Disability Rights Connecticut, Inc. v. Connecticut Department of Correction et al

Filing 172

ORDER granting 132 Motion to Seal Exhibits 9-13 of Plaintiff's Motion to Compel; granting in part and denying in part 134 Motion to Compel Defendants to Produce Information Withheld on Medical Privacy Grounds. See attached ruling. Signed by Judge Robert A. Richardson on 8/28/2024. (Coleman, G)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
DISABILITY RIGHTS
CONNECTICUT, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTION, ET AL,
Defendants.

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: CASE NO. 3:21-cv-146(KAD)
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RULING ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL INFORMATION WITHHELD ON
MEDICAL PRIVACY OBJECTION AND PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO SEAL
Plaintiff Disability Rights Connecticut, Inc. (“DRCT”) has
filed a motion to compel disclosure of medical and mental health
information that Defendant Connecticut Department of Correction
(“DOC”) has redacted or withheld from its discovery production.
(Dkt. #134).

Defendant objects, arguing inter alia that the

information at issue is subject to a constitutional right of
privacy and that DRCT’s governing regulations do not allow DRCT
to obtain the information at issue absent a release from the
individual whose information would be disclosed.

(Dkt. #147).

DRCT also filed a motion to seal exhibits filed in connection
with its motion to compel, to which the DOC made no response.
(Dkt. #132).

After reviewing the parties’ submissions, DRCT’s

motion to compel information withheld based on medical privacy
considerations is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and DRCT’s
motion to seal is GRANTED.
1

I.

Legal Standard

Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party
to obtain discovery of “any nonprivileged matter that is
relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the
needs of the case.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

Pursuant to Rule

37, “[a] party seeking discovery may move for an order
compelling an answer, designation, production, or inspection.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B).

The party moving to compel

discovery bears the burden of demonstrating “that the requests
are within the scope of Rule 26(b)(1).”

Conservation L. Found.,

Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., No. 3:21-CV-00933 (JAM), 2023 WL 5434760,
at *11 (D. Conn. Aug. 22, 2023).

After the party requesting

discovery has demonstrated relevance according to the
requirements of Rule 26, “the party resisting discovery bears
the burden of showing why discovery should be denied.”

Id.

(quoting Cole v. Towers Perrin Forster & Crosby, 256 F.R.D. 79,
80 (D. Conn. 2009)) (internal citation omitted).
II.

Background and Procedural History

DRCT’s operative complaint alleges that the DOC’s utilization
of in-cell shackling on prisoners with mental illness violates
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act.

(Dkt. #134 at 5-6, dkt. #87).
2

To support these allegations, DRCT sought the complete medical
files of certain prisoners as well as reports that are prepared
by the DOC in response to medical or custody incidents.
#134 at 6-7).

The DOC objected to this production.

(Dkt.

Id. at 6.

The parties resolved the DOC’s objection by allowing DRCT to
obtain mental health and medical releases from certain
prisoners, after which the DOC disclosed the complete prisoner
medical files for the individuals who had signed releases.

Id.

The parties dispute whether this compromise resolved all issues
concerning the production of prisoners’ mental health and
medical information.

The DOC maintains that DRCT agreed in

late-2022 that it would obtain authorizations for the release of
any and all confidential health information.
9).

(Dkt. #147 at 8-

DRCT contends that this agreement only resolved the DOC’s

objection to producing complete prisoner medical files.

(Dkt.

#149 at 11).
To resolve the dispute, DRCT filed the instant motion to
compel on March 22, 2024, which was referred to the undersigned
by the Honorable Kari A. Dooley.

(Dkt. #134, 139).

Between

March 1, 2024 and April 5, 2024, DRCT filed four additional
discovery motions, all of which were referred to the undersigned
by Judge Dooley.
146, 154).

(Dkts. #129, 130, 132, 134, 136, 139, 144,

On May 3, 2024, the parties jointly requested a

status conference, or a stay of all case deadlines pending the
3

resolution of Plaintiff’s outstanding motions.

(Dkt. #153).

The undersigned held a status conference on May 14, 2024.
(Dkts. #155, 160).

At the conclusion of that conference, the

joint request for a stay was granted, and all outstanding
deadlines were stayed pending the Court’s ruling on DRCT’s
discovery motions.

