Arias v. State of Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection

Filing 41

ORDER denying 15 Motion to Dismiss. For the reasons set forth in the attached ruling and order, the Court DENIES Defendant's motion to dismiss. Signed by Judge Victor A. Bolden on 03/07/2025. (Fogel, M.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
STARLEY ARIAS,
Plaintiff,
v.

No. 3:24-cv-01060 (VAB)

STATE OF CONNECTICUT
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,
Defendant.
RULING AND ORDER ON THE MOTION TO DISMISS
Starley Arias (“Plaintiff”) previously worked for the Connecticut Department of Energy
and Environmental Protection (“DEEP” or “Defendant”). He claims to have been discriminated
against, harassed, and ultimately fired because of his race, color, and gender. He also claims to
have been retaliated against for filing charges of Discrimination with the Connecticut
Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (“CCHRO”) and the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). He seeks declaratory and monetary relief on four counts
alleging discrimination and harassment as to his race, color, and gender, and retaliation under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000, et. seq.
DEEP has filed a motion to dismiss Mr. Arias’s Complaint. 1

In his original Complaint, Plaintiff also sought relief on four counts based on violations of the Connecticut Fair
Employment Practices Act (“CFEPA”), Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-60(b)(1). Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 76-104 (June 19,
2024). Following DEEP’s filing of its motion to dismiss, ECF No. 15, Plaintiff conceded that the counts in the
Complaint based on CFEPA must be dismissed as they were barred by sovereign immunity. Reply to Resp. to Mot.
to Dismiss, ECF No. 31 at 1 (Oct. 10, 2024). Thus, only the counts under Title VII, Counts 1–4 of the Complaint,
remain, and the Court need not and will not address DEEP’s arguments under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(1).
DEEP also raised arguments under Rules 12(b)(2), and 12(b))5), regarding lack of personal jurisdiction, and for
insufficiency of service. ECF No. 15 at 4-5. Following Mr. Arias’ response to its motion to dismiss, DEEP now
“agrees that the Plaintiff has now properly served the Defendant and withdraws its personal jurisdiction argument.”
Reply at 1. As a result, the Court need not and does not address any of the arguments related to these provisions of
Rule 12.
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For the reasons stated herein, the motion to dismiss is DENIED.
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Factual Allegations 2
Starley Arias is a resident of the State of Connecticut, and a Hispanic male with an

allegedly dark complexion. Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 4, 10 (June 19, 2024). On August 27, 2020,
DEEP allegedly hired him as a research analyst. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. Research analysts allegedly are
considered “trainees” until they successfully complete two years of employment, at which point
they are elevated to the full position of research analyst; and Mr. Arias allegedly expected this
promotion after successful completion of two years of employment. Id. ¶ 13. The promotion
allegedly results in increased benefits including increased pay. Id. ¶ 14.
At all relevant times, Victoria Hackett was the Deputy Commissioner of DEEP. Id. ¶15.
She is allegedly not a member of any of Mr. Arias’s protected classes. Id. ¶16. Starting from the
beginning of his tenure, Ms. Hackett would allegedly express unfounded criticisms of Mr. Arias,
including stating that he would be unable to handle the transition to full employment with DEEP
and that he might “go rogue.” Id. ¶ 17. Ms. Hackett allegedly never expressed unfounded
criticisms about similarly situated employees. Id.
Hackett’s criticisms were allegedly unfounded because, from his date-of-hire to
approximately December 2021, Mr. Arias allegedly performed his duties in at least a satisfactory
manner, according to DEEP’s employee service ratings in periodic departmental reviews. Id. ¶¶
18–19.

The following facts are taken from Mr. Arias’s complaint. They are set forth in the light most favorable to Mr.
Arias as the non-moving party whose allegations are accepted as true for the purposes of evaluating a motion to
dismiss.

