Coles v. Ruiz et al

Filing 57

ORDER: For the reasons set forth in the attached ruling, the defendants' motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 48 ) is hereby GRANTED. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of the defendants and close this case. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 4/30/19. (Mata, E.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

SHAWN A. COLES,
Plaintiff,
v.
DR. RUIZ, et al.
Defendants.

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Case No. 3:17cv1770(AWT)

RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [Doc.#48]
On October 23, 2017, the plaintiff, Shawn A. Coles, an
inmate currently confined at the Willard-Cybulski
Correctional Institution in Enfield, Connecticut, filed a
complaint pro se pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking
damages and injunctive relief against five Department of
Correction (“DOC”) officials: Dr. Ricardo Ruiz, Nurse
Stephanie, Nurse Shonte Haley,1 Nurse Jane Ventrella, and
Dr. Monica Farinella.

Compl. [Doc.#1].

The plaintiff

claimed that the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment
right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment
by acting with deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs.

1

The court permitted his Eighth Amendment

The plaintiff referred to this defendant as Nurse Shonte,
Nurse Hailey, and Nurse Shonte Hailey in his complaint; as
Nurse Ashonte Gilbert in his amended complaint; and as
Nurse Shanta Hailey in his second amended complaint. The
parties subsequently agreed that the defendant should be
referred to as Nurse Shonte Haley [Doc.##55, 48-4 at ¶ 4].

claim to proceed against all five defendants.

Initial

Review Order [Doc.#7] 9-10.
Since the court issued the Initial Review Order, the
plaintiff has filed two amended complaints.
[Doc.#21]; Second Am. Compl. [Doc.#41].
answered the first amended complaint.

Am. Compl.

The defendants

Answer [Doc.#30].

On December 14, 2018, the defendants filed the instant
motion for summary judgment arguing that the evidence fails
to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
they acted with deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s
medical needs.

For the following reasons, the court is

granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
I.

Legal Standard
In a motion for summary judgment, the burden is on the

moving party to establish that there are no genuine issues
of material fact in dispute and that it is “entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

A

fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the
suit under the governing law” and is “genuine” if “a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party” based on it.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also Dister v. Continental Group,
Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1114 (2d Cir. 1988) (mere existence of
alleged factual dispute will not defeat summary judgment
2

motion).

The moving party may satisfy this burden “by

showing – that is pointing out to the district court – that
there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving
party’s case.”

PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 315 F.3d

101, 105 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curium) (internal quotations
omitted; citations omitted).
When a motion for summary judgment is supported by
documentary evidence and sworn affidavits and “demonstrates
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,” the
nonmoving party must do more than vaguely assert the
existence of some unspecified disputed material facts or
“rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated
speculation.”

Robinson v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc.,

781 F.3d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).

The

nonmoving party “must come forward with specific evidence
demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute of
material fact.”

Id.; see also First Nat. Bank of Ariz. v.

Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968) (nonmoving
party must submit sufficient evidence supporting factual
dispute that will require factfinder to resolve differing
versions of truth at trial).
In reviewing the record, the court must “construe the
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party and to draw all reasonable inferences in its favor.”
3

Gary Friedrich Enters., L.L.C. v. Marvel Characters, Inc.,
716 F.3d 302, 312 (2d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

If

there is any evidence from which a reasonable factual
inference could be drawn in favor of the non-moving party
for the issue on which summary judgment is sought, then
summary judgment is improper.

See Security Ins. Co. of

Hartford v. Old Dominion Freight Line Inc., 391 F.3d 77, 83
(2d Cir. 2004).
Where one party is proceeding pro se, the court must
read his papers liberally and interpret them “to raise the
strongest arguments that they suggest.”

Willey v.

Kirkpatrick, 801 F.3d 51, 62 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).

Despite this

liberal interpretation, however, “[u]nsupported allegations
do not create a material issue of fact” and cannot overcome
a properly supported motion for summary judgment.

See

Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 811 (2003).
II.

Facts

The court draws the following facts from the
defendants’ Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement (“Defs.’ Stmt.”)
[Doc.#48-4], the plaintiff’s Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement
(“Pl.’s Stmt.”) [Doc.#55], and the exhibits submitted by
both parties.
4

On March 13, 2017, the plaintiff sustained an injury
to his foot while playing basketball at the Cheshire
Correctional Institution.

Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 1; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶

1; Pl.’s Ex. G [Doc.#41 at 31].

Later that day, he was

taken to the medical unit where he was evaluated by Nurse
Haley.

Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 4; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 4.

Nurse Haley

gave the plaintiff ice and Motrin for his pain and ordered
x-rays for his foot.
5-6.

