Carmona v. Sliya et al

Filing 21

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER: For the reasons stated in the attached memorandum, (1) Plaintiff may PROCEED with his claims against Defendant Sliya in her individual capacity; (2) Plaintiff's claims against Defendants UHC, Drs. Pina and Ferreira, and Plaintiff's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).If Plaintiff wishes to proceed immediately only on the claims set forth in item one against Defe ndant Sliya in her individual capacity only, he may do so without further delay. If Plaintiff selects this option, he shall file a notice on the docket on or before Friday, September 27, 2024, informing the Court that he elects to proceed with service as to the claims in question.Alternatively, if Plaintiff wishes to attempt to replead any of the claims asserted in his complaint that have been dismissed in order to attempt to state a viable claim, he may file an amended complaint by Friday, October 11, 2024.Signed by Judge Vernon D. Oliver on 8/28/2024. (Balkoski, S)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
--------------------------------------------------------------ALFONSO CARMONA,

x
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
:
-against:
MARYELLEN SLIYA, MATTHEW PINA, JOEL:
FERREIRA, and UCONN HEALTH CENTER,
:
:
Defendants.
x
--------------------------------------------------------------VERNON D. OLIVER, United States District Judge:

INITIAL REVIEW
ORDER RE:
COMPLAINT
3:24-CV-814 (VDO)

Plaintiff Alfonso Carmona, a sentenced inmate incarcerated at Osborn Correctional
Institution (“Osborn”), 1 filed this case pro se pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against UConn Health
Center, Drs. Matthew Pina and Joel Ferreira, and New Haven Correctional Center nurse
Maryellen Sliya. (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 1.) Plaintiff alleges a Fourteenth Amendment deliberate
indifference claim and state law negligence claim against these defendants. (Id. at 7–8.) Plaintiff
seeks monetary damages and declaratory and injunctive relief. (Id. at 8–9.)
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts review complaints brought
by prisoners seeking relief against a government entity or officer or employee of a government
entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Upon review, the Court must dismiss the complaint, or any portion

1

The Department of Correction website lists Plaintiff as a sentenced inmate; he was sentenced in
May of 2024 to thirty-three months of incarceration and is currently housed at Osborn Correctional
Institution.
Connecticut
State
Department
of
Correction,
CT
Inmate
Info,
http://www.ctinmateinfo.state.ct.us/detailsupv.asp?id_inmt_num=214656 (last visited August 23,
2024). The Court may take judicial notice of this website. See, e.g., Mangiafico v. Blumenthal, 471
F.3d 391, 398 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Rivera, 466 F. Supp. 3d 310, 313 (D. Conn. 2020)
(taking judicial notice of BOP inmate locator information); Ligon v. Doherty, 208 F. Supp. 2d 384,
386 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (taking judicial notice of state prison website inmate locator information).

of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915(b). The Court has thoroughly reviewed all factual allegations in the
complaint and conducted an initial review of the allegations therein pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915A.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
While the Court does not set forth all of the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint, it

summarizes his basic factual allegations here to give context to its rulings below. The Court
treats references to
Plaintiff alleges he entered the New Haven Correctional Center (“NHCC”) on March 8,
2023, after sustaining a gunshot wound to his left arm. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 11.) Plaintiff was taken to
UConn Medical Center (“UMC”), where doctors assessed his injuries and recommended
surgery. (Id. ¶ 12.) Dr. Matthew Pina performed surgery on Plaintiff on March 17, 2023. (Id.
¶ 13.) Plaintiff was then outfitted with a cast and sling and ordered to attend physical therapy.
(Id.) Dr. Joel Ferreira wrote discharge orders requiring Plaintiff to wear the cast and sling for
ninety days to help his arm heal properly and prevent further damage. (Id. ¶ 14.)
Plaintiff sought material to cover the cast from jail nurse Maryellen Sliya during the first
three days he returned to jail. (See id. ¶ 15.) Sliya did not help Plaintiff shower or cover the cast.
(Id. ¶ 16.) Sliya had to remove the cast on April 20, 2023, because it got wet in the shower. (Id.
¶ 17.) Plaintiff’s arm was in severe pain the following day. (Id. ¶ 18.) A nurse took Plaintiff to
see Sliya. (Id.) Sliya told Plaintiff and the nurse that Plaintiff needed to put in a request slip to
see her. (Id. ¶ 19.) The nurse told Sliya that Plaintiff’s bone was sticking out of his arm. (Id.)

