Ramos v. Malloy et al
Filing
8
ORDER DISMISSING CASE. To the extent Mr. Ramos can amend his Complaint to state a plausible claim against any defendant and to correct the deficiencies identified in this ruling, he is given leave to amend his Complaint. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) ("[L]eave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires...." (citation omitted)). This amended Complaint must be filed by October 1, 2018. Signed by Judge Victor A. Bolden on 8/27/2018. (Riegel, J.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
JOSE E. RAMOS,
Plaintiff,
v.
No. 3:18-cv-583 (VAB)
DANNEL P. MALLOY et al.,
Defendants.
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER
Jose E. Ramos (“Plaintiff”) currently incarcerated at MacDougall-Walker Correctional
Institution in Suffield, Connecticut, and proceeding pro se, has sued Governor Dannel P. Malloy,
the Town of Suffield, Commissioner Scott Semple, Warden William Mulligan, and Lieutenant
Roy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Mr. Ramos alleges that he has been denied a book about religion in violation of his First,
Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He seeks damages as well as declaratory and
injunctive relief.
For the following reasons, the Complaint is DISMISSED, but, to the extent that the
deficiencies in this Complaint can be remedied, Mr. Ramos may file an Amended Complaint by
October 1, 2018.
I.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
On June 1, 2017, Mr. Ramos alleges a third party ordered a book, All Religions are One
by Jeffery Moses, for Mr. Ramos. The third party allegedly instructed Mr. Ramos to contact him,
if Mr. Ramos did not receive the book within thirty days, so he could order another copy. Mr.
Ramos allegedly did not receive the book. After sixty days, Mr. Ramos claims that he contacted
1
the third party and another copy of the book was ordered. Mr. Ramos alleges that he still has not
received the book.
Mr. Ramos claims that he contacted several Department of Correction employees about
the book. On July 20, 2017, he allegedly submitted an inmate request to the grievance counselor
and, the following day, filed a grievance. On September 29, 2017, Mr. Ramos allegedly received
a response from the grievance coordinator indicating that additional time was needed to
investigate the issue. On October 19, 2017, Mr. Ramos allegedly met with a state police trooper
who told him that Lieutenant Roy would investigate the issue to determine whether the books
were received and, if so, where they were.
Mr. Ramos commenced this cased on April 6, 2018, and his motion to proceed in forma
pauperis was granted on April 12, 2018.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court must review complaints by incarcerated persons and dismiss any portion of
the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. § 1915A. Although detailed allegations are not required, a complaint must include
sufficient facts to afford a defendants fair notice of the claims and grounds upon which the
claims are based and to demonstrate a right to relief. Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555-56 (2007). Conclusory allegations are not sufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). A plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
Nevertheless, it is well-established that “[p]ro se complaints ‘must be construed liberally
and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.’” Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723
2
F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474
(2d Cir. 2006)); see also Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing
special rules of solicitude for pro se litigants).
III.
DISCUSSION
Mr. Ramos argues that, by depriving him of a book about religion, Defendants have
infringed on his religious rights, his right to be treated equally, his right to due process, his right
to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, his right against unreasonable seizure and his right
to property as afforded him under the First, Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments,
respectively. The Court addresses each contention in turn.
A.
Defendants Malloy, Town of Suffield, Semple, and Mulligan
Mr. Ramos has sued Governor Malloy, the Town of Suffield, Commissioner Semple and
Warden Mulligan. He contends that Semple and Mulligan are responsible for overseeing daily
operations within the Department of Correction and the correctional facility respectively. He
contends that all four defendants are “liable under Municipalities.” ECF No. 1 at 9, ¶¶ 12–15.
The Town of Suffield is the sole municipality in this case. The remaining defendants are
state, not municipal, employees. Thus, any claims for municipal liability against defendants
Malloy, Semple, and Mulligan are dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). See Walker v. City
of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 301 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that because district attorney was state
official, his conduct cannot trigger municipal liability).
