Rafi v. Yale School of Medicine et al
Filing
97
ORDER: As per the attached ruling, Defendant Harvard Medical School's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint (ECF No. 61 ), Defendants' Brigham and Women's Hospital and Cynthia C. Morton, Ph.D's Motion to Dism iss (ECF No. 63 ), and Defendants' Yale University, Richard P. Lifton M.D., and Allen E. Bale, M.D. Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint (ECF No. 65 ) are hereby GRANTED. The plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint (ECF No. 52) is dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and close the case. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 7/28/2020. (Brambila, N.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
-------------------------------- x
SYED K. RAFI, PhD.,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
YALE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF
:
MEDICINE, ALLEN E. BALE, M.D.
:
(in official and personal
:
capacity), RICHARD P. LIFTON,
:
M.D., PhD., BRIGHAM AND WOMEN’S :
HOSPITAL, HARVARD MEDICAL
:
SCHOOL, and CYNTHIA C. MORTON,
:
PhD.,
:
:
Defendants.
:
-------------------------------- x
Civil No. 3:18-cv-635(AWT)
RULING ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS
Plaintiff Dr. Syed K. Rafi, proceeding pro se, brings claims
against Yale University School of Medicine (“Yale”), Dr.
Richard
Lifton (“Lifton”), and Dr. Allen Bale (“Bale”) (collectively the
“Yale Defendants”); Brigham and Women’s Hospital (“BWH”) and Dr.
Cynthia Morton (“Morton”) (collectively the “BWH Defendants”); and
Harvard Medical School (“HMS”) 1. The plaintiff alleges in his Third
Amended Complaint, ECF No. 52, that the defendants have conspired
to violate his civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985, have
neglected to prevent such an act in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986,
1
The court notes that the correct legal name for Harvard
University, which includes the Harvard Medical School, is
President and Fellows of Harvard College.
and have defamed him. The defendants have separately moved to
dismiss these claims pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth below, each motion
is being granted.
I.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
The Third Amended Complaint, “which [the court] must accept
as true for the purposes of testing its sufficiency,” alleges the
following circumstances. Monsky v. Moraghan, 127 F.3d 243, 244 (2d
Cir. 1997).
In January 2001, the plaintiff began his employment with Yale
as
a
clinical
cytogenetics
trainee
under
the
supervision
of
defendant Lifton, the Chairman of the Genetics Department at Yale.
During the plaintiff’s time as a cytogenetics trainee, he worked
in the laboratory of Dr. Mazin Qumsiyeh, the Director of the
Clinical Cytogenetics program at Yale and a vocal activist on
issues affecting Palestine.
The plaintiff alleges that Yale terminated Qumsiyeh because
of
his
pro-Palestinian
activism.
In
an
effort
to
avoid
an
employment discrimination suit by Qumsiyeh, Lifton, on behalf of
Yale, concurrently fired Dr. Barbara Pober, a medical geneticist
at Yale who is Jewish, and pressured the plaintiff to file a
written
complaint
against
Qumsiyeh.
At
Lifton’s
behest,
the
plaintiff provided a confidential complaint against Qumsiyeh but
-2-
informed Lifton that he would be unwilling to serve as a witness
against Qumsiyeh.
Thereafter, the plaintiff declined to accept an offer to fill
Qumsiyeh’s vacant faculty position and left Yale to move to Boston,
Massachusetts.
According
to
the
plaintiff,
Lifton
and
Yale
unlawfully interfered with his efforts to obtain employment at
various institutions in the Boston area, including at BWH, HMS,
Children’s Hospital Boston (“CHB”), Massachusetts General Hospital
(“MGH”), and others. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that
Lifton and Yale engaged in “race and class based conspiratorial
collusion”
with
Morton,
the
Director
of
Clinical
Cytogenetic
Laboratories at BWH and HMS, to ensure that he was not hired at
BWH-affiliated and HMS-affiliated institutions. Third Am. Compl.
at 22. The plaintiff alleges that “[t]hese alleged conspiratorial
ceaseless denials of professional job opportunities [were] to
coerce [him] to take up a position at [Yale] instead[,]” so that
he could testify as “a defensive witness against . . . Qumsiyeh”
and could “facilitate the return of Dr. Pober[.]” Id. at 21. The
plaintiff does not allege why Yale sought the return of Pober. Nor
does he
allege
why
his
return
to
Yale
would
facilitate
her
rehiring.