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Plaintiff was then taken back to UConn Health Center (“UHC”) to see Drs. Pina and
Ferreira, who advised Plaintiff that he “re-broke” his arm and that they would have to perform
surgery on it in five days. (Id. ¶ 20.) Plaintiff told the doctors that he was in severe pain. (Id. ¶
21.) The doctors told Plaintiff that they would recommend that the jail give him pain medication.
(Id.) When Plaintiff returned to NHCC, Sliya did not give Plaintiff pain medication or a lower
bunk pass. (Id. ¶ 22.) In addition, Sliya did not help Plaintiff shower. (Id.)
UHC did not schedule Plaintiff’s surgery within five days, as Drs. Pina and Ferreira
ordered. (Id. ¶ 23.) Instead, UHC scheduled Plaintiff’s surgery fourteen days after his visit with
the doctors. (Id.) In the meantime, Plaintiff could not move from his top bunk, which prevented
him from showering or eating. (Id. ¶ 24.) Drs. Pina and Ferreira performed surgery on Plaintiff
on May 2, 2023. (Id. ¶ 25.) The doctors had to add extra bone and skin to repair Plaintiff’s arm.
(Id.) Plaintiff now has no feeling in three of his fingers and only limited mobility in his arm. (Id.
¶ 26.) He cannot lift five pounds. (Id.) He has not received physical therapy, despite his ongoing
pain and limitations. (Id.)
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, courts must review prisoner civil complaints in which a

prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity and dismiss any portion that “(1) is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2).
Although highly detailed allegations are not required, the complaint must “contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the Court
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to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678. This plausibility standard is not a “probability requirement” but imposes a
standard higher than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.
In undertaking this analysis, the court must “draw all reasonable inferences in [the
plaintiff’s] favor, assume all well-pleaded factual allegations to be true, and determine whether
they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Faber v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 98,
104 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the court is “not bound to
accept conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions,” id.,
and “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678.
With respect to pro se litigants, it is well-established that “[p]ro se submissions are
reviewed with special solicitude, and ‘must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the
strongest arguments that they suggest.’” Matheson v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 706 F.
App’x 24, 26 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 47475 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam)). However, pro se litigants are still required to comply with Rule
8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Wynder v. McMahon, 360 F.3d 73, 79 n.11
(2d Cir. 2004) (“[T]he basic requirements of Rule 8 apply to self-represented and counseled
plaintiffs alike.”). Rule 8 requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “fair
notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
(alteration in original). A statement of claim that is not short and direct places “an unjustified
burden on the court and the party who must respond to it because they are forced to select the
relevant material from a mass of verbiage.” Harden v. Doe, No. 19-CV-3839 (CM), 2019 WL
4

2578157, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2019) (quoting Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d
Cir. 1988)) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
III.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff raises a claim of deliberate indifference under the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments and a negligence claim under Connecticut state law. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 27–31.)
A.

Defendants Subject to Suit

Section 1983 “provides a private right of action against any person who, acting under
color of state law, causes another person to be subjected to the deprivation of rights under the
Constitution or federal law.” Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252, 264 (2d Cir. 1999). Plaintiff
claims that all defendants have violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (See ECF
No. 1 ¶¶ 27–30.)
Plaintiff cannot assert any plausible claim under § 1983 against UHC because no state,
state agency, or division thereof is a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Will
v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding that § 1983 claims cannot
proceed against states and agencies that are “arms of the State”); Blaine v. UConn Health Care,
No. 3:18-CV-359 (MPS), 2018 WL 1368909, at *2 (D. Conn. Mar. 16, 2018) (dismissing claim
against a University of Connecticut healthcare office because it is a division of a state agency
and not a “person” subject to suit). Thus, Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim against UHC
is dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
Typically, private doctors are not considered to act “under color of state law.” See, e.g.,
Hofelich v. Hopkins, No. 07-CV-6549FE, 2009 WL 210449, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2009)
(concluding that “Telemed Doctor is a private actor and therefore is not a ‘person’ acting under
color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”). But “[t]here are several circumstances
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under which a private doctor providing medical care in a private hospital could be acting under
color of state law.” Coffey v. Coniglio, No. 05-CV-6133P, 2005 WL 1631057, at *2 (W.D.N.Y.
July 1, 2005). One of those circumstances is when a private doctor is hired by the state to provide
medical care to prisoners. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 52 n.10, 57 (1988) (private physician
hired by state to provide medical care to prisoners was state actor because doctor was hired to
fulfill state’s constitutional obligation to attend to necessary medical care of prison inmates).
Because Plaintiff alleges that Drs. Pina and Ferreira were employed by UHC, which is contracted
to provide medical care to prisoners (see ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 5–7), the doctors are subject to suit under
§ 1983.
Plaintiff sues the doctors and jail nurse in their individual capacities. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 8.) To
sue a defendant in his or her individual capacity, Plaintiff must allege facts showing that each
defendant against whom he seeks damages was personally involved in the alleged constitutional
violation. Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[P]ersonal involvement of
defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under
§ 1983.”) (quoting Moffitt v. Town of Brookfield, 950 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1991)). As the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has clarified, “there is no special rule for
supervisory liability.” Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 618 (2d Cir. 2020). Thus, a plaintiff
must plead and prove the elements of the underlying constitutional violation directly against a
state official without relying on a special test for supervisory liability. Id. at 620.
B.

