Chmura v. Norton et al

Filing 9

ORDER. For the reasons discussed in the attached, Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED. The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis st atus is denied for the purpose of an appeal. The 2 motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, 3 and 7 emergency petitions, and 6 motion to appoint counsel are DENIED as moot. The Clerk is directed to close this case. Signed by Judge Michael P. Shea on 5/9/2018. (Taykhman, N.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
LINDA LAN CHMURA,
Plaintiff,
v.
NORTON, HAMMERSLEY, LOPEZ & SKOKOS
INVERSO PA, ACME INVESTMENT GROUP
LLC, JOHN W. DEIDRE JAGO, SANCTUARY
PELICAN POINTE HOA, PROGRESSIVE
COMMUNITY MGT INC., JUDD, ULRICH,
SCARLETT, WICKMAN, SIMMONTI & DEAN,
PA, STEPHEN H. KURVIN, JUDGES LOGALBO
JR., HAWORTH, BENNETT JR., DAKIN,
ROBERTS, RUSHING, SHERIFF THOMAS
KNIGHT, THE FLORIDA BAR,
Defendants.

No. 3:17-cv-2164 (MPS)

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER
I.

Background

Plaintiff Linda Lan Chmura, appearing pro se, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. §§
1983, 1985, the Racketeer Influences and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §
1965(a), et seq., and other statutory provisions. She seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as
well as punitive damages, in connection with a foreclosure action filed against her in Sarasota
County, Florida.
Ms. Chmura’s complaint arises out of a foreclosure of a property she owned in Sarasota
County, Florida (“the Property”). Ms. Chmura alleges that she retained a law firm, Norton,
Hammersley, Lopez & Skokos PA (“Norton Hammersley”), to represent her in the foreclosure
action. Eventually, as a result of disagreements between Ms. Chmura and her counsel, Norton
Hammersley terminated its representation. Ms. Chmura filed a legal malpractice action against
the firm in Florida state court (Case No. 09 CC 001986 NC) and retained attorney Stephen
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Kurvin to represent her. Norton Hammersley asserted counterclaims, including that Ms. Chmura
owed the firm unpaid fees. Ms. Chmura fired Kurvin in May 2010 and ultimately lost the suit
against Norton Hammersley. On September 13, 2010, Judge LoGalbo of the Florida Circuit
Court for Sarasota County entered final judgment against Ms. Chmura and in favor of Norton
Hammersley. (ECF No. 1-2 at 36-38.)
On May 26, 2011, Sheriff Thomas Knight executed the judgment by foreclosing upon
and selling the Property to Acme Investment Group, LLC (“Acme”). (ECF No. 1-2 at 50.) Ms.
Chmura then filed another lawsuit (Case No. 11 CA 004853 NC) against Norton Hammersley
and Acme, seeking a declaratory judgment that the foreclosure sale was void. (ECF No. 1-2 at
91-94.) On October 28, 2011, Judge Roberts of the Florida Circuit Court for Sarasota County
entered final judgment against Ms. Chmura and in favor of Norton Hammersley and Acme,
stating that Acme owned the Property. (ECF No. 1-2 at 34.)
Ms. Chmura brings this action against Norton Hammersley, Acme Investment Group, her
former attorney Stephen Kurvin, the Florida state court judges who rendered rulings against her,
Clerk of Court Karen Rushing, Sheriff Thomas Knight, the Florida Bar, and various other
individuals and entities. She seeks a declaration that the Sheriff’s foreclosure sale was void, an
injunction granting her the right to repossess the Florida property, and punitive damages.
II.

Legal Standard

Because Ms. Chmura seeks to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court must evaluate her
complaint and determine whether it should advance. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (“[T]he court shall
dismiss [a] case at any time if the court determines that [the action] is frivolous or malicious;
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant
who is immune from such relief.”) The Court must construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v.

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Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest arguments that
they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 472 (2d Cir. 2006). A pro se
plaintiff, however, still must meet the standard of facial plausibility. See Hogan v. Fischer, 738
F.3d 509, 515 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[A] pro se complaint must state a plausible claim for relief.”)
(citing Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 73 (2d Cir. 2009)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
III.

