Reed v. Doe et al

Filing 23

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER. See attached.The case shall proceed on Plaintiff's individual capacity claims for (a) a Fourteenth Amendment violation arising out of deliberate indifference to his health and safety against Does 2, 3, and 4; and (b) a Fourteenth Amendment violation arising out of deliberate indifference to his medical needs against Does 5 and 6. All other claims, including official capacity claims, are DISMISSED without prejudice. The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate Doe 1 and Warden Martin as defendants.Plaintiff may file a Notice, on or before January 10, 2025, to identify at least one Doe defendant by name. If Plaintiff wishes to correct the deficiencies of his claims as identified by this Order, he may also file a second amended complaint by January 10, 2025. Plaintiff is advised that any second amended complaint will completely replace the prior complaints in the action, and that no portion of any prior complaint shall be incorporated into his second amended complaint by reference.Signed by Judge Kari A. Dooley on 11/22/2024. (Lacina, A)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
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TYJUAN REED,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
INITIAL REVIEW
-against:
ORDER
:
DOES 1-6 and ROBERT MARTIN,
:
3:24-cv-1359 (KAD)
:
Defendants.
:
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Plaintiff TyJuan Reed is an unsentenced inmate currently housed at Garner Correctional
Institution within the custody of the Connecticut Department of Correction (“DOC”).1 He filed a
complaint pro se and in forma pauperis under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to assert individual and official
capacity claims for violation of his constitutional rights against seven Doe Defendants who work
at Corrigan-Radgowski Correctional Center (“Corrigan”). The Court dismissed this case without
prejudice because Plaintiff did not comply with the Court’s order to provide materials in support
of his application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Thereafter, Plaintiff provided the
materials required to support his IFP application and an amended complaint, ECF Nos. 16 & 17,
and the Court reopened his case and granted his motion to proceed IFP. ECF Nos. 18 & 20.
The Court now considers whether Plaintiff’s amended complaint against the six Doe
Defendants and Warden Martin alleges any plausible claims against Defendants in their individual
and official capacities.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires that federal courts review complaints
brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a

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The Connecticut DOC website reflects that Plaintiff was admitted to DOC on July 17, 2023, and is still
unsentenced.
See
Inmate
Information,
Conn.
Dep’t
of
Corrs.,
at
http://www.ctinmateinfo.state.ct.us/detailsupv.asp?id_inmt_num=388506. See Giraldo v. Kessler, 694 F.3d 161, 164
(2d Cir. 2012) (Court may “take judicial notice of relevant matters of public record”).

governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Upon review, the Court must dismiss the complaint,
or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b). The Court has thoroughly reviewed all factual allegations
in the complaint and conducted an initial review of the allegations therein pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
While the Court does not set forth all of the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint, it

summarizes his basic factual allegations here to give context to its rulings below.
Plaintiff alleges (1) Doe 1 was a Correctional Transport Driver, (2) Doe 4 was a
Correctional Unit Driver, (3) Does 2, 3, 5 and 6 were Correctional Officers, and (4) Defendant
Martin was the Acting Warden at Corrigan at the time relevant to the Amended Complaint. See
Am. Compl., ECF No. 17, ¶ 4; id. ¶ 31 (referring to Martin as the Acting Warden).
On March 16, 2023, Plaintiff was put in transfer restraints by Transport Unit Driver Doe 1
with the assistance of Correctional Officer Does 2 and 3. Id. ¶¶ 12–13. Other inmates for the same
transport were also placed in restraints. Id. ¶ 14.
Transport Unit Driver Doe 1 escorted the inmates to the “FH Corridor” and told the inmates
to wait in the corridor. Id. ¶¶ 15-16. He left the inmates in restraints unattended while he entered
the control room. Id. ¶ 17.
Another inmate—who was being supervised by Correction Officer Does 2 and 3 and
Correctional Unit Driver Doe 4—came out of the Admitting and Processing area without restraints
and assaulted Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 19–20. Plaintiff was found a short time later on the floor bleeding
and unconscious. Id. ¶ 21.

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Plaintiff was transported to the Backus Hospital where Correction Officer Does 5 and 6
provided false information to the hospital staff that prevented Plaintiff from receiving an
assessment for proper treatment for his assault injuries. Id. ¶¶ 22–24. Plaintiff was diagnosed with
a traumatic brain injury and received stitches in his lip. Id. ¶¶ 25–26. Plaintiff’s foot and leg were
not evaluated. Id. ¶ 27.
Corrigan correctional staff failed to notify Plaintiff’s emergency contact about his being in
hospital. Id. ¶ 28. A Corrigan inmate notified Plaintiff’s family that he was in the hospital with
life-threatening injuries. Id. ¶ 29. Warden Martin also provided false information to Plaintiff’s
emergency contact and his mother. Id. ¶ 31.
After Plaintiff’s emergency contact bonded him out, Plaintiff was transferred to Waterbury
Hospital where he remained until March 23, 2023. Id. ¶¶ 33–34. Plaintiff was later taken home
where nurses made daily visits. Id. ¶ 35.
II.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint raises claims of indifference to his safety and medical

needs. In light of Plaintiff’s allegation indicating that his emergency contact bonded him out of
DOC custody, the Court will consider for purposes of this initial review that Plaintiff is a pretrial
detainee. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims of deliberate indifference to his health and safety are governed
by the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Eighth Amendment. Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d
17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017) (deliberate indifference); Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396–97
(2015) (excessive force); see also Charles v. Orange County, 925 F.3d 73, 85–86 (2d Cir. 2019)
(pretrial detainee medical indifference claims fall under the Fourteenth Amendment).
Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment violation claims are therefore dismissed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

