Robinson v. Warden

Filing 19

ORDER. For the reasons set forth in the attached Order, Robinson's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, doc. no. 1, is denied. Accordingly, Robinson's motion for enlargement, docs. no. 15 and 17 , is also denied. Robinson's 16 Motion to Seal is granted. The clerk is directed to close this case. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 3/11/2025. (Markowitz, C)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

JANELL ROBINSON,
Petitioner,

No. 3:24-cv-1167 (SRU)

v.
WARDEN, FCI DANBURY,
Respondent.
RULING ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND MOTION FOR
ENLARGEMENT
On July 8, 2024, petitioner Janell Robinson filed pro se a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. No. 1. Robinson in incarcerated at FCI Danbury. See
Find an Inmate, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited March 11,
2025). She challenges the Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) calculation of her time credits under the
First Step Act (“FSA”) and the failure of the BOP to release her pursuant to the Second Chance
Act (“SCA”). Pet., Doc. No. 1. On October 23, 2024, respondent Darek Puzio, Acting Warden of
FCI Danbury, filed a response asserting that the petition should be denied because Robinson has
not demonstrated anything unlawful about her present custody. See Response, Doc. No. 10.
On November 26, 2024, counsel was appointed to represent Robinson. Doc. No. 11. On
February 12, 2025, counsel filed an emergency motion for enlargement, seeking an enlargement
of Robinson’s place of custody while her habeas petition is still pending. Doc. No. 15. For the
following reasons, Robinson’s petition and emergency motion for enlargement are DENIED.
I.

LEGAL STANDARD
A federal prisoner may petition for habeas relief if she is “in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “A writ of habeas

corpus under § 2241 is available to a federal prisoner who does not challenge the legality of [her]
sentence, but challenges instead its execution subsequent to [her] conviction.” Carmona v. U.S.
Bureau of Prisons, 243 F.3d 629, 632 (2d Cir. 2001). Thus, section 2241 petitions are
appropriately used to challenge conditions of confinement or sentence calculations. See Levine v.
Apker, 455 F.3d 71, 78 (2d Cir. 2006); Dailey v. Pullen, No. 3:22-cv-1121 (SRU), 2023 WL
3456696, at *2 (D. Conn. May 15, 2023) (considering a challenge to FSA time credit calculation
on a section 2241 petition).
A federal court has inherent authority order to enlargement or bail as a provisional
remedy in habeas cases, pending adjudication of a petitioner’s claims. Mapp v. Reno, 241 F.3d
221 (2d Cir. 2001). Enlargement is appropriate “only in unusual cases, or when extraordinary or
exceptional circumstances exist which make the grant of bail necessary to make the habeas
remedy effective.” Id. at 226 (quoting Ostrer v. United States, 584 F.2d 594, 596 n.1 (2d Cir.
1978)). A petitioner must demonstrate that their habeas petition raises substantial claims and that
extraordinary circumstances exist. Id.
II.

BACKGROUND
Robinson was sentenced in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey

to a term of 108 months’ imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release, after a
jury found her guilty of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy to
commit extortion. See Mot. for Enlargement, Doc. No. 17, at 1-2. Her term of imprisonment was
later reduced to 97 months. Id.
A. First Step Act (“FSA”)
The FSA encourages federal inmates to participate in evidence-based recidivism
reduction programs (“EBRRs”) and other productive activities (“PAs”) by providing time credits
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to an inmate who successfully participates in such programs. See 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A); 28
C.F.R. § 523.40(b); Dailey, 2023 WL 3456696, at *2. An inmate’s initial risk and needs
assessment is ordinarily completed within 28 days of his or her arrival at the designated facility.
See BOP Program Statement 5410.01, CN-2, § 5. 1 Inmates are reassessed at each regularly
scheduled Program Review throughout the remainder of their incarceration. See id. Program
Reviews occur approximately every 180 days unless an inmate is within one year of release, at
which point those reviews occur every 90 days. See 28 C.F.R. § 524.11(a)(2). An inmate earns
either ten or fifteen days of FSA time credits for every thirty days of successful participation in
EBRRs or PAs. 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A). 2
Prisoners’ terms of imprisonment are computed under applicable law. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3624(g)(1)(C). For inmates who are determined by the BOP to be a minimum or low risk for
recidivating, the BOP estimates a conditional projected release date by calculating the maximum
number of potential time credits that the inmate may earn during his or her sentence. See BOP
Program Statement 5410.01, CN-2. However, inmates can benefit from time credits only if they
have shown a demonstrated risk reduction or are maintaining a minimum/low risk of recidivism.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(B). In addition, an inmate may accumulate credits every month, but

