Reid v. Connecticut et al

Filing 8

ORDER. For the reasons set forth in the attached Order, this matter is hereby DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Clerk shall close this case. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Sarah A. L. Merriam on 7/29/2022. (Teague, J.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
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:
DONNA REID
:
:
v.
:
:
STATE OF CONNECTICUT, JUDGE
:
MATTHEW J. BUDZIK, JUDGE
:
SUSAN QUINN COBB, ATTORNEY
:
ADAM L. AVALLONE and ATTORNEY :
MICHELLE BIBEAU
:
:
------------------------------X

Civ. No. 3:22CV00912(SALM)

July 29, 2022

ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff has filed a Complaint naming five defendants:
the State of Connecticut, two Connecticut Superior Court Judges,
and two private attorneys. See Doc. #1 at 1. The Court orders
this matter DISMISSED, as lacking subject matter jurisdiction.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See U.S.
Const., Art. III, §2, cl. 1. It is “the obligation of a court,
on its own motion, to inquire as to subject matter jurisdiction
and satisfy itself that such jurisdiction exists.” Da Silva v.
Kinsho Int’l Corp., 229 F.3d 358, 361 (2d Cir. 2000); see also
Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 501 (2006) (“[Federal]
courts ... have an independent obligation to determine whether
subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a
challenge from any party.”). “A federal court is obligated to

inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte at the
earliest opportunity to determine whether such jurisdiction
exists.” Gonzalez v. Ocwen Home Loan Servicing, 74 F. Supp. 3d
504, 510 (D. Conn. 2015), aff’d sub nom. Gonzalez v. Deutsche
Bank Nat. Tr. Co., 632 F. App’x 32 (2d Cir. 2016). “If the court
determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(h)(3).
The Court has reviewed the Complaint to assess whether
subject matter jurisdiction has been established. The Complaint
asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 and under state law,
asserting “Depravation of Civil Right Under Color of Law,
conspiracy to commit real estate deed fraud, and forgery.” Doc.
#1 at 1 (sic). The gravamen of the Complaint, however, is a
challenge to the validity of a state court foreclosure judgment.
See id. at 10-11. Plaintiff describes the filing of “the
foreclosure complaint” by the attorney defendants, and contends
that the statute relied upon in that complaint is invalid. Id.
at 5. Plaintiff contends that the foreclosure process violated
her due process rights “by using an unfair court process[.]” Id.
at 13. As relief, plaintiff demands damages arising from the
allegedly “wrongful foreclosure,” id.
The Court takes judicial notice of the docket in the

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Connecticut Superior Court foreclosure matter identified in the
Complaint, Docket No. HHD-CV20-6128384-S, a foreclosure action
by U.S. Bank, N.A. against plaintiff here, Donna Reid, and
others. A Judgment of Strict Foreclosure was entered in that
matter on February 28, 2022. See id. at Docket Entry 112.86.
Plaintiff here plainly seeks to challenge the foreclosure
judgment in the Connecticut Superior Court. The Second Circuit
has repeatedly concluded that the federal district courts
generally lack jurisdiction over foreclosure actions, and
collateral challenges thereto, under various jurisdictional and
abstention doctrines, including the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. See
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923); Gonzalez
v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., 632 F. App’x 32 (2d Cir. 2016)
(summary order).
“Under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, federal district courts
lack jurisdiction over cases that essentially amount to appeals
of state court judgments.” Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home
Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423, 426 (2d Cir. 2014). “It is well
settled that judgments of foreclosure are fundamentally matters
of state law.” Woermer v. Hirsh, No. 3:18CV01898(KAD), 2018 WL
7572237, at *3 (D. Conn. Dec. 11, 2018) (citation and quotation
marks omitted). Thus, “[c]ourts in this Circuit consistently
find that a plaintiff who lost possession of his home in a state

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court foreclosure proceeding is barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine from attacking the state court judgment in federal
district court.” De Fries v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No.
3:20CV01882(MPS)(SALM), 2021 WL 1890296, at *2 (D. Conn. May 11,
2021) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Ashby v.
Polinsky, 328 F. App’x 20, 21 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that the
Rooker–Feldman doctrine precluded plaintiff’s attempt to relitigate a state court foreclosure judgment in federal court);
Garvin v. Bank of N.Y., 227 F. App’x 7, 8 (2d Cir. 2007); Rene
v. Citibank NA, 32 F. Supp. 2d 539, 543 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (“The
claims raised in the ... Complaint implicate the propriety of
the state judgment of foreclosure and eviction -- the very
issues apparently decided by the state court. Because the
Rooker–Feldman doctrine compels a federal court to give full
faith and credit to the judgments of state courts, see 28 U.S.C.
§1738, this Court is without subject matter jurisdiction to hear
this case.”).
This “Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain a
challenge to a state court judgment of foreclosure, however
creatively cloaked.” US Bank Tr., N.A. v. Krondes, No.
3:21CV01578(SALM), 2021 WL 5578090, at *2 (D. Conn. Nov. 30,
2021) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff’s
claims, while “creatively cloaked” in terms of due process,

