Taylor v. Muhammad et al

Filing 34

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 16 Motion to Dismiss. For the reasons stated in the attached memorandum and order, the motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims of retaliation in violation of Title VII, ADEA, ADA, and CFEPA in con nection with MPCS's termination of Plaintiffs employment is DENIED. The motion to dismiss all other claims, including all claims against the Individual Defendants and the claims that Plaintiff was discriminated against on the basis of his sex, race, color, national origin, religion, age, and disability, as well as Plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress and CUTPA claims, is GRANTED, and the claims are DISMISSED. Accordingly, Defendant MPCS shall file an answer to the Complaint by October 8, 2024. The stay on discovery in this case is LIFTED. By October 30, 2024, the parties shall confer and file a joint status report regarding their intended next steps. If the parties h ave not yet exchanged settlement demands and responses thereto, the parties shall propose a schedule for such an exchange.The Clerk is directed to terminate Abdul-Rahmaan I. Muhammad and Dayeshell Muhammad from the docket. Signed by Judge Vernon D. Oliver on 9/24/2024. (Balkoski, S)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
--------------------------------------------------------------- x
THADDEUS TAYLOR,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
MEMORANDUM &
:
ORDER GRANTING IN
-against:
PART AND DENYING IN
ABDUL-RAHMAAN I. MUHAMMAD et al.,
:
PART DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO DISMISS
:
Defendants.
:
--------------------------------------------------------------- x
3:23-CV-1505 (VDO)
VERNON D. OLIVER, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Thaddeus Taylor, proceeding pro se, commenced this action against
Defendants Abdul-Rahmaan I. Muhammad, Dayeshell Muhammad (collectively, the
“Individual Defendants”), and My People Community Services (“MPCS”), bringing claims
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”),
the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (“CFEPA”), the Connecticut Unfair Trade
Practices Act (“CUTPA”), and common law. Plaintiff alleges retaliation, wrongful
termination, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and discrimination on the basis of sex,
race, color, national origin, religion, age, and disability. The defendants move to dismiss the
First Amended Complaint (“FAC” or “Complaint”) for failure to state a claim under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). As discussed below, the motion to dismiss is granted in
part and denied in part. All claims are dismissed except for the retaliation claims against
MPCS.

I.

BACKGROUND 1
Plaintiff brought this action against his former employer, MPCS, an agency that

provides support services for individuals who are involved in the criminal justice system.
(FAC, ECF No. 15, ¶¶ 32, 34.) The Individual Defendants are practicing Muslims who make
policies and rules for MPCS employees. (Id. ¶ 10.)
In 2017, Plaintiff was hired by MPCS as Intensive Support Staff. (Id. ¶ 14.) Taylor
identifies as a Black male of “Baptist” religion who was disabled in his service in the United
States Army. (FAC ¶¶ 9, 10; ECF No. 21-1 at 38.)
Plaintiff alleges that employment discrimination and misconduct began in January
2017. (FAC ¶ 12.) During Plaintiff’s employment, the Individual Defendants prevented MPCS
staff from cooking pork on grills and celebrating Christian holidays. (Id. ¶ 36.) And, though
Plaintiff was a disabled veteran, Defendants forced him to work on military holidays. (Id.)
At some point, Plaintiff was demoted and transferred to a Third Shift Supervisor
position in East Hartford. (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff was also transferred to the “Morality House
Program” in Hartford, where he worked with four residents. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 16.) Plaintiff never
received any bad evaluations during his employment. (Id. ¶ 20.)
In February 2023, Plaintiff was placed on administrative leave without pay. (Id. ¶ 13.)
Defendants were advised by the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services
(“DMHAS”) that Plaintiff could no longer work with any clients because a client accused him
1