According to the plaintiff, the collusion resulted in the
“coerci[ve]
and
retaliatory
non-consideration
of .
. .
every
professional clinical cytogenetics job application at [Morton’s]
-3-
diagnostic clinical cytogenetics laboratory at BWH (HMS) from 2004
through 2019[,] along with dozens of medical genetics research and
training positions at Harvard affiliated hospitals and medical
centers
from
2004
to
2019,
totaling
more
than
100
job
applications.” Id. at 6. Several prospective employers, including
Morton, allegedly
informed
the
plaintiff that
they could
not
consider the plaintiff for any cytogenetics positions because
Bale, the Director of the American Board of Medical Genetics and
37 Genomics (“ABMGG”) training program at Yale, had “vetoed” the
plaintiff’s candidacy when he was called by them as a reference:
[S]everal of those prospective employers over these
years, who did not appreciate Dr. Bale’s vengeful
continued vetoing of plaintiff’s job prospects, chose to
reveal the reason as [Yale’s] vetoing of those job
opportunities [] for their inability to proceed ahead
with plaintiff’s well qualified candidacies.
. . .
At [HMS], Dr. Bieber (a senior associate clinical
cytogenetics laboratory director who serves along with
[Morton] . . . ) informed Dr. Rafi during 2004 that
[Lifton] . . . wanted to offer Dr. Rafi a faculty
position at Yale, thus indicated that he and [Morton]
could not offer Dr. Rafi a position at their clinical
cytogenetics laboratory at BWH/HMS, and this assertion
is clearly evident in [Morton’s] prior initial email to
Dr. Rafi, dated December 28, 2002, wherein “she
encourages Dr. Rafi to try to work something out at Yale,
where it was clear to her from the reference letters
that she had received that Dr. Ravi was [valued] as a
member of the cytogenetics staff at Yale” – meaning that
Yale did not permit her to consider Dr. Rafi for a
position at BWH/HMS after the completion of his
professional [training] at Yale.
. . .
-4-
Over these years, several of the prospective employers
around the nation have indirectly alluded to [Yale’s
interference] in their inability to consider Dr. Rafi’s
candidacies. It should be noted that professional
courtesy demands not explicitly disclosing the alleged
“third party”- vetoing by Dr. Bale (Yale).
Id. at 50, 52, 63 (emphasis in the original). Several employers
encouraged him to seek a position at Yale instead, which he
repeatedly sought and was denied. See id. at 21, 37,
55.
According to the plaintiff, Yale’s collusion with HMS, BWH,
and their agents has “permanently destroyed . . . [his] highpaying and in-demand professional clinical cytogenetic . . . and
medical genetics career” and has “undeniably rendered him a
‘pauper’ today.” Id. at 67. “The consequent suffering and dire
financial hardship over the years [have] forced plaintiff to
seek even labor-oriented temporary jobs to survive.” Id. The
plaintiff alleges that he is entitled to damages, including
“reparations for the alleged white-collar slavery” he has been
subjected to, compensation for lost wages and future losses, and
compensation for emotional distress. Id. at 68.
II.
LEGAL STANDARDS
“On a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the
court has jurisdiction over the defendant.” Metro. Life Ins. Co.
v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 566 (2d Cir. 1996). Where a
defendant challenges “only the sufficiency of the plaintiff's
-5-
factual allegations, in effect demurring by filing a Rule 12(b)(2)
motion, the plaintiff need persuade the court only that its factual
allegations constitute a prima facie showing of jurisdiction.”