(Dkt. #160).

Shortly thereafter, the undersigned held a hearing on the
pending discovery motions.

(Dkt. #164, 167, 170).

At the

outset of the hearing, the parties reported that they had
resolved three of the five pending motions.

That same day, the

parties filed a joint stipulation reflecting this resolution.
(Dkt. #169).

The joint stipulation resolved DRCT’s Motion to

Compel Responses to DRCT’s Second Set of Interrogatories (dkt.
#129), DRCT’s Motion to Compel Defendants to Produce Witnesses
in Response to DRCT’s Outstanding Deposition Notices (dkt.
#144), and DRCT’s Opposed Motion for an Extension of Time (dkt.
#136).

The undersigned adopted the joint stipulation and denied

the relevant motions as moot without prejudice to refiling as
outlined in the joint stipulation.

(Dkt. #171).

Still pending are DRCT’s Motion to Compel Defendants to
Produce Information Withheld on Medical Privacy Grounds (dkt.
#134) and DRCT’s Motion to Seal exhibits filed in connection
with that motion (dkt. #132).

DRCT’s motion to compel seeks an
4

order compelling the DOC to produce (1) emails and unredacted
versions of emails responsive to DRCT’s email requests, and (2)
information responsive to DRCT’s interrogatories.
5).

(Dkt. #134 at

In its motion, DRCT noted that it had separately moved to

compel the DOC to respond to DRCT’s interrogatories, a dispute
which was subsequently resolved by the parties’ joint
stipulation.

(Dkt. #134 at 5 n.2; dkt. #169 at 2-4).

Accordingly, the information that remains in contention is
information that was redacted from documents produced to DRCT or
contained in documents withheld from DRCT based on the DOC’s
medical privacy objection.
III. Discussion
The DOC raises several objections to the production of the
medical and mental health information at issue.

First, the DOC

contends that DRCT should be estopped from challenging the DOC’s
medical privacy objection because the parties previously
resolved the dispute when DRCT agreed to obtain authorizations
for the release of certain inmates’ medical files.
at 7-10).

(Dkt. #147

Next, the DOC argues that disclosure of the medical

and mental health information at issue is disallowed by the
regulations that govern DRCT’s organization and would violate
the prisoners’ constitutional right to privacy in their
confidential health information and records.
5

Id. at 10-11.

For

the following reasons, the undersigned finds that DRCT is not
estopped from seeking the records at issue.

However, DRCT must

obtain authorizations from inmates to receive their identifying
medical and mental health information in unredacted form.
A. DRCT is not estopped from challenging the DOC’s medical
privacy objection.
First, the DOC argues that DRCT should be estopped from
raising the dispute regarding the redactions given “defendants’
reliance on this resolution in conducting and producing
discovery in this case, including the substantial time and
resources required to redact such confidential health
information in the defendants’ email review and production.”
(Dkt. #147 at 10).

The DOC argues that it will be prejudiced

due to the “substantial time and resources” devoted to redacting
the information of prisoners for whom authorizations were not
provided.

Id.

However, based on the Court’s reading of the materials
submitted by the parties, it is not clear that DRCT agreed to
secure authorizations to obtain access to the information at
issue.

DRCT argues that it agreed to obtain authorizations to

gain access to the full medical files of particular inmates,
even though it took the position that those files could be
produced without an authorization.
6

(Dkt. #134 at 6; dkt. #149

at 11).

The DOC counters that DRCT “backed off” its initial

position and agreed that it had to obtain authorizations for the
release of confidential health information.

(Dkt. #147-1 at 3).

Absent more information, the Court is not able to determine
whether DRCT did or did not maintain the position that it was
not required to secure authorizations but agreed to obtain them
to gain access to the medical files.

