Siddiqui v. Rocheleau
Filing
27
RULING granting 19 Motion to Dismiss. For the foregoing reasons, Rocheleaus Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 19 ) is GRANTED, and Siddiquis Amended Complaint is dismissed without prejudice. Siddiqui is permitted to replead his right to travel claim, h is Fourth Amendment search and seizure claim, and the existence of diversity jurisdiction over his state law claims. Any amended complaint shall be filed on or before December 31, 2018. If no amended complaint has been filed by that date, the clerk is directed to close the case. Signed by Judge Janet C. Hall on 12/10/2018. (Lewis, D)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
FAIZ SIDDIQUI,
Plaintiff,
v.
ERIC ROCHELEAU
Defendant.
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CIVIL ACTION NO.
3:18-CV-00839 (JCH)
DECEMBER 10, 2018
RULING RE: MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. NO. 19)
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Faiz Siddiqui (“Siddiqui”), a citizen and resident of the United Kingdom,
brings this action against Connecticut police officer Eric Rocheleau (“Rocheleau”) in his
individual capacity. See generally Amended Complaint (“Am. Compl.”) (Doc. No. 3).
Siddiqui alleges that Rocheleau committed various constitutional and state law
violations in connection with his ongoing criminal investigation of Siddiqui for
harassment of Erum Majid Randhawa (“Randhawa”). Id. Rocheleau now moves to
dismiss Siddiqui’s Amended Complaint in its entirety. See generally Motion to Dismiss
(“Mot. to Dismiss”) (Doc. No. 19).
For the reasons set forth below, Rocheleau’s Motion to Dismiss is granted.
II.
BACKGROUND1
Siddiqui is a citizen of the United Kingdom and a resident of London. Am.
Compl. at ¶ 3. Rocheleau is a Connecticut resident and is employed as a police officer
1
For the purposes of deciding this Motion to Dismiss, the court accepts all well-pleaded factual
allegations in the Amended Complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in Siddiqui’s favor.
Crawford v. Cuomo, 796 F.3d 252, 256 (2d Cir. 2015).
1
by the West Hartford Police Department. Id. at ¶ 4. Randhawa, the complainant in the
underlying criminal case against Siddiqui, is also a Connecticut resident. Id. at ¶ 6.
In 2006, Siddiqui became acquainted with Randhawa while visiting his aunt in
Connecticut. Id. at ¶ 7. After Siddiqui returned to London, he attempted to continue the
relationship with Randhawa. Id. at ¶ 8. However, Randhawa lost interest in Siddiqui in
2007, and the two had no further contact until 2012. Id.
Some time before 2012, Siddiqui started to suspect that Randhawa had been
defaming him. Id. at ¶ 9. On the advice of counsel, he emailed Randhawa in August
2012, to express “his dismay at her conduct,” but then had no further contact with her
until early 2015. Id.
On January 1, 2015, Siddiqui learned that Randhawa had been viewing his
information on the internet. Id. at ¶ 10. In response, Siddiqui called Randhawa once,
but did not connect with her and did not leave a message. Id. At that time, Siddiqui
was enrolled in a graduate business school program at Northwestern University in
Illinois. Id.
In March 2015, Randhawa complained to Rocheleau that Siddiqui was harassing
her. Id. at ¶ 11. In response, Rocheleau visited Siddiqui’s aunt and uncle, both of
whom lived in Connecticut. Id. at 12. Rocheleau threatened that, if they did not provide
him with Siddiqui’s phone number, “they would be treated as felons and arrested.” Id.
In addition, Rocheleau called the Dean of Siddiqui’s business school and falsely stated
that Siddiqui was living and working in the United States in violation of his student visa.
Id. While speaking with Siddiqui’s father in May 2015, Rocheleau also represented that
Siddiqui would be arrested and internationally extradited to the United States to face
2
criminal charges on the next occasion that he attempted to travel outside of the United
Kingdom. Id.
On April 24, 2015, Rocheleau applied for a search warrant in Connecticut state
court to obtain certain text messages and phone records from Siddiqui’s cell phone. Id.
at ¶ 18; see generally Exhibit 1, Am. Compl. (“Search Warrant Application”) (Doc. No.
3). Although the state court issued the search warrant, Rocheleau did not provide
Siddiqui with a copy of the warrant, and Siddiqui did not discover that his phone records
had been searched and seized until October 30, 2017. Id. at ¶¶ 20–23.
On May 22, 2015, Rocheleau applied for a warrant for Siddiqui’s arrest on a
charge of Harassment in the Second Degree in violation of section 53a-183 of the
Connecticut General Statutes. Id. at ¶ 30; see generally Exhibit 2, Am. Compl. (“Arrest
Warrant Application”) (Doc. No. 3). The warrant was signed by a state court judge and
then “lodged with the United States Department of Homeland Security.” Id. at ¶ 31.
Due to this outstanding arrest warrant, Siddiqui has not traveled to the United States for
the past three years and, as a result, has not completed his graduate business program
at Northwestern University. Id. at ¶¶ 32, 33.
On May 18, 2018, Siddiqui filed this action against Rocheleau. See generally
Complaint (“Compl.”) (Doc. No. 1). In his Amended Complaint, Siddiqui asserts federal
claims for violations of (1) his right of access to the courts under the First Amendment,
Am. Compl. at ¶ 24; (2) his right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures
under the Fourth Amendment, id. at ¶ 26; (3) his right to travel under the First, Fourth,
and Fourteenth Amendments, id. at ¶ 32; (4) his right to be free of false arrest and
imprisonment under the Fourth Amendment, id. at ¶ 35; (5) his right to substantive due
3
process under the Fourteenth Amendment, id. at ¶ 37; and (6) his right to engage in
protected speech under the First Amendment, id. at ¶ 40. Siddiqui also asserts various
state law claims, including for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at ¶ 44.
On July 9, 2018, Rocheleau filed a Motion to Dismiss all claims alleged in the
Amended Complaint. See generally Mot. to Dismiss. Rocheleau moves to dismiss
Siddiqui’s right to travel claim under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Defendant’s Memorandum of Law
in Support of Motion to Dismiss (“Def.’s Mem.”) (Doc. No. 19-1) at 5. Rocheleau moves
to dismiss Siddiqui’s remaining claims under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
See id.
III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.