Ball v. Metallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt, S.A., 902 F.2d 194, 197 (2d
Cir. 1990). “[W]hen a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
is decided on the basis of affidavits and other written materials,
the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing. The allegations
in the complaint must be taken as true to the extent they are
uncontroverted by the defendant's affidavits.” Seetransp., Wiking,
Trader, Schiffarhtsgesellschaft MBH & Co., Kommanditgesellschaft
v. Navimpex Centrala Navala, 989 F.2d 572, 580 (2d Cir. 1993)
(quoting Taylor v. Phelan, 912 F.2d 429, 431 (10th Cir. 1990) (per
curiam) (citations omitted)). However, “[i]f the parties present
conflicting affidavits, all factual disputes are resolved in the
plaintiff's favor, and the plaintiff's prima facie showing is
sufficient notwithstanding the contrary presentation by the moving
party." Id. (quoting Taylor, 912 F.2d at 431).
When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the
court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint
and
must
draw
inferences
in
a
light
most
favorable
to
the
plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). Although
a
complaint
plaintiff’s
“does
not
obligation
‘entitle[ment]
to
need
to
relief’
detailed
provide
requires
-6-
factual
the
more
allegations,
‘grounds’
than
a
of
his
labels
and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
550, 555 (2007) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286
(1986)) (on a motion to dismiss, courts “are not bound to accept
as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”). “Nor
does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of
further factual enhancement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). “Factual allegations
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint
are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
(internal
citations
and
quotations
omitted).
However,
the
plaintiff must plead “only enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.”
plausibility
allows
the
when
court
the
to
Id. at 547. “A claim has facial
[claimant]
draw
the
pleads
factual
reasonable
content
inference
that
that
the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678. “The function of a motion to dismiss is ‘merely to assess
the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight of
the evidence which might be offered in support thereof.’”
Mytych
v. May Dep’t Store Co., 34 F. Supp. 2d 130, 131 (D. Conn. 1999)
(quoting Ryder Energy Distribution v. Merrill Lynch Commodities,
Inc., 748 F.2d 774, 779 (2d Cir. 1984)). “The issue on a motion to
dismiss is not whether the plaintiff will prevail, but whether the
-7-
plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support his claims.”
United States v. Yale New Haven Hosp., 727 F. Supp. 784, 786 (D.
Conn. 1990) (citing Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 232).
In its review of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, the court may consider “only the facts alleged in the
pleadings,
documents
attached
as
exhibits
or
incorporated
by
reference in the pleadings and matters of which judicial notice
may be taken.”
Samuels v. Air Transport Local 504, 992 F.2d 12,
15 (2d Cir. 1993).
incorporated
by
“[I]n some cases, a document not expressly
reference
in
the
complaint
is
nevertheless
‘integral’ to the complaint and, accordingly, a fair object of
consideration on a motion to dismiss. A document is integral to
the complaint ‘where the complaint relies heavily upon its terms
and effect.’” Goel v. Bunge, Ltd., 820 F.3d 554, 559 (2d Cir. 2016)
(quoting Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir.
2002)).
III.
DISCUSSION
The BWH Defendants, the Yale Defendants, and HMS separately
move to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint to the extent that it
asserts claims against them. The BWH Defendants move to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(2) on the ground that the court lacks personal
jurisdiction over them, and also under Rule 12(b)(6) on the grounds
that the claims in the Third Amended Complaint are barred by the
doctrine of res judicata, are barred by the applicable statute of
-8-
limitations, and fail to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. HMS and the Yale Defendants move to dismiss the Third
Amended Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) on grounds identical to those
raised by the BWH Defendants, except that the Yale Defendants have
not moved to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint as time-barred.
The BWH Defendants’ motion is being granted because the court lacks
personal jurisdiction over the BWH Defendants, and the plaintiff’s
claims
against
them
are
also
barred
by
the
doctrine
of
res
judicata. HMS’ and the Yale Defendants’ motions are being granted
because the plaintiff’s claims as to each defendant are barred by
the doctrine of res judicata. 2
A. Personal Jurisdiction
The BWH Defendants contend that they are not subject to
personal jurisdiction in this district. The court agrees.