The Court accepts as true the factual allegations in the Complaint and draws all reasonable
inferences in Plaintiff’s favor for the purpose of deciding Defendants’ motion. And because the
complaint filed with the CHRO is “integral” to the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint, and
because there are no disputed issues regarding its relevance, authenticity, or accuracy, the Court
will consider it on this motion to dismiss. (Pl. Exs. G and H, ECF No. 21-1, at 37-47.) In deciding
the motion, the court does not consider any of the other documents submitted by the parties.
2

of serious misconduct. (Id. ¶ 22.) Plaintiff was then sent home without the opportunity to
retrieve his belongings. (Id. ¶ 23.) To this day, Plaintiff does not know any details about the
complaint lodged against him (Id. ¶ 25.) Plaintiff asserts that the defendants failed to
adequately investigate the complaint by failing to review the video cameras, interview staff
and residents, or ask DMHAS to produce evidence. (Id. ¶¶ 33, 42.)
On March 16, 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Connecticut Commission on
Human Rights and Opportunities (“CHRO”). (Id. ¶ 27; ECF No. 21-1 at 39.) Then, on April
25, 2023, MPCS terminated Plaintiff’s employment. (FAC ¶ 7.) Plaintiff alleges that hewas
terminated in retaliation for filing complaints about discrimination and that he was weeded out
in favor of younger, well-educated female staff. (Id. ¶¶ 38, 41.)
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
A party may move to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “On a motion to dismiss, all factual allegations in
the complaint are accepted as true and all inferences are drawn in the plaintiff’s favor.”
Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 306 (2d Cir. 2015). “To survive dismissal, the
pleadings must contain ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face[.]’”
Buon v. Spindler, 65 F.4th 64, 76 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Documents filed pro se must be liberally construed and interpreted “to make ‘the
strongest arguments that they suggest.’” Wiggins v. Griffin, 86 F.4th 987, 996 (2d Cir. 2023)
(quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006)); see also
3

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). “Even in a pro se case, however, ‘although a court
must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint, that tenet is inapplicable to
legal conclusions, and threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.’” Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir.
2010) (quoting Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009)). “The issue is not whether a
plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support
the claims.” Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal citation and quotation
marks omitted).
III.

DISCUSSION
A.

Plaintiff’s Title VII, ADEA, ADA, and CFEPA Claims Against AbdulRahmaan I. Muhammad and Dayeshell Muhammad

As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s claims against the Individual Defendants under the
ADEA, ADA, Title VII, and CFEPA must be dismissed because individuals cannot be liable
under those statutes. Guerra v. Jones, 421 F. App’x 15, 17 (2d Cir. 2011) (explaining that the
ADEA and Title VII do not “subject[] individuals, even those with supervisory authority over
the plaintiff, to personal liability.”); Spiegel v. Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72, 79–80 (2d Cir. 2010)
(ADA and Title VII); Rieger v. Orlor, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 2d 105, 121–22 (D. Conn. 2006)
(CFEPA). These claims against Abdul-Rahmaan I. Muhammad and Dayeshell Muhammad are
therefore dismissed.
B.

Plaintiff’s Title VII and CFEPA Discrimination Claims Against MPCS

Discrimination claims under Connecticut law are analyzed “in the same manner as
federal courts evaluate federal discrimination claims.” Jackson v. Water Pollution Control
Auth. of Bridgeport, 900 A.2d 498, 508 n.11 (Conn. 2006). Regarding the remaining Title VII

4

and CFEPA claims against an employer, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that he “is a member
of a protected class, was qualified, suffered an adverse employment action, and has at least
minimal support for the proposition that the employer was motivated by discriminatory intent.”
Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 311. Therefore, in an employment discrimination case, a plaintiff must
plausibly allege that: “(1) the employer took adverse action against him, and (2) his race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor in the employment decision.” Vega v.
Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 87 (2d Cir. 2015).
1.

Sex, Race, Color, and National Origin Discrimination

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants treated him differently than other similarly situated
white employees. (FAC ¶ 43.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that MPCS conspired with a third
party to deprive him of a fair investigation, due process, and right to provide a defense. (Id. ¶
44.) Plaintiff suggests that other employees who were under investigation did not experience
similar deprivations. (Id.) Plaintiff also asserts that his employment was terminated because
he was weeded out in favor of younger, well-educated female staff. (Id. ¶¶ 38, 41.)
As discussed below, the claims that MPCS discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis
of his sex, race, color, and national origin fail at a key benchmark: the requirement to plead
“plausible support to a minimal inference of discriminatory motivation.” Littlejohn, 795 F.3d
at 311. Circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination can include the following:
the employer’s criticism of the plaintiff's performance in ethnically degrading
terms; or its invidious comments about others in the employee's protected group;
or the more favorable treatment of employees not in the protected group; or the
sequence of events leading to the plaintiff’s discharge.
Id. at 312 (citation omitted). Where a plaintiff seeks to show discrimination through allegations
of disparate treatment of a purported similarly situated employee, he must show that he “was

