Lexis v. Peterson

Filing 13

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons set forth in the attached ruling, the Court enters the following orders: (1) Lexis may proceed with his Fourteenth Amendment claims against Lt. Peterson for deliberate indifference to health and safety, excessive force, and deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. These claims may proceed against Lt. Peterson in his individual capacity for money damages. The Court otherwise DISMISSES Lexis' s remaining claims against Peterson. (2) The Clerk shall verify the current work address for Lt. Peterson with the DOC Office of Legal Affairs, mail a waiver of service of process request packet containing the complaint to Lt. Peterson at th e confirmed address within twenty-one (21) days of this Order, and report to the Court on the status of the waiver request by no later than the thirty-fifth (35) day after mailing. If Lt. Peterson fails to return the waiver request, the Clerk shall arrange for in-person service by the U.S. Marshals Service on that defendant, and Lt. Peterson shall be required to pay the costs of such service in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d). (3) Lt. Peterson shall file a response to the complaint, either an answer or motion to dismiss, within sixty (60) days from the date that the notice of lawsuit and waiver of service of summons forms are mailed to him. (4) The Clerk shall send a courtesy copy of the complaint and this Order to the DOC Office of Legal Affairs. (5) The discovery deadline is extended to six months (180 days) from the date of this Order. The parties must comply with the District of Connecticut "Standing Order Re: Initial Discovery Disclosures" which the Clerk must send to plaintiff with a copy of this order. The order also can be found at http://ctd.uscourts.gov/district-connecticut-public-standing-orders. Note that discovery requests should not be filed with t he Court. In the event of a dispute over discovery, the parties should make a good faith effort to resolve the dispute amongst themselves; then, the parties should file the appropriate motion to compel on the docket. (6) The deadline for sum mary judgment motions is extended to seven months (210 days) from the date of this Order. (7) Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7(a), a nonmoving party must respond to a dispositive motion (i.e., a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment) within twenty-one (21) days of the date the motion was filed. If no response is filed, or the response is not timely, the Court may grant the dispositive motion without further proceedings. (8) If Lexis changes his a ddress at any time during the litigation of this case, Local Court Rule 83.1(c)2 provides that he MUST notify the court. Failure to do so can result in the dismissal of the case. Lexis must give notice of a new address even if he is incarcerated. He should write PLEASE NOTE MY NEW ADDRESS on the notice. It is not enough to just put the new address on a letter without indicating that it is a new address. If Lexis has more than one pending case, he must indicate all of the case numbers in the noti fication of change of address. Lexis must also notify the defendant or defense counsel of his new address. (9) Lexis shall utilize the Prisoner E-Filing Program when filing documents with the Court. Lexis is advised that the Program may be u sed only to file documents with the Court. As discovery requests are not filed with the Court, the parties must serve discovery requests on each other by regular mail. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Jeffrey A. Meyer on 05/08/2024. (Parker, B.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
PATRICK LEXIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
L.T. PETERSON,
Defendant.

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No. 3:24-cv-00118 (JAM)

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
The plaintiff, Patrick Lexis, is a sentenced prisoner in the custody of the Connecticut
Department of Correction (“DOC”). He was a pretrial detainee at the time of the events that gave
rise to this action.1 Lexis brings this complaint pro se and in forma pauperis against Correctional
Officer Lieutenant Peterson (“Lt. Peterson”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Lt. Peterson
violated his constitutional rights through excessive force and indifference to his health and
safety.
After an initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, I conclude that Lexis’s claims for
excessive force and deliberate indifference to health and safety may proceed against Lt. Peterson.
In addition, construing his pro se complaint liberally, I also determine that Lexis may pursue a
claim against Lt. Peterson for deliberate indifference to medical needs.
BACKGROUND
I take the facts as stated in Lexis’s complaint as true for the purposes of this ruling. On
January 3, 2023, Lexis was a pretrial detainee at New Haven Correctional Center (“NHCC”).2

1

Doc. #1 at 8 (¶ 2). I take judicial notice of records on the Connecticut DOC website indicating that Lexis was
sentenced on February 16, 2024 and is now in custody at the Osborn Correctional Institution.
http://www.ctinmateinfo.state.ct.us/detailsupv.asp?id inmt num=370866 (last visited May 8, 2024).
2
Doc. #1 at 8 (¶¶ 2, 3).