Rule 12(b)(1) Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), “[a] case is properly dismissed
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction . . . when the district court lacks the statutory or
constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d
Cir. 2000). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the existence of subject matter
jurisdiction. Id. In determining whether the plaintiff has met this burden, the court must
accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences
in favor of the plaintiff. Carter v. Healthport Techs., LLC, 882 F.3d 47, 57 (2d Cir. 2016);
Aurecchione v. Schoolman Transp. Sys., Inc., 426 F.3d 635, 638 (2d Cir. 2005).
B.
Rule 12(b)(6) Failure to State a Claim
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a complaint to plead “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ.
Proc. 8(a). To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule
4
12(b)(6), that plain statement must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim for
relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While this plausibility standard does not require
probability, it is not satisfied by “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully” or by facts that are “merely consistent with a defendant’s liability.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept all
material factual allegations of the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences
in favor of the plaintiff. Crawford v. Cuomo, 796 F.3d 252, 256 (2d Cir. 2015).
However, the court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted). In those
instances, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. “[O]nly the facts alleged in the pleadings,
documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the pleadings, and
matters of which judicial notice may be taken” may be considered by the court.
Samuels v. Air Transp. Local 504, 992 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1993).
IV.
DISCUSSION
Rocheleau seeks to dismiss all of Siddiqui’s claims. See Mot. to Dismiss at 1.
To begin, Rocheleau argues that the court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction
over the Amended Complaint under the Younger abstention doctrine. See Def.’s Mem.
at 2. If the court determines that abstention is not warranted, Rocheleau argues that the
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Siddiqui’s right to travel claim because it is
5
unripe, and that Rocheleau’s remaining causes of action fail to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. See id. at 2–3. The court addresses each of these arguments in
turn, starting with the issue of abstention.
A.
Abstention
Rocheleau argues that, under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the court
should abstain and dismiss Siddiqui’s Amended Complaint because the suit interferes
with an ongoing state criminal proceeding, namely, the execution of a pending, state
court warrant for Siddiqui’s arrest. See Def.’s Mem. at 7–10. Specifically, Rocheleau
argues that Siddiqui is using federal court to mount an improper, collateral attack on the
validity of his arrest and search warrants. See id. at 8–9. Rocheleau contends that, if
Siddiqui wishes to challenge the lawfulness of these warrants, he should surrender
himself to Connecticut authorities and raise these challenges during the ensuing state
court criminal proceeding. See id. at 9.
Under the Younger abstention doctrine, federal courts should generally refrain
from exercising jurisdiction over federal claims that “involve or call into question ongoing
state proceedings.” Diamond "D" Const. Corp. v. McGowan, 282 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir.
2002). This doctrine, which is rooted in the principles of comity and federalism, “serves
the vital purpose of reaffirming the competence of the state courts, and acknowledging
the dignity of states as co-equal sovereigns in our federal system.” Spargo v. New York
State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d 65, 74–75 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted).
In this Circuit, application of Younger abstention depends on the nature of the
remedy being sought. While Younger abstention may apply to suits for injunctive or
declaratory relief, the Supreme Court has not decided whether it applies to claims for
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damages. See Kirschner v. Klemons, 225 F.3d 227, 238 (2d Cir. 2000). However, the
Second Circuit has reasoned that, “[w]hen money damages, as opposed to equitable
relief, are sought, it is less likely that unacceptable interference with the ongoing state
proceeding, the evil against which Younger seeks to guard, would result from the
federal court’s exercise of jurisdiction.” Id. Accordingly, the Second Circuit has held
that “abstention and dismissal are inappropriate when damages are sought, even when
a pending state proceeding raises identical issues and [the court] would dismiss
otherwise identical claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, but that a stay of the
action pending resolution of the state proceeding may be appropriate.” Id.
In this case, Siddiqui’s Amended Complaint seeks “compensatory damages,
punitive damages, attorney fees, costs, and such equitable relief as this court may
deem to be fair and just.” Am. Compl. at ¶ 44. However, when arguing against the
application of Younger abstention to his case, Siddiqui represents in his Opposition brief
that he is “not seeking injunctive relief,” but is instead “seek[ing] money damages for
wrongdoing which already has taken place and to compensate him for injuries already
suffered as a result of that wrongdoing.” Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss (“Pl.’s Mem.”) (Doc. No. 20) at 8. In light of these representations and the
Amended Complaint’s failure to specify the form of equitable relief being sought, the
court treats Siddiqui’s suit as an action for damages only. See Nwachukwu v.
Connecticut Dep't of Labor, No. 3:13-CV-1539 JCH, 2014 WL 6633050, at *1 n.1 (D.
Conn. Nov. 20, 2014) (treating plaintiff’s suit as a damages suit when the plaintiff did not
argue otherwise and the only equitable remedy requested in the complaint was for
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“[s]uch further and equitable relief as the Court may deem appropriate”). Accordingly,
Younger abstention is not an appropriate basis for dismissing Siddiqui’s claims.2
Although the Second Circuit has suggested that district courts have the power to
stay damages suits based on Younger abstention principles, see Kirschner, 225 F.3d at
238, it has also recognized that “[t]he decision as to whether to stay a federal action on
the ground that there is a related action pending in a state court is committed to the
sound discretion of the district court,” United States v. Pikna, 880 F.2d 1578, 1582 (2d
Cir. 1989). The court need not decide the propriety of issuing a stay in this case. In this
case, neither party has argued for a stay. Moreover, there are grounds for dismissing
Siddiqui’s claims which, as discussed below, avoid unduly infringing upon the state
criminal proceedings against Siddiqui. See Mancuso v. Dunbar, No. 3:08-CV-1018VLB,
2010 WL 466004, at *5 (D. Conn. Feb. 5, 2010) (declining to decide whether a stay
would be appropriate on the basis of abstention principles when plaintiff’s claims for
money damages could be dismissed on other grounds). The court will therefore
consider the merits of Siddiqui’s claims.
B.
Right to Travel
Siddiqui asserts that the pending arrest warrant has deprived him of his
constitutional right to travel to and within the United States. Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 31, 32. In
response, Rocheleau argues that Siddiqui’s right to travel claim is not ripe because
Siddiqui has not suffered an injury in fact. See Def.’s Mem. at 10. As a result,
2
To the extent that Siddiqui seeks equitable relief, that claim is dismissed as abandoned in light
of the representations that he made in his Opposition brief. See Moccio v. Cornell Univ., No. 09 CIV.