Deliberate Indifference Claim for Damages

Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee when the events in question happened. (See ECF No. 1
at 1.) While Plaintiff brings his deliberate indifference claim under both the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments (see id. ¶¶ 27–31), deliberate indifference claims brought by pretrial
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detainees should be analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Eighth Amendment. See
Valdiviezo v. Boyer, 752 F. App’x 29, 32–33 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order) (observing that
pretrial detainees’ claims of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs should be evaluated
under Fourteenth Amendment standard rather than Eighth Amendment standard).
There are two prongs to a Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference to medical
needs claim. Under the first prong, a detainee must allege that his or her medical need or
condition was “a serious one.” Brock v. Wright, 315 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 2003). A “sufficiently
serious” deprivation can exist if the plaintiff suffers from an urgent medical condition that can
cause death, degeneration, or extreme or chronic pain. Id. at 162–63. Under the second prong, a
detainee must allege that the prison official “acted intentionally to impose the alleged condition,
or recklessly failed to act with reasonable care to mitigate the risk that the condition posed to
[him or her] even though the [prison]-official knew, or should have known, that the condition
posed an excessive risk to health or safety.” Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2017).
Deliberate indifference can include indifference “manifested by prison doctors in their response
to the prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical
care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 105–06 (1976).
Plaintiff has satisfied the first prong because his broken arm was a “sufficiently serious”
medical condition. See Villafane v. Sposato, No. 16-CV-3674 (JFB) (AKT), 2017 WL 4179855,
at *20 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. 16-CV-3674 (JFB)
(AKT), 2017 WL 4157220 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2017) (collecting cases) (finding that plaintiff’s
broken arm constitutes a sufficiently serious medical condition).

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Plaintiff has also satisfied the second prong in his claim against jail nurse Sliya. A prison
official’s failure to follow a doctor’s discharge orders constitutes deliberate indifference. See,
e.g., Durr v. Slator, 558 F. Supp. 3d 1, 23–24 (N.D.N.Y. 2021) (plaintiff’s claims “that prison
officials failed to follow discharge instructions of a physician to schedule further medical care
for the plaintiff are sufficient to establish a claim for deliberate indifference.”); Benn v. Nassau
Cnty., No. 10-CV-1963(JS)(AKT), 2010 WL 2976540, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2010) (failure
to comply with doctor’s order sufficient to state plausible deliberate indifference claim on initial
review).
Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Ferreira wrote discharge orders requiring Plaintiff to wear the
cast and sling for ninety days to help his arm heal properly and prevent further damage. (ECF
No. 1 ¶ 14.) Plaintiff sought material to cover the cast from Sliya during the first three days he
returned to jail (see id. ¶ 15), but she did not provide him anything to cover the cast. (See id. ¶
16.) Sliya then had to remove the cast because it got wet in the shower. (Id. ¶ 17.) Removing the
cast resulted in Plaintiff’s bone sticking out of his arm (id. ¶ 19), which required another surgery.
(See id. ¶ 20.) Because Sliya failed to follow the doctor’s discharge orders to keep the cast dry,
Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim for damages against Sliya may proceed.
Plaintiff’s claims against the doctors, however, must be dismissed. Plaintiff alleges that
the doctors were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs because they did not perform
surgery within five days, as they had ordered. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 23, 28–29.) However, Plaintiff
does not allege that this delay in his surgery was caused by Drs. Pina and Ferreira. Instead, he
alleges that UHC—not the doctors—scheduled Plaintiff’s surgery fifteen days after his visit with
the doctors. (See id. ¶ 23.) Just as an employer is not liable under § 1983 for the constitutional
torts of its employees under a respondeat superior theory, see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs, 436
8