Regarding the Town of Suffield, Mr. Ramos alleges no facts suggesting the town was
involved in the alleged factual scenario. The only conceivable connection is that the correctional
facility is located in Suffield. Mr. Ramos provides no legal basis to suggest that the town has
authority to direct the actions of state officials within a state correctional facility.
3
Any claim against the Town of Suffield therefore is dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)(1).
B.
First Amendment Claim
Mr. Ramos first argues that the deprivation of the book violates his First Amendment
right to exercise his religion.
To state a First Amendment free exercise claim, a plaintiff “must make a threshold
showing that ‘the disputed conduct substantially burden[ed] his sincerely held religious beliefs.’”
Washington v. Gonyea, 538 Fed. App’x 23, 26 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Salahuddin v. Goord, 467
F.3d 263, 274–75 (2d Cir.2006)). He must allege facts showing that he sincerely holds a
particular belief, that the belief is religious in nature, and that the challenged action substantially
burdened his exercise of that belief. See Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 588-91 (2d Cir. 2003);
see also Jones v. Annucci, No. 16-cv-3516 (KMK), 2018 WL 910594, at *13–14 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
14, 2018) (noting that an incarcerated plaintiff must make a threshold showing that disputed
conduct substantially burdens sincerely held religious beliefs).
He has failed to do so. Mr. Ramos alleges that he did not receive a book about religion,
but alleges no facts suggesting this has burdened his exercise of religious beliefs. Indeed, Mr.
Ramos makes no reference to his religion or religious practices at all. Absent any allegations
suggesting that Mr. Ramos’ ability to exercise his religious belief has been burdened, he fails to
state a First Amendment claim.
All First Amendment claims therefore are dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
4
C.
Fourth Amendment Claims
Mr. Ramos contends that withholding the book constitutes an unreasonable seizure in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
A search or seizure occurs when “the person invoking [the Fourth Amendment’s] protection can
claim a ‘justifiable,’ a ‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ that has been invaded
by government action.” Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979). “The [Fourth]
Amendment does not protect the merely subjective expectation of privacy, but only those
‘expectation[s] that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Oliver v. United States, 466
U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
Although the Supreme Court has recognized that a person, while incarcerated, possesses
a legitimate expectation of privacy, “severely curtailed” as it may be, Mr. Ramos has failed to
plead sufficient factual matter to give rise to a claim under the Fourth Amendment. United States
v. Roy, 734 F.2d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). Mr. Ramos alleges no facts
indicating that the book actually arrived at the correctional facility, much less that, upon the
book’s arrival at the correctional facility, someone took the book and refused to deliver it to him.
Thus, Mr. Ramos has not named any person responsible for allegedly seizing the book in
question.
As there are no allegations to support a Fourth Amendment claim against any defendant,
this claim therefore is dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
5
D.
Eighth Amendment Claims
Mr. Ramos also asserts an Eighth Amendment claim.
To state an Eighth Amendment claim, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that the
defendants failed to provide for his “basic human needs—e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical
care, and reasonable safety.” DeShaney v. Winnegabo Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
200 (1989). Only those conditions that deprive an inmate of the “minimal civilized measure of
life’s necessities” are sufficiently serious to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment claim.
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
Mr. Ramos alleges that he did not receive a book that allegedly was mailed to him on two
occasions. Mr. Ramos has failed to supplement this allegations with sufficient factual detail to
allow for a plausible claim that he has been deprived a basic human need, e.g., food, clothing,
shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety. See Jones v. Pallito, No. 2:14-cv-199, 2015 WL
2376347, at *8 (D. Vt. May 18, 2015) (dismissing an eighth amendment claim for deprivation of
art supplies and certain books). Thus, the allegations do not state a cognizable Eighth
Amendment claim.
Any Eighth Amendment claim therefore is dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
E.
Fourteenth Amendment Claims
Finally, Mr. Ramos contends that the deprivation of the book violated his Fourteenth
Amendment rights to due process and equal protection.
1.
Due Process
The Due Process Clause protects against the deprivation of a protected property interest.
