Pentland v. Mulligan et al
Filing
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For the reasons stated in the attached, the respondents' 14 Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. The Court concludes that an appeal of this order would not be taken in good faith. Thus, a certificate of appealability will not issue. The petitioner's 20 motion to amend is DENIED as moot. Signed by Judge Michael P. Shea on 11/5/2018. (Guevremont, Nathan)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
ROBERT V. PENTLAND,
Petitioner,
v.
MULLIGAN, et al.,
Respondents.
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CASE NO. 3:18-cv-561 (MPS)
NOVEMBER 5, 2018
_____________________________________________________________________________
RULING ON RESPONDENTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
Petitioner Robert V. Pentland challenges his 2011 state conviction for witness tampering
in this habeas corpus action filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He asserts two claims:
ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. The respondents move to
dismiss the petition on three grounds: (1) the petitioner is not in custody on the sentence he
challenges, (2) the petition was untimely filed, and (3) the petitioner has not exhausted his state
court remedies. For the reasons that follow, the respondents’ motion is granted and the petition
is dismissed.
I.
Background
The petitioner was arrested in December 2010 on charges of witness tampering.
Pentland v. Commissioner of Correction, 176 Conn. App. 779, 782, 169 A.3d 851, 853, cert.
denied, 327 Conn. 978, 174 A.3d 800 (2017). The charges were tried to the court. The
petitioner was found guilty on two counts of witness tampering and was sentenced to a total term
of imprisonment of one year. The petitioner served his sentence from December 20, 2010, until
December 19, 2011. Id. at 783, 169 A.3d at 854.
During this time, however, the petitioner also was being held in lieu of bond on several
other charges relating to sexual assault of a minor from 1998 to 2009. After the sentence on the
witness tampering charges ended, the petitioner continued to be held in lieu of bond on the
sexual assault charges. Id., 169 A.3d at 854.
In 2012, the petitioner entered a guilty plea on the sexual assault charges and was
sentenced to a total effective term of imprisonment of eighteen and one-half year followed by
twenty-five years of probation. Id., 169 A.3d at 854.
On May 22, 2015, the petitioner filed a state habeas action challenging the 2011
conviction for witness tampering, Pentland v. Warden, State Prison, No. CV15-4007248-S. The
petitioner argued that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel. Resp’ts’ Mem. App.
A, ECF No. 14-3 at 31-55. On March 29, 2016, the state court dismissed the petition on the
ground that the petitioner was not in custody on the witness tampering conviction at the time he
filed the petition. Id., ECF No. 14-3 at 56. On September 26, 2017, the Connecticut Appellate
Court affirmed the dismissal, Pentland, 176 Conn. App. at 788, 169 A.3d at 856, and the
Connecticut Supreme Court denied certification to appeal. Pentland v. Commissioner of
Correction, 327 Conn. 978, 174 A.3d 800 (2017).
II.
Discussion
In opposition to the motion to dismiss, the petitioner addresses two of the grounds in the
motion to dismiss, the in custody requirement and exhaustion of state court remedies, and then
proceeds to discuss the merits of the petition. He does not address the respondents’ argument
that the petition was untimely filed.
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A.
“In Custody” Requirement
“The federal habeas statute gives the United States district court jurisdiction to entertain
petitions for habeas relief only from persons who are ‘in custody in violation of the Constitution
or laws or treaties of the United States.’” Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490 (1989). The
petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating the court’s jurisdiction. See Thompson v. County of
Franklin, 15 F.3d 245, 249 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that jurisdictional requirements must be
affirmatively stated in the record). This jurisdictional requirement has been interpreted to require
that the petitioner be “in custody” under the conviction or sentence he is challenging at the time
he filed the petition, Maleng, 490 U.S. at 490-91, or under a consecutive sentence imposed at the
same time as the conviction or sentence being challenged. See Garlotte v. Fordice, 515 U.S. 39,
41 (1995). Once the sentence for a particular conviction has fully expired, a habeas petitioner is
no longer in custody on that conviction. Maleng, 490 U.S. at 492.
The Supreme Court permits a challenge to an expired sentence where the expired
sentence is one of a series of consecutive sentences. Garlotte, 515 U.S. at 45-47. In the case of
consecutive sentences, habeas relief on any one of the sentences will reduce the total
incarceration time for the petitioner. Id. at 47. In this case, the petitioner’s two sentences are not
consecutive. His sentence on the witness tampering charges ended in December 2011. He was
not sentenced on the sexual assault charges until 2012. The petitioner argues, however, that
because he remained in custody in lieu of bond from the end of his sentence for witness
tampering until he was sentenced on the sexual assault charges, he had a continuous period of
custody and, therefore, that the holding in Garlotte applies. The Supreme Court has not
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extended the holding of Garlotte beyond consecutive sentences and there are no reported cases
from courts within the Second Circuit doing so.
