Gladstein v. Goldfield et al
Filing
126
ORDER denying 119 Motion for Reconsideration. For the reasons detailed in the attached ruling and order, Ms. Gladstein's motion for reconsideration is DENIED. Signed by Judge Victor A. Bolden on 3/19/2021. (Shaffer, Chelsea)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
RUTH GLADSTEIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
No. 3:18-cv-0926 (VAB)
SARANN GOLDFIELD, et al.,
Defendants.
RULING AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Ruth Gladstein has sued Sarann Goldfield, Alvin Goldfield 1 (the “Goldfields”), Martin
Wolf, Esq., and Cohen and Wolf, P.C. (with Mr. Wolf, the “Wolf Defendants”) (collectively,
“Defendants”). She alleges intentional interference with inheritance, undue influence or
coercion, fraudulent concealment, civil conspiracy, reckless indifference, larceny, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress against Defendants;
negligence and breach of fiduciary duties against the Wolf Defendants; and negligence and
breach of fiduciary duties against the Goldfields. Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1 (June 4, 2018)
(“Compl.”).
Ms. Gladstein now moves for reconsideration of the Court’s Order granting the Wolf
Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Pl.’s Mot. for Recons. of Ruling and Order Dismissing Case,
ECF No. 119 (Aug. 10, 2020) (“Pl.’s Mot.”).
For the following reasons, Ms. Gladstein’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
1
On July 1, 2020, the Estate of Alvin Goldfield was substituted as a party for Mr. Goldfield. Order Granting Second
Mot. to Substitute Party, ECF No. 100 (July 1, 2020).
1
I.
BACKGROUD
Familiarity with the factual and procedural background in this case is assumed. See
Order, ECF No. 115 (July 31, 2020) (“Dismissal Order”).
On July 31, 2020, the Court granted the Wolf Defendants’ motion to dismiss, see
Dismissal Order, and denied as moot Ms. Gladstein’s motion for summary judgment and motion
to set aside, Order, ECF No. 116 (July 31, 2020); see also Pl.’s Mot. for Partial Summ. J., ECF
No. 89 (May 15, 2020); Mot. to Set Aside Order Granting Mot. to Deny or Defer Resp. to Pl.’s
Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 92 (June 3, 2020).
On August 10, 2020, Ms. Gladstein moved for reconsideration with supporting materials.
Pl.’s Mot.; Mem. of Law in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Recons. of Ruling and Order Dismissing
Case, ECF No. 119-1 (Aug. 10, 2020) (“Pl.’s Mem.”).
On August 11, 2020, the Wolf Defendants opposed Ms. Gladstein’s motion. Mem.
Opposing Pl.’s Mot. for Recons. of Defs. Martin Wolf and Cohen and Wolf P.C., ECF No. 120
(Aug. 11, 2020) (“Wolf Opp’n”).
On the same day, Ms. Gladstein responded to the Wolf Defendants opposition. Pl.’s
Resp. to Allegation that Her Motion for Recons. was Untimely, ECF No. 121 (Aug. 11, 2020)
(“Pl.’s Resp.”).
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to move to “alter or
amend a judgment . . . no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
59(e). Courts consider a motion made under Rule 59(e) to be a motion for reconsideration. See
2
Krohn v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 341 F.3d 177, 179 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that a party timely filed
for reconsideration under Fed R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(b)).
“The standard for granting [a motion for reconsideration] is strict, and reconsideration
will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that
the court overlooked – matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the
conclusion reached by the court.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995);
see also Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd. v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir. 1992)
(“The major grounds justifying reconsideration are an intervening change of controlling law, the
availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). “[A] motion to reconsider should not be granted where the
moving party seeks solely to relitigate an issue already decided.” Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257.
III.
DISCUSSION
In its order granting the Wolf Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court dismissed Ms.
Gladstein’s nine counts against the Wolf Defendants for lack of standing. See Dismissal Order at
19-23. The Court concluded that
Ultimately, Ms. Gladstein is dissatisfied with her inheritance; and
having failed to undermine the legal instruments that, in her view,
unfairly limited her inheritance, she now seeks to attack collaterally
these very same documents by suing the Wolf Defendants. But Ms.
Gladstein lacks standing to bring claims based on the Wolf
Defendants’ conduct and provision of legal services related to Ms.
Klavir’s estate planning; she also lacks standing to bring claims
based on their conduct as trustee for the Klavir Trust . . . [A]ny
standing to assert those claims reside in the trustee or the
representative of Ms. Klavir’s estate, Ms. Goldfield.
Id. at 19. Although the Wolf Defendants also moved to dismiss Counts Seven, Eleven, and
Twelve for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court declined to
3
separately address these issues because the counts had been dismissed for lack of standing. Id. at
23.
Ms. Gladstein moves for the order to be reconsidered because “material facts and
controlling law were overlooked.” Pl.’s Mem. at 1.
