Quezada v. Waterbury Police Dept et al

Filing 76

ORDER: Defendants City of Waterbury, Jeffrey Hamel and Fernando Lucas's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 64 ) is hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED in part for the reasons set forth in the attached document. The claim in the First Count against Sergeant Jeffrey Hamel in his official capacity is dismissed without prejudice, and the motion is otherwise being denied. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 8/29/2024.(Mata, E.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
---------------------------------x
AVIS QUEZADA,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
: Civil No. 3:22-cv-00077 (AWT)
:
CITY OF WATERBURY, SGT. JEFFREY :
HAMEL, and OFC. FERNADO LUCAS,
:
:
:
Defendants.
:
:
---------------------------------x
ORDER RE MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Avis Quezada (“Quezada”) filed this action on
January 14, 2022 against defendants City of Waterbury, Sergeant
Jeffrey Hamel (“Hamel”), and Officer Fernando Lucas (“Lucas”).
The claim against defendant Hamel is against him in his official
and individual capacities, and the claims against defendant
Lucas are against him in his individual capacity. The Third
Amended Complaint has six counts, and the defendants have moved
for partial summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below,
the defendants’ motion is being granted in part and denied in
part.
I.

LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate only where “there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)
(“[R]ule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment . . .
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial.”).
“The party seeking summary judgment has the burden to
demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists.”
Marvel Characters v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 286 (2d Cir 2002). An
issue is “genuine . . . if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A
fact is material if it would “affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing law”. Id.
When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court
must respect the province of the jury, and therefore may not try
issues of fact. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Donahue v.
Windsor Locks Bd. of Fire Comm’rs, 834 F.2d 54, 58 (2d Cir.
1987); Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., 22 F.3d 1219,
1224 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he trial court’s task at the summary
judgment motion stage of the litigation is carefully limited to
discerning whether there are any genuine issues of material fact
to be tried, not to deciding them.”). In determining whether a
- 2 -

genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must “assess
the record in the light most favorable to the non-movant and . .
. draw all reasonable inferences in [his] favor.” Weinstock v.
Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 2000) (ellipsis in
original) (quoting Delaware & Hudson Ry. Co. v. Consolidated
Rail Corp., 902 F.2d 174, 177 (2d Cir. 1990)).
II.

DISCUSSION
A. First Count: 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Fourteenth Amendment Violation
1. Hamel

The defendants move to dismiss the section 1983 claim
against Sergeant Jeffrey Hamel in his official capacity on the
grounds that it is duplicative of the plaintiff’s section 1983
claim against the City of Waterbury.
“[O]fficial-capacity suits generally represent only another
way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer
is an agent”. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New
York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 n.55 (1987). “[A]n official-capacity
suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a
suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166
(1985). Thus, this claim is duplicative.
The plaintiff argues that special circumstances justify
keeping both the Town of Waterbury and Hamel in his official
capacity as defendants. The plaintiff maintains that “[a]s the

- 3 -

primary agent controlling the lockup, the injunctive relief
sought by plaintiff is directed at Sergeant Hamel.” Pl.’s Opp’n
(ECF No. 69) at 5. However, the Third Amended Complaint requests
an “injunction that defendant Waterbury change its custom,
practice, and policy at the Holding Facility . . . .” Third Am.
Compl. (ECF No. 53) at 9. The plaintiff has not shown that it is
necessary to also name Hamel in his official capacity for
purposes of any injunctive relief. The plaintiff also argues
that “jurisdiction over Sergeant Hamel was never contested,
while defendants did assert lack of jurisdiction over the Town
of Waterbury premised upon a failure of service.” Pl.’s Opp’n
(ECF No. 69) at 6. However, both the City of Waterbury and Hamel
were first served on August 25, 2023. See ECF No. 56.
Therefore, the claim against defendant Hamel in his
official capacity is being dismissed, without prejudice, as
duplicative.
2. City of Waterbury
The City of Waterbury contends that it is entitled to
summary judgment on the plaintiff’s conditions of confinement
Monell claim. The defendants argue that first, the plaintiff
cannot establish a Constitutional violation, and second, even if
the plaintiff could establish a Constitutional violation, he
cannot establish that the Constitutional violation was caused by
a custom, policy, or practice of the City of Waterbury.
- 4 -

“A pretrial detainee may establish a § 1983 claim for
allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement by showing
that the officers acted with deliberate indifference to the
challenged conditions.” Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F. 3d 17, 29 (2d
Cir. 2017). “This means that a pretrial detainee must satisfy
two prongs to prove a claim . . . .” Id. With respect to the
first, or objective, prong the plaintiff must prove “that the
challenged conditions were sufficiently serious to constitute
objective deprivations of the right to due process”. Id. at 29.
With respect to the second, or subjective, prong the plaintiff
“must prove that the defendant-official acted intentionally to
impose the alleged condition, or recklessly failed to act with
reasonable care to mitigate the risk that the condition posed to
the pretrial detainee even though the defendant-official knew,
or should have known, that the condition posed an excessive risk
to health or safety.” Id. at 35.
The plaintiff has created genuine issues of material fact
as to both prongs. With respect to the first prong, he has
proffered evidence with respect to unsanitary conditions,
extreme temperatures, inadequate nutrition and failure to
administer medication, which must be analyzed in combination,
not in isolation. With respect to the second prong, the court
agrees with the plaintiff that