Discussion

A. Absolute Judicial Immunity
Ms. Chmura’s claims against Florida state court judges fail under the doctrine of absolute
judicial immunity, which renders judges immune from suit for damages for judicial acts. Mireles
v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). “[A]cts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before the
judge are considered judicial in nature.” Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009).
Absolute judicial immunity protects judges from liability for their judicial acts, even when the
plaintiff alleges that the judge acted “maliciously or corruptly.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.
349, 356 (1978). Absolute immunity shields judges from all civil suits for damages, including
suits under Section 1983, Section 1985, or civil RICO. See, e.g., Peia v. U.S. Bankruptcy Court,
62 F. App’x 394, 396 (2d Cir. 2003) (summary order affirming dismissal of RICO claim as
barred by judicial immunity); Turner v. Boyle, 116 F. Supp. 3d 58, 81-82 (D. Conn. 2015)
(dismissing Section 1983 and 1985 claims as barred by judicial immunity).
Absolute immunity also bars Ms. Chmura’s Section 1983 claim for injunctive relief. The
1996 amendments to Section 1983 make injunctive relief unavailable for claims against judges

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for actions taken in their judicial capacity “unless a declaratory decree was violated or
declaratory relief was unavailable.” Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1999).
Ms. Chmura’s claims against Defendants LoGalbo, Haworth, Bennett, Dakin, and
Roberts arise from acts the judges took in their judicial capacities while presiding over Ms.
Chmura’s Florida lawsuits. Ms. Chmura does not allege that any of the actions violated a
declaratory decree or that declaratory relief was unavailable. Therefore, the claims against
Florida state court Judges LoGalbo, Haworth, Bennett, Dakin, and Roberts are dismissed under
the doctrine of judicial immunity and because they are frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (iii); Mills v. Fischer, 645 F.3d 176, 177 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Any claim dismissed
on the ground of absolute judicial immunity is ‘frivolous’ for purposes of [the in forma pauperis]
statute.”).
B. Absolute Quasi-Judicial Immunity
Clerk of Court Karen Rushing and Sheriff Thomas Knight are also immune from suit
based on Ms. Chmura’s allegations that Rushing entered writs of execution and Knight
completed a Sheriff’s sale as part of the foreclosure proceedings. Absolute immunity extends to
nonjudicial officers who perform acts that “are integrally related to an ongoing judicial
proceeding.” Mitchell v. Fishbein, 377 F.3d 157, 172-73 (2d Cir. 2004). Quasi-judicial immunity
protects court clerks and sheriffs from suit “for performance of tasks which are judicial in nature
and an integral part of the judicial process.” Garcia v. Hebert, No. 3:08CV95 (DFM), 2013 WL
1294412, at *12 (D. Conn. Mar. 28, 2013) (quoting Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 66 (2d
Cir. 1997)), aff’d, 594 F. App’x 26 (2d Cir. 2015) (summary order), cert. denied, No. 14-9720
(Oct. 5, 2015). See also Tornheim v. Eason, 363 F. Supp. 2d 674, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (sheriff
had absolute quasi-judicial immunity for effectuating a judgment’s mandate). Ms. Chmura’s

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claims against Rushing and Knight arise out of acts that were integrally related to the Florida
foreclosure proceedings. Therefore, the Court dismisses Ms. Chmura’s claims against Rushing
and Knight as frivolous.
C. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
The Court must also dismiss this action because it lacks jurisdiction over Ms. Chmura’s
claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 41516 (1923); Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983). That
doctrine precludes federal district courts from reviewing final judgments of state courts. See
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (holding that federal
district courts are barred from deciding cases “brought by state-court losers complaining of
injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments”). The RookerFeldman doctrine applies where the plaintiff (1) lost in state court, (2) complains of injuries
caused by the state-court judgment, (3) invites the district court to review and reject the state
court judgment, and (4) commenced the district court proceedings after the state-court judgment
was rendered. Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423, 426 (2d Cir. 2014).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “concerns a district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.” Lance v.
Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439 n.* (2007).
Ms. Chmura lost her cases in the Florida state courts before she filed this suit. She
complains of injuries that she suffered as a result of those losses and requests that this Court
declare that the foreclosure sale was void and order that she may take possession of the Property.
Thus, Ms. Chmura’s federal claims are “inextricably intertwined” with the Florida state court
judgments, and this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear those claims. See, e.g., Andrews v.