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Around January 2022, DEEP allegedly appointed Shubhada Kambli as Mr. Arias’s
supervisor. Ms. Kambli is allegedly not a member of any of Mr. Arias’s protected classes. Id. ¶
22. In April 2022, Ms. Kambli allegedly told Mr. Arias that his work was not at “research analyst
level,” despite his satisfactory ratings on previous employee evaluations. Id. ¶ 25. She also
allegedly scheduled, cancelled, rescheduled, and re-cancelled some of Mr. Arias’s performance
reviews. Id. ¶ 26.
Ms. Kambli allegedly made efforts to “set Plaintiff up for failure,” including an instance
where she sent Mr. Arias an e-mail asking for a response, did not afford him reasonable time to
respond, and then scolded Mr. Arias that he did not respond fast enough. Id. ¶ 27. She also
allegedly chided Mr. Arias for missing her phone calls, despite instances where he was unable to
answer due to being on another work-related phone call or being in the restroom. Id. ¶ 28. She
also allegedly issued him a lower rating on a subsequent employee evaluation despite the fact
that she was only his supervisor for roughly half the evaluative period. Id. ¶ 30.
Because of his hiring date, Mr. Arias’s “trainee” status allegedly should have ended on
August 27, 2022. Because of Ms. Kambli’s lower performance evaluation, however, he allegedly
was not elevated to full research analyst, his training period was extended for an additional six
months, and he was placed on a performance improvement plan. Id. ¶ 31. He thus allegedly did
not receive the increase in pay and benefits afforded to non-trainee research analysts. Id. ¶ 32.
Ms. Kambli allegedly asserted that Mr. Arias had a conflict of interest on a particular
project, despite the fact that he had made a full disclosure to DEEP about any potential conflict
and received clearance to continue on the project. Id. ¶ 33. She also allegedly refused to issue
assignments to Mr. Arias and directed his other coworkers, who were not supervisors, to issue

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work to him instead. Id. ¶ 34. She allegedly set impossible deadlines for Mr. Arias to complete
his work. Id. ¶ 35.
Mr. Arias allegedly complained to his union about Ms. Kambli’s treatment. A union
representative allegedly had at least one meeting with Ms. Kambli, during which she was asked
to provide specific examples of Mr. Arias’s job performance issues, and she was allegedly
unable to do so. Id. ¶ 36.
On October 4, 2022, Mr. Arias’s supervisors allegedly summoned him to a meeting
related to a complaint received about him. Mr. Arias, DEEP’s labor relations specialist, Mr.
Arias’s union representative, and Ms. Kambli all attended the meeting. Once there, Mr. Arias
learned that a complaint had been lodged again him by Deputy Commissioner Hackett, who was
not in attendance. Id. ¶ 37.
At the meeting, the labor relations specialist allegedly described Ms. Hackett’s complaint.
At a work function, Mr. Arias had allegedly been exhibiting signs of agitation, including using
an elevated and confrontational tone of voice. Id. ¶ 38. Ms. Kambli allegedly added that she had
observed Mr. Arias being disengaged, not making eye contact with her, and that his behavior had
a “chilling effect on the group.” Id. The union representative asked if there would be
consequences based on the complaint, and the labor relations specialist allegedly responded that
there would be no formal investigation, but the meeting was called regarding Mr. Arias’s
performance improvement plan. Id.
Mr. Arias alleged that Ms. Kambli “treated other similarly-situated employees differently
than Plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 39. In one instance, Mr. Arias and a female, non-Hispanic colleague
allegedly sent an e-mail to Ms. Kambli regarding a work project. Id. Ms. Kambli allegedly
contacted Mr. Arias and told him that the e-mail was unsatisfactory. But Ms. Kambli allegedly

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told his female, non-Hispanic colleague that the e-mail was “okay” and did not similarly criticize
her. Ms. Kambli also allegedly “rarely, if ever” provided Mr. Arias with the feedback or
supervision he requested but did provide such requested guidance to other similarly situated
employees. Id. ¶¶ 40–41.
Ms. Kambli also allegedly required Mr. Arias to submit a form for requesting an adjusted
work schedule, even when she did not require similarly situated employees to fill out the form
and allowed them to orally make schedule-adjustment requests. Id. ¶ 41. On at least one
occasion, Mr. Arias allegedly submitted the request form, but Ms. Kambli did not process it. Mr.
Arias alleges that Ms. Kambli promptly processed other similarly situated employees’ request
forms. Id. ¶ 42.
On October 12, 2022, Mr. Arias filed charges of discrimination with the CCHRO and
EEOC. Compl. ¶ 43. He alleges that DEEP received a copy of the charges on October 24, 2022.
Id. ¶ 44. After his filing the charges with EEOC and CCHRO, Ms. Kambli allegedly began
treating him differently, including refraining from communicating with Mr. Arias as she had in
the past. Id. ¶ 45. From October 2022 until December 2022, DEEP allegedly never informed Mr.
Arias of any new or additional deficiencies in his performance. Id. ¶ 46. On December 16, 2022,
DEEP allegedly fired Mr. Arias. Id. ¶ 47. Mr. Arias timely and properly exhausted administrative
remedies and filed this lawsuit within ninety days of EEOC and CCHRO releasing jurisdiction.
Id. ¶¶ 6-9.
B. Procedural History
On June 18, 2024, Mr. Arias filed his Complaint. Compl.