Defs.’ Stmt. ¶¶ 5-6; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶¶

She entered an order for 200 milligrams of Ibuprofen.

Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 7; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 7.
Two days later, the plaintiff was evaluated by Dr.
Ruiz.

Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 8; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 8.

Ruiz ordered

crutches and a bottom bunk pass for the plaintiff; Defs.’
Stmt. ¶ 8; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 8; Aff. of Ricardo Ruiz, MD (“Ruiz
Aff.”) [Doc.#48-3] ¶ 4; the plaintiff contends that he only
had crutches for twelve days.

Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 8.

Ruiz also

ordered a five-day Motrin regimen for the plaintiff, but
the plaintiff claims that he never received the medication.
Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 9; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 9.
On March 27, 2017, multiple x-rays were taken of the
plaintiff’s foot.

Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 10; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 10;

Medical Records, Defs.’ Attach. A. [Doc.#49 at 12].

The x-

rays showed a slightly distracted rotated fracture of the

5

base of the plaintiff’s fifth metatarsal.

Defs.’ Stmt. ¶

11; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 11; Medical Records at 12.
On April 19, 2017, Dr. Ruiz once again evaluated the
plaintiff.

Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 12; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 12.

Following

the examination, Ruiz submitted a request to the
Utilization Review Committee (“URC”) that the plaintiff be
evaluated by an orthopedic specialist.

Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 12;

Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 12; Medical Records at 14.

The URC granted

the request on May 19, 2017, and the plaintiff was
transported to the UConn Health Center for an orthopedic
consultation with Dr. Merrill.

Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 13; Pl.’s

Stmt. ¶ 13; Medical Records at 14.
During the orthopedic consultation, Dr. Merrill
concluded that the plaintiff had a mild fracture, good
range of motion, and flat feet.

Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 14; Pl.’s

Stmt. ¶ 14; Medical Records at 13.

Merrill noted that the

plaintiff’s fracture was healing and did not recommend
surgery, Ruiz Aff. ¶ 8, but he informed the plaintiff that
he may experience pain for up to six months and recommended
a brace and an orthopedic shoe.

Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 15; Pl.’s

Stmt. ¶ 15; Medical Records at 13.

A physician order for

an orthopedic shoe was written on May 22, 2017.

Defs.’

Stmt. ¶ 16; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 16; Medical Records at 5.

6

On August 4, 2017, Nurse McClain provided the
plaintiff with an orthopedic shoe as ordered; Defs.’ Stmt.
¶ 19; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 19; Medical Records at 4.

The

plaintiff later complained that the shoe did not fit.
Pl.’s Ex. H [Doc.#41 at 36].

The use of an orthopedic shoe

is merely for comfort; it is not designed to heal a
fracture in the foot.

Ruiz Aff. ¶ 13.

Three days later, medical personnel performed
additional x-rays on the plaintiff’s foot.

Defs.’ Stmt. ¶

20; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 20; Medical Records at 11.

The reviewing

physician did not find any significant change in the
plaintiff’s fracture.

Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 20; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 20;

Medical Records at 11.
On August 16, 2017, Dr. Ruiz evaluated the plaintiff
for a third time, and the two discussed the latest x-ray
results.

Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 21; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 21; Medical

Records at 27; Ruiz Aff. ¶ 15.

Ruiz explained to the

plaintiff that the type of fracture he sustained often does
not heal well or at all.

Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 22; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶

22; Medical Records at 27; Ruiz Aff. ¶ 15.

He also

explained that surgery often does not help to heal the
fracture, but he would let the surgeon at UConn decide
whether it was appropriate.

Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 22; Pl.’s Stmt.

¶ 22; Medical Records at 27; Ruiz Aff. ¶ 15.
7

Ruiz told the

plaintiff that he would order another x-ray of his foot,
and if the x-ray showed no healing, he would refer him back
to the orthopedic surgeon at UConn.

Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 23;

Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 23; Medical Records at 27; Ruiz Aff. ¶ 15.
Other than over-the-counter pain medication, Ruiz did not
deem it appropriate to prescribe any additional pain
medication for the plaintiff.

Ruiz Aff. ¶ 16.

III. Discussion
To prevail on a claim for deliberate indifference to a
serious medical need under the Eighth Amendment, the
plaintiff must show both that his medical need was serious
and that defendants acted with a sufficiently culpable
state of mind.

See Smith v. Carpenter, 316 F.3d 178, 184

(2d Cir. 2003) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105
(1976)).

There are both objective and subjective

components to the deliberate indifference standard.

See

Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994).
Objectively, the alleged deprivation must be “sufficiently
serious.”

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991).

The

condition must be “one that may produce death,
degeneration, or extreme pain.”

