Gulley v. Limmer et al

Filing 44

ORDER denying 38 Motion for Preliminary Injunction; denying 38 Motion for TRO. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 4/13/2020. (Simon, K)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

CHAZ GULLEY,
Plaintiff,

Nos. 3:19-cv-612 (SRU)
3:18-cv-858 (SRU)
3:18-cv-941 (SRU)
3:19-cv-310 (SRU)

v.
OGONDO, et al.,
MULLIGAN, et al.,
LIMMER, et al.,
LIZON, et al.,
Defendants.

RULING ON MOTIONS FOR RELEASE
Chaz Gulley, currently confined at Corrigan-Radgowski Correctional Center, filed the
instant motions seeking immediate release from confinement. For the reasons that follow, the
motions are denied.
I.

Background
On June 18, 2012, Gulley pled guilty to assault in the first degree, in violation of Conn.

Gen. Stat. § 53-59(a)(1) and attempted armed robbery in the first degree, in violation of Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 53-134(a)(2). Chaz Gulley, Criminal/Motor Vehicle Conviction Case Detail, STATE
OF CT JUDICIAL BRANCH,

https://www.jud2.ct.gov. He was sentenced to twenty years of

imprisonment, execution suspended after ten years, and five years of probation. Id. His sentence
ends on May 18, 2020. Chaz Gulley, Inmate Information, CT STATE DEP’T OF CORR.,
http://www.ctinmateinfo.state.ct.us.
On March 26, 2020, Gulley filed motions for a preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order in four of his pending 42 U.S.C § 1983 cases, requesting early and immediate

release from prison because of the risk of contracting Coronavirus Disease-2019 (“COVID-19”)
while incarcerated. 1 He posits that, if he were “to catch the virus, it [would] most definitely be
from a correctional officer while incarcerated.” See, e.g., Mot., Doc. No. 40, Gulley v. Ogando,
et al., 19-cv-612, at 1–2. The defendants filed objections on April 1, 2020.
II.

Discussion
The defendants first argue that I cannot order Gulley’s release because the cases at bar

are civil rights actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983. I agree.
As a state prisoner seeking relief in federal court, Gulley can challenge the duration of his
confinement only by petition for writ of habeas.2 Preisier v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487–90
(1973) (holding that a state prisoner challenging the length of confinement and requesting
immediate release must do so by a habeas petition, not by a section 1983 suit); Murphy v. Travis,
36 F. App’x 679, 681 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that a state prisoner’s request for injunctive relief
in a section 1983 case was “tantamount to seeking relief from confinement and is thus barred by
the Supreme Court’s decision in Preisier”). Accordingly, I do not have the authority to grant the
relief that Gulley seeks.
Even if Gulley was not barred from requesting release in the present actions, his motion
for a preliminary injunction would nonetheless fail on the merits. “A party seeking a preliminary
injunction ordinarily must show: (1) a likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of the

1

Because the motions filed in each case are identical, and because my analysis of the issues presented
overlaps across the cases, this opinion addresses each motion.
2
I note that, as amended by the First Step Act of 2019, 18 U.S.C. § 3582 authorizes courts to reduce a term
of imprisonment if, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a), it concludes, in relevant part, that
“extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction” and that “such a reduction is consistent with
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). That relief,
however, is available only to individuals incarcerated for federal offenses and thus cannot be granted here. United
States v. Rivernider, 2020 WL 597393, at *2 (D. Conn. Feb. 7, 2020) (“The First Step Act . . . modified the
compassionate release statute to enable a federal prisoner to petition the sentencing court for a reduction in his
sentence.”) (emphasis added).

2

injunction; and (2) either a likelihood of success on the merits or sufficiently serious questions
going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation, with a balance of hardships tipping
decidedly in the movant's favor.” Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 47 (2d Cir. 2008). “When
the movant seeks a ‘mandatory’ injunction—that is, as in this case, an injunction that will alter
rather than maintain the status quo—she must meet the more rigorous standard of demonstrating
a ‘clear’ or ‘substantial’ likelihood of success on the merits.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
Significantly, “[t]o prevail on a motion for preliminary injunctive relief, the moving party
must establish a relationship between the injury claimed in the motion and the conduct giving
rise to the complaint.” Vega v. Lantz, 2006 WL 2642416, at *2 (D. Conn. Sept. 14, 2006)
(internal citations omitted); see also Taylor v. Rowland, 2004 WL 231453, at *2–*3 (D. Conn.
Feb. 2, 2004) (concluding that a motion for preliminary injunctive relief was not proper because
it was “unrelated to the issues in the amended complaint”). That is because preliminary
injunctive relief is intended to “prevent irreparable harm until the court has an opportunity to rule
on the lawsuits merits.” Taylor, 2004 WL 231453, at *2 (citing Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d
470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994)).
Further, the defendants must be capable of providing the relief sought by the plaintiff.
Wells v. Jacobs, 2004 WL 1146028, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2004) (denying motion for
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction because none of the defendants could
provide the plaintiff with the requested relief).
Here, the injury that Gulley now asserts—his continued confinement during the
COVID-19 pandemic—is entirely unrelated to the conduct giving rise to his section 1983
complaints, which assert claims of excessive force, deliberate indifference, and retaliation, and
challenge specific actions by various correctional staff and nurses. Gulley v. Mulligan, et al., 18-

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cv-858 (D. Conn. May 22, 2018) (asserting Eighth Amendment excessive force and deliberate
indifference claims); Gulley v. Ogando, et al., 19-cv-612 (D. Conn. April 23, 2019) (asserting
First Amendment retaliation and Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference and excessive force
claims); Gulley v. Limmer, et al., 19-cv-941 (D. Conn. June 7, 2018) (asserting Eighth
Amendment excessive force claim); Gulley v. Lizon, et al., 19-cv-310 (D. Conn. March 4, 2019)
(asserting Eighth Amendment excessive force and deliberate indifference claims).
Moreover, as the defendants argue, they would not have the authority to release Gulley
from prison even if I were to direct them to do so. Although Gulley claims that “the
Commissioner of Correction has the authority to discharge, transfer or detain any inmate in the
custody of corrections,” see, e.g., 19-cv-612, doc. no. 40, I do not have personal jurisdiction
over the Commissioner because the Commissioner is not a defendant and has not been served in
any of the actions at bar. Wells, 2004 WL 1146028, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2004).
III.

Conclusion
For all the foregoing reasons, I must deny Gulley’s motions for release. Doc. No. 38,

Gulley, 18-cv-858; Doc. No. 40, Gulley, 19-cv-612; Doc. No. 38, Gulley, 19-cv-941; Doc. No.
33, Gulley, 19-cv-310.
So ordered.
Dated at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 13th day of April 2020.

/s/ STEFAN R. UNDERHILL
Stefan R. Underhill
United States District Judge

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