A. Timeliness
A motion for reconsideration must filed within seven days of the filing of the order from
which such relief is sought. D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 7(c)(1). “The Local Rules are not merely the
hopes, dreams, or suggestions of this [C]ourt; they make up the framework within which cases
are decided in this district. They cannot be disregarded on a whim, nor will they be waived
without a substantial showing of necessity.” Am. Lines, LLC v. CIC Ins. Co., A.V.V., S.A., No.
3:03-cv-1891 (JCH), 2004 WL 2381717, at *7 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2004).
The Wolf Defendants note that Ms. Gladstein’s moved for reconsideration “a bit tardily.”
Wolf Opp’n at 1. Ms. Gladstein replies that
[T]he Court’s Order [dismissing the Wolf Defendants] . . . was
issued by th[e] Court at 6:47pm, after the close of business, on July
31, 2020. The next business day was Monday, August 3, 2020. The
plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was filed before noon on
Monday, August 10, 2020.
Pl.’s Resp. at 1. She also contends that her counsel was affected by a tropical storm that hit
Connecticut and did not have electricity until August 8, 2020. Id. at 1-2.
Under Rule 6, “[w]hen the period is stated in days,” parties should “exclude the day of
the event that triggers the period; . . . count every day, including intermediate Saturdays,
Sundays, and legal holidays; and . . . include the last day of the period” unless it is “a Saturday,
Sunday, or legal holiday.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1). In this case, the computation of time would
have started on August 1, 2020 and run through August 7, 2020. As August 7, 2020 was a
4
Friday, rather than a weekend day or holiday, the deadline would not “continue to run” until
Monday, August 10, 2020. Id.
Given the tropical storm that affected Connecticut residents during this time, however,
the Court could find a “substantial showing of necessity” on the part of Ms. Gladstein and her
counsel to have missed the reconsideration deadline. Am. Lines, 2004 WL 2381717, at *7. In any
event, as explained further below, Ms. Gladstein’s motion fails on the merits.
Accordingly, the Court declines to decide the motion on timeliness and will proceed to
the merits.
B. Reconsideration
“A failure to timely file a motion for reconsideration may constitute sufficient grounds
for denying the motion; however, courts have exercised their discretion to address
even untimely motions.” Palmer v. Sena, 474 F. Supp. 2d 353, 354 (D. Conn. 2007). “The major
grounds justifying reconsideration are an intervening change of controlling law, the availability
of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Virgin Atl.
Airways, 956 F.2d at 1255 (internal quotation marks omitted). Ms. Gladstein makes five
arguments for reconsideration.
First, Ms. Gladstein argues that “[t]he Court overlooked the fact that the Supreme Court
of Connecticut . . . found [in a related case] that it was an undisputed fact that the Plaintiff is a
beneficiary of the Frances Klavir Living Trust (“Trust”).” Pl.’s Mem. at 3. The Wolf Defendants
counter that Ms. Gladstein “ignores the basis for the [Court’s] decision [dismissing the claims
against them] and simply rehashes arguments she made in opposition.” Wolf Opp’n at 2.
Specifically, Wolf Defendants contend Ms. Gladstein “ignores the circumstances under which a
5
third party may sue an attorney relating to wills or trusts, and that the Court stated and applied
the law correctly.” Id.
The Court agrees.
The Court’s Order dismissing the Wolf Defendants did not turn on whether Ms. Gladstein
was a beneficiary of the Trust, but whether she was a client of the Wolf Defendants. Dismissal
Order at 17 (“Because Ms. Gladstein’s claims are based on the legal services rendered by the Wolf
Defendants, those claims must fail. She was not their client.”). The Court did not ignore that Ms.
Gladstein was a beneficiary. It just determined that being a beneficiary alone did not give her
standing to sue the Wolf Defendants. See id. at 18 (“Although a beneficiary may sue the trustee on
behalf of the trust, . . . Ms. Gladstein’s claims are not against Mr. Wolf as trustee of the Living Trust,
but are against him individually, and based on alleged personal injuries, which Connecticut courts
disallow.” (internal citations omitted)).
Second, Ms. Gladstein argues that after taking judicial notice of the Connecticut Court of
Probate finding the Last Will and Testament duly executed and no evidence of undue influence,
the Court “overlooked the subsequent order issued by the same [p]robate [c]ourt . . . [holding]
that the [p]robate [c]ourt lacked subject matter jurisdiction to make a determination as to the
validity of the 1997 amendment to the Trust . . . .” Pl.’s Mem. at 3-4.
The Wolf Defendants argue that “th[is] June 2009 Order is not properly before the Court
as it was available and not presented in opposition.” Wolf Opp’n at 2. They further contend that
the probate court determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction for allegations of fraud and
forgery, but reserved determination for the other allegations. Id. The Wolf Defendants argue that
the claims against them in this case fall into the latter category, and thus, the June 2009 Order
“changes nothing.” Id. at 3.
