Sadowski v. Dyer et al

Filing 8

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER See attached document. Be advised, that an amended complaint must be filed on or before November 5, 2018 or the Clerk is directed to dismiss the complaint.Signed by Judge Kari A. Dooley on 10/5/18.(Dooley, Kari)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
CHRISTOPHER SADOWSKI,
Plaintiff,
v.
JUDGE RICHARD DYER, ET AL.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 3:18cv1074(KAD)

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER
The plaintiff, Christopher Sadowski, filed a civil rights
complaint against Superior Court Judge Richard Dyer, John Doe
Prosecutor 1, John Doe Prosecutor 2, John Doe Bail Commissioner
and multiple John and Jane Doe defendants employed by the State
of Connecticut Department of Corrections.

For reasons set forth

below, the complaint is dismissed in its entirety with leave to
file an amended complaint as against some of the named
defendants.
Standard of Review
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), the court must review
prisoner civil complaints against governmental actors and
“dismiss ... any portion of [a] complaint [that] is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted,” or that “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.”

Id.

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure requires that a complaint contain “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

Although detailed allegations are not required, “a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.
A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted).

A complaint that

includes only “‘labels and conclusions,’ ‘a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action’ or ‘naked assertion[s]’
devoid of ‘further factual enhancement,’” does not meet the
facial plausibility standard.

Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007)).

Although courts still

have an obligation to interpret “a pro se complaint liberally,”
the complaint must include sufficient factual allegations to
meet the standard of facial plausibility.

See Harris v. Mills,

572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).
Allegations
On November 6, 2016, police officers arrested the plaintiff
on charges of disorderly conduct and interfering with a 911
call.

Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 1.

At his arraignment, a judge
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instructed the plaintiff not to contact his girlfriend, and
released the plaintiff on a promise to appear.

Id.

On November 7, 2016, the plaintiff contacted his girlfriend
via a text message.

Id. ¶ 2.

Southington Police officers

arrested the plaintiff on the charge of violation of a
protective order.

Id.

A police official set the plaintiff’s

bond at $10,000.00, which he was able to post. Id.
On November 29, 2016, police officers arrested the
plaintiff on the charge of violation of a protective order
because he had contacted his girlfriend.

Id. ¶ 3.

A police

official set the plaintiff’s bond at $25,000.00, which he was
able to post. Id.
On February 11, 2017, police officers arrested the
plaintiff again on the charge of violation of a protective order
because he had contacted his girlfriend.

Id. ¶ 4.

A police

official set the plaintiff’s bond at $15,000.00, which he was
able to post. Id.
On March 10, 2017, police officers arrested the plaintiff
on charges of violation of a protective order, disorderly
conduct and assault in the third degree.

Id. ¶ 5.

A police

official or a judge set the plaintiff’s bond at $125,000.00
which again, the plaintiff was able to post. Id.
On March 15, 2017, police officers arrested the plaintiff
3

on charges of intimidation of a witness, harassment in the
second degree and violation of a protective order.

Id. ¶ 6.

A

police official or a judge set the plaintiff’s bond at
$100,000.00, which once again, the plaintiff posted. Id.
On June 11, 2017, police officers arrested the plaintiff on
the charge of violation of a protective order. Id. ¶ 9.
Following this arrest, Superior Court Judge Richard Dyer set the
plaintiff’s bond at $400,000.00.

Id.

Judge Dyer informed the

plaintiff that if “bond[ed] out,” he would hold a bond hearing
and raise all of the plaintiff’s bond amounts.
plaintiff posted the $400,000.00 bond. Id.

Id.

The

Upon his release

from Hartford Correctional Center (“Hartford Correctional”), the
plaintiff was on “bond probation” and had to wear a monitoring
bracelet.
test.

Id. ¶ 10.

He subsequently failed to pass a urine

Id.

On July 20, 2017, Judge Dyer raised all of the plaintiff’s
bonds to include raising the $400,000.00 bond to $800,000.00 in
the criminal case that was filed pursuant to the plaintiff’s
arrest on June 11, 2017.
The plaintiff now claims that the $800,000.00 bond amount
was excessive as he was not a flight risk.

Id.

After his bonds were increased on July 20, 2017,
Connecticut Judicial Marshals transported the plaintiff in a van
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to Hartford Correctional.

Id. ¶ 14.

During the trip, the

driver stopped suddenly to avoid an accident which caused other
inmates in the van to slam into the plaintiff.