“In the absence of a federal statute specifically directing
otherwise, and subject to limitations imposed by the United States
Constitution, we look to the law of the forum state to determine
whether a federal district court has personal jurisdiction over a
defendant.” Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 624 (2d
Cir. 2016). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A) (“Serving a summons
. . . establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant[] who is
2
Because the court concludes that the plaintiff’s claims are
barred by the doctrine of res judicata, it need not address the
other proffered grounds for dismissal.
-9-
subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in
the state where the district court is located. . . .”); PDK Labs
v. Friedlander, 103 F.3d 1105, 1108 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating federal
court applies forum state’s personal jurisdiction rules in federal
question case “if the federal statute does not specifically provide
for national service of process”).
In Connecticut, “a trial court may exercise jurisdiction over
a [defendant] only if the defendant’s intrastate activities meet
the requirements both of [the state’s long-arm] statute and of the
due process clause of the federal constitution.”
Thomason v. Chem.
Bank, 234 Conn. 281, 285-86 (1995). “[The] first inquiry must be
whether [Connecticut’s] long-arm statute authorizes the exercise
of jurisdiction under the particular facts of this case. Only if
[the court] find[s] the statute to be applicable [does the court]
reach the question whether it would offend due process to assert
jurisdiction.”
Lombard Bros., Inc. v. Gen. Asset Mgmt. Co., 190
Conn. 245, 250 (1983). See also Chloe v. Queen Bee of Beverly
Hills, 616 F.3d 158, 163-64 (2d Cir. 2010) (“To determine personal
jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary . . . the Court must engage in
a two-step analysis. First, we apply the forum state's long-arm
statute. . . . If [it] permits personal jurisdiction, the second
step is to analyze whether personal jurisdiction comports with the
Due Process Clause[.]").
-10-
The
plaintiff
has
failed
to
allege
facts
sufficient
to
establish that this court has personal jurisdiction over the BWH
Defendants under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-59b(a) or Conn. Gen. Stat.
§
33-929(f)(4),
Connecticut’s
long-arm
statutes
pertaining
to
nonresident individuals and corporations, respectively. 3 Because
these
statutes
do
not
authorize
the
exercise
of
personal
jurisdiction in this case, the court need not address whether it
would offend due process to assert such jurisdiction.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-59b(a) provides in relevant part:
[A] court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any
nonresident individual, foreign partnership or foreign
voluntary association . . . who in person or through an
agent: . . . (2) commits a tortious act within the state,
except as to a cause of action for defamation of
character arising from the act; (3) commits a tortious
act outside the state causing injury to person or
property within the state, except as to a cause of action
for defamation of character arising from the act, if
such person or agent (A) regularly does or solicits
business, or engages in any other persistent course of
conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used
or consumed or services rendered, in the state, or (B)
expects or should reasonably expect the act to have
consequences in the state and derives substantial
revenue from interstate or international commerce[.]
3
In their memorandum, the BWH Defendants limit their analysis to
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-59(b), stating that it allows a “Connecticut
court [to] exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
individual or foreign corporation[.]” Mem. at 17. However, this
statute only confers personal jurisdiction over nonresident
individuals,
foreign
partnerships,
and
foreign
voluntary
associations. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 33-929(f), in contrast, confers
personal jurisdiction over “foreign corporation[s],” such as BWH.
-11-
Id.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 33-929(f)(4) provides in relevant part:
Every foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in
this state, by a resident of this state or by a person
having a usual place of business in this state, whether
or not such foreign corporation is transacting or has
transacted business in this state and whether or not it
is engaged exclusively in interstate or foreign
commerce, on any cause of action arising as follows: .
. . (4) out of tortious conduct in this state, whether
arising out of repeated activity or single acts, and
whether arising out of misfeasance or nonfeasance.
Id.
The Third Amended Complaint alleges that BWH and Morton,
residents of Massachusetts, see Third Am. Compl. at 64, conspired
against the plaintiff, a current resident of Virginia, to deny his
“four dozen professional and non-professional job applications.”