“In order to succeed on a motion for reconsideration based on newly discovered
6
evidence, the evidence must be ‘truly newly discovered or . . . could not have been found by due
diligence.’” Kopperl v. Bain, No. 3:09-CV-01754 (CSH), 2016 WL 310719, at *3 (D. Conn. Jan.
26, 2016) (quoting U.S. v. Potamkin Cadillac Corp., 697 F.2d 491, 493 (2d Cir. 1983)).
“[N]ewly discovered evidence must not have been available prior to entry of the judgment
leading to reconsideration.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Thus, this 2009 Order does not
constitute newly discovered evidence because it was known and available to Ms. Gladstein when
she filed her opposition. It cannot be the basis for a successful motion for reconsideration.
Third, Ms. Gladstein argues that the Court “overlooked controlling law from the
Connecticut Supreme Court.” Pl.’s Mem. at 4 (emphasis omitted). She contends that in Stowe v.
Smith, 184 Conn. 194 (1981), “the Connecticut Supreme Court reasoned that if a lawyer thwarts
the intentions of the testatrix client, then after the client’s death the intended beneficiary would
suffer injury” and “recognized that absent a particular conflict between rules of contract and tort
law, a plaintiff may proceed in contract, tort or both.” Id. at 5-6. Ms. Gladstein argues that she
“has alleged a cause of action that is recognized in Connecticut and for which she is recognized
to have standing.” Id. at 7. The Wolf Defendants contend that Stowe v. Smith is not controlling.
Wolf Opp’n at 3. The Wolf Defendants note that the Court “addressed the law specifically as to
standing to sue trusts [in its Order],” which was “an aspect of the decision not address by [Ms.
Gladstein] at all.” Id. (citing Dismissal Order at 17-18).
The Court agrees.
Reconsideration may be granted if there is an “intervening change of controlling law.”
Virgin Atl. Airways, 956 F.2d at 1255. The Court did not overlook Stowe v. Smith. The case was
cited in Ms. Gladstein’s opposition to the Wolf Defendants’ motion to dismiss, see Pl.’s Mem.
of Law in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 85 at 17-18 (May 4, 2020), which the Court
7
fully considered. But ultimately, the Court determined that the other cases indicated that Ms.
Gladstein lacked standing. See Dismissal Order at 16-19. Moreover, the case cannot be seen to
be “intervening,” as it was published in 1981.
Fourth, Ms. Gladstein argues that the Court “overlooked controlling law from the Second
Circuit.” Pl.’s Mem. at 7 (emphasis omitted). She contends that, in Devlin v. United States, 352
F. 3d 525 (2d Cir. 2003), the Second Circuit held that “a person’s interest as a named beneficiary
or potential heir is a property interest protected by tort laws of Connecticut.” Id. at 7. Ms.
Gladstein argues that she alleged “a valid cause of action that is recognized by the controlling
law of Connecticut.” Id. at 8. The Wolf Defendants argue that “[i]n Devlin[,] the court addressed
Connecticut law in several respects but was not deciding any of the issues here.” Wolf Opp’n at
4. They contend that Devlin “did not address when or how” suits against attorneys by third party
beneficiaries may proceed. Id. The Wolf Defendants further argue that “in a diversity action
Connecticut appellate law controls, not Second Circuit interpretation of it.” Id.
Again, as was the case with Stowe v. Smith, the Court was aware of Devlin v. United
States from Ms. Gladstein’s filings, see Pl.’s Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss,
ECF No. 85 at 12, 18, but applied other more relevant caselaw. Nor can this case be considered
intervening.
Finally, Ms. Gladstein contends that “reconsideration is necessary to prevent manifest
injustice.” Pl.’s Mem. at 8. She “believes that there is more than sufficient evidence to prove that
the alleged amendment to the Trust is not valid and that she is entitled to substantial damages for
the reasons alleged in the Complaint.” Id. at 10. The Wolf Defendants maintain that “the
continuing assertion that the Trust was not validly amended, demonstrates that [Ms. Gladstein]
8
simply refused to acknowledge the premise of the motion to dismiss and the Court’s decision[]
that [she] lacks standing to make that claim.” Wolf Opp’n at 4 (internal citation omitted).
Here, Ms. Gladstein attempts to “relitigate an issue already decided.” Shrader, 70 F.3d at
257. Although she “believes that there is more than sufficient evidence” to show her claims
should continue, Pl.’s Mem. at 10, she has not presented any newly discovered evidence,
intervening controlling, or indeed any evidence that a “manifest injustice” has occurred, Virgin
Atl. Airways, 956 F.2d at 1255.
Because Ms. Gladstein has failed to show “grounds justifying reconsideration,” id., the
Court will deny her motion for reconsideration.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Gladstein’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
SO ORDERED at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 19th day of March, 2021.
/s/ Victor A. Bolden
VICTOR A. BOLDEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
9
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?