3601 (GEL), 2009 WL 2176626, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2009) (“This Court may, and generally will, deem
a claim abandoned when a plaintiff fails to respond to a defendant's arguments that the claim should be
dismissed.”), aff'd, 526 F. App'x 124 (2d Cir. 2013).
8
Rocheleau contends, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this claim. Id.
Rocheleau also argues that the claim should be dismissed on its merits because
Siddiqui has not plausibly pled a violation of his constitutional right to travel. Id. at 5.
The issue of “[r]ipeness is peculiarly a question of timing.” Nat'l Org. for
Marriage, Inc. v. Walsh, 714 F.3d 682, 687 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks
omitted). When a claim “depends upon contingent future events that may not occur as
anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all,” the claim is deemed unripe and therefore
not justiciable. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). More precisely, the ripeness
doctrine imposes “two overlapping threshold criteria for the exercise of a federal court’s
jurisdiction,” both of which concern the issue of “whether a case has been brought
prematurely.” In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prod. Liab. Litig., 725 F.3d 65,
109, 110 (2d Cir. 2013).
The first requirement of constitutional ripeness arises from Article III limitations
on judicial power, and it “prevents a federal court from entangling itself in abstract
disagreements over matters that are premature for review because the injury is merely
speculative and may never occur.” Id. at 110. The Second Circuit has described
constitutional ripeness as “a specific application of the actual injury aspect of Article III
standing.” Nat'l Org. for Marriage, 714 F.3d at 688. Thus, a plaintiff’s claim is
constitutionally ripe when it alleges “an invasion of a legally protected interest” that is
“actual or imminent,” rather than “conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. (quoting Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)).
The second requirement of prudential ripeness is “drawn from prudential reasons
for refusing to exercise jurisdiction.” In re MTBE Prod. Liab. Litig., 725 F.3d at 110.
9
Unlike constitutional ripeness, prudential ripeness does not concern whether the case is
“a real or concrete dispute affecting cognizable current concerns of the parties within
the meaning of Article III.” Simmonds v. I.N.S., 326 F.3d 351, 357 (2d Cir. 2003).
Instead, it is “an important exception” to the exercise of jurisdiction that exists when “the
case will be better decided later and [when] the parties will not have constitutional rights
undermined by the delay.” Id. (emphasis in original). Thus, prudential ripeness is a
“tool that courts may use to enhance the accuracy of their decisions and to avoid
becoming embroiled in adjudications that may later turn out to be unnecessary[.]” Id.
To determine whether to abstain from a case on prudential ripeness grounds, courts in
this Circuit engage in a “two-step inquiry” that requires evaluation of “both the fitness of
the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court
consideration.” New York Civil Liberties Union v. Grandeau, 528 F.3d 122, 131–32 (2d
Cir. 2008). Under the fitness prong, the court must determine “whether the issues
sought to be adjudicated are contingent on future events or may never occur.” Id. at
132. Under the hardship prong, the court must assess whether “the challenged action
creates a direct and immediate dilemma for the parties.” Id. at 134.
In this case, Siddiqui’s right of travel claim is both constitutionally and
prudentially ripe because Siddiqui alleges that the invasion of this right occurred in the
past. See Pl.’s Mem. at 9. Specifically, the Amended Complaint asserts that, as a
result of the arrest warrant being “lodged with the United States Department of
Homeland Security,” Siddiqui has been “deprived of his right to travel to and within the
United States for the past three years.” Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 31–32. Siddiqui further
alleges that he has suffered “substantial loss of income as a result of his inability to
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return to the United States to complete his graduate school education at Northwestern
University.” Id. at ¶ 33. Thus, Siddiqui’s claim does not depend upon contingent future
events that may never occur. Instead, the alleged invasion of a legally protected
interest, i.e., Siddiqui’s constitutional right to travel, has already occurred. Thus,
Siddiqui’s right to travel claim presents a concrete dispute within the meaning of Article
III, and there would be no benefit to delaying review of this cause of action. The court
therefore has jurisdiction to consider the merits of this claim.
A necessary precondition of Siddiqui’s right to travel claim is that he has a right to
enter the United States.3 If Siddiqui, a citizen of the United Kingdom who presently
resides in London, does not have a constitutional right to enter the United States, then
logically he cannot have a constitutional right to travel within the United States.
Whether Siddiqui has a constitutionally protected right to enter the United States
depends, in turn, on his immigration status.
It is well established that “an unadmitted and nonresident alien [ ] ha[s] no
constitutional right of entry to this country[.]” Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762
(1972); see also Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2419 (2018) (“[F]oreign nationals
seeking admission have no constitutional right to entry.”). As the Supreme Court has
explained, “an alien seeking initial admission to the United States requests a privilege
and has no constitutional rights regarding his application, for the power to admit or
exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative.” Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32
(1982). By contrast, a lawfully resident alien who voluntarily leaves the United States
3
The court notes that Siddiqui has not alleged violations to his right to travel internationally, which
is distinguishable from the right to travel within the United States. See Karpova v. Snow, 402 F. Supp. 2d
459, 471–72 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff'd, 497 F.3d 262 (2d Cir. 2007).
11
may, in certain circumstances, be entitled to due process before he can be denied
permission to reenter this country. See id. at 34–35 (holding that a resident alien who
left the United States for a few days was constitutionally entitled to a due process
hearing when the government sought to prevent his reentry to the country).
In this case, Siddiqui has alleged no facts concerning his immigration status
during the alleged deprivation of his constitutional right to travel. Although Siddiqui
indicates that he had an “F1 student visa” at some point in time, Am. Compl. at ¶ 12, he
does not allege that he possessed that visa at the time of the alleged constitutional
violation. Courts, however, look to the foreigner’s immigration status at the time of the
denial of entry when determining whether the denial implicates the foreigner’s
constitutional rights. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 756, 762 (1972) (holding
that an unadmitted and nonresident alien did not have a constitutional right of entry to
the United States, notwithstanding his prior lawful admissions to this country);
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 213 (1953) (“For purposes
of the immigration laws, [ ] the legal incidents of an alien's entry remain unaltered
whether he has been here once before or not.”). Furthermore, even if Siddiqui
possessed a student visa at the time of the alleged constitutional violation, the court
notes that existing case law raises doubts as to whether possession of a student visa
alone would entitle Siddiqui to due process protections. See, e.g., Rahman v. McElroy,
884 F. Supp. 782, 786 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“[E]ven revocation of an entry visa issued to an
alien already within the country has no effect upon the alien's liberty or property
interests.”) (quoting Knoetze v. U.S., Dep't of State, 634 F.2d 207, 212 (5th Cir. 1981))
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass'n v.
