints, including the black box
device, as authorized by Administrative Directive 6.5, in response an inmate’s
refusal to undergo a strip search. See Defs.’ Corrected L.R. 56(a)1 ¶¶ 3, 6, 11-13,
15-17, 19. Thus, to the extent that the complaint includes a challenge to the incell restraints custom/practice/policy of Warden Erfe, Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment is granted on the ground that the use of in-cell restraints,
32

including the black box device, in response to an inmate’s refusal to obey an
order to be strip-searched upon entry into a prison facility does not in and of
itself constitute excessive force. See Shehan, 2017 WL 53691 at *9. 4
2.

Lieutenant Perez – October 24, 2014

On October 24, 2014, as a newly admitted inmate at Corrigan-Radgowski,
Plaintiff was required to participate in a visual body cavity strip search pursuant
to State of Connecticut Administrative Directive 6.7(3)(Q) & (7)(A. As part of the
search, Lieutenant Perez ordered Plaintiff to bend over and spread his buttocks
to permit an officer to make a visual inspection of his rectal area. Lieutenant
Perez gave Plaintiff several opportunities to comply with his order to complete
this aspect of the strip search procedure. When it was clear that Plaintiff would
not comply with his order, at approximately 9:30 p.m., Lieutenant Perez placed
Plaintiff in in-cell restraints, including the black box device, to protect the safety
and security of the facility, staff members and other inmates. Plaintiff does not
allege that he had any further contact with Lieutenant Perez after 10:00 p.m. that
evening.
Administrative Directive 6.7 defines a strip search as “a visual body cavity
search which includes a systematic visual inspection of an unclothed person’s
hair, body cavities []to include the individual’s ears, nose, mouth, under arms,
soles of the feet and between the toes, rectum and genitalia.” Ex. E, Admin.
Directive 6.7(3)(Q), Doc. No. 56-8. Plaintiff has submitted no evidence to suggest

4

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment does not raise this excessive for
33

that the visual body cavity strip search procedure employed by officials at
Corrigan-Radgowski in October 2014, including Lieutenant Perez, did not comply
with Administrative Directive 6.7(3)(Q). Furthermore, the United States Supreme
Court has upheld the use of the “bend and spread” form of strip search by prison
officials. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558 n.39 & 560-61 (1979) (upholding
Fourth Amendment and Due Process challenges to strip search involving
requirement that inmate, who was naked at the time, bend at the waist and spread
his buttocks).
Compliance with all aspects of the strip search process, including a visual
inspection of the rectal area to rule out the possibility that an inmate has
dangerous contraband, including drugs, a weapon or a handcuff key, secreted in
that area, is important to preserving the safety and security of the prison facility,
prison staff members and other inmates. See Erfe Decl. ¶¶ 11, 13, Doc. No. 56-5;
Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 328 (2012) (recognizing
that “correctional officials must be permitted to devise reasonable search
policies to detect and deter the possession of contraband in their facilities”)
(citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 546).

Plaintiff contends that he did not violate the

Department of Correction’s strip search policy set forth in Administrative 6.7,
because he completed the cough and squat procedure that had been employed
by officials at other prison facilities in the past. It is undisputed, however, that
Plaintiff did not complete the strip search procedure that Lieutenant Perez

claim.
34

ordered him to complete upon his admission at Corrigan-Radgowski on October
24, 2014, which involved bending at the waist and spreading his buttocks to
permit a visual inspection of his rectal area.
State of Connecticut Department of Correction Directive 6.5 permits shift
supervisors to use in-cell restraints to gain compliance with an order or to
maintain order, safety and security in a prison facility. “[M]aintaining institutional
security and preserving internal order and discipline are essential goals that may
require limitation or retraction of the retained constitutional rights of both
convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 546. Given that
Plaintiff had no legal basis to refuse to comply with the lawful order of Lieutenant
Perez to complete the strip search process by bending over and spreading his
buttocks to permit a visual inspection of his rectal area, the use of in-cell
restraints was warranted under Administrative Directive 6.5.
Although handcuffs, leg irons and a tether chain connecting the leg irons
and handcuffs are typically used when placing an inmate in in-cell restraints, the
black box device, which may be fitted over the holes in the handcuffs, is also
authorized as a restraint device that may be used in placing an inmate in in-cell
restraints. See Defs.’ Corrected L.R. 56(a)1 ¶¶ 11-15, Ex. D, Admin. Dir. 6.5(3)(F) &
(8)(B)(2)-(3). The purpose of the black box device is to prevent an inmate from
picking the locks securing the handcuffs.