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forgery, and fraud, amount to an attack on the foreclosure
judgment entered by the Connecticut Superior Court. Indeed,
plaintiff even contends that she “filed her notice of removal”
to transfer the foreclosure action to District Court. Doc. #1 at
6.1 The Court therefore lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff’s
claims.
The Court notes, moreover, that each of the defendants
named would be immune from suit. Plaintiff asserts claims
against the State of Connecticut; however, “absent waiver by the
State or a valid congressional override, the Eleventh Amendment
bars a damages action against a State in federal court.”
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985). Sovereign immunity
therefore deprives the court of “federal jurisdiction over suits
against nonconsenting States.” Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528
U.S. 62, 73 (2000); see also Brewer v. Brewer, 34 Fed. App’x 28,
29-30 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that the plaintiff’s “First
Amendment claims against the State of New York pursuant to §1983
are barred by the Eleventh Amendment since New York State has

No removal notice of this action has been filed in the District
of Connecticut, according to a review of the ECF system by the
undersigned today. If a notice of removal of a foreclosure
action were filed, however, the matter would be promptly
remanded to the Superior Court. See, e.g., Krondes, 2021 WL
5578090, at *3 (“The Clerk of Court is directed to remand this
matter to the Florida court immediately, the provisions of Local
Rule 83.7 notwithstanding.”).
1

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not consented to be sued”). Plaintiff also asserts claims
against two Connecticut Superior Court Judges, based on their
rulings in the foreclosure action. See Doc. #1 at 1. A Judge is
generally “entitled to absolute immunity from damages for
actions performed in his [or her] judicial capacity.” Fields v.
Soloff, 920 F.2d 1114, 1119 (2d Cir. 1990). As a result, “this
Court may, sua sponte, dismiss a complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, based on a finding of judicial immunity.”
Miller v. Cnty. of Nassau, 467 F. Supp. 2d 308, 312 (E.D.N.Y.
2006). Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts that judicial immunity is
inapplicable here because “the judge lacks immunity when he/she
violates the law[.]” Doc. #1 at 14. Plaintiff does not contend,
however, that either Superior Court Judge was acting outside the
scope of her or his judicial capacity. It therefore appears that
the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s
claims against the Superior Court Judges, because those Judges
are entitled to judicial immunity. Finally, plaintiff asserts
claims against two private attorneys based on their actions in
the foreclosure case. “Connecticut courts recognize a litigation
privilege which grants absolute immunity to ‘all participants in
judicial proceedings, including judges, attorneys, parties, and
witnesses’ from claims arising out of the information they
provide in connection with judicial and quasi-judicial

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proceedings.” Cleary v. Bonjour, No. 3:17CV01957(VLB), 2018 WL
2390140, at *3 (D. Conn. May 25, 2018), aff’d sub nom. Cleary v.
MacVicar, 813 F. App’x 12 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting MacDermid,
Inc. v. Leonetti, 79 A.3d 60, 67-68 (Conn. 2013)); see also
Weldon v. MTAG Servs, LLC, No. 3:16CV00783(JCH), 2017 WL 776648,
at *10 (D. Conn. Feb. 28, 2017) (noting that federal courts
“routinely apply the state’s litigation privilege to claims that
challenge representations made in underlying state court
litigation”). Plaintiff’s claims against the private defendants
therefore appear to be barred by Connecticut’s litigation
privilege.
In sum, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
this action because “[t]he Court does not have jurisdiction to
entertain a challenge to a state court judgment of foreclosure,
however creatively cloaked.” Krondes, 2021 WL 5578090, at *2
(citation and quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, even if
this matter were not, at its core, an improper challenge to a
state court judgment of foreclosure, it appears that each
defendant in this action is immune from suit.
Accordingly, this matter is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.

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It is so ordered this 29th day of July, 2022, at Bridgeport,
Connecticut.
__/s/___
Hon. Sarah A. L. Merriam
United States District Judge

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