Spruill v. USA

Filing 17

ORDER denying 1 Motion to Vacate/Set Aside/Correct Sentence (2255). See attached ruling and order for details. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 3/31/22. (Salah, M.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
JEFF SPRUILL

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Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

Case No. 3:17-cv-1819 (RNC)

RULING AND ORDER
Petitioner Jeff Spruill, a former federal inmate, commenced
this action while incarcerated seeking resentencing or a new
trial pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 based primarily on
ineffective assistance of counsel.

Petitioner alleges that his

trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the forcause removal of a deliberating juror, failing to dispute the
applicability of the Sentencing Guidelines’ career offender
enhancement, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, and failing to properly convey
the terms of a plea offer.

For reasons that follow, the

petition is denied.
I.
Petitioner was convicted by a jury of possession with
intent to distribute and distribution of cocaine (count one),
and cocaine base (count two), possession with intent to
distribute cocaine (count three), and unlawful possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon (count four).
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The career offender

enhancement resulted in a Guidelines range of 210-240 months
(the statutory maximum), which was excessive because the drug
quantities involved in petitioner’s offense conduct were
relatively small and his longest prior term of incarceration (29
months) relatively short.

Applying the parsimony principle, I

sentenced petitioner on each count to 120 months’ imprisonment
followed by 36 months of supervised release (the mandatory
minimum on counts one, two and three), all to run concurrently.
On appeal, petitioner claimed that he had been deprived of
a fair trial due to the removal of a deliberating juror after
the jury disclosed that it was divided 11-1.

The Court of

Appeals held that petitioner, through counsel, had waived
appellate review of this claim by affirmatively agreeing to the
juror’s removal.

See United States v. Spruill, 808 F.3d 585,

598 (2d Cir. 2015).

In addition, petitioner claimed that the

evidence was insufficient to support the verdicts of guilty on
counts one, two and four, and that his Guidelines range had been
improperly calculated due to the career offender enhancement.
The Court of Appeals rejected these claims.

United States v.

Spruill, 634 Fed. App’x 312, 314-15 (2d Cir. 2015).
II.
To obtain habeas relief based on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, petitioner must satisfy the two-prong
test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which
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requires him to prove that (1) his counsel’s performance “fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) his
counsel’s deficient performance was prejudicial, resulting in
“errors . . . so serious as to deprive [him] of a fair trial.”
Id. at 687-88, 698-700.

Under the performance prong, petitioner

must overcome a presumption that his counsel’s performance was
“within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”
Id. at 689.

“As a general rule, a habeas petitioner will be

able to demonstrate that trial counsel’s decisions were
objectively unreasonable only if ‘there was no . . . tactical
justification for the course taken.’”

Lynn v. Bliden, 443 F.3d

238, 247 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Luciano, 158
F.3d 655, 660 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (internal alteration
omitted)).

Under the prejudice prong, petitioner must

demonstrate that “there exists a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.”
477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986).

Kimmelman v. Morrison,

Failure to satisfy either prong

requires dismissal of the claim.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

A. Ineffective Assistance Based on Failure to Object to
Removal of Juror
During voir dire, a member of the venire stated that she
did “outreach in the prison systems in Hartford.”
of only two persons of color in the venire.
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She was one

Petitioner at first

exercised a peremptory challenge against her, expressing concern
that she was “a bit jaded” because of her work.

However, he

changed his mind and she wound up serving on the jury (“Juror
11”).
During deliberations, the jury sent a note stating that it
was divided 11-1 and requesting clarification on the law of
constructive possession.

In response to this note, the jury was

given a standard instruction that a juror should not yield a
conscientious view simply to arrive at a verdict.

In reply, the

jury asked for a definition of “conscientious view.”

With

counsels’ approval, the term was defined.
The jury then sent a second note stating that there was
“one juror who feels in their gut that they have a conflict of
interest.

We need to understand how to proceed.”

In response

to this note, the jury was given a definition of “conflict of
interest.”
In a subsequent note, Juror 11 expressed concern about
having a bias as a result of her work with individuals in
prison, and suggested it might make sense to replace her.
Petitioner’s counsel said the court “would need to inquire of
her whether she can set aside the bias and deliberate.”
Such an inquiry was undertaken.

In response, Juror 11

confirmed that her employment experience was the source of her

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concern.

She was asked to think about whether she had a bias or

just a different view of the evidence.
After a period of time for reflection, Juror 11 asked to be
excused, citing her “difficulty in making a decision on a
verdict based on feelings of sensitivity toward individuals who
have similar cases to Mr. Spruill.”

All counsel agreed that

Juror 11 should be dismissed for bias.
conclusion.

I reached the same

An alternate joined the jury and deliberations

began again.
Petitioner faults his counsel for “fail[ing] to object to
the dismissal of [a] known deadlocking/dissenting juror who was
also of the same ethnic background [as petitioner].”
any such objection would have been futile.

However,

Rule 23(b) of the

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes removal of a
deliberating juror “for just cause.”

Juror 11’s request to be

excused due to her inability to put aside feelings of sympathy
required her removal.

I regretted losing her as a juror,

especially since she was the only person of color on the jury.
But her inability to judge the evidence impartially left me with
no alternative.
The Second Circuit has held that counsel cannot “have been
ineffective for failing to take action that would have been
futile.”
2008).

United States v. Abad, 514 F.3d 271, 276 (2d Cir.
Failure to take action that would have been futile bears
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on both prongs of Strickland: it is not objectively unreasonable
for a lawyer to refrain from making a futile objection; nor can
it result in prejudice.