1

Until recently, BOP policies and forms, including Program Statement 5410.01, were available
on the BOP website at https://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat. That content has now been taken
down, and the page now displays an error message reading: “Policy and Forms Temporarily
Unavailable. This content is temporarily unavailable as we implement the Executive Order on
‘Defending Women from Gender Ideology Extremism and Restoring Biological Truth to the
Federal Government.’” Program Statement 5410.01 was operative at the time that Robinson’s
petition was filed, however, and caselaw from around that time confirms its content. See, e.g.,
Samoiloff v. Stover, 733 F. Supp. 3d 68, 70 (D. Conn. 2024).
2
Eligible inmates who successfully complete EBRRs and PAs earn ten days of time credits for
every thirty days of successful participation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A)(i). An
eligible inmate who has been determined by the BOP to be a minimum or low risk for
recidivating over two consecutive assessments earns fifteen days of time credits for every thirty
days of successful participation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A)(ii).
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in order to be eligible to have credits applied, an inmate must have “earned time credits under the
risk and needs assessment system . . . in an amount that is equal to the remainder of the
prisoner’s imposed term of imprisonment.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(A). “In other words, the
inmate is not ‘eligible’ for application of [her] FSA time credits until the number of credits
equals the number of days remaining in [her] sentence.” Pujols v. Stover, 2023 WL 4551423, at
*1 (D. Conn. July 14, 2023).
Application of FSA time credits enables an inmate to be transferred to prerelease custody
or supervised release earlier than the completion date of her sentence. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3624(g)(2) and (3); 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(C); see also Saleen v. Pullen, 2023 WL 3603423,
at *1 (D. Conn. Apr. 12, 2023) (“Prerelease custody can be in the form of either home
confinement or transfer to a residential reentry center.”). If the inmate has a term of supervised
release imposed as part of their sentence, “the Director of the Bureau of Prisons may transfer the
prisoner to begin any such term of supervised release at an earlier date, not to exceed 12
months.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(3).
B. Second Chance Act
The Second Chance Act provides, in relevant part:
The Director of the Bureau of Prisons shall, to the extent practicable, ensure that a
prisoner serving a term of imprisonment spends a portion of the final months of that term
(not to exceed 12 months), under conditions that will afford that prisoner a reasonable
opportunity to adjust to and prepare for the reentry of that prisoner into the community.
18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(1). Thus, the BOP has discretion to determine whether a prisoner receives
prerelease custody placement and how much time the prisoner receives within the twelve-month
maximum period. The BOP is directed to exercise that discretion “in a manner consistent with