Id.

The

plaintiff hit his head against the back divider in the van.

Id.

¶ 15.
Upon his arrival at Hartford Correctional, the plaintiff
informed both the judicial marshals and facility correctional
officers about his head injury and they all laughed at him.
¶ 16.

Id.

After being processed for admission to Hartford

Correctional, the plaintiff spoke with staff members in the
medical department regarding his head injury. Id. ¶ 17.

None

of the medical staff members followed the concussion protocol or
scheduled him for an MRI. Id.
The plaintiff experienced severe pain from his head injury.
Id. ¶ 18.

The plaintiff submitted many requests for medical

treatment and was eventually seen by a physician after
approximately two weeks. Id.

The physician examined the

plaintiff and diagnosed him as suffering from post-concussion
syndrome. Id. ¶ 19.

The physician prescribed multiple

medications to alleviate the plaintiff’s pain, including a
medication that is used as an anti-depressant. Id. ¶ 20.

The

anti-depressant caused the plaintiff to experience mood swings
and to gain a lot of weight.

Id.
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The plaintiff continues to

suffer from migraines. Id. ¶ 21.
Discussion
The plaintiff first claims that the $800,000.00 bond set by
Judge Dyer was excessive and violated his Eighth Amendment
rights.

Id. ¶¶ 10, 12.

The plaintiff further claims that he

has experienced an “extreme lack of healthcare throughout his
incarceration at” Hartford Correctional, Northern Correctional
Institution (“Northern”), Walker Correctional Institution
(“Walker”) and Osborn Correctional Institution (“Osborn”).
¶ 22.

Id.

The plaintiff seeks monetary damages.
Official Capacity Claims – All Defendants
The plaintiff sues the defendants in their individual and

official capacities. Id. ¶ 23.

All defendants are State actors.

To the extent that the plaintiff seeks money damages from the
defendants in their official capacities, such a request for
relief is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

See Kentucky v.

Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985) (Eleventh Amendment, which protects
the state from suits for monetary relief, also protects state
officials sued for damages in their official capacity); Quern v.
Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979) (Section 1983 does not override
a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity).

Accordingly, the claims

against the defendants in their official capacities which seek
monetary damages are dismissed with prejudice.
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See 28 U.S.C. §

1915A(b)(2).
Judge Dyer
The plaintiff claims that Judge Dyer violated his Eighth
Amendment constitutional rights when he increased his bond to
$800,000.00 on July 20, 2017. See U.S. Const. amend. VIII
(“[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted”).
“It is well settled that judges generally have absolute
immunity from suits for money damages for their judicial
actions. . . . [and] acts arising out of, or related to,
individual cases before the judge are considered judicial in
nature.”

Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 209-10 (2d Cir. 2009).

This immunity applies even to claims that a judge acted in bad
faith, erroneously, maliciously or “in excess of his
authority.”

Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991).

A judge

is not entitled to absolute immunity, however, “for nonjudicial
actions” which were “not taken in the judge's judicial capacity”
such as “administrative decisions.”

Bliven, 579 F.3d at 209-10

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Connecticut General Statutes § 54-64a permits Superior
Court judges to set a bond, in no greater amount than necessary,
during arraignment or a subsequent proceeding.

A Superior Court

Judge is also authorized to set conditions of release and to
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revoke or increase bond if conditions of release are violated.
Thus, in setting and raising the plaintiff’s bond, Judge Dyer
was acting in his judicial capacity.

See Root v. Liston, 444

F.3d 127, 132 (2d Cir. 2006) (“A decision to increase the amount
of a bond is inherently “judicial,” even when it is made outside
the bail application process.”); Tucker v. Outwater, 118 F.3d
930, 933 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Justice Outwater's arraignment of
plaintiff and setting of bail were plainly judicial acts.”)

As

such, Judge Dyer is entitled to absolute immunity with regard to
his conduct in setting and increasing the plaintiff’s bond
amounts.
prejudice.

The claim against Judge Dyer is dismissed with
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2).

John Doe Prosecutors 1 and 2 and Bail Commissioner
The plaintiff names two prosecutors and a bail commissioner
as defendants.

He does not identify these defendants by name or

otherwise mention or refer to these defendants in the body of
the complaint.