See Blue v. United States, 2012 WL

2175783, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2012) (rejecting ineffective
assistance claim for failure to request the removal of a hostile
juror when court had already determined that juror could act
impartially).

In this case, petitioner’s counsel might well

have recognized that an objection to removal of Juror 11 would
have been futile.

See Spruill, 808 F.3d at 599 (“[Petitioner’s]

counsel may simply have recognized that the juror’s final
response acknowledged an extrinsic bias that compelled
removal.”).

In any event, his failure to object does not

provide a basis for habeas relief under Strickland.
B. Ineffective Assistance Based on Failure to Object to
Career Offender Enhancement
Petitioner next alleges that his counsel rendered
ineffective assistance in failing to argue that his prior
convictions for sale of narcotics in violation of Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 21a-277(a) could not be counted as “controlled substance
offenses” for purposes of the career offender enhancement.
Specifically, he faults his counsel for failing to make
arguments under Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013),
and Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013).

In effect, he

argues that his counsel should have predicted Mathis v. United
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States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), which built on Descamps and
Alleyne.

The Government responds that this claim fails to

satisfy either prong of Strickland.

I agree.

Assuming that as a result of Mathis, petitioner’s prior
drug felonies no longer qualify as predicate offenses for
purposes of the career offender enhancement, 1 it was not
objectively unreasonable in 2013 for his trial counsel to fail
to predict this change in the law.

See Hancock v. United

States, No. 3:14-cv-1751(VAB), 2019 WL 418093, at *9 (D. Conn.
Feb. 1, 2019) (holding that in 2012 it was objectively
reasonable for counsel to view prior conviction for possession
with intent to sell narcotics as predicate offense for career
offender enhancement).

Moreover, no prejudice resulted from

counsel’s failure to object to the career offender enhancement.
Had petitioner not been classified as a career offender, and had
none of his prior convictions been classified as “controlled
substance offenses,” his guidelines range would have dropped to
130-162 months.

But he was sentenced to 120 months, still below

the bottom of that range, in accordance with the parsimony
principle. 2

Because I determined that a sentence of 120 months

In fact, the merits of petitioner’s Mathis claim are not
“straightforward.” Parker v. Hazelwood, Civil No. 17-cv-484-LM,
2019 WL 1748150, *5 & n. 7 (D.N.H. March 19, 2019).
2 As I explained to petitioner at the time:
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was “necessary” and not “harsher than necessary,” petitioner
would not have received a lesser sentence in any event. 3
C. Ineffective Assistance Based On Failure to Convey
Plea Offer
I agree with [your counsel] that the Guidelines
range [of 210-262] is excessive mainly because the
longest prior sentence you served was 29 months and, as
I mentioned, you're not a drug kingpin and you have no
record of violence.
So I'm going to . . . impose a non-Guidelines
sentence. I'm going to sentence you to 120 months and
recommend to the Bureau of Prisons that you receive
credit for the time you've spent in pretrial detention.
I expect that you will get that credit if the state
charges are nolled or dismissed, and at that point you
will have 107 months in round numbers to serve.
I think this sentence is necessary to impose just
punishment, to protect society against further criminal
activity on your part, and to deter others from engaging
in criminal activity, without being harsher than
necessary.
Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, United States v. Spruill,
No. 13-cr-00023-RNC-1 (D. Conn. Dec. 12, 2013), ECF No. 68,
at 21.
As a separate ground for relief, petitioner claims that he
should have been given the benefit of Mathis, which was decided
after the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment but before his
petition for certiorari was denied. The Government contends
that this claim is procedurally defaulted because petitioner did
not raise it on direct review – by supplementing his petition
for certiorari - despite having ample time to do so. The
Government’s argument may be correct. See Walden v. United
States, 63 Fed. App’x 568, 569 (2d Cir. 2003). But it is
unnecessary to resolve this issue because, as discussed in the
text, even assuming Mathis precludes application of the career
offender enhancement, petitioner cannot prove that he would have
received a shorter sentence.
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Petitioner’s final claim is that his trial counsel failed
to inform him of a plea offer.

In support of this claim, he

alleges the following:
Defendant asked trial counsel about a month before the
trial about the plea offer and counsel stated, “one
second,” and as counsel looked through his briefcase, came
up empty, and said “I can’t find it, I must’ve left it at
the office.” After that the plea deal was never again
raised between counsel and the defendant. Counsel’s only
discussion from then on was about how this trial was going
to be his “big debut” in the federal courts.
ECF No. 1-3, at 4.
Petitioner also relies on the following exchange at a
pretrial conference:
THE COURT: Okay. What is Mr. Spruill looking at if
he’s convicted?
MS. DYE:

I believe he’s looking at about five years.

(Pause)
MS. DYE:

We’ve calculated 70 to 87 months if he had
pled, so it would be three additional points
on top of that.

Transcript of Pretrial Conference, United States v. Spruill, No.
13-cr-00023-RNC-1 (D. Conn. Dec. 12, 2013), ECF No. 62, at 8.
Petitioner alleges that he would have accepted a plea offer with
an exposure of 70 to 87 months rather than risk far greater
exposure by going to trial.
This claim does not provide petitioner with a basis for
habeas relief.

Even if there was a plea offer that petitioner’s

counsel failed to convey, the only part of petitioner’s sentence
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that remains to be completed is his three-year term of
supervised release.

Had he accepted the alleged offer and

pleaded guilty, the same term of supervised release would have
been mandatory.

See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C).
III.

Accordingly, the petition is hereby denied.

The clerk may

close the case.
So ordered this 31st day of March 2022.

/s/ Robert N. Chatigny_____
Robert N. Chatigny
United States District Judge

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