An incarcerated plaintiff can state a due process claim for loss or destruction of property,
6
however, only if the state has not created adequate post-deprivation remedies. See Edwards v.
Erfe, 588 Fed. App’x 79, 80 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984)).
Connecticut provides a remedy for lost or destroyed property. Under Connecticut General
Statutes § 4-141 et seq., a person who is incarcerated may bring a claim against the Connecticut
Claims Commission unless there is another administrative remedy for the claim. See Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 4-142. The Department of Correction has established an administrative remedy for lost or
destroyed property. See Department of Correction Administrative Directive 9.6(16)(B),
http://portal.ct.gov/DOC/AD/AD-Chapter-9 (last visited Apr. 13, 2018). Thus, an aggrieved
person first must utilize the administrative remedy and then can proceed to the Claims
Commission, if the claim is denied.
This available remedy is not rendered inadequate because Mr. Ramos anticipates a more
favorable remedy in this forum. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 535 (“[T]hat [a Plaintiff] might not be
able to recover under these remedies the full amount which he might receive in a § 1983 action is
not, as we have said, determinative of the adequacy of the state remedies.”). As Connecticut
provides post-deprivation remedies, Mr. Ramos cannot state a due process claim for the
deprivation of property.
Further, to the extent that the Complaint may be construed to assert a claim against
defendant Roy for failure to investigate the issue and, therefore, resolve his grievance to his
satisfaction, the claim fails as a matter of law. Mr. Ramos has no constitutional right to have his
issue investigated by correctional staff. See Torres v. Mazzuca, 246 F. Supp. 2d 334, 342
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that an incarcerated person has no constitutional right to have
grievance investigated to his satisfaction) (citing cases).
The due process claim therefore must be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
7
2.
Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause protects individuals from invidious discrimination. This
provision does not mandate identical treatment for each individual; rather it requires that
similarly situated persons be treated the same. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.
432, 439 (1985). To state an equal protection claim, an plaintiff must allege facts showing that
the plaintiff was treated differently from similarly situated individuals and that the reason for the
different treatment was based on “impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to
inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injury a
person.” Diesel v. Town of Lewisboro, 232 F.3d 92, 103 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting LeClair v.
Saunders, 627 F.2d 606, 609 –10 (2d Cir. 1980)).
Mr. Ramos does not allege that he is a member of a protected class or that he was treated
differently because of a suspect classification. See Robles v. Dennison, 745 F. Supp. 2d 244, 301
n.18 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) (merely being a prisoner is insufficient to put plaintiff in a suspect class),
aff’d, 449 Fed. App’x 51 (2d Cir. 2011). Thus, he cannot state a traditional equal protection
claim.
To state a valid claim under a “class of one,” a plaintiff must allege, first, that a plaintiff
was intentionally treated differently from others who are similarly situated. Village of
Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). Second, a plaintiff must allege facts showing
that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. Id. The plaintiff must allege an
“extremely high” level of similarity with the person to whom he is comparing himself; their
circumstances must be “prima facie identical.” Neilson v. D’Angelis, 409 F.3d 100, 105 (2d Cir.
2005), rev’d on other grounds, Appel v. Spiridon, 531 F.3d 138, 139 (2d Cir. 2008). Mr. Ramos
8
identifies no similarly situated inmate who was treated differently. Thus, he cannot state a “class
of one” equal protection claim.
Mr. Ramos’ Fourteenth Amendment claims therefore are dismissed, consistent with 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the complaint is DISMISSED under 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)(1).
To the extent Mr. Ramos can amend his Complaint to state a plausible claim against any
defendant and to correct the deficiencies identified in this ruling, he is given leave to amend his
Complaint. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (“[L]eave to amend shall be freely
given when justice so requires . . . .” (citation omitted)). This amended Complaint must be filed
by October 1, 2018.
SO ORDERED at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 27th day of August, 2018.
/s/ Victor A. Bolden
VICTOR A. BOLDEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
9
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?