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When Lexis and his cellmate, Eric Williams, entered the dining room for breakfast that day,
Correctional Officer Russell asked Williams to remove his do-rag or to take his food back to his
cell.3 Williams decided to return to his cell, but Russell refused to open it for him, and
dishonestly issued Williams a flagrant disobedience ticket.4 Lexis returned to that same cell
around this time.5
Shortly after, Lt. Peterson, who bore animus towards Williams from past arguments,
visited the cell and told Williams to “cuff-up.”6 Williams grew irate and denied any
wrongdoing.7 Lt. Peterson told Williams he did not care.8 Williams then proceeded to block the
cell window with white paper.9
Lt. Peterson offered Williams “a couple of warnings,” then deployed an orange chemical
agent for 3-5 seconds against Williams and Lexis (who had remained in the cell).10 The chemical
agent caused “instant irritation & burning to [their] eyes & nose as well as trouble breathing.”11
After Williams refused another of Lt. Peterson’s commands to take down the paper and “cuffup,” Lt. Peterson again sprayed Lexis and Williams for 3-5 seconds, causing more “irritation &
burning of [their] eyes & nose as well as trouble breathing.”12
When Lexis complained to Lt. Peterson that he was having trouble breathing and had
nothing to do with the dispute between Lt. Peterson and Williams, Lt. Peterson asked Lexis to

3

Id. at 8 (¶ 5).
Id. at 8 (¶¶ 6-7, 9).
5
Id. at 8 (¶ 8).
6
Id. at 9 (¶ 10).
7
Id. at 9 (¶ 11).
8
Id. at 9 (¶ 12).
9
Ibid.
10
Id. at 9 (¶ 13).
11
Ibid.
12
Id. at 9 (¶¶ 14, 15).
4

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tell his cellmate, Williams, to “cuff-up.”13 Lexis repeatedly told Lt. Peterson that he “couldn’t
breathe” but Lt. “Peterson disregarded [Lexis’s] health & safety by not bringing [him] to
medical.”14
Instead, Lt. Peterson deployed another round of chemical agent for 3-5 seconds, causing
Lexis “to lay on the floor coughing profusely.”15 At this point, other inmates witnessing the
scene began yelling at Lt. Peterson to take Lexis for medical attention.16 However, Lt. Peterson
did nothing.17 After two to three hours, Williams “cuffed-up,” and Lexis was sent to a medical
unit to address irritation, burning in his eyes, and trouble breathing.18 When he returned to his
cell, the residue of the chemical agent continued to irritate him every time he touched the walls.19
Lexis did not receive a disobedience ticket for these events.20
Lexis alleges constitutional claims for deliberate indifference, failure to protect, and
excessive force, as well as several state law causes of action.21 He claims to have exhausted all
his administrative remedies and seeks compensatory and punitive damages against Lt. Peterson,
as well as court costs and attorney fees.22

13

Id. at 10 (¶¶ 18-19).
Id. at 10 (¶ 20).
15
Id. at 10 (¶ 21).
16
Id. at 10 (¶ 23).
17
Ibid.
18
Id. at 10-11 (¶ 24).
19
Id. at 11 (¶ 26).
20
Id. at 11 (¶ 25).
21
Id. at 12. Though Lexis brings several state law claims, the court limits its review for purposes of 28 U.S.C. §
1915A to federal law claims. That is because the core purpose of an initial review order is to make a speedy initialscreening determination of whether the lawsuit may proceed at all in federal court and should be served upon any of
the named defendants. If there are no facially plausible federal law claims against any of the named defendants, then
the court would decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. On
the other hand, if there are any viable federal law claims that remain, then the validity of any accompanying state
law claims may be appropriately addressed in the usual course by way of a motion to dismiss or motion for
summary judgment. More generally, the Court’s determination for purposes of an initial review order under 28
U.S.C. § 1915A that any claim may proceed against a defendant is without prejudice to the right of any defendant to
seek dismissal of any claims by way of a motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment.
22
Doc. #1 at 12-13.
14

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DISCUSSION
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must review a prisoner’s civil complaint
against a government entity or government actors and “identify cognizable claims or dismiss the
complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint—(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief.” A complaint may not survive an initial review under § 1915A
unless it alleges facts that, taken as true, give rise to plausible grounds for relief. See Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). If the prisoner is proceeding pro se, the allegations of the
complaint must be read liberally to raise the strongest arguments they suggest. See Meadows v.
United Servs., Inc., 963 F.3d 240, 243 (2d Cir. 2020) (per curiam). Still, even a pro se complaint
may not survive dismissal if its factual allegations do not establish plausible grounds for relief.
Ibid.
Lexis seeks relief under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.23 But, given the
nature of his allegations, only the Fourteenth Amendment is potentially applicable. The Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment constrains only the federal government, Dusenbery v.
United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167 (2002), and the Eighth Amendment applies only to punishment
following conviction. See Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017).
Nevertheless, Lexis’s federal claims—for deliberate indifference to health and safety and
for excessive force—are both cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Frost v. New
York City Police Dep’t, 980 F.3d 231, 251 (2d Cir. 2020) (excessive force); Darnell, 849 F.3d at

23

Id. at 5.