The exhibits to the complaint that appear to

relate to the plaintiff’s many arrests during the period from
November 2016 to June 2017, do not reflect the involvement of a
Bail Commissioner or a State’s Attorney in connection with the
bond amounts set for each arrest.

See Comp. at 15-35.

Absent allegations that either John Doe 1 Prosecutor, John
Doe 2 Prosecutor or the Bail Commissioner, through their
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conduct, violated the plaintiff’s constitutionally protected
rights, the claim is not facially plausible.

The claims against

the John Doe Prosecutors and John Doe Bail Commissioner are
dismissed.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

Correctional Officers, Physicians and Nurses
The plaintiff has named two correctional officers, a nurse
and a mental health nurse from Hartford Correctional, two nurses
and a physician named Michael Clements from Northern, two nurses
and a doctor from Walker and four nurses and two doctors from
Osborn.

The plaintiff generally asserts that he did not receive

necessary healthcare during his confinement at any of these
facilities.

The court addresses his claims one facility at a

time, seriatum.
HARTFORD CORRECTIONAL
The claims against staff at Hartford Correctional arise out
of the events of July 20, 2017 and thereafter.

Specifically,

although the plaintiff advised staff of his head injury, they
neither followed the concussion protocol nor sent him for an
MRI.
John Doe Officers
To the extent that the two John Doe Correctional Officers
named on page two of the complaint are the same officers who
laughed at the plaintiff upon his arrival at Hartford
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Correctional, the allegations against them do not state a
plausible claim of a violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional
rights.

At the time of the plaintiff’s arrival at Hartford

Correctional, July 20, 2017, he was a pretrial detainee.
Conditions of confinement claims of pretrial detainees “are
governed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
rather than the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the
Eighth Amendment . . . because [p]retrial detainees have not
been convicted of a crime and thus may not be punished in any
manner—neither cruelly and unusually nor otherwise.”

Darnell v.

Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).

A pretrial detainee may establish

a §1983 claim of unconstitutional conditions of confinement by
demonstrating that officers “acted with deliberate indifference
to the challenged conditions.”

Id. In pursuing such claims, “a

pretrial detainee must satisfy two prongs to prove a claim, an
“objective prong” showing that the challenged conditions were
sufficiently serious to constitute objective deprivations of the
right to due process, and a “subjective prong” – perhaps better
classified as a “mens rea prong” … -- showing that the officer
acted with at least deliberate indifference to the challenged
conditions.”

Id.

Under the first prong, a detainee must allege that “the
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conditions, either alone or in combination, pose[d] an
unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health . . . which
includes the risk of serious damage to physical and mental
soundness.”

Id. at 30. (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted).
To meet the second prong, a pretrial detainee must allege
that the prison official “acted intentionally to impose the
alleged condition, or recklessly failed to act with reasonable
care to mitigate the risk that the condition posed to the
pretrial detainee even though the official knew, or should have
known, that the condition posed an excessive risk to health or
safety.”

Id. at 35.

It is unclear whether plaintiff’s complaint is best
characterized as a deliberate indifference to confinement
conditions claim or a deliberate indifference to medical needs
claim.

Regardless the characterization however, the court

engages in the same analysis.

See, Walker v. Wright, No. 3:17-

CV-425 (JCH), 2018 WL 2225009, at *5 (D. Conn. May 15, 2018)
(“District courts in this Circuit have . . . applied Darnell’s
objective “mens rea” prong to claims of deliberate indifference
to serious medical needs under the Fourteenth Amendment” because
“a footnote in Darnell indicate[d] that ‘deliberate indifference
means the same thing for each type of claim under the Fourteenth
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Amendment’” quoting Darnell, 849 F.3d at 33 n.9).
The plaintiff alleges that he suffered an injury during
transport to Hartford Correctional.

He further alleges that

although he advised the correctional officers when he arrived,
they laughed at him.

That same day, the plaintiff completed the

admission process and spoke to a medical staff member about his
injury.

Although the John Doe Correctional Officers did not

take any action in response to the plaintiff’s complaint about
an injury that he had allegedly suffered in the transport van,
there are no allegations that the officers could have provided
the plaintiff with medical treatment.

Furthermore, the

plaintiff states that he was able to speak to a medical provider
later that day regarding his injury.
Even construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff,
these allegations do not plausibly satisfy the requirements of a
Fourteenth Amendment claim.

