Young v. Reis

Filing 24

ORDER granting 10 MOTION to Dismiss. In accordance with the attached ruling, the court hereby grants Respondent's motion to dismiss the petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Clerk of Court is directed to please terminate this case from the courts docket. Signed by Judge Omar A. Williams on 3/18/2023. (Mamillapalli, S.).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

JAMES KEITH YOUNG,
Petitioner,
v.
JENNIFER REIS,
Respondent.

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Civil No. 3:22-cv-985 (OAW)

MAY 18, 2023

RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Petitioner James Keith Young, a pretrial detainee with pending criminal matters in
state court, has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
challenging his pretrial confinement. In response to the court’s order to show cause,
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition on three grounds: (1) Petitioner did not
exhaust his state court remedies on any ground for relief, (2) the claims are frivolous, and
(3) the court should exercise abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). For
the following reasons, the motion to dismiss hereby is GRANTED.

I.

Background
Petitioner is incarcerated because he was unable to post bond on six pending

criminal matters in the Judicial District of Fairfield. 1

In this petition, he appears to

challenge the fact of his confinement, rather than the charges in any particular case. See

Case Nos. F02B-CR18-0306037-S, F02B-CR19-0306563-S, F02B-CR20-0336572-S, F02B-CR200337428-S, F02B-CR21-0342312-S, and F02B-CR22-0346078-S.
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ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”) ¶ 5 (“The court had/has no jurisdictional authority to force me into their
courts, to detain me, or to have me arrested.”). Petitioner elaborates that his claim is
based on “[u]nreasonable bond, and unlawful incarceration, done without subject or in
personam jurisdiction[.]”
Petitioner commenced this action by petition filed on August 3, 2022. He asserts
nine grounds for relief: (1) “Right to self-determination per the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights,” (2) “Lack of jurisdictional authority; in personam,” (3) “Lack of
jurisdictional authority subject matter,” (4) “Lack of citizenship jurisdiction; parents patria,”
(5) “Violation of the speedy trial act,” (6) “Violation of each individual’s oath of office,” (7)
“Federal

Constitutional

Violations,”

specifically

the

Eleventh

Amendment,

(8)

“State of Connecticut Constitution due process, specifically the speedy trial act,” and (9)
“Violation of the federal public laws, specifically title 18 242-243 color of law crimes and
1981-1989 rights violations.” Pet. ¶ 13.

II.

Discussion
Respondent moves to dismiss the petition on three grounds: failure to exhaust

state court remedies, frivolous claims, and abstention.
A. Exhaustion of State Court Remedies
Before filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court, a state prisoner
must exhaust all state court remedies. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999);
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). He must present the essential factual and legal bases for his
federal claims to each appropriate state court, including to the highest state court capable
of reviewing them, in order to afford the state courts a full and fair “opportunity to pass

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upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.” Duncan v. Henry, 513
U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The
exhaustion requirement is designed to avoid the ‘unseemly’ result of a federal court
‘upset[ting] a state court conviction without’ first according the state courts an ‘opportunity
to ... correct a constitutional violation.’” Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058, 2064 (2017)
(quoting Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982)).
Failure to exhaust state remedies may be excused only if “there is no opportunity
to obtain redress in state courts or if the corrective process is so clearly deficient to render
futile any effort to obtain relief.” Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981) (per curiam);
29 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B). However, a petitioner may not simply wait until appellate
remedies are no longer available and then argue that the claim is exhausted. See
Galdamez v. Keane, 394 F.3d 68, 72-74 (2d Cir. 2005).
To properly exhaust his claim, the petitioner must present the factual and legal
bases of the claim to the state court. See Daye v. Attorney General of State of N.Y., 696
F.2d 186, 191 (2d Cir. 1982) (“Specifically, [the petitioner] must have set forth in the state
court all of the essential factual allegations asserted in his federal petition; if material
allegations were omitted, the state court has not had a fair opportunity to rule on the
claim.”) (citation omitted).
Petitioner is a pretrial detainee and has filed his habeas petition pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241, not 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Nieves v. Farber, No. 1:20-CV-0990(LJL),
2020 WL 129454, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2020) (“A prisoner in state custody generally
must challenge his confinement in a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, but
such relief is available under § 2241 to a state pretrial detainee challenging his custody

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as unlawful under the Constitution or federal law.”); accord Rivera v. Connecticut, No.
3:20-cv-860(OAW), 2022 WL 124248, at *2 (D. Conn. Jan. 13, 2022) (“district courts in
the Second Circuit have liberally construed section 2254 petitions filed by pretrial
detainees as having been filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) which affords habeas relief
to a person ‘in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States”).
“While [§ 2241] does not by its own terms require the exhaustion of state remedies
as a prerequisite to the grant of federal habeas relief, decisional law has superimposed
such a requirement in order to accommodate principles of federalism.”

Petties v.