U.S. 658, 694 (1978), an employee is not liable under § 1983 for the constitutional torts of his
employer. See Schwartz v. Booker, 702 F.3d 573, 583 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding that “no DHS
employee could be liable under a ‘reverse respondeat superior’ theory for the actions of the
department.”). Rather, a plaintiff must plead and prove the elements of the underlying
constitutional violation directly against a state official. Tangreti, 983 F.3d at 620. Because the
complaint alleges that UHC scheduled the surgery, the doctors cannot be held liable for that
decision. Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim for damages against the doctors must be
dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
C.

Negligence Claim for Damages Under Connecticut Law

Plaintiff also sues Defendants for negligence under Connecticut law. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 31.)
He claims Defendants were negligent by delaying his surgery and by failing to treat his broken
arm, provide physical therapy, or provide further examinations for his broken arm. (Id.) The
federal claim against UHC and its doctors has been dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
The district court has discretion to retain or decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law
claim asserted against a defendant who has no federal claims pending against him. Briarpatch
Ltd., L.P. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 308 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that the court can
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim even if “asserted against a party
different from the one named in the federal claim” but “[t]he fact that the district court has the
power to hear these supplemental claims does not mean, of course, that it must do so. Instead,
it may decline to exercise its power based on the facts laid out in 28 U.S.C. § 13676(c).”); Kaplan
v. County of Orange, 528 F. Supp. 3d 141, 160–61 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (declining to exercise
jurisdiction over state law claims against certain defendants against whom no federal claims
were pending; discussing discretion to do so; and citing cases). As the federal claims have been
9

dismissed against UHC and its doctors, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the state law negligence claim against them. But because the federal claim against Sliya
may proceed, the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law
negligence claim against her.
To state a claim for negligence under Connecticut law, a plaintiff must adequately plead
the familiar elements of duty, breach, causation, and actual injury. Radesky v. First Am. Title
Ins. Co., No. 02-CV-1304 (JBA), 2003 WL 22119183, at *5 (D. Conn. Aug. 29, 2003). UHC—
not Sliya—was responsible for the delayed surgery. But Sliya was responsible for providing
medical treatment to Plaintiff for his broken arm while in jail. As a jail nurse, Sliya had a duty
to provide medical care to Plaintiff even though he had been treated by an outside doctor. See
Gil v. Vogilano, 131 F. Supp. 2d 486, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting that “a municipality’s duty
to provide medical care to inmates is non-delegable and is not absolved by contracting with a
third party to provide care.”). Sliya breached that duty by failing to provide a covering for
Plaintiff’s cast per the doctor’s order. (See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 15–16.) This failure led directly to the
cast becoming wet in the shower, resulting in its removal. (Id. ¶ 17.) Failure to ensure the
integrity of the cast resulted in a compound fracture that required a second surgery and caused
long-term, if not permanent, injury. (Id. ¶¶ 19–20, 26.) Plaintiff’s negligence claim against Sliya
is adequately pled at this early stage and may proceed.
D.

Request for Declaratory Relief

Plaintiff also seeks declaratory relief. (ECF No. 1 at 8–9.) Plaintiff seeks declaratory
relief in the form of statements that Defendant’s actions violated his Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. (Id.) Declaratory relief serves to “settle legal rights and remove uncertainty
from legal relationships without awaiting a violation of the rights or a disturbance of the
10

relationships.” Colabella v. Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accts., No. 10-CV-229 (KAM) (ALC),
2011 WL 4532132, at *22 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2011) (citation omitted). As such, “[d]eclaratory
relief operates prospectively to enable parties to adjudicate claims before either side suffers great
damages.” Orr v. Waterbury Police Dep’t, No. 17-CV-788 (VAB), 2018 WL 780218, at *7 (D.
Conn. Feb. 8, 2018). In Orr, the court dismissed the request for a declaration that the defendants
had violated the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights during his arrest because the request
“concern[ed] past actions.” Id. As Plaintiff’s request for declaratory relief here concerns a past
incident, any request for declaratory relief would not be cognizable. Plaintiff’s request for
declaratory relief is therefore dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
E.