If DRCT simply agreed to

secure authorizations to obtain the full medical files, the
undersigned agrees with DRCT that this agreement by itself would
not necessarily waive DRCT’s position with regards to other
discovery materials such as the emails and incident reports at
issue.
In any event, the record does not demonstrate that the DOC
notified DRCT of the extent of the material that the DOC planned
to redact, and that the redactions would withhold confidential
medical information from the other discovery materials for the
inmates who had not authorized disclosure. 1

Had the DOC notified

The parties also briefed this issue in the other, now resolved,
discovery motions. The DOC argued in its objection to DRCT’s motion
for extension of time that the DOC had “indicat[ed] that much of the
time in reviewing and producing emails was caused by the need to
review and redact such privileged health information.” (Dkt. #138 at
16). From the materials submitted to the Court, the communications
regarding the DOC’s delay due to redactions included a February 15,
2024 email from Attorney Rowley stating that “certain emails...can
take substantial time to review depending on...the need for
redactions.” (Dkt. #142-4 at 2). This email did not specify that the
redactions were of privileged health information. A March 12, 2024
letter also referenced that the DOC was taking time to review and
1

7

DRCT that it would be redacting the information at issue, the
parties could have litigated this dispute before the DOC
expended the time and resources to redact the materials.
Therefore, the Court does not agree that the DOC will suffer
prejudice by having to un-redact records for which DRCT receives
an authorization, where the time and resources could have been
saved by fully resolving this issue prior to undertaking the
redactions.
B. Federal law controls the parties’ dispute regarding the
DOC’s medical privacy objection.
In its opposition to DRCT’s motion to compel, the DOC
denied that its medical privacy objection is rooted exclusively
in Connecticut law.

(Dkt. #147 at 5).

During oral argument,

defense counsel again conceded that federal law would control
the dispute regarding its medical privacy objection but argued
that state law may nevertheless be considered by the Court.
DRCT is the designated protection and advocacy system (“P&A
system” or “P&A organization”) for Connecticut pursuant to the
Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act
(“PAIMI Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 10801.

(Dkt. #87 at 4).

P&A systems

like Plaintiff are entitled to access records pursuant to

“redact[] appropriate materials” without specifying the redactions
were of privileged health information. (Dkt. #145-19 at 3).
8

federal law notwithstanding state statutes which would otherwise
preclude disclosure.

For example, in Connecticut Office of

Protection & Advocacy for Persons With Disabilities v. Kirk, 354
F. Supp. 2d 196 (D. Conn. 2005), DRCT’s predecessor organization
brought an action against officials of the State of Connecticut
Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services.

This action

requested that the court order the production of documents
relating to the death of two former residents of the defendant’s
facilities.

Id. at 197.

Defendants resisted production of the

records, arguing that the records were shielded from disclosure
pursuant to state statute.

Id. at 198.

When deciding cross-

motions for summary judgment, the Honorable Dominic J. Squatrito
identified the dispositive issue in the lawsuit as “the
reconciliation of the federal statute providing plaintiff the
authority to gather records to investigate potential abuse or
neglect and the state statute shielding peer review records from
disclosure.”

Id. at 199.

Judge Squatrito concluded that a

P&A’s authority to seek records expressly preempted any state
law to the contrary, and that “the federal scheme will apply
regardless of the laws of the state.”

Id. at 202.

Judge

Squatrito ordered the defendant to produce the records at issue
notwithstanding the fact that they fell under the state statute
that would normally shield them from production.

9

Id.

Even outside the context of P&A systems, “questions about
privilege in federal question cases are resolved by the federal
common law.”

Woodward Governor Co. v. Curtiss Wright Flight

Sys., Inc., 164 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 1999).

While

considerations of federal law control whether DRCT is entitled
to disclosure of the information at issue, “federal courts are
required to take account of the policies embodied in state law
that recognize privileges or other rules of confidentiality.”
Haus v. City of New York, No. 03CIV.4915 RWSMHD, 2006 WL
1148680, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2006).

Holjes v. Lincoln

Nat'l Life Ins. Co., No. 3:21-CV-1277 (VDO), 2024 WL 1131115, at
*3 n.2 (D. Conn. Mar. 15, 2024) (“Although state privilege law
does not govern in a federal question case...state privacy rules
may be considered in any federal case when determining whether
discovery is appropriate.”).

Therefore, while federal law

controls the instant dispute, the policies undergirding
Connecticut laws of privilege or confidentiality may be
considered by the Court.
In its original objection to DRCT’s first set of requests
for production, the DOC pointed to Connecticut law codifying the
privileges that cover communications with psychologists,
psychiatric and mental health providers, physicians, surgeons or
other health care providers, and social workers.