Id. ¶ 12, Ex. B, Erfe Aff ¶ 5.

Plaintiff argues that the decision by Lieutenant Perez to place him in in-cell
restraints, including the black box device, was not based on a legitimate
35

penological objective because Lieutenant Perez was aware that the application of
in-cell restraints, including the black box device, would cause him serious
injuries, pain and sleep deprivation. See Pl.’s Mem. Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. at
5, Doc. No. 77-1. Plaintiff has submitted no evidence to support this allegation.
Nor does the video footage of the events leading up to the decision by Lieutenant
Perez to place Plaintiff in in-cell restraints or the application of the in-cell
restraints on Plaintiff’s ankles and wrists, including the black box device, suggest
that Lieutenant Perez used the handcuffs, leg irons, tether chain or the black box
device other than for their intended purposes. See Ex. H, DVD, October 24, 2014.
Plaintiff contends further that the decision to place him in in-cell restraints
was not based on a valid security or safety concern or for the purpose of
maintaining or restoring order and was unreasonable because Lieutenant Perez
could have performed a controlled strip search instead. Administrative Directive
6.7(7)(D)(1) does not require a prison official to perform a controlled strip search
if an inmate refuses to comply with a strip search as defined in section (3)(Q) of
the Directive. Rather, it provides that a prison official may perform a controlled
strip search in that situation. Choosing to initially confine Plaintiff in in-cell
restraints rather than immediately performing a controlled strip search, which
could potentially be more dangerous to the inmate or staff members, does not
constitute the use of excessive force. See Erfe Decl. ¶¶ 17, 20, Doc. No. 56-5;
Shehan, 2017 WL 53691, at *8-9. Warden Erfe has instructed officials at CorriganRadgowski to initially place an inmate in in-cell restraints to attempt to gain
36

compliance with an order prior to conducting a controlled strip search because of
the potentially dangerous aspects of a controlled strip search. See Erfe Decl. ¶
21.
The video footage of the application of in-cell restraints to Plaintiff’s ankles
and wrists and his placement in a cell in the restrictive housing unit on October
24, 2014 reflects that Plaintiff did not complain that the restraints were too tight.
See Ex. H, DVD, October 24, 2014, at 4:30 – 14:38. Given the evidence that there
was a legitimate safety and security reason for subjecting Plaintiff to a strip
search upon his arrival at Corrigan-Radgowksi, the possibility that he might have
secreted contraband in his rectal area, the decision by Lieutenant Perez to place
Plaintiff in in-cell restraints for failing to comply with the order that he bend over
and spread his buttocks as required by the facility’s strip search policy, was not
unreasonable and did not constitute excessive force.

Thus, the motion for

summary judgment is granted as to the Eighth Amendment excessive force claim
asserted against Lieutenant Perez and Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is
denied.
3.

Lieutenant Champion – October 25, 2014
Lieutenant Colvin – October 26, 2014

Lieutenants Champion and Colvin argue that their decisions to continue
Plaintiff’s placement in in-cell restraints on October 25, 2014 and on October 26,
2014 were made for valid safety and security reasons and due to Plaintiff’s
continued refusal to comply with the strip search order that he bend over and
spread his buttocks to permit an officer to make a visual inspection of his rectal
37

