In Re: Luis Javier Martinez Sampedro

Filing 112

ORDER: For the reasons set forth in the attached ruling, Respondents' Objection to the Ruling on Respondents' Motion to Compel Reciprocal Discovery 91 is OVERRULED. Signed by Judge Janet Bond Arterton on 1/3/19. (Davis, Caroline)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
In re Application of LUIS JAVIER MARTINEZ
SAMPEDRO for an Order Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1782 to Conduct Discovery for Use in a Foreign
Proceeding

Civil No. 3:18mc47 (JBA)

January 3, 2019
RULING ON RESPONDENTS’ OBJECTION TO RULING ON MOTION TO COMPEL
RECIPROCAL DISCOVERY
The Respondents object to Magistrate Judge Spector’s Ruling denying Respondents’
Motion to Compel Reciprocal Discovery [Doc. # 84], seeking this Court’s review of that order. For
the reasons that follow, the Respondents’ Objections [Doc. ## 91, 92] to that ruling are overruled.
I. Background
The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the underlying discovery disputes in this
case. After finding that Petitioner is entitled to some discovery from the Respondents under 28
U.S.C. § 1782, (Ruling on Resps.’ Mot. to Quash and Pet.’s Mot. to Compel [Doc. # 55]), this Court
referred several discovery motions, including the Respondents’ Motion to Compel Reciprocal
Discovery [Doc. # 61], to Magistrate Judge Spector [Doc. # 68]. Judge Spector denied the
Respondents’ Motion for Reciprocal Discovery, holding that although courts have authority to
order reciprocal discovery in § 1782 cases, no such order is warranted in this case. (See Ruling on
Resps.’ Mot. to Compel (“the Ruling”).) The Fund Respondents object to Judge Spector’s ruling,
and Respondent Sorensen joins that objection.
II. Discussion
A. Legal Standard and Standard of Review