12
Reno, 18 F. Supp. 2d 38, 45, 59–60 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding that the plaintiffs did not
have due process rights with respect to their admission into the United States, even
though they possessed valid tourist visas), aff'd, 199 F.3d 1352 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The
court, however, need not reach this issue because Siddiqui has not alleged that he
possessed a valid visa when he was allegedly deprived of his constitutional right to
travel. Accordingly, Siddiqui’s right to travel claim is dismissed for failure to state a
plausible cause of action.
C.
Unreasonable Search & Seizure
Siddiqui argues that Rocheleau’s search and seizure of his phone records was
unlawful because (1) Rocheleau failed to provide him with a timely copy of the search
warrant, as ordered by the state court; and (2) Rocheleau’s application for a search
warrant withheld “exculpatory information” that, if included, would have caused the state
court judge to decline to issue a search warrant for Siddiqui’s phone. Pl.’s Mem. at 11–
12. The court will address each of these alleged Fourth Amendment violations in turn.
1.
Failure to Disclose Search Warrant
Pursuant to section 54-33c of the Connecticut General Statutes, a copy of a
search warrant application must be given to the person named on the warrant within
forty-eight hours of the search. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-33c(b). However, a judge
“may, by order, dispense with the requirement of giving a copy of the affidavits to [such
a person] at such time[.]” Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-33c(b). In his Amended
Complaint, Siddiqui alleges that Rocheleau asked a state court judge for permission to
delay disclosing the search warrant to Siddiqui. Am. Compl. at ¶ 21. Although the
judge denied this request, Rocheleau allegedly concealed the search warrant from
Siddiqui for more than two years. See id. at ¶ 23.
13
However, searches and seizures that violate state law do not necessarily violate
the Fourth Amendment. While “police enforcement practices . . . vary from place to
place and from time to time,” the Supreme Court has held that “the search and seizure
protections of the Fourth Amendment are [not] so variable, and [cannot] be made to turn
upon such trivialities.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996) (internal
citations omitted). Thus, while “[a] State is free to prefer one search-and-seizure policy
among the range of constitutionally permissible options,” Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S.
164, 174 (2008), “state restrictions do not alter the Fourth Amendment’s protections,” id.
at 176. Accordingly, the Second Circuit has held that “the Fourth Amendment does not
incorporate state procedural criminal law,” and that “the violation of [state] restrictions
will not generally affect the constitutionality of a seizure supported by probable cause.”
United States v. Bernacet, 724 F.3d 269, 277 (2d Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original).
Instead, “the touchstone of a federal court’s review of a state search warrant secured by
local police officials . . . is the Fourth Amendment and its requirements, and no more.”
United States v. Smith, 9 F.3d 1007, 1014 (2d Cir. 1993).
In this case, Siddiqui’s allegations of Rocheleau’s failure to timely disclose the
search warrant merely state a violation of Connecticut law, not of the Fourth
Amendment.4 Siddiqui does not point to any authority suggesting that the Fourth
Amendment requires disclosure of a search warrant, and the court’s independent review
of the case law has not identified any such requirement. Accordingly, these allegations
4
Indeed, Siddiqui appears to concede this point in his Opposition brief when he notes that “[t]he
defendant persuasively argues that, as a matter of law, the defendant’s violation of the court’s express
command to disclose the warrant and its fruits to the plaintiff within not less than two weeks does not of
itself render his search and seizure unreasonable under Fourth Amendment law.” Pl.’s Mem. at 11.
14
do not plausibly state a Fourth Amendment violation. See Stanley v. Taylor, No. 3:15CV-1722-VLB, 2016 WL 1408078, at *3 (D. Conn. Apr. 8, 2016) (holding that violations
of section 54-33c of the Connecticut General Statutes do not support a constitutional
claim of unlawful search and seizure), appeal dismissed, No. 16-1171, 2016 WL
11113639 (2d Cir. Oct. 25, 2016).
2.
Omission of Exculpatory Evidence
Siddiqui also argues that Rocheleau’s search and seizure of his phone records
was unlawful because Rocheleau omitted exculpatory information from his application
for the search warrant. See Pl.’s Mem. at 11–12. Siddiqui asserts that the search
warrant would not have issued if the state judge had been aware of this information.
See id.
Ordinarily, “the issuance of a warrant by a neutral magistrate, which depends on
a finding of probable cause, creates a presumption that it was objectively reasonable for
the officers to believe that there was probable cause, and a plaintiff who argues that a
warrant was issued on less than probable cause faces a heavy burden.” Golino v. City
of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864, 870 (2d Cir. 1991) (internal citations omitted). However,
under the Franks doctrine,5 “[a] plaintiff can demonstrate that her right not to be
searched absent a search warrant supported by probable cause was violated where [1]
the officer submitting the probable cause affidavit knowingly and intentionally, or with
reckless disregard for the truth, made a false statement in his affidavit or omitted
5
While the Franks doctrine arose in the context of criminal cases, the doctrine has been
extended to Fourth Amendment claims in civil suits. See Velardi v. Walsh, 40 F.3d 569, 573 (2d Cir.
1994); Calderon v. City of New York, No. 14 CIV. 1082 PAE, 2015 WL 2079405, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 4,
2015 )
15
material information, and [2] that such false or omitted information was necessary to the
finding of probable cause.” McColley v. Cty. of Rensselaer, 740 F.3d 817, 823 (2d Cir.
2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
With respect to the first element, the plaintiff must allege that such omissions “are
designed to mislead, or [ ] are made in reckless disregard of whether they would
mislead, the magistrate.” United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 68 (2d Cir. 2003)
(quoting United States v. Colkley, 899 F.2d 297, 300–01 (4th Cir.1990)) (emphasis in
original). While recklessness may be inferred when information omitted from an
affidavit was “clearly critical” to the determination of probable cause, McColley, 740 F.3d
at 823, “misstatements or omissions caused by negligence or innocent mistakes” do not
state a plausible claim under the Franks doctrine, United States v. Rajaratnam, 719
F.3d 139, 153 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
Likewise, allegations of “mere intent to exclude information [are] insufficient.”
