Carlson et al v. CBS Corporation et al
Filing
52
ORDER granting 48 Motion for Summary Judgment for the reasons given in the attached ruling. The Court dismisses with prejudice the Carlsons claims against General Electric. The Court also dismisses with prejudice Foster Wheeler, LLCs and Crane Co.s cross-claims against General Electric. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 1/7/2020.(Dannenmaier, Katherine)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
KURT CARLSON, ELAINE CARLSON
Plaintiffs,
v.
CBS CORPORATION ET AL.,
Defendants.
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No. 3:17-CV-1916 (VLB)
January 7, 2020
Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. 48]
I.
Introduction
Plaintiffs Kurt Carlson (“Mr. Carlson”) and Elaine Carlson (“Ms. Carlson”)
(collectively, the “Carlsons”) sue General Electric and multiple other defendants
for statutory product liability damages under Connecticut General Statutes §§ 52240a, 52-240b, and 52-572m., et seq.; for loss of consortium; and for common-law
product liability. [Dkt. 1-1 (Compl.)]. General Electric now moves for summary
judgment on the grounds that the Carlsons have not offered any admissible
evidence demonstrating that Mr. Carlson was exposed to any asbestos-containing
product manufactured by it. [Dkt. 48 (General Electric Mot. for Summ. Judgment)].
The Carlsons have not responded to the Motion for Summary Judgment. For the
reasons below, the Court now GRANTS the motion.
II.
Standard for Summary Judgment Motion
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue is genuine if “the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is “material” if it
“might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Ibid.
Where a defendant presents admissible evidence tending to show there is
no genuine issue of material fact for a jury to decide and she is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law, a plaintiff must produce admissible evidence raising a genuine
issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Rule 56(c)
“mandates the entry of summary judgment… against a party who fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to a party’s
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Bedor v.
Friendly’s Ice Cream Corp., 392 F. Supp. 2d 367, 373 (D. Conn. 2005) (quoting
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).
“In determining whether that burden [of showing the absence of any genuine
issue of fact] has been met, the court is required to resolve all ambiguities and
credit all factual inferences that could be drawn in favor of the party against whom
summary judgment is sought.” Vivenzio v. City of Syracuse, 611 F.3d 98, 106 (2d
Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). But “[m]ere speculation or
conjecture is insufficient; there must be evidence on which a jury could reasonably
find for the nonmovant.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “The
nonmoving party cannot simply rest on the allegations in its pleadings since the
essence of summary judgment is to go beyond the pleadings to determine if a
genuine issue of material fact exists.” Bedor, 392 F. Supp. 2d at 373 (2005) (quoting
Celote., 477 U.S. at 322 (1986)).
III.
Facts
The Carlsons allege that Mr. Carlson was exposed to various asbestos-
containing products during the course of his employment as a radiological control
technician at General Dynamics/Electric Boat Corp., Groton, CT from 1973 through
1974. [Dkt. 1-1, Count 1 ¶5]. The Carlsons allege that this exposure contributed to
his contraction of asbestos-related mesothelioma and other asbestos-related
pathologies. Ibid. During this time period, the Carlsons alleges that Mr. Carlson
was exposed to asbestos-containing products manufactured by multiple
defendants including General Electric. Ibid. at ¶ 6.
On September 20, 2017, the Carlsons provided answers to General Electric’s
Standard Interrogatories and Requests for Production. [Dkt. 48-2 (General Electric
Statement of Facts) ¶5]. Mr. Carlson did not identify General Electric as an
employer nor does he identify any asbestos-containing General Electric product to
which he claims he was exposed. Ibid.
Mr. Carlson was deposed on October 16, 17, and 18 of 2017. Id. at ¶6. He did
not identify General Electric as an employer, nor did he identify any asbestoscontaining General Electric product to which he was allegedly exposed. Id. at ¶9.
No other witnesses have been deposed in this case. Ibid.
IV.
Discussion
i. Governing Product Liability Law
General Electric argues that substantive maritime law applies to the
Carlsons’ claims, and they do not respond. [Dkt. 48-1 (Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.)
at 5-11]. 1
To establish causation in an asbestos-related personal injuries tort claim
under maritime law, “a plaintiff must show, for each defendant, that ‘(1) he was
exposed to the defendant’s product, and (2) the product was a substantial factor in
causing the injury he suffered,’ and (3) that the defendant manufactured or
distributed the injurious product.” Bray v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19523 at *32-33 (D. Conn. Feb. 19, 2015) (quoting Lindstrom, 424 F.3d at 492). “[T]o
demonstrate that the allegedly defective product was a ‘substantial factor’ in
causing the plaintiff'’ injury, a plaintiff must show that it is ‘more likely than not’
that exposure to the product caused his injuries.” Bray, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *4
(citing Lindstrom, 424 F.3d at 492). Finally,
Minimal exposure’ to a defendant’s product is insufficient to
establish causation. Likewise, a mere showing that defendant’s
product was present somewhere at plaintiff’s place of work is
insufficient. Rather, the plaintiff must show ‘a high enough level of
exposure that an inference that the asbestos was a substantial factor
in the injury is more than conjectural.
In re Asbestos Litig., No. CV 18-410-LPS-SRF, 2019 WL 6211371, at *3 (D. Del. Nov.