Even if, arguendo, the condition

(lack of immediate treatment, an MRI and implementation of the
concussion protocol), alone or in the aggregate “posed an
unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health”

there are

inadequate allegations that the John Doe Correctional Officers
“recklessly failed to act with reasonable care to mitigate the
risk that the condition posed to the plaintiff even though the
officers knew or should have known that the conditioned posed an
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excessive risk to the plaintiff’s health or safety.”
Accordingly, the Fourteenth Amendment claim asserted against
John Doe Correctional Officer 1 and John Doe Correctional
Officer 2 is dismissed.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

John Doe Nurses
There are no specific allegations pertaining to requests
for treatment submitted by the plaintiff to either Nurse John
Doe from Hartford Correctional or Mental Health Nurse John Doe
from Hartford Correctional.

Nor are there allegations regarding

either defendant’s responses to any requests for treatment
submitted by the plaintiff.

As such, the plaintiff has not

alleged a facially plausible claim that either of these
defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights.

The claims

against Nurse John Doe from Hartford Correctional and the claims
against Mental Health Nurse John Doe from Hartford Correctional
are dismissed.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

NORTHERN
The plaintiff states that he saw a doctor two weeks after
July 20, 2017.

By then, he had been transferred to Northern.

According to the records attached to the complaint, on or about
August 3, 2017, a physician examined him, diagnosed him as
suffering from post-concussion syndrome and prescribed
medication to alleviate his concussion symptoms.
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The

plaintiff’s medical records reflect that on August 3, 2017, at
Northern, Dr. Michael Clements prescribed a three-day dose of
medication to treat the plaintiff’s complaints of pain.

Compl.

p. 37.
On August 4, 2017, Dr. Clements examined the plaintiff in
connection with his complaint of a right ear injury.

Id. p. 36.

The plaintiff informed Dr. Clements that he had been in a van
accident on July 21, 2017 and was experiencing headaches,
shooting pain and right-sided ringing in his ears.

Id.

Dr.

Clements diagnosed the plaintiff as suffering from postconcussion syndrome.

He prescribed a medication to treat the

plaintiff’s concussion symptoms, placed the plaintiff on postconcussion syndrome treatment, referred the plaintiff to a
mental health provider for treatment of his post-concussion
symptoms and recommended a follow-up visit to the medical
department in two weeks.

Id. 36-37.

With regard to the objective component of the Fourteenth
Amendment claim, the plaintiff has plausibly alleged that he
suffered from a serious medical condition upon his admission to
Northern at the end of July 2017.

Dr. Clements diagnosed the

plaintiff as suffering from post-concussion syndrome.

Compl. p.

36.
To meet the second prong of a deliberate indifference to
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medical needs claims, a pretrial detainee must allege that the
Dr. Clements “acted intentionally to impose the alleged
condition [which is not at issue here], or recklessly failed to
act with reasonable care to mitigate the risk that the condition
posed to [the plaintiff] even though [Dr. Clements] knew, or
should have known, that the condition posed an excessive risk to
[the plaintiff’s] health or safety.”

Darnell, 849 F.3d at 35.

Negligent actions alone do not rise to the level of deliberate
indifference and do not meet the second prong of the Fourteenth
Amendment standard for either a conditions or a deliberate
indifference to medical needs claim.

Id. at 36 (“A detainee

must prove that an official acted intentionally or recklessly,
and not merely negligently.”).
The allegations are not that the plaintiff was not treated.
He alleges inadequate treatment.

However, the allegations

regarding the treatment provided by Dr. Clements in early August
2017, as reflected in the plaintiff’s medical records, does not
plausibly allege a Fourteenth Amendment violation.

In fact,

although the treatment records are attached to the complaint,
there are no factual allegations in the body of the complaint
regarding Dr. Clements’ treatment of the plaintiff. The claim
against Dr. Clements is therefore dismissed.
1915A(b)(1).
15

See 28 U.S.C. §

Similarly, there are no factual allegations regarding
medical treatment at Northern by Nurse Jane Doe 1 or Nurse Jane
Doe 2.

Thus, the plaintiff has not alleged a facially plausible

claim that either of these defendants violated his federal
constitutional rights.

The claims against Nurse Jane Doe 1 from

Northern and Nurse Jane Doe 2 from Northern are therefore
dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
WALKER AND OSBORN
It is unclear from the complaint and exhibits as to the
date on which prison officials at Northern transferred the
plaintiff to Walker or the date on which prison officials at
Walker transferred the plaintiff to Osborn.