Awadallah, 349 F.3d at 67. The Second Circuit has further stressed that “[u]nsupported
conclusory allegations of falsehood or material omission” cannot support a challenge to
the validity of a warrant. Velardi v. Walsh, 40 F.3d 569, 573 (2d Cir. 1994). Rather,
Franks requires the plaintiff to make “specific allegations.” Id.
With respect to the second element of a Franks claim, courts in this Circuit use a
“corrected affidavit” analysis to determine whether the omitted information was
necessary to the magistrate’s finding of probable cause. McColley, 740 F.3d at 823. In
conducting this analysis, courts “look to the hypothetical contents of a ‘corrected’
application to determine whether a proper warrant application, based on existing facts
known to the applicant, would still have been sufficient to support arguable probable
16
cause[.]” Id. (quoting Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 743–44 (2d Cir. 2004)). While
“the law does not demand that an officer applying for a warrant volunteer every fact that
arguably cuts against the existence of probable cause,” the officer must “not omit
circumstances that are critical to its evaluation.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
“The ultimate inquiry is whether, after putting aside erroneous information and material
omissions, there remains a residue of independent and lawful information sufficient to
support probable cause.” Awadallah, 349 F.3d at 65 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case, Siddiqui fails to state a Fourth Amendment claim under the Franks
doctrine. The Amended Complaint only alleges that “[Rocheleau] withheld exculpatory
information from his application which would have caused [the state court judge] to
decline to issue the warrant had she known of it.” Am. Compl. at ¶ 18. Siddiqui does
not specify the nature or contents of this exculpatory information. Because Siddiqui
does not identify what material should have been added to Rocheleau’s search warrant
application, it is impossible for the court to conduct a corrected affidavit analysis.
Furthermore, Siddiqui does not allege any facts suggesting that Rocheleau acted
knowingly and intentionally when he omitted this information, nor are there any
allegations in the Amended Complaint from which to infer that these omissions were
clearly critical to the determination of probable cause. Accordingly, Siddiqui’s
conclusory allegations fail to satisfy either element of the Franks test, and his Fourth
Amendment claim for unreasonable search and seizure is dismissed.
D.
Access to Courts
Siddiqui alleges that Rocheleau violated his First Amendment right of access to
the courts by concealing the existence of the search warrant from Siddiqui for more than
two years. See Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 18–24.
In doing so, Rocheleau allegedly delayed
17
Siddiqui from bringing claims against Rocheleau for the invasion of his privacy caused
by Rocheleau’s search and seizure of Siddiqui’s phone records. See id.
To plead a violation of a right of access to the courts, a plaintiff must plausibly
allege that a defendant caused “actual injury,” that is, “actual prejudice with respect to
contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to
present a claim.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 348 (1996). As the Supreme Court
has explained, the right of access to the courts is not a “freestanding right,” id. at 351,
but rather is “ancillary to the underlying claim, without which a plaintiff cannot have
suffered injury by being shut out of court,” Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415
(2002). Thus, the plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating not only that a defendant
interfered with his access to the courts, but also that “such conduct materially prejudiced
a legal action he sought to pursue.” Covino v. Reopel, 108 F.3d 1369, 1997 WL
138856, at *1 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Smith v. O'Connor, 901 F.Supp. 644, 649
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (Sotomayor, J.).
In this case, Siddiqui’s pleadings do not satisfy the actual injury requirement for
an access to courts claim. While the concealment of the search warrant may have
delayed Siddiqui from bringing his claims for unconstitutional search and seizure,
Siddiqui has not alleged facts suggesting that this delay has prejudiced his claims in any
way. Notably, the two-year delay has not prevented Siddiqui from bringing privacy
invasion claims against Rocheleau, as evidenced by Siddiqui’s filing of the instant suit in
this court. See Gittens v. Sullivan, 848 F.2d 389, 390 (2d Cir.1988) (noting that the
plaintiff’s filings in the instant suit were indicative that the plaintiff had meaningful access
to the courts). Nor does the Amended Complaint suggest that the delay has impaired
18
Siddiqui’s ability to present the claims that he has brought against Rocheleau. Instead,
Siddiqui has alleged “mere delays without any resulting prejudice,” and courts in this
Circuit have routinely concluded that such allegations “do not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation.” Sheppard v. Lee, No. 10 CIV. 6696 GBD JLC, 2011 WL
6399516, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2011) (quoting Henry v. Annetts, No, 08 Civ.
286(LAP), 2010 WL 3220332, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)); see also Zigmund v. Solnit, 165
F.3d 16, 1998 WL 769747, at *1 (2d Cir. 1998) (“A two-week delay without further
consequences is de minimis and does not satisfy the actual injury requirement.”).
Accordingly, Siddiqui’s access to court claim is dismissed for failure to plausibly allege
actual injury to a meritorious claim.
E.
False Arrest & Imprisonment
The Amended Complaint asserts claims for false arrest and imprisonment under
the Fourth Amendment. See Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 34–35. It specifically alleges that the
issuance of the arrest warrant unlawfully deprived Siddiqui of his liberty because
Siddiqui faces immediate arrest and imprisonment should he return to the United
States. Id. at ¶ 35. In his Opposition brief, however, Siddiqui abandons his Fourth
Amendment claim for false arrest and imprisonment. See Pl.’s Mem. at 12–14. In
particular, he accepts Rocheleau’s argument that the Amended Complaint does not
plausibly allege two elements of a Fourth Amendment claim for false arrest and
imprisonment, namely: (1) favorable termination of the underlying criminal prosecution,
and (2) deprivation of liberty that is cognizable under the Fourth Amendment. See id. at
12. Siddiqui represents that, “while the Fourth Amendment claim asserted in Count
Four may be dismissed, the motion to dismiss must be denied as to the plaintiff’s state
law false imprisonment claim and also should be denied regarding his state law false
19
arrest claim.” Id. at 14. In light of these representations, Siddiqui’s Fourth Amendment
claim for false arrest and imprisonment is deemed abandoned, and dismissal of that
claim is therefore warranted. See Brandon v. City of New York, 705 F. Supp. 2d 261,
268 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (collecting cases that dismissed plaintiffs’ claims on the grounds of
abandonment for failure to address defendants’ arguments).