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section 3621(b),” which outlines five factors that the BOP must consider. See 18 U.S.C. §§
3624(c)(6)(A) and 3621(b). 3
C. Petitioner’s Release Date
Robinson’s projected release date, with consideration of good conduct time under 18
U.S.C. § 3624(b), is January 9, 2028. See FSA Time Credit Assessment, Doc. No. 10-2, at 3.
Robinson was eligible to earn FSA credits, and the BOP’s FSA Time Credit Assessment showed
that she had earned 630 FSA credits as of October 12, 2024. Id. at 2.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(3), the BOP may apply 365 days of FSA credits to shorten
Robinson’s term of imprisonment and begin her term of supervised release at an earlier date.
After the BOP applied 365 days of FSA credit, Robinson’s projected release date was modified
to January 9, 2027. Id. at 3. She had 445 remaining FSA credits that could be used toward an
early transfer to prerelease custody. Id. The BOP also calculated that, if Robinson were to
continue accruing the maximum number of additional FSA credits, she would accrue an
additional 180 FSA credits, making her conditional date of placement in prerelease custody
under the FSA October 21, 2025. Id. Finally, the BOP calculated that, applying the default
twelve months, or 365 days, of early placement in prerelease custody under the SCA, Robinson’s
“Conditional Transition to Community Date” was October 21, 2024. Id.
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The five factors the BOP must consider under section 3621(b) are:
(1) the resources of the facility contemplated;
(2) the nature and circumstances of the offense;
(3) the history and characteristics of the prisoner;
(4) any statement by the court that imposed the sentence-(A) concerning the purposes for which the sentence to imprisonment was
determined to be warranted; or
(B) recommending a type of penal or correctional facility as appropriate; and
(5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to
section 994(a)(2) of title 28.
18 U.S.C. § 3621(b).
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In October 2024 the BOP conducted the five-factor review required under the SCA, and
recommended that Robinson be placed in a residential reentry center (RRC) in Newark, New
Jersey on December 10, 2024. See Declaration of Mandy Breece, Doc. No. 10-3, at ¶ 14; RRC
Referral, Doc. No. 15-1, at ¶ 12. Counsel for Robinson represents that, after their appointment in
November 2024, they conferred with counsel for the Government, who informed them that
Robinson had been given a placement date of April 24, 2025 at an RRC in Newark, New Jersey.
See Mot. for Enlargement, Doc. No. 17, at 3-4.
III.

DISCUSSION
In her petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Robinson states that she is “requesting to have

her [Federal Time Credits] awarded to her release date.” Doc. No. 1. Nothing in Robinson’s
petition, however, suggests that the BOP has incorrectly calculated the number of credits she has
earned, or is projected to earn, under the FSA, and I do not read her petition as making such an
allegation. In fact, the FSA Time Credit Assessment attached to Robinson’s petition, dated
December 2, 2023, stated that at that time Robinson had earned a total of 465 credits. See Doc.
No. 1, at 3. Assuming she continued to earn 15 credits per month after that date, the maximum
possible, she would earn credits equal to the time left on her sentence about 23 months later, or
by approximately the end of October 2025. That calculation comports with the BOP’s more
recent calculation of Robinson’s FSA credits, which projected that Robinson will have earned
credits in an amount equal to her remaining term of imprisonment and thus be eligible to apply
her credits to be transferred to prerelease custody on October 21, 2025. See Doc. No. 10-2, at 2.
See also Declaration of Mandy Breece, Doc. No. 10-3, at ¶ 11. 4
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I note that another FSA Time Credit Assessment worksheet, attached to supplemental letters
Robinson filed, docs. no. 7 and 8, and dated September 3, 2024, lists Robinson’s FSA
conditional placement date as March 25, 2025. See Doc. No. 7, at 2; Doc. No. 8, at 3. But, as
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To the extent that Robinson’s petition seeks application of her FSA time credits, her
petition is not yet ripe. See Doc. No. 1, at 2 (“Petitioner is requesting that she receive her
Conditional Projected Release Date . . . and [] be processed for RRC Placement.”). The FSA
limits the BOP’s ability to apply an eligible individual’s time credits until the number of time
credits equals the amount of time remaining on the individual’s sentence. See 18 U.S.C. §
3624(g)(1)(A) (“This subsection applies in the case of a prisoner . . . [who] has earned time
credits under the risk and needs assessment system . . . in an amount that is equal to the
remainder of the prisoner's imposed term of imprisonment. . . . ”). See also Dailey v. Pullen,
2023 WL 3456696, at *4 (D. Conn. May 15, 2023) (collecting cases). Here, it is undisputed that
Robinson has earned a significant number of FSA time credits by participating in BOP
programming. The BOP projects that Robinson will be eligible to have those credits applied on
October 21, 2025. See Doc. No. 10-2, at 2. But because the number of credits she has earned thus
far is not equal to the remainder of her imposed term of imprisonment, the relief Robinson seeks
is not available under the FSA.
The government acknowledges that, liberally construing Robinson’s petition, she
appears to seek relief under the Second Chance Act. See Doc. No. 10, at 3. See also Doc. No. 1,
at 2 (“Petitioner is requesting that she receive her . . . 12 months Second Chance Act credit, and
[] be processed for RRC Placement.”); Doc. No. 8, at 1 (“The BOP [has] done everything it can
to reduce my Second Chance Act placement specifically by failing to review me in enough time
to receive up to 1 year in halfway house placement specified in the statute.”). As explained
above, the BOP has recommended that Robinson be transferred to prerelease custody pursuant to