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29-34 & n.9 (deliberate indifference). I consider each in turn. Construing Lexis’s complaint
liberally, I also examine whether he states a claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs.
Deliberate indifference (health and safety)
Lexis alleges separate counts for deliberate indifference to health and safety and for
failure to protect, but they form the same cause of action. See Morgan v. Dzurenda, 956 F.3d 84,
89 (2d Cir. 2020) (Eighth Amendment context). An inmate seeking to bring such a claim must
allege facts which satisfy “(1) an ‘objective prong’ showing that the plaintiff’s condition of
confinement posed an unreasonable risk of serious harm to the plaintiff, and (2) a ‘mens rea
prong’ showing that the state actor’s conduct amounts to deliberate indifference to that
objectively serious risk of harm.” Simms v. Durant, 2021 WL 293567, at *2 (D. Conn. 2021)
(citing Darnell, 849 F.3d at 29). The mental state requirement of the second prong “roughly
means recklessness.” Darnell, 849 F.3d at 29.
In light of this standard, Lexis’s claim for deliberate indifference to health and safety may
proceed. Exposure to a chemical agent that causes burning and difficulty breathing creates a risk
of serious harm. See, e.g., Ruffino v. Franco, 2017 WL 132835, at *1-2 (D. Conn. 2017)
(permitting deliberate indifference claim against officer who intentionally sprayed plaintiff with
a chemical agent). In addition, Lt. Peterson was allegedly aware of the risk of his actions—he
knew that Lexis was present in the cell, and Lexis told him that he was suffering from the
repeated use of the chemical agent. The record does not presently reflect any reason why Lt.
Peterson needed to use a chemical agent. An inference of recklessness follows from these facts.
Accordingly, Lexis has stated a claim for deliberate indifference to health and safety.

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Excessive force
The use of excessive force against a pre-trial detainee like Lexis violates the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See Frost, 980 F.3d at 251. The use of force is excessive if
“taken with an expressed intent to punish,” if the force is “not rationally related to a legitimate
nonpunitive governmental purpose,” or if the force “appear[s] excessive in relation to that
[legitimate nonpunitive] purpose.” Id. at 252. In determining whether force is excessive, a court
must consider whether the force was “objectively unreasonable,” as determined from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397
(2015). Considerations that may help answer the question include “the relationship between the
need for the use of force and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any
effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security
problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was
actively resisting.” Ibid.
Courts in this circuit have sometimes refused to allow inmates to proceed with excessive
force claims when they have been incidentally exposed to a chemical agent. In Cruz-Droz v.
Marquis, 2018 WL 1368907 (D. Conn. 2018), the court rejected an excessive force claim when
the inmate was inadvertently sprayed with a chemical agent as part of a correctional officer’s
efforts to subdue his cellmate. Id. at *3. Likewise, in White v. City of New York, 2017 WL
3575700 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), the court encountered a plaintiff who had been unintentionally
exposed to a chemical agent deployed to break up a fight between other inmates. Id. at *1. The
court concluded that the plaintiff could not proceed with an excessive force claim. Id. at *5.

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Nevertheless, I am mindful that excessive force claims “turn[] on the facts and
circumstances of each particular case.” Frost, 980 F.3d at 252. And here, I cannot say that Lt.
Peterson’s alleged actions were necessarily reasonable in light of the factors set out in Kingsley.
To start, it is not clear that the uncooperative inmate (Williams) posed a significant security
threat. Williams was disobeying Lt. Peterson’s order to submit to handcuffing, but the facts of
the complaint offer little other reason to believe he was likely to cause harm or that it was
necessary to require him to submit to handcuffing. He was secured in his cell at the time of the
incident, and no altercation was ongoing. By contrast, in Cruz-Droz, the defendant deployed the
chemical agent to subdue an inmate who was prone to violent tendencies and actively
undergoing a psychotic episode. See Cruz-Droz, 2018 WL 1368907, at *1. Similarly, in White,
officers deployed the chemical agent to stop a fight. See White, 2017 WL 3575700, at *1.
In this context, the amount of force Lt. Peterson deployed plausibly appears
disproportionate to the needs of the situation. Cruz-Droz and White involved a single use of the
chemical agent. Cruz-Droz, 2018 WL 1368907, at *1; White, 2017 WL 3575700, at *1. Here, Lt.
Peterson sprayed repeatedly into Lexis’s cell, despite a lack of evidence that using the chemical
agent was serving any useful purpose. The spray did not end the standoff. Instead, the situation
resolved several hours later when Williams voluntarily submitted to handcuffing.
Indeed, the chemical agent was worse than ineffective. It actively caused Lexis—a
compliant inmate—severe distress, which Lexis conveyed to Lt. Peterson. Yet Lt. Peterson
continued to use the chemical agent.
In light of the specific facts of this case, I conclude that Lexis has plausibly alleged a
claim for the use of excessive force. The situation, as described by Lexis, was not serious enough