area. Plaintiff does not address this argument.
In the video footage depicting the interactions between Plaintiff and
Lieutenant Champion on October 25, 2014 and Lieutenant Colvin on October 26,
2014, both Lieutenants made repeated inquiries as to whether Plaintiff would
comply with the order requiring him to bend over and spread his buttocks as part
of the visual body cavity strip search. See Exs. J, K, L, DVDs, October 25, 2014
and October 26, 2014. Lieutenant Colvin also explained to Plaintiff that the body
cavity search is a visual search and would not involve a staff member touching or
physically probing his rectal area. See Ex. K, DVD, October 26, 2014, at 3:00 –
3:50; Ex. L, DVD, October 26, 2014, at 0:45 – 1:16. Plaintiff repeatedly refused to
engage in the visual body cavity strip search that Lieutenant Perez ordered him to
undergo upon his admission to Corrigan-Radgowski on October 24, 2014. See
Exs. J, K, L, DVDs, October 25, 2014 and October 26, 2014.
Lieutenants Colvin and Champion contend that the safety and security
concerns regarding possible contraband in Plaintiff’s rectum or rectal area were
still present during the restraint checks that occurred at approximately 10:00 a.m.
on October 25, 2014, 11:30 p.m. on October 25, 2014, 1:00 a.m. on October 26,
2014 and 10:00 a.m. on October 26, 2014 because Plaintiff refused to engage in a
visual body cavity search during those restraint checks.

They argue that

Plaintiff’s continued confinement on in-cell restraints, including the black box
device, was necessary until approximately 1:30 p.m. on October 26, 2014, when
Lieutenant Colvin removed Plaintiff from in-cell restraints and placed him in soft
38

full stationary restraints that did not include the black box device.
Plaintiff has offered no evidence to contradict the evidence submitted by
Lieutenants Colvin and Champion regarding the safety and security concerns
that continued to exist during their encounters with him on the evening of
October 25, 2014 and on the morning of October 26, 2014 because he refused to
undergo a strip search that involved him bending over and spreading his
buttocks for a visual inspection of his rectal area by an officer. Thus, Lieutenants
Colvin and Champion have met their burden of demonstrating the absence of a
material fact as the issue of whether a valid safety and security concern existed
that warranted the use of force necessary to maintain Plaintiff’s continued
confinement on in-cell restraints as of 11:30 p.m. on October 25, 2014 and as of
10:00 a.m. on October 26, 2014. The Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
is granted on the ground that the decision by Lieutenants Colvin and Champion
to maintain Plaintiff on in-cell restraints during these two time periods did not
constitute excessive force and the Plaintiff’s motion is denied.
4.

Lieutenant Colvin – October 25, 2014
Lieutenant Hackett – October 26, 2014

Lieutenant Hackett argues that the safety and security concerns regarding
possible contraband in Plaintiff’s rectum or rectal area were still present during
the restraint check that he performed at approximately 1:00 a.m. on October 26,
2014. Lieutenant Colvin does not address the restraint check that he performed
on October 25, 2014 at approximately 10:00 a.m. Lieutenant Hackett has chosen
not to submit a declaration, affidavit, copy of an incident or other report or video
39

footage of his interaction with Plaintiff on October 26, 2014 at approximately 1:00
a.m.

Although Lieutenant Colvin submitted incident reports documenting his

interactions with Plaintiff on October 26, and 27, 2014, he did not submit an
declaration, affidavit, incident report or video footage of his interaction with
Plaintiff on October 25, 2014 at 10:00 a.m. Because neither Lieutenant Colvin or
Lieutenant Hackett has provided evidence documenting their conduct during the
restraint checks on October 25, 2014 and October 26, 2014, material issues of fact
remain in dispute as to whether the safety and security concern that Plaintiff may
have secreted contraband into the facility in his rectal area was still present and
whether that safety and security concern warranted the use of force necessary to
maintain Plaintiff on in-cell restraints. Lieutenant Hackett and Lieutenant Colvin
are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the claims of excessive force
based on their decisions to continue to confine Plaintiff on in-cell restraints from
October 25, 2014 at 10:00 a.m. through and after 1:00 a.m. on October 26, 2014.
The Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and Plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment are denied as to these Eighth Amendment excessive force
claims.
5.