Even if Siddiqui had not abandoned his Fourth Amendment claim for false arrest
and imprisonment, dismissal would still be warranted for the following reasons. First, a
plaintiff may only bring a claim of false arrest or imprisonment when he has suffered a
deprivation of liberty prior to the issuance of legal process, such as when the plaintiff
was subjected to a warrantless arrest. See Singer v. Fulton Cty. Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110,
116–17 (2d Cir. 1995). Where the deprivation of liberty has been effected pursuant to
legal process, such as an arrest made pursuant to a warrant, the proper cause of action
is one for malicious prosecution. See id. at 117; see also Wright v. Stephens, No. 3:17CV-01499 (MPS), 2018 WL 3241352, at *2 (D. Conn. July 3, 2018) (“For a plaintiff to
allege a cause of action for malicious prosecution under § 1983, the plaintiff must show
a deprivation of liberty pursuant to legal process – meaning either post-arraignment or
as a result of arrest pursuant to warrant. Deprivations of liberty from the moment of
warrantless arrest until arraignment are not pursuant to legal process, and therefore
implicate the separate tort of false arrest.”) (internal quotation marks and alterations
omitted). Here, Siddiqui’s alleged deprivation of liberty occurred pursuant to legal
process because it occurred as a result of the issuance of a warrant for his arrest. See
Am. Compl. at ¶ 35. Therefore, Siddiqui has failed to plausibly allege a claim for false
arrest and imprisonment under the Fourth Amendment.
20
Moreover, even if the court treats Siddiqui’s claim as one for malicious
prosecution, the Amended Complaint fails to plausibly allege the requisite elements. As
the Second Circuit has explained, “the merits of a claim for malicious prosecution under
Section 1983 are governed by state law.” Spak v. Phillips, 857 F.3d 458, 461 (2d Cir.
2017). Under Connecticut law, a plaintiff asserting malicious prosecution must prove,
inter alia, that “the criminal proceedings have terminated in favor of the plaintiff.” Id. at
462 n.1 (internal quotation marks omitted). In light of the pending warrant for Siddiqui’s
arrest, it is undisputed that the criminal proceedings against Siddiqui have not
terminated, much less terminated in Siddiqui’s favor. Accordingly, the Amended
Complaint also fails to allege facts that plausibly support a malicious prosecution claim
under the Fourth Amendment.
For the above reasons, Siddiqui’s Fourth Amendment claim for false arrest and
imprisonment is dismissed.
F.
Freedom of Speech
Siddiqui argues that Rocheleau violated his First Amendment right to free speech
by falsely representing in the arrest warrant application that “[Siddiqui] had made three
telephone calls to [Randhawa’s] employers, describing [Randhawa] in pejorative terms
and questioning her suitability for her employment position.” Am. Compl. at ¶ 39. In the
Amended Complaint, however, Siddiqui also “unequivocally denies making any of these
phone calls.” Id. at ¶ 40. The court is troubled by Siddiqui’s attempt to base his First
Amendment claim on speech that he denies ever occurred. However, even if the court
were to assume that Siddiqui had made the three calls to Randhawa’s workplace, his
First Amendment claim would fail as a matter of law.
21
Siddiqui appears to argue that, because these calls constitute protected speech,
the state may not use them as a basis for prosecuting him for harassment under section
53a-183 of the Connecticut General Statutes. See id. at ¶¶ 39–40; Pl.’s Mem. at 16–17.
In response, Rocheleau argues that these calls were evidence of Siddiqui’s intent to
harass Randhawa, and they therefore could be included in the arrest warrant
application without violating the First Amendment. See Def.’s Mem. at 23–25.
Section 53a-183(a) provides in relevant part:
A person is guilty of harassment in the second degree when . . . (2) with
intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person, he communicates with a
person by telegraph or mail, by electronically transmitting a facsimile
through connection with a telephone network, by computer network, as
defined in section 53a-250, or by any other form of written communication,
in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm; or (3) with intent to harass,
annoy or alarm another person, he makes a telephone call, whether or not
a conversation ensues, in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm.
Prosecution under section 53a-183 violates the First Amendment when it is based on
the content of protected speech, rather than on the manner in which it is spoken. See
State v. Moulton, 310 Conn. 337, 352–356, 362–363 (2013); see also State v. Nowacki,
155 Conn. App. 758, 782 (2015). However, as the Second Circuit has explained, the
state may rely on the content of a communication to establish the defendant’s intent to
harass without infringing on First Amendment protections. See Gormley v. Dir.,
Connecticut State Dep't of Prob., 632 F.2d 938, 943 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[T]he trial court's
instruction to the jury to consider the language used by appellant in the course of the
telephone call not only was permissible; it was indispensable to a proper determination
of whether the statutory requirement of ‘intent to harass’ had been proven.”). In other
words, the factfinder in a harassment case, brought pursuant to section 53a-183, is
“entitled to consider the language used during the course of the telephone call, but
22
solely for the purpose of determining whether the state had established the element of
intent.” Moulton, 310 Conn. at 353 (citing Gormley, 632 F.2d at 943).
In this case, the Amended Complaint provides no plausible basis for reasonably
concluding that the state’s criminal prosecution of Siddiqui was impermissibly based on
the content of the phone calls made to Randhawa’s place of employment. Siddiqui
does not dispute Rocheleau’s claim that the language used in these phone calls
provides evidence that the calls were made with the intent to harass Randhawa. See
Def.’s Mem. at 24. Instead, Siddiqui argues that the calls cannot be used as evidence
against him because they were made to third parties (i.e., Randhawa’s employers),
rather than to Randhawa herself. See Pl.’s Mem. at 17. However, “[a] defendant need
not engage in direct communication with the person whom he or she intended to
harass” in order to violate section 53a-183. State v. Buhl, 321 Conn. 688, 719 (2016)
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Accordingly, the Connecticut
Supreme Court has recognized that a defendant’s communications with parties other
than the complainant may serve as evidence of his intent to harass the complainant.
See id. at 721 (noting that the defendant’s communications with the victim’s parents
“could reasonably evince the intent to harass, annoy, or alarm” the victim). Thus, the
fact that the three phone calls were made to Randhawa’s employers, rather than to
Randhawa herself, does not render Rocheleau’s use of these calls unconstitutional.