Request for Injunctive Relief

Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief. (See ECF No. 1 at 9.) He seeks an order compelling
Defendants to provide follow-up medical care and physical therapy. (See id.) But Defendants
are named in their individual capacities only. (See id. ¶ 8.) “[I]njunctive relief against a state
official may be recovered only in an official capacity suit…because [a] victory in a personalcapacity action is a victory against the individual defendant, rather than against the entity that
employs him.” Marsh v. Kirschner, 31 F. Supp. 2d 79, 80 (D. Conn. 1998) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). Thus, Plaintiff cannot seek injunctive relief against the state officials
in their individual capacities. Altayeb v. Chapdelaine, No. 16-CV-67 (CSH), 2016 WL 7331551,
at *3 (D. Conn. Dec. 16, 2016).
But even if Sliya had been named in her official capacity, Plaintiff has been transferred
from NHCC to Osborn Correctional Institution. (See, supra, note 1.) Thus, his request for
injunctive relief is moot. See Prins v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 504, 506 (2d Cir. 1996) (“It is settled in
this Circuit that a transfer from a prison facility moots an action for injunctive relief against the
11

transferring facility.” (citing Young v. Coughlin, 866 F.2d 567, 568 n.1 (2d Cir. 1989) and Beyah
v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 988 (2d Cir. 1986))). Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is
dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
F.

Appointment of Counsel

Lastly, Plaintiff requests the Court to appoint counsel. (See ECF No. 1 at 10.) Plaintiff
already moved for appointment of counsel. (See ECF No. 19.) That motion was denied. (See
ECF No. 20.) Thus, Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from making this request again unless he
has “contacted the Inmates’ Legal Aid Program (“ILAP”), the organization under contract with
the Department of Correction to provide legal assistance to inmates” and has been denied
assistance from ILAP. (See id.)
IV.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants UHC, Drs. Matthew Pina and Joel Ferreira, and the

claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). The case will proceed against Defendant Maryellen Sliya in her
individual capacity on Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference and state law
negligence claims for damages.
Plaintiff has two options as to how to proceed in response to this Initial Review
Order:
(1) If Plaintiff wishes to proceed immediately only on the claims set forth above
against Defendant Maryellen Sliya in her individual capacity only, he may do so without further
delay. If Plaintiff selects this option, he shall file a notice on the docket on or before Friday,
September 27, 2024, informing the Court that he elects to proceed with service as to the

12

claims set forth in this paragraph. The Court will then begin the effort to serve process on
Defendant Silva in her individual capacity as described above.
(2) Alternatively, if Plaintiff wishes to attempt to replead any of the claims asserted in
his complaint that have been dismissed in order to attempt to state a viable claim, he may file an
amended complaint by Friday, October 11, 2024. An amended complaint, if filed, will
completely replace the complaint, and the Court will not consider any allegations made in
the original complaint in evaluating any amended complaint. The Court will review any
amended complaint after filing to determine whether it may proceed to service of process on any
defendants named therein. If Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint, the complaint this
Initial Review Order addresses will not proceed to service of process on any defendant.
If the Court receives no response from Plaintiff by Tuesday, October 15, 2024, the Court
will presume that Plaintiff wishes to proceed on the complaint as to the claims permitted to go
forward in this Initial Review Order, and Plaintiff will have to show good cause if he seeks to
amend the complaint in any manner in the future.
Changes of Address. If Plaintiff changes his address at any time during the litigation of
this case, Local Rule 83.1(d) provides that he MUST notify the Court. Failure to do so can result
in the dismissal of the case. Plaintiff must give notice of a new address even if he is incarcerated.
Plaintiff should write “PLEASE NOTE MY NEW ADDRESS” on the notice. It is not enough
to just put the new address on a letter without indicating that it is a new address. If Plaintiff has
more than one pending case, he should indicate all the case numbers in the notification of change
of address. Plaintiff should also notify Defendants or counsel for Defendants of his new address.

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SO ORDERED.
Hartford, Connecticut
August 28, 2024
/s/ Vernon D. Oliver
VERNON D. OLIVER
United States District Judge

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