Bellemare v. Saul

Filing 24

ORDER. For the reasons stated in the attached Order, plaintiff's 22 Motion for Attorney Fees under EAJA is GRANTED, for the agreed upon amount of $6,580.13. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Sarah A. L. Merriam on 7/29/2022. (Katz, S.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
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:
RONALD B.
:
:
v.
:
:
COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL
:
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
:
:
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Civ. No. 3:21CV000381(SALM)

July 29, 2022

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES PURSUANT TO THE EQUAL
ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT [Doc. #22]
Plaintiff Ronald B. (“plaintiff”) filed an application for
Disability Insurance Benefits on October 26, 2018. See Certified
Transcript of the Administrative Record, Doc. #12, compiled on
June 9, 2021, (hereinafter “Tr.”) at 215-16. Plaintiff’s
application was denied initially on March 25, 2019, see Tr. 10810, and upon reconsideration on January 14, 2020. See Tr. 11724.
On June 11, 2020, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
Alexander Borré held a hearing, at which plaintiff appeared by
telephone with his former counsel, Attorney Mark Wawer. See
generally Tr. 31-64. On July 15, 2020, the ALJ issued an
unfavorable decision. See Tr. 12-29. On January 19, 2021, the
Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review of the
ALJ’s decision, thereby making the ALJ’s July 15, 2020, decision
the final decision of the Commissioner. See Tr. 1-6. Plaintiff,
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represented by Attorney Olia Yelner, timely appealed that
decision to this Court on March 19, 2021. [Doc. #1].
On July 8, 2021, after having sought and received an
extension of time, defendant filed the official transcript. See
Docs. #10, #11, #12. On October 7, 2021, after having sought and
received an extension of time, plaintiff filed a Motion to
Reverse the Decision of the Commissioner. See Docs. #13, #14,
#15. On December 6, 2021, defendant filed a Motion to Affirm the
Decision of the Commissioner. See Doc. #19. On April 25, 2022,
the Court denied defendant’s motion to affirm, and granted
plaintiff’s motion to reverse, to the extent plaintiff sought a
remand for further administrative proceedings. See Doc. #20.
Judgment entered for plaintiff on April 26, 2022. [Doc. #21].
On July 19, 2022, plaintiff filed a Motion for Attorney’s
Fees Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”),
seeking payment of fees in the amount of $6,580.13. See Doc. #22
(hereinafter the “Motion for Attorney’s Fees”). Plaintiff also
filed a document reflecting the “Itemization of Time Spent by
Olia Yelner in 2021-2022[.]” Doc. #22-1. On July 26, 2022,
defendant filed a Stipulation for Allowance of Fees Under the
Equal Access to Justice Act (“Stipulation”). See Doc. #23. The
Stipulation states that the parties “agree and stipulate that
Plaintiff shall be awarded attorney fees in the amount of
$6,580.13 under” EAJA “in full and final satisfaction (upon
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payment) of any and all claims under the EAJA for fees,
expenses, and costs.” Doc. #23 at 1.
Although the parties have reached an agreement as to the
appropriate award of fees in this matter, the Court is obligated
to review the record and determine whether the proposed award is
reasonable. “[T]he determination of a reasonable fee under the
EAJA is for the court rather than the parties by way of
stipulation.” Pribek v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
717 F. Supp. 73, 75 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) (citation and quotation
marks omitted); see also Rogers v. Colvin, No. 4:13CV00945(TMC),
2014 WL 630907, at *1 (D.S.C. Feb. 18, 2014); Design & Prod.,
Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 145, 152 (1990) (holding that
under the EAJA, “it is the court’s responsibility to
independently assess the appropriateness and measure of
attorney’s fees to be awarded in a particular case, whether or
not an amount is offered as representing the agreement of the
parties in the form of a proposed stipulation”). The Court
therefore has reviewed the itemization of time expended by
Attorney Yelner to determine whether the agreed upon fee amount
is reasonable.
For the reasons set forth herein, the Court GRANTS
plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees [Doc. #22], for the
agreed upon amount of $6,580.13.