Id. at 14. The Third Amended Complaint alleges that these denials
occurred in Massachusetts while the plaintiff was still a resident
of Massachusetts. See e.g., id. at 17. It does not allege that the
plaintiff was denied a job in Connecticut. Nor does it allege that
he was denied a job while he was a resident of Connecticut. Thus,
the
court
underlying
agrees
conduct
with
the
BWH
complained
Defendants
of
clearly
that
did
because
not
occur
“the
in
Connecticut, nor did it cause injury in Connecticut where the
plaintiff was not a resident or present in Connecticut at the
time,” “there is no personal jurisdiction” over the BWH Defendants
in this district. Mem. at 17.
-12-
B. Res Judicata
The BWH Defendants, HMS, and the Yale Defendants argue that
the Third Amended Complaint should be dismissed because its claims
are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The court agrees.
“The term res judicata, which means essentially that the
matter in controversy has already been adjudicated, encompasses
two significantly different doctrines: claim preclusion and issue
preclusion.” Marcel Fashions Grp., Inc. v. Lucky Brand Dungarees,
Inc., 779 F.3d 102, 107 (2d Cir. 2015) (“Marcel I”). “At issue
here is claim preclusion, a doctrine which, in the usual situation,
bars a plaintiff from relitigating claims against a defendant that
it lost in a previous action against the same defendant and claims
that the plaintiff could have brought in that earlier action but
did not.” Marcel Fashions Grp., Inc. v. Lucky Brand Dungarees,
Inc., 898 F.3d 232, 236-37 (2d Cir. 2018). Claim preclusion “serves
the interest of society and litigants in assuring the finality of
judgments, [and] also fosters judicial economy and protects the
parties
from
vexatious
and
expensive
litigation.”
Curtis
v.
Citibank, N.A., 226 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2000). It ensures that
“[w]hen a party is victorious, it [does] not have to defend that
victory again.” N. Assur. Co. of Am. v. Square D. Co., 201 F.3d
84, 89 (2d Cir. 2000).
“Preclusion of a claim . . . requires a showing that (1) the
previous action involved an adjudication on the merits; (2) the
-13-
previous action involved the same adverse parties or those in
privity with them; and (3) the claims asserted in the subsequent
action were, or could have been, raised in the prior action.”
Marcel I, 779 F.3d at 108. “In deciding whether a suit is barred
by res judicata, it must first be determined that the second suit
involves the same ‘claim’ or—‘nucleus of operative fact’—as the
first suit.” Channer v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 527 F.3d 275, 280
(2d Cir. 2008) (internal citations and quotations omitted). In
making
this
determination,
courts
consider
“(1)
whether
the
underlying facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation;
(2) whether the underlying facts form a convenient trial unit; and
(3) whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties'
expectations.” Id.
This action is the plaintiff’s third attempt to sue BWH,
Morton,
and
HMS
for
the
same
alleged
conduct.
In
2014,
the
plaintiff filed two actions 4 in the District of Massachusetts
against BWH, CHB, MGH, and/or HMS that were later consolidated
into
one
action,
Docket
No.
1:14-cv-14017-GAO
(the
“First
Massachusetts Litigation”). In his consolidated complaint, the
plaintiff alleged “continuing reckless coercive retaliation as
4
These prior actions were Rafi v. Brigham and Women’s Hospital,
Children’s Hospital Boston, Massachusetts General Hospital, and
Harvard Medical School, Docket No. 1:14-cv-14017-GAO and Rafi v.
Children’s Hospital Boston and Harvard Medical School, Docket No.
1:14-cv-14205-GAO.
-14-
well as continuing reckless discrimination to this date against
each
and
every
one of
his
professional clinical
cytogenetic,
medical genetic research, and technological position applications
. . . in collusion with Dr. Lifton.” Am. Compl. at 3, Docket No.
1:14-cv-14017-GAO, ECF No. 54. Although Morton was not named as a
defendant in the consolidated action, the allegations against BWH
and HMS stem, in part, from her alleged conduct:
[HMS] faculty members, such as, Dr. Cynthia Morton (BWH)
in particular, who, although showed initial interest in
offering professional Clinical Cytogenetics position to
Plaintiff during 2003, in collusion with Dr. Lifton
refused to consider any of Plaintiff’s job applications
at BWH and MGH, despite Plaintiff indicating to her as
well as to Dr. Lifton [that] he lacks interest in taking
up a position at [Yale’s] Clinical Cytogenetics
laboratory, essentially to be utilized as a legal
witness against Dr. Qumsiyeh[.]
