Riddick v. Semple et al

Filing 15

ORDER denying 12 Motion to Disqualify Judge for Personal Bias or Prejudice. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 5/25/18. (Kaas, E.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

JEROME RIDDICK,
Plaintiff,

No. 3:18-cv-408 (SRU)

v.
SEMPLE, et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER
On April 6, 2018, pro se plaintiff Jerome Riddick, also known as Ja-Qure Al-Bukhari,
filed a motion to disqualify me as the presiding judge in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 144
and 455. (Doc. # 12.) Riddick has also filed identical motions to disqualify me in two of his
other federal cases: No. 3:18-cv-313 (SRU) (doc. # 17) and No. 3:13-cv-656 (SRU) (doc. # 73).1
This is not the first time that Riddick has moved to disqualify me—one year ago, Riddick moved
for my disqualification in eight of his other federal cases: No. 3:15-cv-322 (SRU) (doc. 53); No.
3:16-cv-53 (SRU) (doc. 94); No. 3:16-cv-205 (SRU) (doc. 47); No 3:16-cv-1267 (SRU) (doc.
21); No. 3:16-cv-1428 (SRU) (doc. 16); No. 3:16-cv-1769 (SRU) (doc. 11); No. 3:17-cv-120
(SRU) (doc. 15); No. 3:16-cv-2009 (SRU) (doc. 49). In the present motion, Riddick makes
assertions of prejudice due to delay that are comparable to the arguments he asserted in his last
round of disqualification motions. For the same reasons I articulated one year ago, his present
motion is denied.

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Riddick, in fact, filed the present pending motion as a single omnibus motion in all three cases. I note that I
reminded Riddick, on April 18, 2018, that his practice of attempting to file omnibus motions is in violation of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and that future attempts to file omnibus motions would not be considered.
Because Riddick’s present motion(s) for disqualification was (were) filed prior to my reminder to him, however, I
will consider the motion(s) as properly filed.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a judge is required to recuse himself “in any proceeding in
which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned”. The standard to be applied to a motion
to recuse is an objective one: whether a reasonable person, knowing all the facts, would
conclude that the trial court's impartiality could reasonably be questioned. See Apple v. Jewish
Hosp. Med. Ctr., 829 F.2d 326, 333 (2d Cir. 1987). A judge has an affirmative duty not to
disqualify himself unnecessarily. See LoCascio v. United States, 473 F.3d 493, 498 (2d Cir.
2007); National Auto Brokers Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 572 F.2d 953, 958 (2d Cir. 1978).
Riddick’s motion does not provide plausible support for his assertion that I have a
personal bias toward any party in the case, nor any other reason why my impartiality might
reasonably be questioned. He argues that such bias is shown by my delay in ruling on his
motions. A mere delay in issuing a ruling without any other indicia of bias, however, has
routinely been held insufficient to provide grounds for recusal. See United States v. LaMorte,
940 F. Supp. 572, 577 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Moritz, 112 F.3d 506 (2d
Cir. 1997); see also Arrowpoint Capital Corp. v. Arrowpoint Asset Mgmt., LLC, 793 F.3d 313,
329 (3d Cir. 2015) (“We have never held that delay alone merits reassignment.”).
In the present case, any reasonable person can see that any delays in Riddick’s cases are
attributable at least in part to Riddick’s own excessive filings. When I ruled on Riddick’s
motions for disqualification one year ago, he had upwards of 50 motions pending in ten different
federal cases. Those motions have all been resolved, yet he now again has upwards of 50
motions pending in even more federal cases. And, as I pointed out to Riddick in my order, dated
April 18, 2018, many of his motions seek to resolve issues that should not have been addressed
through motion practice in a federal court in the first place. Ironically, the filing of his motions
to disqualify me has actually contributed to the delay in Riddick’s cases, because, when a judge

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is the subject of a motion pursuant to section 144, “such judge shall proceed no further therein”
until the motion to disqualify has been decided. Nor is Riddick the sole litigant before this court.
Finally, a recusal would cause still further delays in Riddick’s cases because a new judge would
have to take the time to become familiar with Riddick’s extensive litigation history.
Accordingly, his motion must be denied.
So ordered.
Dated at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 25th day of May 2018.

/s/ STEFAN R. UNDERHILL
Stefan R. Underhill
United States District Judge

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