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DISCUSSION
A party who prevails in a civil action against the United
States may seek an award of fees and costs under the EAJA, 28
U.S.C. §2412, the purpose of which is “to eliminate for the
average person the financial disincentive to challenging
unreasonable government actions.” Commissioner, I.N.S. v. Jean,
496 U.S. 154, 163 (1990) (citing Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S.
877, 883 (1989)). In order for an award of attorney’s fees to
enter, this Court must find (1) that plaintiff is a prevailing
party, (2) that the Commissioner’s position was without
substantial justification, (3) that no special circumstances
exist that would make an award unjust, and (4) that the fee
petition was filed within thirty days of final judgment. See 28
U.S.C. §2412(d)(1)(B).
Plaintiff’s counsel claims fees for: 5.7 hours of attorney
work at the 2020 rate of $209.54 per hour; 23.8 hours of
attorney work at the 2021 rate of $217.72 per hour; and 0.9
hours of attorney work at the 2022 rate of $226.67 per hour. See
Doc. #22-1 at 1-2; see also Doc. #22 at 1. The parties have
reached an agreement under which defendant would pay $6,580.13
in fees, which is the entirety of the attorney time sought. It
is plaintiff’s burden to establish entitlement to a fee award,
and the Court has the discretion to determine what fee is
“reasonable.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 437
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(1983) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. §1988, which allows a “prevailing
party” to recover “a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the
costs”).1 This Court has a duty to review Attorney Yelner’s fee
itemization to determine the reasonableness of the hours
requested and to exclude hours “that are excessive, redundant,
or otherwise unnecessary[.]” Id. at 434. “Determining a
‘reasonable attorney’s fee’ is a matter that is committed to the
sound discretion of a trial judge.” J.O. v. Astrue, No.
3:11CV01768(DFM), 2014 WL 1031666, at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 14,
2014) (quoting Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 558 (2010)).
The Court finds that plaintiff has satisfied the
requirements of 28 U.S.C. §2412(d)(1)(B), and that an award of
fees may enter. Specifically, the Court finds that: (1)
plaintiff is a prevailing party in light of the Court ordering a
remand of this matter for further administrative proceedings;
(2) the Commissioner’s position was without substantial
justification; (3) on the current record, no special
circumstances exist that would make an award unjust; and (4) the
fee petition was timely filed. 2 See 28 U.S.C. §2412(d)(1)(B). The
Court next turns to the reasonableness of the fees sought.

The “standards set forth in [Hensley] are generally applicable
in all cases in which Congress has authorized an award of fees
to a ‘prevailing party.’” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 n.7.
2 The request for attorney’s fees is timely because it was filed
within thirty days after the time to appeal the final judgment
had expired. See Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 96 (1991)
1

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In this case, plaintiff’s counsel seeks payment for a total
of 30.4 hours of attorney time. See Doc. #22 at 1. The
administrative transcript in this case was comprised of 1,142
pages and plaintiff’s counsel, who did not represent plaintiff
at the administrative level, submitted a thorough and wellreasoned brief. See generally Doc. #15. The Court finds the
attorney time reasonable for the work claimed, including: review
of the administrative transcript [Doc. #12]; preparation of the
motion to reverse and supporting memorandum [Docs. #15, #15-1];
and preparation of the statement of material facts [Doc. #15-2].
Cf. Rodriguez v. Astrue, No. 3:08CV00154(JCH)(HBF), 2009 WL
6319262, at *3 (D. Conn. Sept. 3, 2009) (“Relevant factors to
weigh include the size of the administrative record, the
complexity of the factual and legal issues involved, counsel’s
experience, and whether counsel represented the claimant during
the administrative proceedings.” (quotation marks and multiple

(“[A] ‘final judgment’ for purposes of 28 U.S.C. §2412(d)(1)(B)
means a judgment rendered by a court that terminates the civil
action for which EAJA fees may be received. The 30–day EAJA
clock begins to run after the time to appeal that ‘final
judgment’ has expired.”). “The notice of appeal may be filed by
any party within 60 days after entry of the judgment” in cases
where, as here, one of the parties is “a United States officer
or employee sued in an official capacity[.]” Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(1)(B), (B)(iii). In this case, the 30-day EAJA clock would
begin to run on June 27, 2022, 60 days after judgment for
plaintiff entered. The Motion for Attorney’s Fees was filed on
July 19, 2022, before the expiration of the filing deadline on
July 27, 2022. See Doc. #22.
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citations omitted)); see also Lechner v. Barnhart, 330 F. Supp.
2d 1005, 1012 (E.D. Wis. 2004); cf. Barbour v. Colvin, 993 F.
Supp. 2d 284, 291 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). The Court further finds that
the 30.4 hours claimed in attorney time is reasonable because
“[c]ourts throughout the Second Circuit have consistently found
that routine Social Security cases require, on average, between
[twenty] and [forty] hours of attorney time to prosecute.”
Poulin v. Astrue, No. 3:10CV01930(JBA)(JGM), 2012 WL 264579, at
*3 (D. Conn. Jan. 27, 2012) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Accordingly, the Court finds that the claimed time is
reasonable, particularly in light of the parties’ agreement,
which adds weight to the claim that the fee award claimed is
reasonable. Therefore, an award of $6,580.13 in fees is
appropriate, and the Court GRANTS plaintiff’s Motion for
Attorney’s Fees [Doc. #22], for the agreed upon amount of
$6,580.13.
It is so ordered at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 29th day
of July 2022.
____/s/__ ____ ____________
HON. SARAH A. L. MERRIAM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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