In granting a request for discovery under § 1782, courts have broad discretion in deciding
whether to also grant reciprocal discovery. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S.
241, 262 (2004) (“When information is sought by an ‘interested person,’ a district court could
condition relief upon that person’s reciprocal exchange of information.” (emphasis added));
Euromepa S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 51 F.3d 1095, 1102 (2d Cir. 1995) (“if the district court wished
to insure procedural parity . . . it could have conditioned relief upon the parties’ reciprocal
exchange of information”); In re Esses, 101 F.3d 873, 876 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Section 1782 grants
district courts wide discretion to determine whether to grant discovery and equally wide discretion
to tailor such discovery to attendant problems.”). “Substantively, so long as the district court
fashions its order in accordance with the ‘twin aims’ of § 1782, ‘providing efficient means of
assistance to participants in international litigation in our federal courts and encouraging foreign
countries by example to provide similar means of assistance to our courts,’ . . . it acts within its
discretion.” In re Esses, 101 F.3d 873 (quoting In re Malev Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d 97, 100 (2d
Cir. 1992)).
A district court may modify or set aside a magistrate judge’s decision on “[n]ondispositive
[m]atters” only if “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). Under that standard,
the reviewing court may not modify the magistrate judge’s decision “simply because we would
have decided the case differently” and instead “must ask whether, on the entire evidence, it is left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Easley v. Cromartie, 532
U.S. 234, 242 (2001) (internal quotations omitted). “Matters concerning discovery generally are
considered ‘nondispositive’ of the litigation.” Thomas E. Hoar, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp., 900 F.2d 522,
525 (2d Cir. 1990). Thus decisions of magistrate judges under § 1782 are generally reviewed by
district courts under the clearly erroneous standard. See, e.g. In re XPO Logistics, Inc., 2017 WL
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6343689 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (reviewing for clear error the magistrate judge’s decision to grant in part
petitioner’s request for discovery under § 1782).
B. Magistrate Judge Spector’s Ruling Denying Respondents’ Motion to Compel
Judge Spector’s denial of the Respondents’ Motion to Compel acknowledged that courts
have authority to grant reciprocal discovery under § 1782 but are not required to do so, with the
question left to the discretion of the courts. The ruling cited cases from district courts in this circuit
which, in deciding whether to grant reciprocal discovery under § 1782, considered factors like the
respondent’s ability to procure discovery abroad, whether the respondent is a party to the foreign
proceeding and, relatedly, whether a respondent who is not a party to the foreign proceeding has
any purpose for requesting reciprocal discovery. (Ruling at 4.)
The Ruling also addressed the Respondents’ argument that they have a “substantial
interest” in the foreign proceedings and have tailored their request for reciprocal discovery to
“obtain evidence critical to the foreign proceedings.” (Id.) Judge Spector found that because the
“Respondents are not parties to the Spanish Litigation and, therefore, cannot request discovery or
submit evidence in that proceeding,” it is therefore “not clear how Respondents would use the
reciprocal discovery even if the Court granted the request.” (Id.) The Ruling also declined to
consider the Respondents’ possible uses of the requested reciprocal discovery in the ICC
Arbitration because that foreign proceeding is not the one for which the underlying § 1782
discovery was granted, citing this Court’s earlier Ruling on the Respondents’ Motion to Quash and
the Petitioner’s Motion to Compel. (Id.)
Respondents argue that Judge Spector’s Ruling “erred in refusing to grant reciprocal
discovery” and should therefore be modified by this Court. (Resps.’ Mot. at 6.) The Respondents
acknowledge that a grant of reciprocal discovery is discretionary, not mandatory, (see id.), but
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argue that Judge Spector’s decision not to grant such discovery was nonetheless in error. The
Respondents argue that the Ruling erred by (i) ignoring the ICC arbitration in finding that the only
foreign proceeding at issue is the Spanish Litigation; (ii) failing to consider whether the
Respondents have a “substantial interest” in the foreign proceedings and instead considering only
whether they are “formally-named” parties; and (iii) failing to consider the standards for reciprocal
discovery set forth in Consorcio Minero, S.A. v. Renco Grp. Inc., 2012 WL 1059916 (S.D.N.Y 2012).
(See Resps.’ Mot. at 6-10.) Petitioner argues that those questions were “committed to [Magistrate
Judge Spector’s] discretion” and that Respondents have failed to show that the Ruling contained
any error at all, let alone the sort of clear error “that would justify a reversal” of a magistrate judge’s
decision on a discovery matter. (Pet.’s Opp. to Resps.’ Obj. [Doc. # 96] at 6.)
In support of their contention that the Ruling erred in holding that the only foreign
proceeding at issue is the Spanish Litigation, the Respondents claim that “[r]eciprocal discovery is
meant to ensure procedural ‘parity’ for all foreign parties and in all relevant foreign litigation.”
(Resps.’ Mot. at 7 (emphasis in original).) Respondents argue that because this Court declined to
issue a protective order prohibiting Petitioner from using any discovery obtained through § 1782
in the ICC arbitration, (Ruling on Resps.’ Mot. to Quash and Pet.’s Mot. to Compel at 11-12), there
will be no “procedural parity” if they are not granted reciprocal discovery for use in that arbitration.
(Id. at 7-8.) However, the Respondents cite only Consorcio Minero in support of this argument,
offering no other authority for their assertion that “parity” is required “for all foreign parties and
in all relevant foreign litigation.” In light of the broad discretion granted to courts on this question
and the other district court cases cited in the Ruling which suggest that the Respondents are not
entitled to reciprocal discovery, that Magistrate Judge Spector did not reach the same outcome as
the court in Consorcio Minero was not clear error.
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In support of their contention that the Ruling “erred by failing to even address” whether
Respondents have a “substantial interest” in the foreign proceedings and finding that “it is not clear
how Respondents would use the reciprocal discovery” because they are non-parties to the Spanish
Litigation, the Respondents again cite only Consorcio Minero. (See Resps.’ Mot. at 8.) Respondents
argue that under that case, the “correct inquiry is not whether Respondents are formally-named
‘parties’ in the Spanish Litigation, but instead whether they have a “substantial interest in each of
the [foreign] actions” and whether both proceedings “arise out of the same set of facts.” (Resps.’
Mot. at 8 (quoting Consorcio Minero, 2012 WL 1059916 at *4) (alteration in original).) In contrast,
the Ruling cites cases which rely more heavily on whether a respondent requesting reciprocal
discovery is “a party to the underlying litigation.” (Ruling at 4 (citing, inter alia, Deposit Ins. Agency
v. Leontiev, 2018 WL 3536083, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)).) Again, in light of the broad discretion
granted to courts on this question and the other district court cases cited in the Ruling which
suggest that non-parties to the foreign proceeding are often not entitled to reciprocal discovery,
that Judge Spector did not use the same test or reach the same outcome as the court in Consorcio
Minero was not clear error.
Finally, in support of their contention that the Ruling erred by failing to consider the
standards for reciprocal discovery set forth in Consorcio Minero, the Respondents again cite only
to that case. (See Resps.’ Mot. at 8-10.) In deciding whether to grant reciprocal discovery, Judge
Spector exercised the broad discretion granted to courts under § 1782 to determine how the
principles of that statute and the relevant caselaw apply to the Respondents’ request. In the absence
of any controlling authority requiring Magistrate Judge Spector to follow the reasoning of
Consorcio Minero and given the Ruling’s consideration of other relevant cases, the Ruling’s
differences from the opinion in that case again do not constitute clear error.
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Respondents essentially argue that Judge Spector should have followed the reasoning and
standards of Consorcio Minero in considering their request for reciprocal discovery, but they have
made no showing that Judge Spector’s apparent decision not to do so was beyond the scope of the
court’s discretion, nor have they shown that it was “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” In the
absence of any such showing, this Court cannot set aside the order of a magistrate judge on a
nondispositive motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Respondents’ Objection to the Ruling on Respondents’ Motion
to Compel Reciprocal Discovery [Doc. # 91] is OVERRULED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/
Janet Bond Arterton, U.S.D.J.

Dated at New Haven, Connecticut this 3rd day of January 2019.

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