(Dkt. #135-2

at 2) (citing Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-146d(7), 52-146o, 5210

146q(b)).

Additionally, the DOC pointed to special protections

in Connecticut law for medical records that discuss testing,
treatment, or diagnosis of HIV.
19a-583).

Id. (citing Conn. Gen. Stat. §

The Connecticut Supreme Court has noted that the

“principal purpose” behind the privilege against disclosure of
psychiatric communications is “to give the patient an incentive
to make full disclosure to a physician in order to obtain
effective treatment free from the embarrassment and invasion of
privacy which could result from a doctor’s testimony.”
Inst. of Living, 254 Conn. 321, 328 (2000).

Falco v.

This principle

applies to the other privileges regarding communications with
health care providers, which were enacted “to address the need
‘to protect the confidentiality of communications in order to
foster the free exchange of information from patient to
physician....’”

Jarmie v. Troncale, 306 Conn. 578, 607-08

(2012) (quoting Edelstein v. Dept. of Public Health & Addiction
Services, 240 Conn. 658, 666 (1997)).

Similarly, the statute

which protects the confidentiality of medical records concerning
HIV was designed to facilitate treatment of the disease, during
a time when the stigma associated with HIV discouraged
individuals from seeking testing or treatment.

Doe v. Marselle,

236 Conn. 845, 852 (1996) (explaining that the requirements of
informed consent and confidentiality “are aimed at helping
health care providers to identify those people with the disease,
11

to treat them and to educate them in an attempt to put an end to
the epidemic in our state”).

Keeping in mind the Connecticut

public policy favoring full disclosure to health care providers
to encourage and facilitate effective treatment, the Court will
analyze the parties’ arguments according to federal law.
C. The DOC is not entitled to withhold information based on
DRCT’s governing regulations.
The DOC argues that the federal regulations governing DRCT
as a P&A system do not allow for the release of privileged
health information and records without an authorization.
147 at 2).

(Dkt.

In its response to DRCT’s Second Set of

Interrogatories, the DOC pointed to 42 C.F.R, 51.41(c).
According to 42 C.F.R. Section 51.41, “[a] P&A system shall have
access to the records of any of the following individuals with
mental illness: (1) An individual who is a client of the P&A
system if authorized by that individual or the legal guardian,
conservator or other legal representative.”
51.41(b)(1).

42 C.F.R. §

The DOC has not pointed to any cases, and the

Court is aware of none, where this regulation blocked access of
a P&A system to the medical records of its constituents in
discovery.

More often, P&A systems bring actions pursuant to

this regulation to compel other entities to comply with the
regulation and provide medical records.
12

Courts within the Second Circuit have noted that P&A
systems are imbued with statutory authority to pursue remedies
to ensure the protection of their constituents, and that
“[c]learly, the purpose of the statutes weighs in favor of
robust disclosure.”

Disability Rts. New York v. Wise, 171 F.

Supp. 3d 54, 60 (N.D.N.Y. 2016).

In Disability Rights New York

v. Wise, the court “agree[d] with DRNY that the [state agency]
cannot withhold records based on their confidential nature.”
Id. at 61.

See also Prot. & Advoc. For Persons With

Disabilities v. Armstrong, 266 F. Supp. 2d 303, 320 (D. Conn.
2003) (finding P&A system was not required to obtain the consent
of any next of kin to be entitled to the medical records of
inmates who died by suicide).

The regulations that the DOC

contends should limit discovery in this matter are actually
designed to facilitate P&A systems’ access to records in
furtherance of their statutory mandate to “protect and advocate
the rights of [individuals with mental illness] through
activities to ensure the enforcement of the Constitution and
Federal and State statutes; and...investigate incidents of abuse
and neglect of individuals with mental illness...”
10801(b)(2)(A)-(B).

42 U.S.C. §

Therefore, the Court declines to deny

DRCT’s motion on this basis.

13

D. Prisoners subjected to in-cell shackling have a
constitutional right to privacy in their medical and mental
health information. 2
DRCT argues that in cases where a plaintiff advocates on
behalf of “vulnerable third parties, the disclosure of relevant
mental health and medical information is appropriate.”
#134 at 12).