Furthermore, the arrest warrant application provides a basis for concluding that
the state’s prosecution of Siddiqui was based on his harassing conduct, rather than on
the content of his communications. Notwithstanding Siddiqui’s claim that his arrest
warrant was obtained “in large part” on the three phone calls made to Randhawa’s
23
employers, Am. Compl. at ¶ 39, the arrest warrant application contains numerous
allegations relating to the harassing manner in which Siddiqui communicated with
Randhawa. For example, the application alleges that Randhawa received more than
nine calls from blocked or disguised numbers that she believed were from Siddiqui.
See Arrest Warrant Application at ¶¶ 4, 9; see also State v. Reed, 176 Conn. App. 537,
552 (2017) (“Typically, telephone harassment involves multiple telephone calls or calls
placed at inconvenient locations or hours.”). Moreover, some of Siddiqui’s alleged
communications were placed at inconvenient locations or hours, such as the calls to
Randhawa’s place of employment and a lengthy email that Siddiqui sent to Randhawa
and her family during the week of Randhawa’s wedding. See Arrest Application
Warrant at ¶¶ 5, 7–9; see also Gormley, 632 F.2d at 940–41 (denying habeas petition
from appellant convicted of telephone harassment for calling complainant’s workplace to
harass her). As a result, Siddiqui has not pled factual allegations that support a
reasonable inference that the warrant for his arrest violates his First Amendment rights.
For the aforementioned reasons, Siddiqui’s free speech claim is dismissed.
G.
Substantive Due Process
Siddiqui also claims that Rocheleau’s conduct violated his right to substantive
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Am. Compl. at ¶ 37.
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a substantive due process claim “must allege
governmental conduct that is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to
shock the contemporary conscience.” Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 93 (2d Cir. 2005)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Because “[s]ubstantive due process is an outer limit
on the legitimacy of governmental action[,] . . . [s]ubstantive due process standards are
violated only by conduct that is so outrageously arbitrary as to constitute a gross abuse
24
of governmental authority.” Natale v. Town of Ridgefield, 170 F.3d 258, 263 (2d Cir.
1999). Thus, while the Second Circuit has noted that “malicious and sadistic”
government action that is “designed for no legitimate government purpose[ ]
unquestionably shock[s] the conscience,” Velez, 401 F.3d at 94 (internal quotation
marks omitted), it has also cautioned that the protections of due process are not
implicated by state conduct that “merely offend[s] some fastidious squeamishness or
private sentimentalism,” Smith v. Half Hollow Hills Cent. Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 168, 173
(2d Cir.2002). Instead, the state action must “fairly be viewed as so brutal and offensive
to human dignity as to shock the conscience.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Supreme Court has further cautioned against expanding the concept of substantive
due process, noting that “the guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this
unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271–72
(1994). Accordingly, “where another provision of the Constitution provides an explicit
textual source of constitutional protection, a court must assess a plaintiff's claims under
that explicit provision and not the more generalized notion of substantive due process.”
Kia P. v. McIntyre, 235 F.3d 749, 757–58 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted).
In this case, Siddiqui argues that “all of [Rocheleau’s] actions, taken as a whole,
violated [his] Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process.” Pl.’s Mem. at
14. However, to the extent that Siddiqui’s substantive due process claim rests on the
issuance of the arrest warrant or the search of his phone, it is dismissed because it is
subsumed by his more particularized claims for violations of his rights to travel, to
access courts, and to be free of search and seizure, which this court has already
25
addressed. See, supra, at 8–21. Likewise, to the extent that Siddiqui’s substantive
due process claim is based on the alleged phone calls made to Randhawa’s workplace,
it is dismissed because it is subsumed by Siddiqui’s free speech claim, which the court
also addressed above. See, supra, at 21–24.
While acknowledging that portions of his substantive due process claim have
redress under other constitutional provisions, see Pl.’s Mem. at 15, Siddiqui suggests
that some of Rocheleau’s unlawful conduct falls outside the scope of any explicit textual
sources of constitutional protection, see id. at 15–16. Siddiqui highlights, in particular,
his allegations that Rocheleau (1) harassed his family members by threatening arrest if
they did not divulge Siddiqui’s phone number; (2) provided false information to the
Siddiqui’s business school about his immigration status; and (3) withheld exculpatory
information from state court judges, as well as disobeyed state court orders. See id. at
16; Am. Compl. at ¶ 12.
Turning first to Rocheleau’s threats to arrest Siddiqui’s family members, the court
notes that these verbal threats were in service of a legitimate governmental objective,
namely, acquiring Siddiqui’s phone number in order to investigate Randhawa’s
complaints of harassment. While Rocheleau’s interview of Siddiqui’s family members
may have been coercive, “investigatory conduct that includes coercive techniques does
not offend substantive due process absent particularly egregious circumstances.”
Rhodes v. Tevens, No. 07-CV-471S, 2012 WL 777421, at *12 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2012),
aff'd sub nom. Rhodes v. United States, 519 F. App'x 703 (2d Cir. 2013). Notably
absent from Siddiqui’s Amended Complaint are allegations that Rocheleau used
physical force when conducting his interview of Siddiqui’s family. Velez, 401 F.3d at 93
26
(“We tend to speak of that which ‘shocks the conscience’ largely in the context of
excessive force claims.”). Instead, Siddiqui only alleges that Rocheleau made verbal
threats to Siddiqui’s family, and district courts in this Circuit have routinely held that
verbal abuse alone does not normally satisfy the shock the conscience standard. See,
e.g., Longmoor v. Nilsen, 285 F. Supp. 2d 132, 139 (D. Conn. 2003).
For similar reasons, Rocheleau’s false statements to Siddiqui’s business school
about Siddiqui’s immigration status do not rise to the level of a substantive due process
violation. While such statements may have jeopardized Siddiqui’s student visa status,
they are not, by themselves, “so brutal and offensive to human dignity as to shock the
conscience.” See Roman v. Velleca, No. 3:11CV1867 VLB, 2012 WL 4445475, at *11
(D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2012) (dismissing substantive due process claim against defendant
who “fabricated incidents of misconduct in order to impugn the [p]laintiff’s reputation,
causing him to be reprimanded in writing, transferred, and suspended.”).
Finally, Siddiqui’s allegations that Rocheleau withheld exculpatory evidence and
disobeyed orders from state court judges do not plausibly support a substantive due
process claim because they are subsumed by Rocheleau’s Fourth Amendment claim for
unreasonable searches and seizures. Moreover, even if the court were to ignore the
duplicative nature of these alleged constitutional violations, this conduct does not
“constitute the kind of heinous behavior recognized in the law as ‘conscious shocking.’”
