Marra v. State's Attorney's Office et al

Filing 13

ORDER. For the reasons stated in the attached, the 11 , 12 Motion to Amend is DENIED. The case remains dismissed.Signed by Judge Michael P. Shea on 3/20/2018. (Mac Dougall, S.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
THOMAS E. MARRA,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE’S ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, et al.
Defendants.

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CASE NO. 3:18-cv-179 (MPS)

March 20, 2018

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RULING ON MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT
On January 31, 2018, the plaintiff, Thomas E. Marra, an inmate currently
confined at Garner Correctional Institution in Newtown, Connecticut, brought a civil
complaint pro se under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against the Connecticut State’s
Attorney’s Office for the Judicial District of Fairfield and State’s Attorney John C.
Smriga in his official capacity for their refusal to release biological evidence in
connection with his murder investigation and trial for DNA testing. Compl. (ECF No. 1).
He sought an order from this Court requiring the defendants to release the evidence and
send it to the Connecticut forensic laboratory for DNA testing.
On February 20, 2018, this Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted under 28 U.S.C. Section 1915A(b)(1). (ECF
No. 9.) The Court ruled that under District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist.
v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (2009), a state prisoner does not have a freestanding, substantive
due process right to access the state’s evidence for DNA testing, and any due process
challenge must show that the state’s statutory procedure for post-conviction DNA testing
is constitutionally invalid. Initial Review Order (ECF No. 9) 5-6. Because the plaintiff
in this case did not allege that Connecticut’s post-conviction DNA statute, Conn. Gen.

Stat. § 54-102kk, violated procedural due process, his claim against the defendants was
dismissed. Id. at 7.
On February 26, 2018, the plaintiff filed a “Motion to Alter or Amend the
Judgment” (ECF Nos. 11 and 12).1 He argues that he can offer proof that the defendants’
refusal to release the evidence for testing violates his constitutional rights and that the
Court should construe his complaint liberally as stating plausible constitutional claims
against the defendants. The Court construes this motion as a motion for reconsideration
of its Initial Review Order.
Local Rule 7(c) of the District of Connecticut Local Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that motions for reconsideration “will generally be denied unless the movant can
point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked in the initial decision or
order.” Such motions must be filed within seven days of the filing of the decision or
order from which relief is sought. Id.
The Court reviews the plaintiff’s motion under Local Rule 7(c) because it was
filed within seven days from the Initial Review Order. However, the plaintiff has not
identified any controlling decisions or data that the Court has overlooked. He cites
precedent establishing that pro se complaints should be construed liberally and be
allowed to proceed if it appears that the plaintiff could offer proof in support of his
claims. See Motion to Alter or Amend J. at 3 (citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10
(1980)). However, this Court has construed his allegations liberally and concluded that,
under Osborne, he cannot a state a claim for post-conviction DNA testing unless he

It appears that the plaintiff’s motion was uploaded and docketed twice. Each
entry was assigned a different docket number. Thus, the Court’s ruling on the motion
applies to ECF Nos. 11 and 12.
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challenges the constitutional validity of section 54-102kk itself. The plaintiff’s motion
does not dispute the holding in Osborne, nor does it cite any precedent that conflicts with
Osborne. Moreover, as noted in the Initial Review Order, the plaintiff already
unsuccessfully litigated a post-conviction DNA challenge under § 54-102kk in the state
courts. (See ECF No. 9 at 4–5.) Thus, contrary to the plaintiff’s motion, it would not be a
miscarriage of justice to dismiss his claim in federal court, which is based on the same
facts and legal principles.
Because the holding in Osborne precludes the plaintiff’s constitutional claims in
this case and for the other reasons set forth in the Court’s earlier ruling (ECF No. 9), the
plaintiff’s motion to amend the judgment (ECF Nos. 11 and 12) is DENIED. The case
remains dismissed.
It is so ordered.
Dated at Hartford, Connecticut this 20th day of March 2018.

/s/
Michael P. Shea, U.S.D.J.

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