(Dkt.

In support of this argument, DRCT claims that the

DOC has failed to establish that “the constitutional right to
privacy covers any withheld information.”

(Dkt. #149 at 7).

Relying on Matson v. Board of Education of the City School
District of New York, DRCT argues that the Second Circuit has
rejected the proposition that individuals have a broad right to
privacy in medical information.

631 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 2011).

At

oral argument, DRCT contended that the Second Circuit has only
recognized a constitutional right to privacy for an HIV/AIDS
diagnosis and gender identity issues.
DRCT is correct that “[a] general medical determination or
acknowledgment that a disease is serious does not give rise ipso

The parties dispute whether the DOC has waived its objection based on
a constitutional right to privacy. (Dkt. #149 at 6-7; dkt. #147 at 6
n.3). However, even if the Court found that the DOC had failed to
timely raise this objection, failure to object in a timely manner can
be excused for good cause. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4). As the
constitutional right of privacy at issue is the privacy of third
parties who have not been given an opportunity to weigh in on this
dispute, the Court declines to find that this objection has been
waived and will consider the parties’ arguments on the merits.
2

14

facto to a constitutionally-protected privacy right,” and that
the determination that a constitutional right of privacy
attaches to various serious medical conditions “proceed[s] on a
case-by-case basis.”

Matson, 631 F.3d at 65-66.

However, the

Court does not agree that the Second Circuit in Matson cabined
the constitutional right to privacy in medical information only
to HIV/AIDS diagnoses and gender identity issues.

In Matson,

when discussing its decision in O’Connor v. Pierson, 426 F.3d
187 (2d Cir. 2005), the Second Circuit noted that in O’Connor,
it found that “[m]edical information in general, and information
about a person’s psychiatric health and substance-abuse history
in particular, is information of the most intimate kind.”
at 66 (quoting O’Connor, 426 F.3d at 201).

Id.

The court cited

other sources indicating that mental health issues carry the
“public opprobrium” that gives rise to a constitutional right of
privacy.

Id. 3

See also Hancock v. County of Rensselaer, 882

F.3d 58, 66 (2d Cir. 2018) (“We have never held, in Matson or
elsewhere, that only medical records documenting conditions of
sufficient gravity and stigma may qualify for constitutional
privacy protection.”).

Therefore, the medical information at

issue, which includes the mental health scores and diagnoses of

3 Additionally, as the DOC noted during oral argument, the medical
information being withheld from DRCT may very well deal with the
specific issues of HIV/AIDS diagnosis and gender identity which DRCT
concedes would be protected by the constitutional right to privacy.

15

DOC inmates, is protected by the constitutional right of
privacy.
While the prisoners’ mental health and medical information is
protected by the constitutional right of privacy, this right is
not absolute.

Courts have found that where other important

considerations are at issue, and the requisite protections are
in place to ensure that the burden on privacy interests is
minimized, disclosure of protected information may be
appropriate.

For example, both parties point to Doe v. Meachum,

126 F.R.D. 444 (D. Conn. 1989) as supportive of their respective
positions.

Doe was a class action consisting of HIV-positive

inmates in the custody of the Connecticut Department of
Correction.

Plaintiffs in that action moved to compel, inter

alia, the medical and mental health records of absent class
members.

Id. at 448.

The defendants resisted such discovery,

arguing that prior to disclosure of these sensitive records, the
class members must sign consent forms, in the absence of which
the court should “permit only a random selection of redacted
medical records.”

Id. at 448-49.

The court disagreed, finding

that because the records at issue were “sought by professionals
whose purpose it is to protect the constitutional rights of the
plaintiff class,” it was “more important to the interests of
justice that the communications be disclosed, under the strict
parameters set forth in the protective order, than that the
16

relationship between patient and psychologist/psychiatrist be
protected.”

Id. at 450.

In other cases where a party sought discovery that implicated
the privacy rights of non-litigants, but the party seeking the
discovery has brought the underlying lawsuit to vindicate other
rights on behalf of the non-litigants, courts have undertaken a
balancing test to determine whether disclosure of protected
information is appropriate.

For example, Haus v. City of New

York involved a class action brought on behalf of all
individuals arrested during the course of a February 15, 2003
demonstration in Manhattan opposing the impending Iraq War.