Riviezzo, No 20-CV-350(ALC), 2020 WL 6748528, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2020) (quoting
United States ex rel. Scranton v. New York, 532 F.2d 292, 294 (2d Cir. 1976) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484,
489-92 (1973) (requiring exhaustion of state court remedies prior to filing section 2241
petition challenging detention on pending criminal charges pursuant to state detainer).
For pretrial detainees, exhaustion requires seeking habeas corpus relief in state
court and appealing to the Supreme Court of Connecticut. “A petitioner who has not
exhausted available State court or administrative remedies may only seek a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to § 2241 if: (1) he established cause for his failure to exhaust
and prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law . . . or (2) he demonstrates
that failure to consider his claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Smith
v. New Haven Superior Court, No. 3:20-c-00744(KAD), 2020 WL 4284565, at *4 (D.
Conn. July 27, 2020) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A petitioner “shall
not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within

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the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any
available procedure, the question presented.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c).
On the petition form, Petitioner only asserts that he presented his first three
grounds in all appeals that were available to him. Pet. at 6-7, 9. He did not attest to
raising ground four in state appeals, and in response to a prompt to list any grounds not
presented on state appeal (and to explain such failure), Petitioner asks that the court,
“Please see attached grounds 5-9” (none of which affirmatively states whether such claim
was presented on state appeal). Id. at 7. Petitioner also states that on July 22, 2022, he
filed an appeal challenging the state court’s action from May 23, 2022, id. at 2, and that
he filed two additional appeals on that same date of July 22, 2022. Id. at 3. Petitioner
cannot have properly exhausted his state court remedies through an initial motion and
two appeals all filed on the same day. Additionally, Petitioner commenced this action on
August 3, 2022, twelve days after his July 22 motion. Thus, even if he did file the motion,
there was insufficient time for the courts to have respond before he filed his petition.
Respondent refers the court to copies of the certified files of the Clerk for each
state case and notes that the files do not indicate that any motions relating to exhaustion
of state court remedies were filed on July 22, 2022, or at any other time. In response to
the motion to dismiss, Petitioner does not address the exhaustion issue. Instead, he
argues that the state courts lack jurisdiction over him.
The court concludes that Petitioner has not exhausted his state court remedies by
going through one complete round of the state appellate review process on each of his
claims before commencing this action. Nor has he: shown that he lacked the opportunity
to obtain redress in the state courts; established cause for his failure to exhaust (and

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established cause for any resulting prejudice); or shown that the failure to consider his
claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Duckworth, 454 U.S. at 3
(exception to exhaustion requirement “is made only if there is no opportunity to obtain
redress in state court or if the corrective process is so clearly deficient as to render futile
any effort to obtain relief”). Accordingly, the petition is dismissed for failure to exhaust
state court remedies.
B. Frivolous Claims
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 gave district courts the
discretion to deny a petition for writ of habeas corpus on the merits “notwithstanding the
failure of an applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.” Stover
v. Ercole, No. 08 Civ. 6737(SAS), 2011 WL 814710, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar, 8, 2011) (citing
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1989)). Many district courts have elected to exercise
this discretion and to “deny unexhausted claims that are’ patently frivolous.’ The Supreme
Court has noted that ‘plainly meritless’ claims should be denied on the merits rather than
dismissed for failure to exhaust.” Id.
Respondent notes that, in grounds 1-4, 6, and 7, Petitioner challenges the authority
of the state, state courts, and state personnel, to detain him based on warrants charging
him with the commission of various crimes, and he argues that these claims are legally
frivolous. In the first ground, Petitioner contends that his prosecutions violate his rights
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In the second through
fourth grounds, he argues that the state court lacks personal, subject matter, and
citizenship jurisdiction over him. In the sixth ground, Petitioner argues that unidentified
state officials violated their oaths of office by failing to “uphold the rights of men.” Pet. at

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9. And in the seventh ground, Petitioner argues that, as a citizen of a foreign state, the
Eleventh Amendment precludes his prosecution in a United States court.
In opposition to the motion to dismiss, Petitioner describes himself as a “noncorporate entity or animal (hereinafter I, me, myself), a man, Am in the image of the living
Spirit Yahweh the Flesh and Blood Original Man.” ECF No. 14-1 at 2. He denies the
existence of, inter alia, the United States, United States District Court, United Nations,
State of Connecticut, Internal Revenue Service, all state counties, various municipalities,
Connecticut’s Superior Court, any “all CAPS NAME OR REFERENCE,” addresses and
zip codes, and the State of Connecticut. Id. He argues that he “cannot appear and plead”
because he is not a corporation, and Petitioner denies that he is a “United States Person,
United States Resident, U.S. Citizen, U.S. Individual, U.S. Corporation, or citizen
subjected to [its] jurisdiction.” Id. at 4 (internal quotations omitted). And in Petitioner’s
“Affidavit of Sovereignty,” he states: “I am one of We, the People,” “I am a state citizen,
a/k/a state of the Union citizen,” “I am a citizen of the Kingdom of God,” and that he is “a
non-resident alien, foreign in regards to the UNITED STATES and the STATE OF
CONNECTICUT CORPORATIONS”. ECF No. 14-4 at 2.
Petitioner fails to provide a clear label for his professed citizenship, but it appears
that he believes, as often is true of those who consider themselves “sovereign citizens,”
that he should not be subject to governmental authority. See, e.g., United States v. Ulloa,
511 F. App’x 105, 106 n.1 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order) (“The sovereign citizens are a
loosely affiliated group who believe that the state and federal governments lack
constitutional legitimacy and therefore have no authority to regulate their behavior.”);
Gravatt v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 279, 282 (2011) (“So-called sovereign citizens