Warden Erfe – Placement on In-Cell Restraints
October 24, 2014 – October 26, 2014

Warden Erfe does not dispute that as of approximately 9:30 p.m. on
October 24, 2014, Lieutenant Perez made him aware of Plaintiff’s confinement on
in-cell restraints due to his refusal to comply with a strip search order requiring a
visual inspection of his body cavities by a correctional officer. See Erfe, Decl. ¶
40

17, Doc. No. 56-5. An Incident Report prepared by Lieutenant Champion reflects
that as of 11:50 p.m. on October 25, 2014, she made Warden Erfe aware that
Plaintiff remained on in-cell restraints because he had refused to comply with the
strip search order, she had observed injuries to Plaintiff’s forearms/wrists, a
nurse had treated those injuries and that she had supervised officers in removing
and reapplying the restraints to Plaintiff’s wrists and ankles in an attempt to
prevent the restraints from moving up Plaintiff’s arms and causing further
injuries. See Ex. R at 15, Doc. No. 56-21.
Warden Erfe declares that during the morning of October 26, 2014, he
received information from Lieutenant Colvin indicating that Plaintiff still had
injuries to his forearms/wrists from the in-cell restraints. See Erfe, Decl. ¶ 26. In
response to this information, Warden Erfe issued an order that Plaintiff be
removed from in-cell restraints and placed on soft, stationary restraints to ensure
that Plaintiff would not suffer any additional injuries. See id. ¶ 27. Plaintiff’s
placement on stationary restraints would also continue to protect the facility,
inmates and staff members by preventing Plaintiff from accessing any
contraband that he might have secreted in his body cavities. See id. ¶ 30. Within
several hours of being notified, Lieutenant Colvin had transitioned Plaintiff to
soft, stationary restraints. See Ex. R at 14, Doc. No. 56-21; Ex. L, DVD, October
26, 2014.
This evidence demonstrates that the decision to place Plaintiff in in-cell
restraints was made for safety and security reasons due to Plaintiff’s refusal to
41

undergo a strip search to permit a visual inspection of his rectal area for
contraband and not for the purpose of causing Plaintiff pain or injury and that
when it became apparent that Plaintiff was being harmed by his continued
confinement in in-cell restraints, Warden Erfe ordered his removal from those
restraints. Plaintiff has offered no evidence to contradict the documentary and
video evidence submitted by Warden Erfe.

Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment is granted as to the claim that Warden Erfe’s authorization and approval
of Plaintiff’s initial placement in in-cell restraints, including the black box device,
on October 24, 2014, and authorization and approval of Plaintiff’s continued
confinement in in-cell restraints until the afternoon of October 26, 2014 did not
constitute excessive force. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied.
D.

Placement on Full, Stationary Restraints

The allegations in the complaint challenge only Plaintiff’s placement on incell restraints. See Compl., Doc. No. 1. Plaintiff does not mention his placement
or transition to full stationary restraints during the afternoon of October 26, 2014.
See id.
In his memoranda in support of his own motion for summary judgment and
in opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff raises for
the first time a challenge to his placement on full, stationary restraints on October
26, 2014. See Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. at 9-10, Doc. No. 54-1; Pl.’s Mem.
Opp’n Mot. Summ. J. at 7-8, Doc. No. 77-1. He contends that Lieutenant Colvin
falsely accused him of harming himself while he was in in-cell restraints in an
42

effort to convince Warden Erfe to upgrade him to full stationary restraints. He
further alleges that Warden Erfe unlawfully authorized his placement on
therapeutic stationary restraints without an order from a physician. Id.
A plaintiff may not amend his or her complaint in a memorandum in
opposition

to

the

motion

for

summary judgment.

See Lyman

v.