5

similarly situated in all material respects to the individuals with whom” he compares himself.
Mandell v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 379 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted); accord
Johnson v. Andy Frain Servs., Inc., 638 F. App’x 68, 70 (2d Cir. 2016). “In the context of
employee discipline, [ ] the plaintiff and the similarly situated employee[s] must have engaged
in comparable conduct, that is, conduct of comparable seriousness.” Dooley v. JetBlue Airways
Corp., 636 F. App’x 16, 20 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff’s allegations that he was weeded out in favor of younger, well-educated female
staff and that unidentified white employees were treated more favorably do not reasonably
enable an inference of discrimination. Plaintiff’s vague allegations include no “details as to
timing, place, or circumstances” related to a defendant’s actions involving those comparators
to suggest that similarly situated persons were treated differently. John v. Walmart Store No.
2585, No. 3:21-CV-1285 (MPS), 2023 WL 2346577, at *4 (D. Conn. Mar. 3, 2023). Nor does
Plaintiff provide details as to who the comparators are, “what their positions or responsibilities
were at [the company], how their conduct compared to plaintiff[’s] or how they were treated
differently by defendant[].” Haggood v. Rubin & Rothman, LLC, No. 14-CV-34 (SJF), 2014
WL 6473527, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2014); accord Cromartie v. Dep’t of Corr., No. 21CV-1236 (JBA), 2022 WL 4237072, at *4 (D. Conn. Sept. 14, 2022). The Complaint fails to
identify, much less plausibly show any comparable employees who were treated more
favorably.
Consequently, Plaintiff’s Title VII and CFEPA claims of sex, race, color, and national
origin discrimination are dismissed.

6

2.

Religious Discrimination

Plaintiff alleges that he is a Baptist and that, during his employment, Defendants
prevented MPCS staff from cooking pork and celebrating Christian holidays. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 36.)
In order to plead a religious discrimination claim under Title VII and CFEPA based on
a failure to accommodate theory, a plaintiff must allege that:
(1) that []he had a sincerely held religious belief that conflicted with an
employment requirement, (2) that []he informed [his] employer of this belief,
and (3) that the employer failed to accommodate [his] belief but instead
disciplined [him] or subjected [him] to an adverse action for failing to comply
with the conflicting employment requirement.
Langer v. Hartland Bd. of Educ., No. 3:22-CV-01459 (JAM), 2023 WL 6140792, at *5 (D.
Conn. Sept. 20, 2023) (citing Handverger v. City of Winooski, 605 F. App’x 68, 70 (2d Cir.
2015)). “The rule for disparate-treatment claims based on a failure to accommodate a religious
practice is straightforward: An employer may not make an applicant’s religious practice,
confirmed or otherwise, a factor in employment decisions.” EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch
Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768, 773 (2015).
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations fall short of stating claims of religious
discrimination under Title VII and CFEPA. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants prevented MPCS
staff from cooking pork and celebrating Christian holidays. But these vague allegations do not
plausibly show conflict between a requirement of Plaintiff’s employment and Plaintiff’s
religious beliefs. Critically, Plaintiff does not show that he requested an accommodation based
on his sincerely held religious belief, or that any defendant made an employment decision
motivated by a desire to avoid the prospective accommodation. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim
fails because a plaintiff “must plausibly allege that he actually required an accommodation of
his religious practice—in other words, that his religious beliefs made such an accommodation
7

necessary.” Giurca v. Bon Secours Charity Health Sys., No. 23-200, 2024 WL 763388, at *1
(2d Cir. Feb. 26, 2024).
Consequently, Plaintiff’s Title VII and CFEPA claims of religious discrimination are
dismissed.
C.