20, 2019) (quoting Lindstrom, 424 F.3d at 492); see also Paquin v. Crane Co., 2017
1
The Carlsons initially bring this product liability action under the Connecticut
Product Liability Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-572m, and under a theory of
negligence. [Dkt. 1-1]. As the CPLA is the exclusive remedy for any product
defect action brought under Connecticut law, Conn Gen. Stat. § 52-572n(a), the
Court assumes that the Carlsons’ negligence claim is brought under maritime
law.
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48854 at *6 (D. Conn. Mar. 31, 217) (citing Perkins v. Air & Liquid
Sys. Corp., 2015 WL 4610671 at *6 S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2015)).
With respect to liability for after-applied insulation and replacement parts,
the Supreme Court recently clarified:
In the maritime tort context, a product manufacturer has a duty to warn
when (i) its product requires incorporation of a part, (ii) the manufacturer
knows or has reasons to know that the integrated product is likely to be
dangerous for its intended uses, and (iii) the manufacturer has no reason
to believes that the product’s users will realize that danger.
Air & Liquid Systems Corp. v. DeVries, 139 S. Ct. 986, 995(Mar. 19, 2019). Thus,
under maritime tort law, a defendant may be liable for after-applied insulation and
replacement parts.
This Court has granted summary judgment in favor of an asbestos personalinjury defendant where the plaintiff simply averred the defendant’s equipment was
used on “many, if not most, submarines constructed or overhauled at Electric Boat
during [his] time of employment,” stating that such evidence was not “sufficient to
create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff was exposed to
asbestos-continuing products manufactured, sold, supplied, or in any way created
by” the defendant. Paquin, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48854 at *9. See also Bray, 2015
WL 728515 at *6 (granting summary judgment for the defendants where plaintiffs
did not “demonstrate[] that the defendants manufactured or distributed asbestoscontinuing products” used at plaintiff’s workplace); In re Asbestos Litig., No. CV
16-308-LPS-SRF, 2019 WL 3082196, at *5 (D. Del. July 15, 2019), report and
recommendation adopted sub nom. Hickman v. CBS Corp., No. CV 16-308-LPSSRF, 2019 WL 4670873 (D. Del. Aug. 19, 2019) (granting summary judgment for the
defendant on the grounds that there was no genuine question that defendant’s
product was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s injuries where the sole
plaintiff testified that he worked with defendant’s equipment, but could not place
any defendant’s pumps on any specific ship.)
Therefore, the Carlsons bear the burden of proving that Mr. Carlson was
exposed to defendants’ products and that these exposures were a “substantial
factor” in his mesothelioma and other asbestos-related pathologies.
ii. Analysis of Product Liability Claims
General Electric
argues that the Carlsons have failed to adduce any
evidence to whether General Electric’s products were a substantial factor in
causing Mr. Carlson’s injury because the Carlsons have not identified any instance
where Mr. Carlson was exposed to any General Electric equipment, let alone any
General Electric equipment with asbestos-containing components. [Dkt. 48-1. at
12-13 (citing Dkt. 48-2 at ¶¶ 5, 6, and 9]. Further, Mr. Carlson testified that he did
not perform any work, maintenance or repair on any equipment or machinery, and
did not provide any testimony regarding any work, maintenance or repair
performed by others in his presence. Id. (citing Dkt. 48-2 at ¶¶7-8 ). The Carlsons
have not responded to General Electric’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Since the
Carlsons have not produced any evidence on this question, the Court agrees that
there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether General Electric’s products
were a substantial factor in causing Mr. Carlson’s injuries, and enters summary
judgment in General Electric’s favor.
iii. Analysis of Consortium Claim
“Although general maritime law does not provide relief for a claim for loss
of consortium, a party may bring a common law claim for loss of consortium under
state law.” Bray, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19523 at *15-16 (citations omitted). Under
Connecticut law, a claim for loss of consortium depends on the existence of the
injured spouse’s cause of action, such that “if an adverse judgment bars the
injured spouse’s cause of action, any claim for loss of consortium necessarily fails
as well.” United Servs. Auto Ass’n v. Kaschel (Estate of Kelly), 84 Conn. App. 139,
147 n.9 (2004) (citing Champagne v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 212 Conn. 509, 55556 (1980); Hopson v. St. Mary’s Hospital, 176 Conn. 485, 494 (1979)).
Here, because the Carlsons have failed to meet their evidentiary burden with
respect to Mr. Carlson’s product liability claims, Ms. Carlson’s loss of consortium
claim also fails.
iv. Analysis of Cross-Claims
Co-Defendants Foster Wheeler, LLC and Crane Co. have filed cross-claims
against General Electric seeking contribution for the Carlsons’ alleged damages
pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 52-572o. In addition, co-Defendants
seek equitable contribution for General Electric’s share of any judgment rendered
in favor of the Carlsons. For the same reasons the Carlsons’ claims against General
Electric cannot survive summary judgment, the claims of the Cross-Claimants also
fail.
V.
Conclusion
Therefore, the Court GRANTS General Electric’s motion for summary judgment as
to all claims. The Court dismisses with prejudice the Carlsons’ claims against
General Electric. The Court also dismisses with prejudice Foster Wheeler, LLC’s
and Crane Co.’s cross-claims against General Electric.
SO ORDERED this 7th day of January 2020 at Hartford, Connecticut.
__________/s/ _________
_________
VANESSA L. BRYANT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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