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On August 22, 2024, DEEP filed its motion to dismiss the Complaint. Mot. to Dismiss,
ECF No. 15 (Aug. 22, 2024) (“Mot.”); Mem. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 15-1 (Aug.
22, 2024) (“Mem.”).
On September 26, 2024, Mr. Arias filed a memorandum of law in opposition to
Defendant’s motion to dismiss. ECF No. 24, Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss (Sept. 26, 2024)
(“Opp’n”).
On October 10, 2024, DEEP filed a reply in support of their motion to dismiss. Reply in
Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 31 (Oct. 10, 2024) (“Reply”).
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Any claim that fails “to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted” will be dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In reviewing a
complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), a court applies a “plausibility standard” guided by “[t]wo
working principles.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
First, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.; see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007) (“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need
detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment]
to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action will not do.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)). Second, “only a
complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
679. Thus, the complaint must contain “factual amplification . . . to render a claim plausible.”

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Arista Records LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Turkmen v. Ashcroft,
589 F.3d 542, 546 (2d Cir. 2009)).
When reviewing a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court
takes all factual allegations in the complaint as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The court also views
the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and draws all inferences in the
plaintiff’s favor. Cohen v. S.A.C. Trading Corp., 711 F.3d 353, 359 (2d Cir. 2013); see also York
v. Ass’n of the Bar of N.Y.C., 286 F.3d 122, 125 (2d Cir. 2002) (“On a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, we construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
accepting the complaint’s allegations as true.”).
A court considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) generally limits its review
“to the facts as asserted within the four corners of the complaint, the documents attached to the
complaint as exhibits, and any documents incorporated in the complaint by reference.” McCarthy
v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2007). A court may also consider
“matters of which judicial notice may be taken” and “documents either in plaintiffs’ possession
or of which plaintiffs had knowledge and relied on in bringing suit.” Brass v. Am. Film Techs.,
Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 150 (2d Cir. 1993); Patrowicz v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 359 F. Supp.
2d 140, 144 (D. Conn. 2005). 3

Mr. Arias refers to the prima facie standard set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973), to explain his allegations. See e.g., Mem. in Support of Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss 26-27 (Sept. 26, 2024).
But that standard does not apply at the motion to dismiss stage. See Langer v. Hartland Bd. Ed., No. 22-cv-01459
(JAM) 2023 WL 6140792, at *5 (D. Conn. Sept. 20, 2023) (“The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework
applies to the analysis of discrimination claims at summary judgment but not at the stage of a motion to dismiss.”
(collecting cases)); Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 84 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[O]ur decision in
Littlejohn makes clear that a plaintiff is not required to plead a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, at least
as the test was originally formulated, to defeat a motion to dismiss.” (citing Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d
297, 306, 311 (2d Cir. 2015))).

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III.

DISCUSSION
DEEP claims that Mr. Arias fails to plead plausible claims under Title VII for either

discrimination or retaliation. The Court will address each of these arguments in turn.
A. The Discrimination Claims
“[I]n an employment discrimination case, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) the
employer took adverse action against him and (2) his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
was a motivating factor in the employment decision.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist.,
801 F.3d 72, 86 (2d Cir. 2015). The two adverse acts at issue here are DEEP’s refusal to promote
Plaintiff out of the trainee program and DEEP’s termination of Plaintiff. 4 As the Second Circuit
has explained, “the facts alleged in the complaint must provide at least minimal support for the
proposition that the employer was motivated by discriminatory intent” in carrying out the
adverse acts. Id. at 85.
Mr. Arias’s allegations with respect to discriminatory intent are rather thin. Compare
Milledge v. City of Hartford, 19-cv-01104 (JAM), 2020 WL 3510813, at *2 (D. Conn. June 29,