- 5 -

there are material issues of fact regarding at least (1)
complaints by plaintiff and other detainees, (2) failure to
follow written protocols, (3) the impact of COVID on
cleaning the cells, (4) the failure to provide
prescriptions as standard operating procedure, (5) the
timing of food, (6) the quality of the food, (7) the
quality of water, and (8) the lack of bedding,
clothing, soap, toilet privacy, or even a mattress.
Pl.’s Opp’n (ECF No. 69) at 13.
The City of Waterbury contends that the plaintiff has not
provided evidence that any Constitutional violation was caused
by a policy, custom, or practice on its part. It does not
provide any analysis in support of this assertion. In any event,
the plaintiff has created a genuine issue of material fact with
respect to this element of his claim. See Pl.’s Local R.
56(a)(2) Statement (ECF No. 69-1) at 9-10 para. 3.
Therefore, the motion for summary judgment on this claim is
being denied.
B. Second Count: 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Excessive Force Claim Against Lucas
The defendants do not move for summary judgment on this
claim but rather, contend that the count contains “failure to
protect allegations”, and they “request an affirmative ruling
from the Court dismissing any intended or unintended failure to
protect claim brought by the Plaintiff.” Defs.’ Mem. (ECF No.
64-1) at 22. This request is being denied because such an
affirmative ruling would be duplicative. The plaintiff has made
it clear that “plaintiff is not pursuing a claim of failure to
- 6 -

protect.” Pl.’s Opp’n (ECF No. 69) at 13. The fact that factual
allegations could be made in support of a claim for failure to
protect does not mean that they cannot also be made in support
of some other claim, even if they are not essential for purposes
of stating a claim upon which relief may be granted.
C. Third Count: Assault and Battery Against Lucas
The defendants renew the argument, made in their motion to
dismiss, that the section 1983 excessive force claim and the
assault and battery claim are duplicative because
regardless of whether
element of an assault
battery claim against
contains the implicit
acting under color of

under color
and battery
an on-duty,
requirement
state law.

of state law is a named
claim, an assault and
in-uniform police officer
that the officer was

Defs.’ Mem. (ECF No. 64-1) at 23.
The motion for summary judgment on this claim is being
denied based on the analysis set forth in the Ruling on Motion
to Dismiss (ECF No. 50).
D. Fourth Count: Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress Against Lucas
The Fourth Count is a claim against Officer Fernando Lucas
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendants
move for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff has not
submitted “evidence that he has suffered severe emotional
distress.” Defs.’ Mem. (ECF No. 64-1) at 26. As set forth in the
plaintiff’s opposition, genuine issues of material fact exist as

- 7 -

to whether the plaintiff suffered emotional distress that was
sufficient to support a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
Therefore, the motion for summary judgment on this claim is
being denied.
E. Fifth Count: Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress Against Lucas
The Fifth Count is a claim against Officer Fernando Lucas
for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
The defendants argue that “dismissal of Plaintiff’s NIED
claim is warranted in light of plaintiff’s failure to adduce any
evidence which proves that the imminent harm exception applies
to the alleged altercation with Officer Lucas at St. Mary’s
Hospital.” Defs.’ Mem. (ECF No. 64-1) at 28. They maintain that
the imminent harm exception only applies in “scenarios involving
a failure to act that subjects an identifiable person to
imminent harm at the hands of some third party.” Id. at 29.
The plaintiffs cite to authority to the contrary. In
response to what appears to be conflicting precedent, the
defendants merely state that “[a]lthough the prevailing case law
does not explicitly state that there must be a failure to act in
order for the imminent harm exception to apply, there are
nonetheless cases where the court’s analysis focused on a public
officer’s failure to act.” Id. at 30.

- 8 -

This is an issue where the court may find helpful
supplemental briefing and/or certification of a question to the
Connecticut Supreme Court. Therefore, the motion for summary
judgment on this claim is being denied without prejudice.
F. Sixth Count: Indemnification
Against the City of Waterbury
The Sixth Count is a claim against the City of Waterbury
for indemnification pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes §
7-465.
The defendants argue that the plaintiff failed to give the
City timely notice of his claim for indemnification. Section 7465 provides, in relevant part:
No action for personal physical injuries or damages to real
or personal property shall be maintained against such
municipality and employee jointly unless . . . written
notice of the intention to commence such action and of the
time when and the place where the damages were incurred or
sustained has been filed with the clerk of such
municipality within six months after such cause of action
has accrued.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-465(a).
Thus, by its terms, this provision applies to actions for
personal physical injuries or damages to real or personal
property. In Cheshire v. Ledge Light Health Dist., No. 543535,
1998 WL 242512, (Conn. Super. Ct. May 5, 1998), the court held:
Regarding the notice requirement of the statute, it
requires notice if the action is for personal physical
injuries or property damage. The court finds that this is
not such an action. . . . [T]he statute clearly does not
require notice for a “civil rights” action or any action
- 9 -

other than one for personal physical injury or property
damage.
Id. at *1. See also Hall v. Gallo, No. 030476708, 2008 WL
2796950, at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 25, 2008)(“The statute,
however, does not require notice for civil rights actions.”).
Similarly, in Armao v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 917 F. Supp. 142,
143-44 (D. Conn. 1996), the court concluded that “Plaintiff’s
state law claims against the Town . . . are barred because he
failed to give the Town written notice of his intention to
commence an action against the Town within six months after the
cause of action accrued as required by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-465.
His federal civil rights claim against the Town pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 is not barred by his failure to comply with the
state statute.”
Therefore, the motion for summary judgment on this claim is
being denied.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants City of
Waterbury, Jeffrey Hamel and Fernando Lucas’s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 64) is hereby GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part. The claim in the First Count against Sergeant
Jeffrey Hamel in his official capacity is dismissed without
prejudice, and the motion is otherwise being denied.

- 10 -

It is so ordered.
Dated this 29th day of August, at Hartford, Connecticut.
/s/AWT
——————————————————————————————
Alvin W. Thompson
United States District Judge

- 11 -