Plaintiff’s ADEA and CFEPA Age Discrimination Claims Against MPCS

Plaintiff alleges age discrimination in connection with being weeded out in favor of
younger, well-educated female staff. (FAC ¶¶ 38, 41.)
The ADEA provides that it is “unlawful for an employer . . . to discharge any individual
or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age[.]” 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(a)(1). A plaintiff alleging age discrimination must allege “that age was the ‘but-for’
cause of the employer's adverse action.” Vega, 801 F.3d at 86 (citing Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs.,
Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177 (2009)). The CFEPA similarly provides: “It shall be a discriminatory
practice in violation of this section . . . [f]or an employer . . . to refuse to hire or employ or to
bar or to discharge from employment any individual or to discriminate against any individual
in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the
individual’s . . . age[.]” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-60(b)(1).
Absent from the complaint are facts from which it can be inferred that an adverse
employment action was motivated by Plaintiff’s age. Although Plaintiff’s allegation that he is
fifty years old plausibly shows that his age warrants protection, Plaintiff’s threadbare assertion
that he was weeded out in favor of younger females is devoid of any facts to plausibly support
that claim. See D’Cunha v. Genovese/Eckerd Corp., 479 F.3d 193, 194 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The
ADEA prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of age against persons aged 40 or
8

older.”). As alleged, even under a liberal construction of the Complaint, the Complaint is
bereft of “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant

is

liable

for

the

misconduct

alleged.”

Iqbal,

556

U.S.

at

678.

Without more specificity regarding the identities and actions of the employees who allegedly
replaced the plaintiff, the Court cannot draw an inference that Plaintiff’s age caused an adverse
employment action. Bohnet v. Valley Stream Union Free Sch. Dist. 13, 30 F. Supp. 3d 174,
181 (E.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d, 594 F. App’x 53 (2d Cir. 2015); see also Driscoll v. Bob’s Disc.
Stores, No. 3:21-CV-00257 (KAD), 2021 WL 3568894, at *3 (D. Conn. Aug. 11, 2021)
(dismissing CFEPA and ADEA claims where the complaint was “wholly conclusory and raises
only speculation that Plaintiff was not recalled because of his age”).
D.

Plaintiff’s ADA and CFEPA Disability Discrimination Claims Against
MPCS

Plaintiff alleges that, despite being a disabled veteran, Defendants forced him to work
on military holidays. (FAC ¶ 36.)
When a plaintiff brings a discrimination claim under the ADA, he must plausibly allege
that: “(1) the employer is subject to the ADA; (2) the plaintiff is disabled within the meaning
of the ADA or perceived to be so by [his] employer; (3) [he] was otherwise qualified to perform
the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation; (4) [he] suffered
an adverse employment action; and (5) the adverse action was imposed because of [his]
disability.” Davis v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 804 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2015). While
discrimination claims brought under CFEPA are construed similarly to ADA claims, the
definition of disability under CFEPA is broader than the ADA’s. Hopkins v. New England
Health Care Emps. Welfare Fund, 985 F. Supp. 2d 240, 255–56 (D. Conn. 2013). As for the

9

ADA claim, “[a]t the motion to dismiss stage, the plaintiff must allege that he has a physical
or mental impairment, which substantially limits an activity that constitutes a major life
activity under the ADA.” Cavienss v. Norwalk Transit, No. 21-CV-01694 (MPS), 2023 WL
7183833, at *5 (D. Conn. Nov. 1, 2023) (cleaned up). As for the CFEPA claim, at the motion
to dismiss stage, the plaintiff must allege facts to plausibly show that he has a “chronic physical
handicap, infirmity, or impairment” that is “of long duration, or characterized by slowly
progressive symptoms distinguished from acute, and lasting a long time, long-continued,
lingering, inveterate.” Drepaul v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 23-CV-00123 (MPS), 2024 WL
127402, at *3 (D. Conn. Jan. 11, 2024) (cleaned up). A plaintiff may also allege that he was
regarded as disabled if he has “an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether
or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.” Cavienss, 2023 WL
7183833, at *5.
Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege that he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA
or CFEPA or that MPCS regarded him as disabled. The Complaint is replete with allegations
that Plaintiff is a disabled veteran but, without more specificity, the Court has no lens through
which to examine whether his alleged disability interferes with a major life activity, as required
by the ADA, or is a chronic physical handicap, infirmity, or impairment, as required by
CFEPA. See Pineda v. ESPN, Inc., No. 18-CV-00325 (MPS), 2018 WL 5268123, at *3 (D.
Conn. Oct. 23, 2018) (dismissing ADA claim where a plaintiff did not provide any factual
support detailing the frequency, duration, or severity of any limitations on a life activity caused
by her PTSD); see also Wanamaker v. Westport Bd. of Educ., 899 F. Supp. 2d 193, 212 (D.
Conn. 2012) (dismissing CFEPA claim where there was a “naked assertion devoid of further
factual enhancement”). Plaintiff’s vague assertions about being a disabled veteran do not
10