2020) (“What [was] lacking, however, [were] facts to suggest that any of the alleged abuse was
because of [Mr.] Milledge's race . . . . [or that anyone] ‘made any remarks or engaged in any
conduct reflecting race-based animus or stereotypical assumptions about race.’” (emphasis in
original)); with Compl. ¶ 38 (where Mr. Arias said that Ms. Kambli called him “disengaged” and
Ms. Hackett has accused him of being agitated and “confrontational,” but he did not allege that
those allegations were related to his race, color, or gender). Mr. Arias also does not allege much
in the way of facts to show that he was “similarly situated in all material respects to the

“It is well-established that a failure to promote is an adverse employment action,” Barella v. Village of Freeport,
16 F.Supp.3d 144, 162 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (collecting cases), and “[t]ermination is indisputably an adverse action for
the purposes of a Title VII [] claim[].” Chima v. KX Techs., LLC, No. 21-CV-00801 (JCH), 2022 WL 13682064, at
*7 (D. Conn. Oct. 21, 2022).

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individuals with whom he seeks to compare himself.” Milledge, 2020 WL 3510813, at *3 (citing
Brown v. Daikin Am. Inc., 756 F.3d 219, 230 (2d Cir. 2014)). But, given the continued viability
of his Title VII retaliation claim—as discussed below—the Court will exercise its discretion and
not dismiss the discrimination claims now, and await its evaluation after the close of discovery.
See Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 47 (2016) ("[D]istrict courts have the inherent authority to
manage their dockets and courtrooms with a view toward the efficient and expedient resolution
of cases."). Accordingly, the motion to dismiss Mr. Arias’s discrimination claims will be denied,
and any issue regarding the sufficiency of Mr. Arias’s discrimination claims will be addressed
following discovery and the completion, as well as review, of motion for summary judgment
filings.
B. The Retaliation Claims
Title VII also “prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee because
the employee has engaged in protected activity,” and “[p]rotected activity includes opposing an
unlawful employment practice or otherwise making a charge, testifying, assisting, or
participating ‘in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing.’” Banks v. Gen. Motors,
LLC, 81 F.4th 242, 275 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
White, 548 U.S. 53, 62 (2006)). “A plaintiff must show a connection between the protected
activity and the adverse action, that is, that the retaliation was a ‘but-for’ cause of the employer's
adverse action.” Id. Mr. Arias alleges that his filing charges with the CCHRO and EEOC were
the but-for cause of his termination. Compl. ¶ 73; see Langer v. Hartland Bd. Ed., No. 22-cv01459 (JAM), 2023 WL 6140792, at *8 (D. Conn. Sept. 20, 2023) (noting that making a
complaint to CCHRO is protected activity).

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To allege causation, a plaintiff must plausibly demonstrate that a defendant is aware of
the protected activity. Fay v. City of Newburg, No. 21 Civ. 3140 (NSR), 2024 WL 4169552, at
*11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2024) (slip copy) (“[I]t is axiomatic that a defendant ‘must have
knowledge of the protected activity to be able to ‘engage in retaliation.’” (quoting Little v. Nat’l
Broad Co., 210 F. Supp. 2d 330, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citations omitted))).
And, to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the protected
activity was the but-for cause of the employer’s actions. Vega, 801 F.3d at 90 (“Unlike Title VII
discrimination claims, however, for an adverse retaliatory action to be ‘because’ a plaintiff made
a charge, the plaintiff must plausibly allege that the retaliation as the ‘but-for’ cause of the
employer’s adverse action.” (citing Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nasser, 570 U.S. 388, 360
(2013))). “‘But-for causation does not, however, require proof that retaliation was the only cause
of the employer’s action, but only that the adverse action would not have occurred in the absence
of the retaliatory motive.’” Id. at 91 (quoting Zann Kwan v. Andalex Grp., LLC, 737 F.3d 834,
846 (2d Cir. 2013)).
Mr. Arias alleges, on information and belief, that Defendant “received a copy of said
Charges of Discrimination on or about October 24, 2022,” Compl. ¶42, and that DEEP had
knowledge of the CCHRO complaint before his termination. Id. ¶ 44.
DEEP argues that “information and belief” is insufficient to sustain a claim under Title
VII on a motion to dismiss. Mem. at 19 (citing Salu v. Miranda, 830 F.Appx. 341, 346 (2d Cir.
2010)). DEEP also argues that timing is Plaintiff’s only basis for connecting the CCHRO
complaint with his termination, and “[w]here timing is the only basis for a claim of retaliation,
and gradual adverse job actions began well before the plaintiff had ever engaged in any protected