The medical records

reflect that as of September 11, 2017, the plaintiff was
confined at Walker and that as of October 31, 2017, the
plaintiff was confined at Osborn.

Compl. at 39-40.

However,

any claims asserted against the defendants relating to medical
treatment that occurred after the plaintiff was sentenced on
August 18, 2017 are governed by the Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference standard that is applicable to claims of sentenced
individuals.

See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16

(1979).
Deliberate indifference by prison officials to a prisoner's
serious medical needs constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
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in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

See Estelle v. Gamble,

429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (deliberate indifference by prison
officials to a prisoner’s serious medical need constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment).
To state a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious
medical need, a plaintiff must meet a two-pronged test.

Under

the first prong, a plaintiff must demonstrate that his or her
medical or mental health need was “sufficiently serious.”
Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 279 (2d Cir. 2006).

Factors

relevant to the seriousness of a medical condition include
whether “a reasonable doctor or patient would find [it]
important and worthy of comment,” whether the condition
“significantly affects an individual's daily activities,” and
whether it causes “chronic and substantial pain.”

Chance v.

Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998) (quotation marks
omitted).
Subjectively, the defendant must have been actually aware
of a substantial risk that the inmate would suffer serious harm
as a result of his or her actions or inactions.
467 F.3d at 279-80.

See Salahuddin,

Mere negligent conduct does constitute

deliberate indifference.

See id. at 280 (“[R]ecklessness

entails more than mere negligence; the risk of harm must be
substantial and the official's actions more than merely
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negligent.”); Hernandez v. Keane, 341 F.3d 137, 144 (2d Cir.
2003) (medical malpractice alone does not amount to deliberate
indifference).
The complaint is devoid of specific allegations regarding
treatment or lack of treatment by Nurse Jane Doe 1 from Walker,
Nurse Jane Doe 2 from Walker or Dr. John Doe from Walker.

Nor

are there allegations regarding treatment or lack of treatment
by Nurse Jane Doe 1 from Osborn, Nurse Jane Doe 2 from Osborn,
Nurse Jane Doe 3 from Osborn, Nurse Jane Doe 4 from Osborn, Dr.
John Doe 1 from Osborn or Dr. John Doe 2 from Osborn.

Thus, the

plaintiff has not alleged that any of these defendants were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.

The claims against these

defendants are dismissed as lacking an arguable legal or factual
basis.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

ORDERS
For all of the foregoing reasons, the court enters the
following orders:
(1)

The claims against all defendants in their official
capacities and the claims against Judge Richard Dyer
are DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)(2).

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(2)

The claims against John Doe Prosecutor 1, John Doe
Prosecutor 2, and John Doe Bail Commissioner in their
individual capacities are DISMISSED without prejudice
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

(3)

The claims against John Doe Correctional Officer 1
from Hartford Correctional, John Doe Correctional
Officer 2 from Hartford Correctional, Nurse John Doe
from Hartford Correctional, Mental Health Nurse John
Doe from Hartford Correctional, Dr. Michael Clements
from Northern, Nurse Jane Doe 1 from Northern, Nurse
Jane Doe 2 from Northern, Nurse Jane Doe 1 from
Walker, Nurse Jane Doe 2 from Walker, Dr. John Doe
from Walker, Nurse Jane Doe 1 from Osborn, Nurse Jane
Doe 2 from Osborn, Nurse Jane Doe 3 from Osborn, Nurse
Jane Doe 4 from Osborn, Dr. John Doe 1 from Osborn and
Dr. John Doe 2 from Osborn in their individual
capacities are DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

(4)

The plaintiff may file an amended complaint within
thirty (30) days to assert facts which satisfy the
facially plausible pleading requirements set forth
above with respect to any claims dismissed without
prejudice.

To the extent the plaintiff pursues claims
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arising out of his medical treatment, or lack thereof,
the amended complaint should include the dates on
which any requests for treatment were made, to whom
such requests were made, the dates of any responses to
those requests, the identity of the person responding,
and the dates on which the plaintiff was seen by a
medical provider or underwent medical tests or
examinations.
If the plaintiff chooses not to file an amended complaint
within the time specified, the court will direct the Clerk to
enter judgment for the defendants and close this case.
It is so ordered.
Signed this 5th day of October, 2018, at Bridgeport,
Connecticut.
________/s/____________________
Kari A. Dooley
United States District Judge

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