Robinson acknowledges, the BOP advised all inmates that the worksheets provided in September
2024 were under revision because the dates included in the “Planning” section were incorrect.
See Doc. No. 8, at 1.
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the SCA, and apparently plans to transfer Robinson to a residential reentry center in Newark,
New Jersey on April 24, 2025. See Mot. for Enlargement, Doc. No. 17, at 3-4. Accordingly,
pursuant to the SCA, Robinson will serve the final approximately six months of her term of
imprisonment in prerelease custody. That is obviously less than the twelve months that Robinson
was eligible to serve in prerelease custody under the SCA. But the SCA gives the BOP discretion
to determine whether a prisoner receives prerelease custody placement, and to determine how
much time the prisoner receives within the twelve-month maximum period. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3624(c)(1), (c)(6)(A) and 3621(b). “Indeed, district court within the Second Circuit
considering similar claims have uniformly held that decisions regarding pre-release custody
[under the SCA] rest within the discretion of the BOP and that they lack authority to order a
transfer to pre-release custody.” Bortner v. Stover, 2024 WL 3595922, at *3 (D. Conn. July 31,
2024) (collecting cases). In fact, Robinson’s FSA Time Credit Assessment worksheet explicitly
notes that “SCA days are not guaranteed and require an individualized assessment! Therefore, if
a default of 365 days is reflected, this date is subject to change based on the required five-factor
review under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b).” Doc. No. 10-2, at 3.
Though Robinson is correct that the BOP has not transferred her to prerelease custody at
her earliest date of eligibility under the SCA, she does not yet have an enforceable interest in her
transfer. See Sclafani v. Kane, 2020 WL 4676414, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2020) (“Although
Congress enacted the Second Chance Act to improve prisoner reentry into society and reduce
recidivism, . . . the Act did not alter the BOP’s discretion and did not give prisoners an
enforceable liberty interest in pre-release home confinement.”). It is unclear why the BOP first
assigned Robinson a transfer date of December 10, 2024, and then later extended that date to
April 24, 2025. See RRC Referral, Doc. No. 15-1, at ¶ 12; Mot. for Enlargement, Doc. No. 17, at

8

3-4. Perhaps that delay was on account of bed availability at the Newark RRC, to which
Robinson will be transferred. But in any event, Robinson is also not entitled to the relief she
seeks under the SCA. I therefore conclude that Robinson is not in custody in violation of the law,
and her petition is thus denied.
Finally, in her motion for enlargement, Robinson requests enlargement of her place of
custody for the period of time between now and her scheduled transfer to prerelease custody,
while this Court determines the merits of her habeas petition. Doc. No. 17. However, because I
deny her petition, her motion for enlargement is moot.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Robinson’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, doc. no. 1, is

denied. Accordingly, Robinson’s motion for enlargement, doc. no. 15, is also denied.
Finally, I decline to issue a certificate of appealability, because Robinson has not made a
substantial showing of a denial of a federal right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Love v. McCray, 413 F.3d
192, 195 (2d Cir. 2005).
The Clerk is directed to close this case.
So ordered.
Dated at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 11th day of March 2025.
/s/ STEFAN R. UNDERHILL
Stefan R. Underhill
United States District Judge

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