Id.
at
13.
The
court
dismissed
the
plaintiff’s
claims
with
prejudice for failure to satisfy the minimum pleading requirements
of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 10. See Rafi v. Brigham
& Women’s Hosp., No. 1:14-cv-14017-GAO, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
39598, *2-4 (D. Mass. Mar. 20, 2017). The dismissal was affirmed
on appeal, see Rafi v. Brigham & Women’s Hosp., No. 17-1373 (1st
Cir. Feb. 16, 2018), and the Supreme Court denied certiorari, see
Rafi v. Brigham & Women’s Hosp., No. 18-6166 (Dec. 3, 2018).
In 2018, the plaintiff filed another action, this time against
Morton alone, in the District of Massachusetts, which the court
dismissed on claim preclusion grounds:
-15-
Here, all the requirements for claim preclusion are met.
Rafi’s
earlier
action
[the
First
Massachusetts
Litigation] was dismissed for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. A dismissal on this
ground is a judgment on the merits of the case. See
Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394,
399 & n.3 (1981) (noting that a dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is a
judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes);
Airframe Sys., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 601 F.3d 9, 14 (1st
Cir. 2010). There is also sufficient identicality of
parties. In the earlier lawsuit, Morton was not named as
a defendant but Rafi sought to hold her employer, BWH,
liable for her conduct. For purposes of claim
preclusion, the employer-employee relationship between
BWH and Morton satisfies the privity requirement for
matters within the scope of employment. See Krepps v.
Reiner, 377 F. App’x 65, 68 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that
employee acting in the scope of his employment was in
privity with the employer who was sued in earlier action,
and employee could assert claim preclusion on the basis
of prior judgment in favor of employer.).
Finally, there is sufficient identicality between the
causes of action. Rafi’s claims in this action were among
the
claims
raised
in
[the
First
Massachusetts
Litigation]. . . .
Rafi v. Morton, 1:18-cv-10482-NMG, ECF No. 9 at 6-7.
For the same reasons, this court finds that claim preclusion
bars the Third Amended Complaint as to the BWH Defendants and HMS.
The First Massachusetts Litigation was between the same adverse
parties or those in privity with them as the instant suit, and it
was adjudicated on the merits. See Berrios v. N.Y. Hous. Auth.,
564
F.3d
130,
134
(2d
Cir. 2009)
(“As
the
sufficiency of
a
complaint to state a claim on which relief may be granted is a
question of law, the dismissal for failure to state a claim is a
final judgment on the merits and thus has res judicata effects.”)
-16-
(internal citations omitted). Moreover, the instant suit involves
claims that were raised in the prior litigation -- namely, that
BWH, Morton, and HMS attempted to compel the plaintiff to seek
employment at Yale by refusing to hire him and by blocking his
candidacy for other positions throughout the Boston area. Thus,
the plaintiff is barred from asserting these claims or claims that
he could have raised in the earlier litigation.
The plaintiff argues that his claims are not barred by the
doctrine of res judicata because, inter alia, they are based on
“continuing violations [that] are for the very first time . . .
being actioned here under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1985 & 1986.” Third
Am. Compl. at 10. However, “a plaintiff cannot avoid the effects
of res judicata by ‘splitting’ his claim into various suits, based
on different legal theories[.]” Waldman v. Vill. of Kiryas Joel,
207 F.3d 105, 110 (2d Cir. 2000). “It is [the] identity of facts
surrounding the occurrence which constitutes the cause of action,
not the legal theory upon which [the plaintiff] chose to form [his]
complaint.” Woods v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 972 F.2d 36, 39 (2d Cir.
1992). The facts alleged in the Third Amended Complaint are nearly
identical to those alleged in the prior litigation, and therefore
constitute
the
same
cause
of
action
for
purposes
of
claim
preclusion.