See Hathaway v. Coughlin,

99 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks
omitted).

Subjectively, defendants must have been actually

aware of a substantial risk that the plaintiff would suffer
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serious harm as a result of their actions or inactions.
See Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 280–81 (2d Cir.
2006).

Negligence that would support a claim for medical

malpractice does not rise to the level of deliberate
indifference and is not cognizable under § 1983.
at 280.

See id.

Nor does a difference of opinion regarding what

constitutes an appropriate response and treatment.

See

Ventura v. Sinha, 379 F. App’x 1, 2–3 (2d Cir. 2010);
Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 703 (2d Cir. 1998).
In this case, the defendants concede that the
plaintiff has satisfied the objective component of the
Eighth Amendment standard based on evidence that he
suffered a fracture to his foot.

Defs’ Mem. of Law in

Supp. of their Mot. for Summ. J. [Doc.#48-1] at 5.

The

court agrees with their contention, however, that the
plaintiff has failed to produce evidence of deliberate
indifference.
The evidence shows that Nurse Haley, Dr. Ruiz, and
Nurse McClain all provided treatment in response to the
plaintiff’s injury.

Haley gave the plaintiff ice and pain

medication and ordered x-rays for his foot.

Ruiz evaluated

the plaintiff on three different occasions, ordered
crutches, a bottom bunk pass, and five-day Motrin regimen
for the plaintiff, and submitted a URC request for the
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plaintiff to see an orthopedic specialist.

McClain gave

the plaintiff an orthopedic shoe as ordered by the
orthopedist.

The plaintiff argues in his opposition that

he did not receive the medication ordered by Ruiz, see,
e.g., Pl.’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Opp’n to Mot. for Summ.
J. (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) [Doc.#54-1] at 3, but he has not
provided any evidence that Ruiz or any other defendant did
anything that prevented him from receiving the medication.
The plaintiff contends that the treatment provided by
the defendants was not “appropriate” or was insufficient to
match the seriousness of his injury.

Pl.’s Opp’n at 1, 3.

Even if true, this fact would not show that the defendants
subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of the Eighth Amendment.

In order to prevail on an Eighth

Amendment claim, the plaintiff must show more than the mere
fact that the defendants acted negligently.

Salahuddin,

467 F.3d at 280; see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106
(“Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional
violation merely because the victim is a prisoner”).
Although the plaintiff contends that their response was
inadequate, Haley, Ruiz, and McClain all took remedial
action in response to his injury.

There is no evidence

that could support a conclusion by a jury that any of them

10

disregarded a substantial risk that the plaintiff would
suffer serious harm.
The fact that the plaintiff disagrees with the method
of treatment chosen by the defendants does not support a
claim that they violated his Eighth Amendment rights.

See

Chance, 143 F.3d at 703 (“It is well-established that mere
disagreement over the proper treatment does not create a
constitutional claim”).

Dr. Ruiz explained to the

plaintiff that the type of fracture he sustained often does
not heal properly, and neither he nor the orthopedist
recommended surgery.
Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 22.

Ruiz Aff. ¶¶ 8, 15; Defs’ Stmt. ¶ 22;

Ruiz also did not deem it appropriate to

prescribe any medication other than the over-the-counter
medications he had already prescribed.

Ruiz Aff. ¶ 16.

The plaintiff may disagree with these conclusions, but he
has not provided evidence showing deliberate indifference
to his medical needs.
As to Nurse Ventrella and Dr. Farinella, there is no
evidence in the record showing that either of them acted
with deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s medical
needs.

The plaintiff alleges that Ventrella “accused [his]

pain as insignificant” and failed to provide him with
crutches, Second Am. Compl. ¶ 67, but there is no evidence
in the record to support that allegation.
11

The plaintiff is

suing Farinella because she is the director of Correctional
Managed Health Care and is, therefore, responsible for the
“unconstitutional and unforgiving” polices by which other
medical personnel must abide.

Id. at ¶ 78.

However,

because the plaintiff has not shown that any of the other
defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his
medical needs, no reasonable jury could conclude that
Farinella violated his Eighth Amendment right not to be
subjected to cruel and unusual punishment.

The plaintiff

has also not provided evidence to support his conclusory
allegation that the policies of Correctional Managed Health
Care are unconstitutional.
IV.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the
defendants are entitled to summary judgment in their favor,
and the motion for summary judgment [Doc.#48] is hereby
GRANTED.
The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of
the defendants and close this case.
It is so ordered.
Dated this 30th day of April, 2019 at Hartford,
Connecticut.
___________/s/AWT___________
Alvin W. Thompson
United States District Judge
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