enable a reasonable inference that MPCS regarded him as disabled because the Court cannot
conclude whether there was “an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment” under the
ADA or an employer regarded him as “physically disabled” under the CFEPA. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(3)(A); see also Desrosiers v. Diageo N. Am., Inc., 314 Conn. 773, 794 (2014) (finding
that CFEPA “protects individuals who are regarded as physically disabled from employment
discrimination”).
Consequently, because Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that he was disabled or
was regarded as disabled by MPCS, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for disability discrimination
under the ADA and CFEPA.
E.

Plaintiff’s Title VII, ADEA, ADA, and CFPEA Retaliation Claims Against
MPCS

Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to retaliation after MPCS received notice of his
complaints of discrimination with the EEOC. (FAC ¶¶ 27, 28.)
When a plaintiff alleges a retaliation claim under Title VII, ADEA, ADA, and CFEPA,
a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) he engaged in protected activity, (2) the defendant was
aware of that activity, (3) he was subjected to a retaliatory action, or a series of retaliatory
actions, that were materially adverse, and (4) there was a causal connection between the
protected activity and the materially adverse action. Carr v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 76 F.4th
172, 180 (2d Cir. 2023) (Title VII); Lively v. WAFRA Inv. Advisory Grp., Inc., 6 F.4th 293,
304 (2d Cir. 2021) (ADEA); Fox v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 918 F.3d 65, 72–73 (2d Cir.
2019) (ADA); Dagenais v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, No. 23-CV-241 (SVN), 2023 WL
7220753, at *2 (D. Conn. Nov. 2, 2023) (CFEPA). “[A]t the initial stage of a litigation, the
plaintiff’s burden is ‘minimal’—he need only plausibly allege facts that provide ‘at least

11

minimal support for the proposition that the employer was motivated by discriminatory
intent.’” Vega, 801 F.3d at 86–87 (quoting Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 311).
Regarding Plaintiff’s claim that he was fired by MPCS in retaliation for filing a
complaint with the EEOC and CHRO, Plaintiff has plausibly pleaded a prima facie case of
retaliation. First, as to whether plaintiff engaged in a protected activity, filing a complaint on
one’s own behalf can constitute a protected activity where a plaintiff “possessed a good faith
belief that the underlying employment practice was unlawful” under an anti-discrimination
statute. Cieplinski v. Univ. of Conn. Health Ctr., No. 18-CV-1503 (JCH), 2019 WL 13273446,
at *10 (D. Conn. July 25, 2019). In March 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the EEOC
alleging discrimination under Title VII, ADEA, ADA, and CFEPA. (Pl. Ex. H, ECF No. 211, at 38–39.) Plaintiff also alleges that, in April 2023, MPCS was given notice of the agency
complaint via mail and email. (FAC ¶ 28.) Plaintiff has therefore plausibly alleged that MPCS
had knowledge that he engaged in a protected filing of a discrimination complaint.
Second, Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded a causal connection between his protected
complaint and a materially adverse event. “Job termination is a well-recognized adverse
employment action.” O’Brien v. City of New York, Dep’t of Educ., 686 F. Supp. 3d 221, 246
(E.D.N.Y. 2023). While the Second Circuit “has not drawn a bright line to define the outer
limits beyond which a temporal relationship is too attenuated to establish a causal relationship
between the exercise of a federal constitutional right and an allegedly retaliatory action[,]”
Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Co-op Extension of Schenectady Cnty., 252 F.3d 545, 554 (2d Cir.
2001), the Second Circuit has held that a gap of two months between a plaintiff’s protected
complaint and employment termination sufficiently establishes causation. Gorzynski v. JetBlue
Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 111 (2d Cir. 2010). Here, approximately one month had passed
12

between Plaintiff’s filing of the protected complaint on March 16, 2023 and his termination on
April 25, 2023. (FAC ¶ 28; Pl. Ex. H, ECF No. 21-1, at 39.) Plaintiff has thus sufficiently
alleged a causal connection between his protected complaint with an agency and his
termination.
Consequently, the motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s retaliation claims under Title VII, ADA,
ADEA, and CFEPA is denied.
F.