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believe that they are not subject to government authority and employ various tactics in an
attempt to, among other things, avoid paying taxes, extinguish debts, and derail criminal
proceedings.”).
Many district courts, including courts within this district, have dismissed
jurisdictional challenges from “sovereign citizens” as patently frivolous.

See, e.g.,

Campbell v. Mulligan, No. 3:19-CV-00540(AWT), 2021 WL 3173021 (D. Conn. July 27,
2021); Ramos v. Semple, No. 3:18-CV-1259(VAB), 2019 L 243781, at *4-5 (D. Conn.
June 11, 2019); Tyson v. Clifford, No. 3:18-CV01600(JCH), 2018 WL 6727538 (D. Conn.
Dec. 21, 2018). In Tyson, the court dismissed as being devoid of any arguable legal basis
any claims challenging “the jurisdiction of the State of Connecticut, its courts, or Judge
Clifford, or the authority of the State, through Attorney Doyle, to prosecute him for a
criminal offense, based on a ‘sovereign citizen’ theory....” 2018 WL 6727538, at *3.
In addition, in his first ground, Petitioner asserts a claim based on the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. That treaty, however, does not create a private
right of action. See Alejandro v. Quiros, No. 3:21-CV-00542(JAM), 2021 WL 5324905, at
*7 (D. Conn. Nov. 16, 2021) (citing Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233,
262 (2d Cir. 2003)). In addition, “there is a strong presumption against inferring private
rights from international treaties.” Id. (quoting Yuen Jin v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 143, 159
(2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, grounds 1-4, 6, and 7 are
legally frivolous claims and are denied on the merits.
C. Abstention
Finally, Respondent argues that the court should abstain from considering
Petitioner’s claims under the doctrine set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

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In Younger, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a federal court should not
enjoin a pending state criminal proceeding unless an injunction was necessary to prevent
immediate and irreparable harm to the criminal defendant. Id. at 45. The certified Clerk
files submitted by Respondent show that Petitioner’s state cases are ongoing.
The only two exceptions to Younger abstention are bad faith, and extraordinary
circumstances. Diamond “D” Constr. Corp. v. McGowan, 282 F.3d 191, 197-98 (2d Cir.
2002). The bad faith exception focuses on the subjective intent or motive of the state
prosecutor who initiated the proceeding and considers whether the proceeding was
brought in bad faith or only to harass Petitioner. Id. at 199. Petitioner presents no
evidence suggesting that the charges were brought against him in bad faith or for
harassment with “no reasonable expectation of obtaining a favorable outcome.” Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The extraordinary circumstances exception applies when there is “no state remedy
available to meaningfully, timely, and adequately remedy the alleged constitutional
violation” and where “the litigant will suffer ‘great and immediate’ ham if the federal court
does not intervene.” Id. at 201 (citation omitted). Petitioner can challenge any conviction
on direct appeal to Connecticut’s state courts of review. Thus, he has a state remedy for
any constitutional violations occurring in connection with his prosecution. In addition,
Petitioner does not identify any great and immediate harm if this court does not intervene.
Courts have held that the burden of defending against criminal charges does not
constitute irreparable harm. See, e.g., Davis v. Lansing, 851 F.2d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1988).
Petitioner alleges no facts suggesting a viable exception to Younger abstention.
Thus, the court abstains from addressing Petitioner’s claims. See Allen v. Maribal, No.

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11-CV-2638(KAM), 2011 WL 3162675, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2011) (declining to
consider pretrial speedy trial motion asserted in section 2241 petition because to do so
would “permit the derailment of a pending state proceeding by an attempt to litigate
constitutional defenses prematurely in federal court”) (quoting Braden, 410 U.S. at 493
(internal quotation marks omitted)); York v. Ward, 538 F. Supp. 315, 316 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)
(“The writ of habeas corpus ... was never conceived to be the means by which a state
proceeding can be aborted or a decree by which the orderly functioning of the State’s
judicial processes can be disrupted. Nor is the federal habeas corpus to be converted
into a pretrial motion forum for state prisoners.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
III.

Conclusion
The motion to dismiss the habeas corpus petition (ECF No. 10) hereby is

GRANTED. The Clerk of Court kindly is directed to please close this case.
The court concludes that an appeal from this order would not be taken in good
faith. Thus, a certificate of appealability will not issue.

IT IS SO ORDERED at Hartford, Connecticut, this 18th day of May, 2023.
____________/s/__ _________
OMAR A. WILLIAMS
United States District Judge

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