Pinnicchia v. United States Department of Veterans Affairs

Filing 30

ORDER granting 12 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Victor A. Bolden on 3/13/2019. (Washington, Gregory)

`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

JOHN PINNICCHIA,
Plaintiff,
v.

No. 3:17-cv-2139 (VAB)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS
AFFAIRS,
Defendant.

RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
John Pinnicchia sued the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (either the “VA””
or “Defendant”) for declaratory and injunctive relief under the Freedom of Information Act
(“FOIA”). Mr. Pinnicchia alleges that the VA has improperly withheld agency records. The VA
has moved for summary judgment. Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 12.
For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment, and
the VA need not unredact the documents already provided.
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.

Factual Allegations

According to Mr. Pinnicchia, on or about May 25 or 26, 2017, he was falsely accused of
job-related impropriety and suspended with pay, pending an investigation. Compl., ECF No. 1,
at ¶ 6. According to his FOIA request, Mr. Pinnicchia was informed by Mr. Harry Lovett that he
“allegedly threatened” his “immediate supervisor Kevin Tyson.” Martin Decl., Ex. A, ECF No.
13-2. The time and date of the event were not made clear to Mr. Pinnicchia. Id. Mr. Pinnicchia
was exonerated by the investigation, but his accuser was never identified. Compl., at ¶ 6.
On June 2, 2017, Mr. Pinnicchia requested “any and all police reports or police logs

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relating to this incident.” Martin Decl., Ex. A., ECF No. 13-2; Compl., at ¶ 7.
On June 14, 2017, Veteran Affairs provided Mr. Pinnicchia with a redacted police report.
Id. at ¶ 8. The initial agency decision noted that “all personal, names and identifying information
of the other parties have been redacted.” Martin Aff., Ex. C, ECF No. 13-4. The VA’s General
Counsel later affirmed the decision to redact the personally identifiable information on Mr.
Pinnicchia’s appeal. Id. at ¶¶ 9–10, Ex. 1.
B.

Procedural History

On December 21, 2017, Mr. Pinnicchia filed this Complaint against the Department of
Veterans Affairs for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, costs, and attorney’s fees under FOIA.
ECF No. 1. On January 29, 2018, the VA answered the Complaint. ECF No. 11.
On July 13, 2018, the VA moved for summary judgment. ECF No. 12.
On July 22, 2018, Mr. Pinnicchia filed a memorandum in opposition to summary
judgment. ECF No. 17.
On August 6, 2018, the VA replied to Mr. Pinnicchia ’s response. ECF No. 18.
On March 6, 2019, the Court held a hearing on the VA’s ’s motion for summary
judgment.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
“FOIA was enacted to promote honest and open government and to assure the existence

of an informed citizenry to hold the governors accountable to the governed.” Grand Cent.
P’ship., Inc. v. Cuomo, 166 F.3d 473, 478 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). FOIA reflects “a general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information is
exempted under clearly delineated statutory language,” Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352,
360–61 (1976) (quotation marks omitted), and “adopts as its most basic premise a policy

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strongly favoring public disclosure of information in the possession of federal agencies.”
Halpern v. F.B.I., 181 F.3d 279, 286 (2d Cir. 1999).
“There are, however, limits to FOIA’s reach. Specifically, in recognition of those
interests that may at times conflict with the policy of full disclosure, FOIA also provides nine
exemptions from its disclosure requirement.” El Badrawi v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 583 F.
Supp. 2d 285, 292 (D. Conn. 2008) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Yet, “[i]n keeping
with the policy of full disclosure, the exemptions are narrowly construed with doubts resolved in
favor of disclosure.” Halpern, 181 F.3d at 287 (quotation marks omitted).
“Summary judgment is the procedural vehicle by which most FOIA actions are
resolved.” N.Y. Times Co. v. Dep’t of Def., 499 F. Supp. 2d 501, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (citation
omitted). When an agency withholds material under a FOIA Exemption, “[t]he agency asserting
the exemption bears the burden of proof, and all doubts as to the applicability of the exemption
must be resolved in favor of disclosure.” N.Y. Times v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 756 F.3d 100, 112
(2d Cir. 2014) (citing Wilner v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 592 F.3d 60, 69 (2d Cir. 2009)). “As with all
motions for summary judgment, summary judgment in a FOIA case is appropriate only when
the . . . materials submitted to the Court show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Serv. Women’s Action
Network v. Dep't of Def., 888 F. Supp. 2d 231, 240 (D. Conn. 2012) (quotation marks omitted)
(“SWAN”).
“In order to prevail on a motion for summary judgment in a FOIA case, the defending
agency has the burden of showing that its search was adequate and that any withheld documents
fall within an exemption to FOIA.” Carney v. Dep't of Justice, 19 F.3d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1994).
To sustain that burden, the agency may rely on “[a]ffidavits or declarations supplying facts