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Citimortgage, Inc., No. 14-CV-1534 (JS)(AKT), 2015 WL 1509511, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31,
2015) (holding that Rooker-Feldman doctrine precluded federal court jurisdiction over claims
alleging injuries that occurred as a result of a state court foreclosure judgment); Done v. Option
One Mortg., No. 09-CV-4770, 2011 WL 1260820, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2011) (“Although
plaintiff has made a cursory reference to seeking monetary damages, it is abundantly clear that
the whole purpose of this action is to undo the foreclosure judgment. Therefore, Rooker-Feldman
clearly applies.”). Therefore, the Court dismisses Ms. Chmura’s claims for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).1
D. Statute of Limitations
Ms. Chmura’s claims also fail because they are barred by the statute of limitations. The
statute of limitations for a section 1983 claim is “that which the State provides for personalinjury torts.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). The Connecticut statute of limitations
for personal injury actions is three years. “When a § 1983 action is filed in the District of
Connecticut, it is subject to a three-year statute of limitations.” Walker v. Jastremski, 159 F.3d
117, 119 (2d Cir. 1998). “RICO claims are subject to a four-year statute of limitations.” Koch v.
Christie’s Intern. PLC, 699 F.3d 141, 148 (2d Cir. 2012). “A cause of action to recover damages
based on [a] RICO injury accrues to plaintiff at the time [she] discovered or should have
discovered the injury.” Eno Farms Co-op. Ass’n., Inc. v. Corp. for Indep. Living, 2007 WL
3308016, at *4 (D. Conn. Nov. 5, 2007) (quoting Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096,
1102 (2d Cir. 1988)) (alterations omitted).

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Further, the complaint fails to plead facts showing why the Court would have personal
jurisdiction over any of the defendants. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1) (requiring allegations showing
that the court has jurisdiction); Sinoying Logistics Pte Ltd. v. Yi Da Xin Trading Corp., 619 F.3d
207, 213 (2d Cir. 2010) (where defendants have not appeared in a case, the court may dismiss a
case sua sponte for lack of personal jurisdiction).
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Here, all of the conduct underlying Ms. Chmura’s claims occurred more than four years
ago, with the most recent conduct occurring on October 28, 2011, when Judge Roberts entered
final judgment against Ms. Chmura and in favor of Norton Hammersley and Acme. Ms. Chmura
does not allege that she discovered her injuries at a later point in time. Therefore, Ms. Chmura’s
claims are barred by the statutes of limitations applicable to both Section 1983 and RICO claims
and must be dismissed.2
IV.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED. The Court certifies
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith,
and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. The motion for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2), emergency petitions (ECF Nos. 3 and 7), and
motion to appoint counsel (ECF No. 6) are DENIED as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/
Michael P. Shea, U.S.D.J.
Dated:

Hartford, Connecticut
May 9, 2018

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While the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, the Court may consider it upon the
filing of the complaint if “it is clear from the face of the complaint, and matters of which the
court may take judicial notice, that the plaintiff’s claims are barred as a matter of law.” Staehr v.
Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., 547 F.3d 406, 425 (2d Cir. 2008). Further, while the statute of
limitations may be avoided where equitable tolling or other tolling doctrines apply, in this case
the inapplicability of such doctrines is apparent because Ms. Chmura pleads no facts
demonstrating that she was reasonably diligent in pursuing her claims and that extraordinary
circumstances prevented her from filing her complaint within the limitations period. See Walker
v. Jastremski, 430 F.3d 560, 564 (2d Cir. 2005). The facts alleged indicate not only that she
knew of the cause of action but that she was actively litigating related claims in another forum at
a time that is well beyond the statute of limitations. Ms. Chmura asserts a “fraud upon the court”
but pleads no facts alleging “fraudulent concealment of the existence of a cause of action,” as
required for equitable tolling on the basis of “fraud.” See Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d
76, 84 (2d Cir. 2002).
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