Connecticut statutes provide that if the petitioner’s 2011 sentence were reversed on
appeal and if during the period of that sentence he had also been held in lieu of bond on other
charges, then the time served on the 2011 sentence would be credited toward any new sentence
as presentence custody time. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 18-98d(a)(1)(B) (“if a person is serving a
term of imprisonment at the same time such person is in presentence confinement on another
charge and the conviction for such imprisonment is reversed on appeal, such person shall be
entitled, in any sentence subsequently imposed, to a reduction based on such presentence
confinement….”). Thus, any order vacating the 2011 sentenced would shorten the petitioner’s
confinement on his current sentence.
However, the fact that an expired sentence has been used to enhance a current sentence is
insufficient to render the petitioner “in custody” on the expired sentence. See Garlotte, 515 U.S.
at 45 (“We held [in Maleng] that the potential use of a conviction to enhance a sentence for
subsequent offenses did not suffice to render a person ‘in custody’ within the meaning of the
habeas statute”) (citing Maleng, 490 U.S. at 492). The proper procedure to assert this challenge
is to challenge the current sentence as illegally enhanced by the unlawful prior
conviction. See Garlotte, 515 U.S. at 45 n. 4; Curtis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 512 & n. 7
(1994); Williams v. Edwards, 195 F.3d 95, 96 (2d Cir. 1999). The respondents’ motion to
dismiss is granted on the ground that the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the petition because
the petitioner is not in custody on the 2011 conviction.
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The Court will not construe this petition as seeking relief from the petitioner’s 2012
sentence as the petitioner has two pending state habeas petitions directed to the 2012 sentence.
See Resp’ts’ Mem. App. J & K, ECF Nos. 14-12 & 14-13;
civilinquiry.jud.ct.gov/CaseDetail/PublicCaseDetail.aspx?DocketNo=TSRCV164008403S;
civilinquiry.jud.ct.gov/CaseDetail/PublicCaseDetail.aspx?DocketNo=TSRCV174008701S. If
the Court were to construe this petition as addressing the 2012 conviction, the petitioner may not
be able to challenge that conviction on the grounds asserted in the state habeas petitions once he
completes the exhaustion process in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) (petitioner
cannot file second or successive petition without first obtaining authorization from the court of
appeals).
B.
Statute of Limitations
Even if Court had concluded that the petitioner was “in custody” on the 2011 conviction,
he could not obtain habeas relief with respect to that conviction because the petition is untimely.
Congress has imposed a one year statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas
corpus challenging a judgment of conviction imposed by a state court. See 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d)(1). The one year limitations period commences when the petitioner’s conviction
becomes final. That date is defined as the completion of the direct appeal or the conclusion of the
time within which an appeal could have been filed, id., and may be tolled for the period during
which “a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with
respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see also
Williams v. Artuz, 237 F.3d 147, 151 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 924 (2001).
The petitioner was sentenced on December 9, 2011. He did not file a direct appeal of his
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conviction within the twenty days allotted to do so under state law. See Conn. Practice Book, §
63-1. Thus, the limitations period commenced on December 30, 2011, and ended on December
30, 2012. The petitioner did not file a state habeas petition challenging the 2011 conviction until
May 22, 2015, over two years after the limitations period expired. Thus, the filing of the state
habeas petition does not toll the limitations period. See Guman v. Payant, No. 06-CV6315(BMC), 2006 WL 3535782, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2006) (motions filed after limitations
period expired do not toll limitations period).
To equitably toll the limitations period, the petitioner must show that extraordinary
circumstances prevented him from filing his petition on time and that he acted with reasonable
diligence during the entire period he seeks to have tolled. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649
(2010). The petitioner does not raise any equitable tolling argument in his opposition papers.
Thus, he has identified no extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable tolling, the petition
is time-barred.
II.
Conclusion
The respondents’ Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 14] is GRANTED. The Court concludes
that an appeal of this order would not be taken in good faith. Thus, a certificate of appealability
will not issue. The petitioner’s motion [ECF No. 20] is DENIED as moot.
The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the respondents and close this case.
SO ORDERED this 5th day of November 2018, at Hartford, Connecticut.
________/s/_____________________
Michael P. Shea
United States District Judge
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