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indicating that the agency has conducted a thorough search and giving reasonably detailed
explanations why any withheld documents fall within an exemption.” Id.
Affidavits submitted by an agency are accorded a presumption of good faith;
accordingly, discovery relating to the agency’s search and the exemptions it
claims for withholding records generally is unnecessary if the agency’s
submissions are adequate on their face. When this is the case, the district court
may forgo discovery and award summary judgment on the basis of affidavits.
Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). This good faith presumption, however, only applies
to agency affidavits or declarations that are “reasonably detailed.” Halpern, 181 F.3d at 295.
Affidavits “must be relatively detailed and non-conclusory,” which “means, for instance, that
[they] must describe in reasonable detail the scope of the search and the search terms or methods
employed.” SWAN, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 241 (quotation marks omitted).
“Finally, FOIA instructs district courts to review de novo agency decisions to withhold
records. The de novo standard of review for FOIA cases is well established in this circuit.” El
Badrawi, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 292 (citations omitted).
III.

DISCUSSION
FOIA requires disclosure of public agency records unless the requested documents fall

within one of FOIA’s nine enumerated exemptions. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a), (b)(1)–(9); Nat’l Council
of La Raza v. Dep’t of Justice, 411 F.3d 350, 355 (2d Cir. 2006) (“FOIA strongly favors a policy
of disclosure and requires the government to disclose its records unless its documents fall within
one of the specific enumerated exemptions set forth in the act.”). Courts “construe FOIA
exemptions narrowly, resolving all doubts in favor of disclosure.” Wood v. F.B.I., 432 F.3d 78,
83 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1,
8 (2001)).
The VA argues that the redacted information in this case falls within FOIA Exemptions 6

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and 7(C) for three reasons. First, the VA properly redacted information in the record because the
police record was compiled for law enforcement purposes covered under exemption 7(C).
Second, the redacted information implicates a recognized privacy interest because unredacted
information could be used to identify other parties referred to in the request. Third, disclosure of
the redacted information serves no public interest and is outweighed by the countervailing
privacy interests of the parties implicated in the redacted information. Alternatively, the VA
requests that the Court review the unredacted record in camera to make appropriate redaction
determinations.
In response, Mr. Pinnicchia argues that the privacy interest of every individual who VA
attempts to protect is engaged in government work, on government time, and in government
facilities. Mr. Pinnicchia therefore argues that the alleged private matters do not implicate 7(C)’s
personal matters and personal facts exemption. According to Mr. Pinnicchia, when the requested
information concerns government matters and there is no other way to access the information,
the balance of public and private interests weighs in favor of disclosure of the information. Mr.
Pinnicchia also does not object to the Court reviewing the unredacted information in camera.
In reply, the VA argues that, even when the information requested sheds light on a
government activity, the personally identifiable information omitted is still protected; thus, Mr.
Pinnicchia cannot satisfy his burden in proving that an overriding public interest necessitates
disclosure of the personal information.
The Court agrees
To succeed on a motion for summary judgment in a FOIA case, “the defending agency
has the burden of showing that its search was adequate and that any withheld documents fall
within an exemption to the FOIA.” Carney, 19 F.3d at 812. An agency may meet its burden by

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“giving reasonably detailed explanations why any withheld documents fall within an
exemption,” with the affidavits and declarations in support of this determination being “accorded
a presumption of good faith.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, neither party contests
the adequacy of the search. The Court shall therefore only consider the purported FOIA
exemptions.
A.

Applicability of Exemptions 6 and 7(C)

The VA justifies its redactions to the records provided to Mr. Pinnicchia under FOIA
Exemptions 6 and 7(C). These exemptions permit agencies to withhold “personnel and medical
files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), and “records or information compiled for law
enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records
or information . . . could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C).1 Because these documents were compiled for law
enforcement purposes, the applicability of Exemption 7(C) is the threshold issue with respect to
the redaction of these records.
The Second Circuit has consistently emphasized that, “[i]n keeping with the policy of full
disclosure, the [FOIA] exemptions are narrowly construed with doubts resolved in favor of
disclosure.” Halpern, 181 F.3d at 287 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Exceptions to FOIA’s general principle of broad disclosure of Government
records have consistently been given a narrow compass. The government bears
the burden of demonstrating that an exemption applies to each item of information
it seeks to withhold, and all doubts as to the applicability of the exemption must
be resolved in favor of disclosure.