Cusick v. City of New Haven, 145 F. App'x 701, 703 (2d Cir. 2005). Government
conduct does not violate substantive due process simply because it violates state law.
See Natale, 170 F.3d at 262 (holding that “[a]rbitrary conduct that might violate zoning
regulations as a matter of state law is not sufficient to demonstrate conduct so
27
outrageously arbitrary as to constitute a gross abuse of governmental authority that will
offend the substantive component of the Due Process Clause”). Nor does an officer’s
withholding of exculpatory evidence necessarily shock the conscious. Kozey v.
Quarles, No. 3:04 CV 1724 MRK, 2005 WL 2387708, at *6 (D. Conn. Sept. 28, 2005)
(dismissing substantive due process claim that alleged failures to report exculpatory
information to the state court), aff'd, 252 F. App'x 387 (2d Cir. 2007); Watson v. Grady,
No. 09-CV-3055 KMK, 2010 WL 3835047, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010) (dismissing
substantive due process claim that vaguely alleged that defendants hid exculpatory
evidence and gave prosecutors false information regarding plaintiff’s involvement in
criminal activity). Where, as here, the plaintiff challenges the actions of an executive
official, the Supreme Court has cautioned that “only the most egregious official conduct
violates” a party’s substantive due process rights, the reason being that “executive
action challenges raise a particular need to preserve the constitutional proportions of
constitutional claims, lest the Constitution be demoted to . . . a font of tort law.” Cty. of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846, 474 n.8 (1998). Absent allegations of
additional egregious conduct, Rocheleau’s withholding of exculpatory evidence and
failure to comply with state court orders do not do not “fall within the narrow range of
‘conscious-shocking’ conduct that has been held to violate the right to substantive due
process.” Cusick, 145 F. App'x at 703.
H.
State Law Claims
Finally, Siddiqui brings various state law claims against Rocheleau, including for
unreasonable search and seizure and for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Am.
Compl. at ¶¶ 26, 44. However, having dismissed all of Siddiqui’s federal law claims, the
court will not reach the merits of Siddiqui’s state law claims because Siddiqui has not
28
carried his burden of proving that his suit satisfies the amount in controversy
requirement for diversity jurisdiction.6 Although Siddiqui asserts that the court has
diversity jurisdiction and Rocheleau has not this assertion, the court is obligated, sua
sponte, “to consider whether the requirements of the diversity statute were satisfied in
this case,” both because “a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived
and because where jurisdiction is lacking, dismissal is mandatory.” Mehlenbacher v.
Akzo Nobel Salt, Inc., 216 F.3d 291, 295 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted); see also id. at 295–298 (addressing, sua sponte, whether plaintiff’s
claim satisfied the amount in controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction).
Pursuant to section 1332 of title 28 of the United States Code, a district court has
diversity jurisdiction when (1) there is diversity of citizenship between the parties, and
(2) “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of
interests and costs.” The Second Circuit has noted that the “party invoking the
jurisdiction of the federal court has the burden of proving that it appears to a ‘reasonable
probability’ that the claim is in excess of the statutory jurisdictional amount.” Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Am. Nat. Bank & Tr. Co. of Chicago, 93 F.3d 1064, 1070 (2d
Cir. 1996). While “[i]t is well settled that the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the
claim is apparently made in good faith,” id. (emphasis in original), “[a] plaintiff must [ ]
show that the amount in controversy is non-speculative in order to satisfy the [diversity
6
The court also declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Siddiqui’s state law claims.
Where, as here, “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,” it may
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining causes of action. 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3). Indeed, “[i]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the
balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial economy,
convenience, fairness, and comity—will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining
state-law claims.” DiLaura v. Power Auth. of State of N.Y., 982 F.2d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1992).
29
jurisdiction] statute,” Herbert v. Devito, No. 18-CV-5287 (AMD), 2018 WL 4845737, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2018). Accordingly, district courts in this Circuit have routinely found
jurisdictional defects in complaints that merely allege that the claim exceeds the
statutory jurisdictional amount, without alleging a factual basis to support a reasonable
probability that the requirement has been met. See, e.g., Baltazar v. Earth Ctr. of
Maanu, Inc., No. 14-CV-3543 ENV LB, 2014 WL 3887717, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 11,
2014). However, even where the court concludes that the plaintiff has not pled a
reasonable probability of satisfying the amount in controversy requirement, “the court
must afford the plaintiff an appropriate and reasonable opportunity to show good faith in
believing that a recovery in excess of the jurisdictional amount is reasonably possible.”
Chase Manhattan Bank, 93 F.3d at 1070 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted).
In this case, Siddiqui alleges that “[t]he amount in dispute, exclusive of interest
and costs, is greater than seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000).” Am. Compl. at ¶ 1.
However, the factual allegations underlying this claim of jurisdiction do not provide a
basis for inferring to a reasonable probability that Siddiqui’s suit satisfies the amount in
controversy requirement. Siddiqui merely alleges that he has suffered (1) “significant
damage to his reputation,” id. at ¶ 33; (2) “substantial loss of income as a result of his
inability to return to the United States to complete his graduate school education at
Northwestern University,” id.; and (3) “severe emotional distress, including significant
exacerbation of his Major Depression and Chronic Insomnia,” id. at ¶ 43. To infer from
these allegations that Siddiqui’s suit exceeded $75,000 in value would be speculative.
30
Accordingly, Siddiqui has not met his burden of proving to a reasonable probability that
the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional limit.
The court therefore concludes that it lacks diversity jurisdiction over the case at
this time. In accordance with the Second Circuit’s directions, the court grants Siddiqui
leave to amend his Amended Complaint to allege that recovery in excess of $75,000 is
reasonably possible, as well as to replead, if he can, his right to travel claim and his
unreasonable search and seizure claim.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Rocheleau’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 9) is
GRANTED, and Siddiqui’s Amended Complaint is dismissed without prejudice. Siddiqui
is permitted to replead his right to travel claim, his Fourth Amendment search and
seizure claim, and the existence of diversity jurisdiction over his state law claims. Any
amended complaint shall be filed on or before December 31, 2018. If no amended
complaint has been filed by that date, the clerk is directed to close the case.
SO ORDERED.
Dated at New Haven, Connecticut this 10th day of December, 2018.
/s/ Janet C. Hall __
Janet C. Hall
United States District Judge
31
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