No.

03CIV.4915 RWSMHD, 2006 WL 1148680 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2006).
The plaintiffs in Haus sought the arrest records for all people
arrested during the demonstration.

Id. at *1.

Defendants

objected, arguing that pursuant to New York law, arrest records
are to remain under seal and can only be disclosed with the
consent of each non-party arrestee.

Id.

In evaluating this

dispute, the court analyzed other instances in which the privacy
interests of non-litigants were implicated and found that the
appropriate approach was a balancing test, weighing the privacy
rights at issue against the importance of the information to the
litigation and the protections that can be applied to the
information.

Id. at *3-4 (collecting cases).

The court in Haus

ordered the production of the arrest records with the names of
17

the arrestees redacted and other identifying information
deleted.

Id. at 4-5.

Accordingly, to determine whether DRCT’s motion to compel
should be granted, the Court will conduct a balancing test
considering on one hand the intrusion on the privacy interests
of the prisoners and on the other hand the need for the material
to prosecute the litigation, the important rights the litigation
seeks to vindicate, and the procedural protections that can be
imposed to minimize the burden on the prisoners’ privacy
interests.
E. DRCT must obtain signed authorizations to obtain the
medical and mental health information that the DOC has
withheld based on its privacy objection.
Where a case “involves significant issues specially affecting
the public interest,” that fact will weigh in favor of
disclosure.

Lora v. Bd. of Ed. of City of New York, 74 F.R.D.

565, 579 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).

In Lora, the Honorable Jack B.

Weinstein noted that “[o]nly strong countervailing public
policies should be permitted to prevent disclosure when, as
here, a suit is brought to redress a claim for violation of
civil rights under the Constitution.”

Id.

Here, DRCT alleges

that the DOC’s practices of in-cell shackling unfairly impacts
prisoners with mental illness in violation of the Eighth and
18

Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, Title
II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act.

(Dkt. #134 at 5-6).

Therefore, the

importance of the rights that DRCT seeks to vindicate in this
litigation weighs in favor of disclosure.

Additionally, the

ability of the Court to impose a protective order on the
information at issue also weighs in favor of disclosure, because
the burden on the privacy interests of the non-litigants can be
minimized by imposing an “attorney’s-eyes only” restriction on
the unredacted records.
However, the potential intrusion on the privacy interests of
the prisoners who have been subjected to in-cell shackling
weighs against disclosure.

As identified by DRCT, the

information being withheld includes the names and other
identifying information of persons with mental illness that have
been subjected to in-cell shackling, their mental health status,
and other medical information contained in in-cell shackling
descriptions and reports.

(Dkt. #134 at 7).

This information

is clearly sensitive, and as previously discussed, the Second
Circuit has recognized that “information about a person’s
psychiatric health...is information of the most intimate kind.”
O'Connor v. Pierson, 426 F.3d 187, 201 (2d Cir. 2005).

As the

potential intrusion on the privacy interests of the prisoners is
significant, DRCT must show that without the information it
19

seeks, DRCT will be unable to adequately prosecute the
litigation and vindicate the prisoners’ other important rights.
See Lora v. Bd. of Ed. of City of New York, 74 F.R.D. 565, 584
(E.D.N.Y. 1977) (“While the impact of disclosure on the state
and personal interests implicated is legally insignificant, even
such minimal intrusion might be sufficient ground for denying
discovery if plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate a genuine need
for the material...”).
At oral argument, DRCT argued that access to the unredacted
information is critical because the names of the inmates
subjected to in-cell shackling may help DRCT’s experts identify
individuals with whom they would like to speak and allow its
experts to connect multiple documents in the case to fully
evaluate the impact of shackling on prisoners.

In response, the

DOC argues that DRCT has been provided sufficient information to
prove its claims.

(Dkt. #147 at 14).

Based on the

representations of the parties, DRCT has been provided with a
significant amount of material, including the full medical files
and unredacted incident reports for the inmates from whom they
have procured authorizations.

Additionally, according to

counsel’s representations during oral argument, DRCT’s experts
have been able to speak directly with inmates during recent
visits to DOC facilities.