The standard for evaluating a threatened invasion of privacy interests under Exemption 7(C) “is somewhat broader
than the standard applicable” under Exemption 6. U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. For Freedom of Press,
489 U.S. 749, 756 (1989). Because both exemptions are implicated here, the Court will analyze this case under the
broader 7(C) standard. See Perlman v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 312 F.3d 100, 106 (2d Cir. 2002).
1

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Ctr. for Constitutional Rights v. C.I.A., 765 F.3d 161, 166 (2d Cir. 2014) (quotation marks and
citations omitted), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 1530 (2015).
To meet its burden, an agency “must provide a relatively detailed justification,
specifically identifying the reasons why a particular exemption is relevant and correlating those
claims with the particular part of a withheld document to which they apply.” Vietnam Veterans of
Am. Conn. Greater Hartford Chapter 120 v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 8 F. Supp. 3d 188, 228 (D.
Conn. 2014) (citing Morley v. C.I.A., 508 F.3d 1108, 1122 (2d Cir. 2007)). The department
asserting the FOIA Exemption “must explain specifically which of the nine statutory exemptions
to FOIA’s general rule of disclosure supports the agency’s decision to withhold a requested
document or to delete information from a released document.” Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted). “In analyzing the applicability of exemption 7(C), a court must consider three factors:
(1) whether the document was compiled for law enforcement purposes, (2) whether the record
implicates a recognized privacy interest, and (3) whether the privacy interest is outweighed by an
overriding public interest in disclosure of the information.” Peeler v. Dep't of Justice, No. 3:13–
cv–1323 (JAM), 2015 WL 418136, at *5 (D. Conn. Jan. 30, 2015) (citing Massey v. F.B.I., 3
F.3d 620, 624–25 (2d Cir. 1993)).
Here, the VA has met its burden by showing that the record requested by Mr. Pinnicchia
was compiled for a law enforcement function and implicated privacy interests without a
countervailing public interest.
First, Exemption 7 only applies to FOIA requests involving “records or information
compiled for law enforcement purposes.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). Exemption 7 would apply
because Mr. Pinnicchia requested “any and all police reports or police logs relating to” the
relevant incident. Martin Decl., Ex. A, ECF No. 13-2. The documents therefore were requested

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for a law enforcement purpose.
Second, Exemption 7(C) allows an agency to withhold documents for personal privacy
reasons. As the Supreme Court has noted, “Exemption 7(C), by its terms, permits an agency to
withhold a document only when revelation ‘could reasonably be expected to constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.’” Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 771. “[W]hether
disclosure of a private document under Exemption 7(C) is warranted must turn on the nature of
the requested document and its relationship to” this “basic purpose” of the FOIA. Id. at 772.
Here, Mr. Pinnicchia seeks his accuser’s personal identity. See Compl., at ¶ 6. The
Court’s review of the redacted and unredacted versions of Mr. Pinnicchia’s requested record
shows that only personally identifiable private information was redacted from the investigation
report. See ECF Nos. 13-5, 14. A comparison of the redacted and unredacted versions of the
documents shows that the redacted record omits the reporting person’s name, driver’s license
information, age, date of birth, gender, physical characteristics, work location, and event
narrative—all of which is personally identifiable information. Id.
As a member of the public requesting these records, Mr. Pinnicchia is entitled only to the
unredacted portions that indicate that a referral was taken, an investigation took place, and that
the police investigation was closed at the conclusion of the investigation—all of which is
unredacted in the file that was disclosed to him. ECF No. 13-5; see Associated Press v. U.S.
Dep’t of Def., 554 F.3d 274, 284 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Exemption 7(C) requires a court to balance the
public interest in disclosure against the privacy interest Congress intended the Exemption to
protect.”). In sum, the fundamental purpose of Exemption 7(C) is to prevent unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy through the use of FOIA, which is what would happen if the
redacted information would be provided to Mr. Pinnicchia.

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Third, there is no public interest that outweighs the privacy interest in this case. When
there is a privacy interest under Exemption 7(C), the only relevant public interest is “the citizens’
right to be informed about ‘what their government is up to.’” Reilly v. Dep’t. of Justice, 3:16-cv2024 (VLB), 2018 WL 1582547, at * 6 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2018) (citing Boyd v. Exec. Office of
U.S. Attorneys, 87 F. Supp. 3d 58, 73 (D.D.C. 2015)). Mr. Pinnicchia seeks this information
because “[h]is accuser was never identified, he was never given any opportunity to understand
the nature of the accusation against him, and he has never been afforded the opportunity of a
name-clearing proceeding of any kind.” Compl., at ¶ 6.
Mr. Pinnicchia’s rationale falls outside of the recognized public interest purpose of
identifying “what the government is up to.” The undredacted information already informed Mr.
Pinnicchia of what “the government [was] up to;” it was investigating this complaint about his
alleged conduct, a complaint ultimately dismissed in his favor.2 As a result, Mr. Pinnicchia’s
request is not a matter of public interest in the activities of government, but rather a personal one,
an interest that does not further the public’s interest when weighed against the countervailing
privacy interests at issue.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment, and

the VA need not unredact the documents already provided.
SO ORDERED at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 13th day of March 2019.
/s/ Victor A. Bolden
VICTOR A. BOLDEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Significantly, Mr. Pinnicchia claims that “he has never been afforded the opportunity of a name-clearing
proceeding of any kind,” Compl. at 6, but he nevertheless also alleged that “he was exonerated and returned to his
regular employment. Id.
2

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