CSX

Transportation Inc., 364 F. App'x 699, 701 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order)
(affirming district court’s determination that it should not consider claims raised
for the first time in opposition to summary judgment (citations omitted); Simpson
v. Town of Warwick Police Dep't, 159 F. Supp. 3d 419, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“A
party generally may not assert a cause of action for the first time in response to a
summary judgment motion.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Nor is the court inclined to permit Plaintiff at this late stage of the proceedings to
add a claim that he did not notify the Defendants, at the time he filed the
complaint, that he intended to pursue. 5 Plaintiff offers no explanation as to why
this claim was not previously pled and he offers no argument as to why it should

Furthermore, Plaintiff’s allegations are not supported by the evidence
submitted by Warden Erfe regarding his placement on full stationary restraints.
Plaintiff was not placed on therapeutic restraints, defined as “[f]ull stationary
restraints that are ordered by a psychiatrist or physician as part of a medical or
mental health treatment.” Ex. D, Admin. Directive 6.5(3)(O), Doc. No. 56-7.
Rather, Warden Erfe issued the order to place Plaintiff in full stationary restraints
pursuant to Administrative Directive 6.5(8)(B)(6) which permits an inmate to be
transitioned to full stationary restraints if the inmate continues to be a threat to
staff, self or others. See id.; Erfe Decl. ¶¶ 27-30, Doc. No. 56-5. Thus, it would be
futile to permit Plaintiff to add these allegations regarding his placement on full
stationary restraints. See McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 200–
01 (2d Cir. 2007) (“A district court has discretion to deny leave for good reason,
including futility, bad faith, undue delay, or undue prejudice to the opposing
43
5

be permitted at this point in the proceedings. Thus, any challenge to Plaintiff’s
placement on full, stationary restraints is not before the Court.
E.

Qualified Immunity

Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity with regard to
Plaintiff’s claims that he was unlawfully placed in in-cell restraints.

Qualified

immunity “protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
An official is entitled to qualified immunity unless (1) the facts alleged or shown
by the plaintiff state a violation of a statutory or constitutional right by the official
and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.
See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (citation omitted). The Supreme
Court has held that district courts have the discretion to choose which of the two
prongs of the qualified immunity standard to decide first in view of the particular
circumstances surrounding the case to be decided. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.
Under the second prong, a right is clearly established if, at the time of the
challenged conduct, it is “sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would
have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Mullenix v. Luna, 136
S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and alterations
omitted). “The dispositive question is ‘whether the violative nature of particular

party.”) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).
44

conduct is clearly established.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S.
at 742).
There is no requirement that a case has been decided which is directly on
point, “but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional
question beyond debate.”

al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741.

The Supreme Court has

recently “reiterate[d] the longstanding principle that ‘clearly established law’
should not be defined ‘at a high level of generality.’” White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct.
548, 552 (2017) (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742). Rather, “the clearly established
law must be ‘particularized’ to the facts of the case.” Id. (citing Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
The claims that remain pending are as follows: the Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference to health claim against Nurse Baker and Lieutenant Colvin
regarding Plaintiff’s continued confinement on in-cell restraints as of 10:00 a.m.
on October 25, 2014, the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to health
claim against Lieutenant Hackett regarding Plaintiff’s continued confinement on
in-cell restraints as of 1:00 a.m. on October 26, 2014, the Eighth Amendment
excessive force claim against Lieutenant Hackett regarding Plaintiff’s continued
confinement on in-cell restraints as of 1:00 a.m. on October 26, 2014 and the
Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Lieutenant Colvin regarding
Plaintiff’s continued confinement on in-cell restraints as of 10:00 a.m. on October
25, 2014.
The right to be free from the use of excessive force was clearly established
45