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to justify Lt. Peterson’s decision to expose a bystander to repeated sprays of a chemical agent,
particularly when that agent caused noticeable harm to that innocent party. Lexis’s excessive
force claim may proceed.
Deliberate indifference (medical needs)
Though Lexis does not raise this cause of action explicitly, the facts of his complaint also
suggest a claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs. The elements of a deliberate
indifference to medical needs claim parallel those for deliberate indifference to health and safety.
An inmate must demonstrate an objectively serious medical need and a culpable mental state.
Charles v. Orange Cnty., 925 F.3d 73, 86 (2d Cir. 2019). The first prong requires “a condition of
urgency such as one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain.” Ibid. The second
prong demands “culpable recklessness, i.e., an act or a failure to act that evinces a conscious
disregard of a substantial risk of serious harm.” Darby v. Greenman, 14 F.4th 124, 128 (2d Cir.
2021).
Here, Lt. Peterson is alleged to have ignored Lexis’s pleas for medical attention when he
had pain and difficulty breathing as a result of the chemical agent. Instead, he made Lexis wait
several hours while his standoff with Williams resolved. These facts are sufficient to state a
claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs. The pain resulting from being sprayed with a
chemical agent may be serious enough to fulfill the first prong of the deliberate indifference
inquiry. See Cruz-Droz, 2018 WL 1368907, at *4; see also Al-Bukhari v. Semple, 2017 WL
2125746, at *4 (D. Conn. 2017). Likewise, Lt. Peterson’s alleged actions here evince deliberate
disregard for Lexis’s need. Lexis communicated his difficulties breathing to Lt. Peterson, and
other inmates who observed the incident told Lt. Peterson that Lexis required medical attention.

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Accordingly, Lexis has alleged plausible grounds for relief for deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court enters the following orders:
(1) Lexis may proceed with his Fourteenth Amendment claims against Lt. Peterson for
deliberate indifference to health and safety, excessive force, and deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs. These claims may proceed against Lt. Peterson in his individual capacity
for money damages. The Court otherwise DISMISSES Lexis’s remaining claims against
Peterson.
(2) The Clerk shall verify the current work address for Lt. Peterson with the DOC Office
of Legal Affairs, mail a waiver of service of process request packet containing the complaint to
Lt. Peterson at the confirmed address within twenty-one (21) days of this Order, and report to
the Court on the status of the waiver request by no later than the thirty-fifth (35) day after
mailing. If Lt. Peterson fails to return the waiver request, the Clerk shall arrange for in-person
service by the U.S. Marshals Service on that defendant, and Lt. Peterson shall be required to pay
the costs of such service in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d).
(3) Lt. Peterson shall file a response to the complaint, either an answer or motion to
dismiss, within sixty (60) days from the date that the notice of lawsuit and waiver of service of
summons forms are mailed to him.
(4) The Clerk shall send a courtesy copy of the complaint and this Order to the DOC
Office of Legal Affairs.
(5) The discovery deadline is extended to six months (180 days) from the date of this

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Order. The parties must comply with the District of Connecticut “Standing Order Re: Initial
Discovery Disclosures” which the Clerk must send to plaintiff with a copy of this order. The
order also can be found at http://ctd.uscourts.gov/district-connecticut-public-standing-orders.
Note that discovery requests should not be filed with the Court. In the event of a dispute over
discovery, the parties should make a good faith effort to resolve the dispute amongst themselves;
then, the parties should file the appropriate motion to compel on the docket.
(6) The deadline for summary judgment motions is extended to seven months (210 days)
from the date of this Order.
(7) Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7(a), a nonmoving party must respond to a dispositive
motion (i.e., a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment) within twenty-one (21)
days of the date the motion was filed. If no response is filed, or the response is not timely, the
Court may grant the dispositive motion without further proceedings.
(8) If Lexis changes his address at any time during the litigation of this case, Local Court
Rule 83.1(c)2 provides that he MUST notify the court. Failure to do so can result in the dismissal
of the case. Lexis must give notice of a new address even if he is incarcerated. He should write
PLEASE NOTE MY NEW ADDRESS on the notice. It is not enough to just put the new address
on a letter without indicating that it is a new address. If Lexis has more than one pending case, he
must indicate all of the case numbers in the notification of change of address. Lexis must also
notify the defendant or defense counsel of his new address.
(9) Lexis shall utilize the Prisoner E-Filing Program when filing documents with the
Court. Lexis is advised that the Program may be used only to file documents with the Court. As
discovery requests are not filed with the Court, the parties must serve discovery requests on each

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other by regular mail.
It is so ordered.
Dated at New Haven this 8th day of May 2024.
s/ Jeffrey Alker Meyer
Jeffrey Alker Meyer
United States District Judge

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