The instant litigation also marks the third time that the
plaintiff
has
sued
the
Yale
Defendants
-17-
for
the
same
alleged
conduct. In 2014, the plaintiff filed suit against Yale and Lifton
in this district. See Rafi v. Yale Univ. School of Med., Docket
No. 14-cv-1582-VAB. In that action, the plaintiff likewise claimed
that Yale and Lifton interfered with his job applications in the
field of cytogenetics in retaliation for the plaintiff’s refusal
to work for Yale and testify against Qumsiyeh. See, e.g., Am.
Compl. at 1-3, Docket No. 14-cv-1582-VAB, ECF No. 51. The court
dismissed the complaint with prejudice for, inter alia, the failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Rafi v.
Yale Univ. School of Med., No. 14-cv-1582-VAB, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 117678, *40-41 (D. Conn. Jul. 27, 2017). The dismissal was
affirmed on appeal, see Rafi v. Yale Univ. School of Med., No. 172754
(2d
Cir.
Mar.
3,
2019),
and
the
Supreme
Court
denied
certiorari, see Rafi v. Yale Univ. School of Med., No. 18-5977
(Nov. 5, 2018).
In 2018, the plaintiff filed suit against Lifton alone in the
Southern District of New York. See Rafi v. Lifton, No. 18-cv-1161CM. In that action, the plaintiff asserted claims under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1983, 1985(3), 1986, 1981a, and 2000d-4a. The court dismissed
the action on res judicata grounds, stating that “because the
District of Connecticut already considered Plaintiffs’ claims on
the merits and dismissed the action with prejudice, the doctrine
of claim preclusion bars this employment discrimination action.”
-18-
Rafi v. Lifton, 18-CV-1161-CM, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49823, *5-6
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2018).
For the same reason, this court finds that claim preclusion
bars the Third Amended Complaint as to the Yale Defendants. The
prior litigation was between the same adverse parties or those in
privity with them as the instant suit, and it was adjudicated on
the merits. Although Bale was not named as a defendant in the prior
litigation, the plaintiff sought to hold his employer, Yale, liable
for his alleged conduct:
Plaintiff also alleges that Dr. Lifton’s subordinate and
colleague at his Genetics Department (YSM), Dr. Allen
Bale is/was also well positioned to derail Plaintiff’s
professional clinical cytogenetics-candidacies when
contact[ed] due to his contact information at the
American Board of Medical Genetics (AMBG)-official
website as the point man at [Yale] for verifying ABMGprofessional clinical cytogenetics training, and to know
why Plaintiff could not pursue his trained (in-demand
and high-paying) clinical cytogenetics profession . . .
since leaving [Yale.]
3:14-cv-1582-VAB, ECF No. 51 at 25-26 (emphasis in original). For
purposes of claim preclusion, the employer-employee relationship
between Yale and Bale satisfies the privity requirement for matters
within the scope of employment. See Houdet v. U.S. Tennis Ass’n,
13-CV-5131 (FB) (LB), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167791, *9-10 (E.D.N.Y.
Dec. 3, 2014) (concluding that employees acting in the scope of
their employment “have a sufficiently close relationship” with the
employer who was sued in an earlier action “to justify application
of
res
judicata”)
(citing
18
-19-
Moore's
Federal
Practice
§
131.40[3][f] (Matthew Bender 3d Ed.) ("Generally, an employeremployee . . . relationship will provide the necessary privity for
claim preclusion with respect to matters within the scope of the
relationship."). Because the instant suit involves claims against
the Yale Defendants that were or could have been raised in the
prior litigation, the plaintiff’s claims are barred.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Harvard Medical School’s
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (ECF No.
61),
Defendants’
Brigham
and Women’s
Hospital
and Cynthia
C.
Morton, Ph.D’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 63), and Defendants’
Yale University, Richard P. Lifton M.D., and Allen E. Bale, M.D.
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (ECF No. 65)
are hereby GRANTED. The plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (ECF
No. 52) is dismissed with prejudice.
The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and close the case.
It is so ordered.
Dated this 28th day of July 2020, at Hartford, Connecticut.
/s/ AWT
Alvin W. Thompson
United States District Judge
-20-
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