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activity, an inference of retaliation does not arise.” Id. at 19-20 (quoting Slattery v. Swiss Reins.
Am. Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 2001)).
The Court disagrees.
“An allegation based upon information and belief is sufficient to survive a motion to
dismiss . . . where the belief is based on factual information that makes the inference []
plausible.” Shore v. Mirabilio, No. 16-cv-2078 (VLB), 2018 WL 1582548, at *7 (D. Conn.
March 29, 2018) (citing Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2010)); see
Langer, 2023 WL 6140792, at *8 (“[e]ven if a complaint is ultimately without merit, lodging the
complaint is a protected activity so long as it was motivated by a good faith, reasonable belief
that the underlying employment practice was unlawful, and ‘[t]he reasonableness of the
plaintiff’s belief is to be assessed in light of the totality of the circumstances and is evaluated
from the perspective of a reasonable similarly situated person.’” (quoting Leroy v. Delta Air
Lines, No. 21-267-cv 2022 WL 12144507, at *4 (2d Cir. Oct. 27, 2022) (summary order))).
Here, Ms. Kambli’s behavior allegedly changed toward Mr. Arias after she became aware
of the CCHRO filing. Compl. ¶ 45 (“Subsequent to receipt of said Charges of Discrimination,
Defendant began treating Plaintiff differently than in the past. For example, Defendant refrained
from communicating with Plaintiff with the same level of frequency as it had in the past.”). Mr.
Arias also alleged that his termination occurred fifty-three days after DEEP became aware that
Plaintiff filed administrative complaints. Id. ¶ 47. Plaintiff further alleged that his supervisor
“refrained from communicating with [him] with the same level of frequency as [she] had in the
past,” id. ¶ 45, and that he was never informed of “any new or additional deficiencies in his work
performance” between October 2022, when he alleged DEEP was informed of his CCHRO
complaint, and his termination in December 2022. Id. ¶ 46.

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At this stage of the case, these allegations are more than sufficient to survive a motion to
dismiss. Cf. Langer, 2022 WL 12144507, at *8 (“It would be premature . . . to decide now at the
pleadings stage whether [the Plaintiff] had a good faith and reasonable belief to support her
claim of religious discrimination”); id. at *9 (“[R]etaliatory intent may be plausibly inferred from
[the Plaintiff’s] allegations about the rush to fire her even though she raised her concerns about
an immediate return to work.”); see also Banks, 2023 WL 5761361, at *22 (“While this Court
has not drawn a bright line defining . . . the outer limits beyond which a temporal relationship is
too attenuated to establish causation, we have previously held that a period of several months can
demonstrate a causal connection between the protected activity and the alleged adverse action.”).
Indeed, beyond temporal proximity, Mr. Arias alleges having received no additional
negative feedback between early October and his termination in December, despite being on a
performance plan, allegations sufficient, at least right now, to support the inference “that the
adverse action would not have occurred in the absence of the retaliatory motive.” Vega, 801 F.3d
at 91 (quoting Zann Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 GF.3d 834, 846 (2d Cir. 2013)); see
Langer, 2022 WL 12144507, at *9 (“[I]t would be premature . . . at the pleadings stage to weigh
the competing evidence and to decide as a matter of law that [the Plaintiff] has not alleged
plausible claim for retaliation.”). Accordingly, DEEP’s motion to dismiss Mr. Arias’s Title VII
retaliation claim will be denied.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, DEEP’s motion to dismiss is DENIED.
SO ORDERED at New Haven, Connecticut, this 7th day of March, 2025.
/s/ Victor A. Bolden
VICTOR A. BOLDEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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