Plaintiff’s CUTPA Claim

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated CUTPA by placing him on unpaid
administrative leave without conducting a fair investigation. (FAC ¶ 46.)
CUTPA makes it unlawful for a party to engage in “unfair methods of competition and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce.” Conn Gen. Stat.
§ 42-110b(a). “‘Trade’ and ‘commerce’” are defined as “the advertising, the sale or rent or
lease, the offering for sale or rent or lease, or the distribution of any services and any property
. . . and any other article, commodity, or thing of value in this state.” Id. § 42-110a(4).
Even under a liberal construction of the allegations in the Complaint, the Court cannot
reasonably infer that Defendants violated CUTPA. The source of friction between Plaintiff and
Defendants is the handling of the complaints of misconduct and the aftermath of Plaintiff’s
employment. But Connecticut caselaw makes clear that an employer-employee relationship
does not fall within conduct involving “trade or commerce,” as defined by CUTPA. Sempey v.
Stamford Hosp., 221 A.3d 839, 848 (Conn. App. 2019). Because Plaintiff’s allegations relate
solely to the relationship he had with Defendants during the scope of his employment and
because no other allegations of unlawful practices in the conduct of trade or business appear

13

in the Complaint, Plaintiff’s CUTPA claim is dismissed. See, e.g., Parimal v. Manitex Int’l,
Inc., No. 19-CV-01910, 2021 WL 1146918, at *9 (D. Conn. Mar. 25, 2021).
G.

Plaintiff’s Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants engaged in outrageous conduct by illegally terminating
his employment and subjecting him to hardships, noting that he has since been unable to find
a similar job. (FAC ¶¶ 47, 49.)
When a plaintiff alleges an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim under
Connecticut law, he must set forth sufficient allegations “‘(1) that the actor intended to inflict
emotional distress or that he knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely
result of his conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the defendant’s
conduct was the cause of the plaintiff’s distress; and (4) that the emotional distress sustained
by the plaintiff was severe.’” Apatow v. Town of Stratford, 651 F. Supp. 3d 573, 591 (D. Conn.
2023) (quoting Watts v. Chittenden, 22 A.3d 1214, 1221 (Conn. 2011)). Additionally, “in order
to hold an employer liable for the intentional torts of his employee, the employee must be
acting within the scope of his employment and in furtherance of the employer’s business.” A-G
Foods, Inc. v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 579 A.2d 69, 73 (Conn. 1990). “[I]t must be the affairs
of the principal, and not solely the affairs of the agent, which are being furthered in order for
the doctrine to apply.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege outrageous conduct sufficient to state an intentional
infliction of emotion distress claim. Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants terminated his
employment, subjected him to an involuntary transfer, and failed to investigate complaints of
misconduct in good faith. But “[l]iability for intentional infliction of emotional distress
requires conduct that exceeds all bounds usually tolerated by decent society.” Nwachukwu v.
14

Liberty Bank, 257 F. Supp. 3d 280, 297 (D. Conn. 2017). The alleged retaliatory misconduct
and failure to sufficiently respond to complaints do not rise to the level of extreme or
outrageous behavior. Consequently, Plaintiff’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress against Defendants is dismissed.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons described above, the motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims

of retaliation in violation of Title VII, ADEA, ADA, and CFEPA in connection with MPCS’s
termination of Plaintiff’s employment is DENIED. The motion to dismiss all other claims,
including all claims against the Individual Defendants and the claims that Plaintiff was
discriminated against on the basis of his sex, race, color, national origin, religion, age, and
disability, as well as Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress and CUTPA claims
is GRANTED, and the claims are DISMISSED.
Accordingly, Defendant MPCS shall file an answer to the Complaint within fourteen
days of this order. The stay on discovery in this case is LIFTED. By October 30, 2024, the
parties shall confer and file a joint status report regarding their intended next steps. If the
parties have not yet exchanged settlement demands and responses thereto, the parties shall
propose a schedule for such an exchange.
The Clerk is directed to terminate Abdul-Rahmaan I. Muhammad and Dayeshell
Muhammad from the docket.
SO ORDERED.

Hartford, Connecticut
September 24, 2024

/s/Vernon D. Oliver
VERNON D. OLIVER
United States District Judge
15