20

However, the fact that weighs most heavily against an order
compelling the DOC to provide the information without
authorizations is that DRCT appears to have been provided
sufficient information to obtain the authorizations without
significant expense.

In its objection, the DOC noted that it

has provided DRCT with a list of inmates placed in in-cell
restraints during an agreed upon time frame.

(Dkt. #147 at 4).

The list includes the name, inmate number, and current location
of each inmate.

Id.

During oral argument, the DOC noted that

DRCT may write letters to the inmates who are identified on the
list to request a signed authorization.

The DOC argued that

this would not be particularly burdensome for DRCT.
DRCT did not respond to this assertion.

Counsel for

Absent any indication

to the contrary, the Court sees no reason why DRCT is not able
to mail a form letter to the inmates on the list explaining the
litigation and DRCT’s request for a signed authorization.
Considering the privacy interests at stake, the fact that DRCT
is already in possession of a significant amount of discovery
relevant to their claims, and DRCT has the information necessary
to obtain authorization through mailed correspondence, the Court
declines to compel the disclosure of the information at issue
absent a signed authorization.

The Court has discretion

pursuant to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
limit discovery that is cumulative or duplicative.
21

Pursuant to

this discretion, the Court finds that the relative utility of
the information sought by DRCT does not justify an order
compelling the production of sensitive health information
without the consent of the individual whose information would be
disclosed.
F. The exhibits filed in connection with the motion to compel
may remain under seal.
Lastly, DRCT has filed a motion to seal Exhibits 9-13 of
Attorney Shaun deLacy’s declaration in support of DRCT’s instant
motion to compel.

(Dkt. #132).

A strong presumption against

sealing court records arises from the public’s right to access
court records and proceedings.

This presumption is “rooted in

both the common law and the First Amendment.”

Travelers Indem.

Co. v. Excalibur Reins. Corp., No. 3:11-cv-1209 (CSH), 2013 WL
4012772, at *2 (D. Conn. Aug. 5, 2013) (citing Nixon v. Warner
Commc’ns Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597–98 (1978)).

However, the right

of public access is not absolute, and can be overcome by
countervailing considerations.

Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of

Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal citations
omitted).

Additionally, materials submitted in connection with

non-dispositive motions, including discovery motions, are
entitled to a weaker but “still substantial” presumption of
public access.

In re Arida, LLC, No. 19- MC-522 (PKC), 2020 WL
22

8513844, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2020) (citing Brown v.
Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41, 49-50, 53 (2d Cir. 2019)).
“The burden of demonstrating that a document submitted to a
court should be sealed rests on the party seeking such action.”
DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 826 (2d Cir.
1997).

In this District, Rule 5(e)(3) of the Local Rules of

Civil Procedure requires that an order to seal documents that
are entitled to a presumption of public access must be
accompanied by “particularized findings demonstrating that
sealing is supported by clear and compelling reasons and is
narrowly tailored to serve those reasons.”

D. Conn. L. Civ. R.

5(e)(3).
DRCT’s motion to seal advises the Court that the exhibits
attached to its motion to compel have been designated as
“Confidential” under the operative protective order, and that
Exhibit 13 contains non-public mental health and medical
information.

(Dkt. #132 at 1).

The exhibits at issue are

judicial documents because they are “relevant to the performance
of the judicial function and useful in the judicial process.”
Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 119.

However, as the documents are subject

to a relatively lower presumption of public access, and because
they contain personally identifying information in connection
with non-public mental health and medical information, the
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privacy interests at stake overcome the presumption of public
access.

The request to seal the documents is narrowly tailored

to protect those interests.

Accordingly, Exhibits 9-13 of

Attorney Shaun deLacy’s declaration in support of DRCT’s motion
to compel (dkt. #133) will remain under seal.
IV.

Conclusion

This is not a Recommended Ruling.

This is a discovery ruling

or order which is reviewable pursuant to the “clearly erroneous”
statutory standard of review.

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 72(a); D. Conn. L. R. 72.2.

As such, it is an order of

the Court unless reversed or modified by a district judge upon
motion timely made.
SO ORDERED this 28th day of August, 2024 at Hartford,
Connecticut.
_________/s/___________________
Robert A. Richardson
United States Magistrate Judge

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