at the time that Lieutenants Hackett and Colvin continued Plaintiff on in-cell
restraints. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10; Davidson v. Flynn, 32 F.3d 27, 29-30 &
n.1 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that correctional officers’ application of handcuffs too
tightly to an inmate’s wrists stated claim of excessive force in violation of the
Eighth Amendment even if inmate did not incur serious injury). An inmate’s right
to be free from a condition of confinement that subjects him or her to a risk of
serious harm was also clearly established at the time that Lieutenants Colvin and
Hackett and Nurse Baker continued Plaintiff on restraints. See Farmer, 511 U.S.
at 834, 847 (1994) (a prison official's act or omission” resulting in the denial of the
minimal civilized measure of life's necessities” or “conditions posing a
substantial risk of serious harm” violates the Eighth Amendment) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
The court has concluded that issues of material fact remain in dispute as to
whether Plaintiff’s injuries to his forearms/wrists or complaints of pain that he
attributed to the in-cell restraints, including the black box device, during the
morning of October 25, 2014 and early morning of October 26, 2014, constituted
an objectively serious risk of harm to his health and whether Lieutenants Colvin
and Hackett and Nurse Baker exhibited deliberate indifference by offering no
relief from the application of restraints. With regard to the excessive force claims
against Lieutenants Hackett and Colvin there is an issue of material fact in
dispute as to whether a legitimate safety or security concern still existed at the
time that Lieutenant Colvin continued Plaintiff on in-cell restraints without
46

performing a restraint check on October 25, 2014 and as to whether a legitimate
safety or security concern still existed at the time that Lieutenant Hackett
removed and reapplied the restraints to Plaintiff’s ankles and wrists on October
26, 2014.

These issues of fact preclude a determination as to whether the

Lieutenants Colvin and Hackett and Nurse Baker acted in a reasonable manner in
continuing to confine Plaintiff on in-cell restraints. See Thomas v. Roach, 165
F.3d 137, 143 (2d Cir.1999) (“Summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is
not

appropriate

when

there

are facts in dispute that

are

material

to

a

determination of reasonableness.”); Alster v. Goord, 745 F. Supp. 2d 317, 342
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Here, “issues of fact exist concerning the severity of [Alster's]
condition and the state of mind of the individual Defendants that are material to a
determination of reasonableness.”) (citation omitted).
The motion for summary judgment is denied on the ground that Lieutenant
Colvin and Hackett are entitled to qualified immunity as to the Eighth Amendment
excessive force claims asserted against them arising from the restraints checks
performed on October 25, 2014 at 10:00 a.m. and on October 26, 2014 at 1:00 a.m.
and denied on the ground that Nurse Baker and Lieutenants Colvin and Hackett
are entitled to qualified immunity as to the Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference to health claims asserted against them arising from the restraint
checks performed on October 25, 2014 at 10:00 a.m. and October 26, 2014 at 1:00
a.m.
Conclusion
47

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, [ECF No. 56] is GRANTED as
to the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to medical needs claim against
Nurse Baker; the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to health claim and
the Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Lieutenant Champion, the
Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to health claim against Nurse Baker
and Lieutenant Colvin arising from the restraint check performed at 10:00 a.m.
October 26, 2014; the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to health claim
related to a deprivation of clothing and bedding against Lieutenant Perez, the
Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to health claim related to a deprivation
of food against Warden Erfe, the Eighth Amendment excessive force claim
against Lieutenant Perez, the Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against
Lieutenant Colvin arising from the restraint check at 10:00 a.m. on October 26,
2014; and the Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against Warden Erfe.
The Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, [ECF No. 56], is DENIED
as to the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to health claim and the
Eighth Amendment excessive force claim arising from the restraint check at 10:00
a.m. on October 25, 2014 against Lieutenant Colvin, the Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference to health claim arising from the restraint check at 10:00
a.m. on October 25, 2014 against Nurse Baker; and the Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference to health claim and the Eighth Amendment excessive force
claim arising from the restraint check at 1:00 a.m. on October 26, 2014 against
Lieutenant Hackett. The Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, [ECF No. 54]
48

is DENIED.
Thus, all claims have been dismissed against Lieutenant Perez, Lieutenant
Champion and Warden Erfe. The case remains pending against Nurse Baker,
Lieutenant Colvin, Lieutenant Hackett and Nurse Barnas, who has not been
served.
SO ORDERED this 30th day of March, at Hartford, Connecticut.
___________/s/________________
Vanessa L. Bryant
United States District Judge

49