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The Court turns next to Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims. Preliminarily, and
applicable to all Defendants, Plaintiff must allege facts to reflect a defendant was personally
involved in the alleged constitutional violation. Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994)
(“[P]ersonal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to
an award of damages under § 1983.” (quotation omitted)). This is true with respect to supervisory
officials as well. Tangreti v. Bachman, 983 F.3d 609, 620 (2d Cir. 2020) (holding that a plaintiff
must “plead and prove the elements of the underlying constitutional violation directly against the
official without relying on a special test for supervisory liability” in order to hold a state official
liable for damages under § 1983, and that “it is not enough for [a plaintiff] to show that [a
defendant] was negligent, or even grossly negligent, in her supervision of the correctional officers
or in failing to act on the information she had”).
Deliberate Indifference to Safety/Failure to Protect
Plaintiff maintains that Transport Unit Driver 1 was indifferent to his safety by leaving him
unattended in restraints in the corridor. Am. Compl., ECF No. 17, ¶ 39. He claims Correction
Officer Does 2 and 3, and Correctional Unit Driver Doe 4, permitted the inmate under their
supervision to attack Plaintiff.
“[P]rison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other
prisoners.” Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 128 (2d Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994)). However, “not . . . every injury suffered by one
prisoner at the hands of another . . . translates into constitutional liability for prison officials
responsible for the victim’s safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. A claim that a correctional officer
failed to protect an inmate from attack rises to the level of a constitutional violation only when the

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officer acted with “‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate.” Id.
at 828.
A claim that a prison official has acted with deliberate indifference under the Fourteenth
Amendment involves analysis of two prongs: (1) an objective prong, which requires a plaintiff to
show that “the challenged conditions were sufficiently serious to constitute objective deprivations
of the right to due process”; and (2) a subjective or “mens rea” prong, which requires a plaintiff to
show that the defendant “acted with at least deliberate indifference to the challenged conditions.”
Darnell, 849 F.3d at 29. With respect to the first prong of a deliberate indifference claim, the
plaintiff must show that the conditions he experienced “either alone or in combination, pose[d] an
unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health.” Id. at 30 (quotation omitted). With respect to
the second prong, “the pretrial detainee must prove that the defendant-official acted intentionally
to impose the alleged condition, or recklessly failed to act with reasonable care to mitigate the risk
that the condition posed to the pretrial detainee even though the defendant-official knew, or should
have known, that the condition posed an excessive risk to health or safety.” Id. at 35. Negligence
is insufficient to satisfy this component. Id. at 36 (holding that detainee must show that defendant
acted recklessly or intentionally, not merely negligently).
Plaintiff’s allegations provide no suggestion that Doe 1 had any awareness that Plaintiff
would or could be subjected to assault from another inmate when he left him in the corridor. Doe
1 may have acted negligently, but negligent conduct does not support a deliberate indifference
claim of constitutional dimension. See id. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not alleged a plausible
Fourteenth Amendment claim against Doe 1.
Plaintiff provides few facts about the circumstances of the assault and conduct by
Correction Officer Does 2 and 3 and Correctional Unit Driver Doe 4. Nonetheless, the alleged

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facts suggest that Does 2, 3, or 4 may plausibly have been in a position to know that Plaintiff was
at risk of being attacked by the inmate under their supervision, and that they could have prevented
or protected Plaintiff from the attack. See Conquistador v. Adamaitis, No. 3:19-CV-430, 2021 WL
810361, at *4 (D. Conn. Mar. 3, 2021) (“[C]ourts have found sufficiently serious conditions where
correctional officers simply stand by and allow an inmate-on-inmate attack to proceed.” (citing
Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1966))) (collecting cases). Accordingly, the Court will
permit Plaintiff’s claims of indifference to his health and safety under the Fourteenth Amendment
to proceed for further development against Correction Officer Does 2 and 3, and Correctional Unit
Driver Doe 4 in their individual capacities.
Medical Interference
Plaintiff alleges that he did not receive proper assessment and treatment for his injuries
because Correction Officer Does 5 and 6 “deliberately” provided false information to the hospital
staff. Am. Compl., ECF No. 17, ¶¶ 23–27. Correctional staff may act with indifference to an
inmate’s medical needs by denying or delaying access to medical care or interfering with medical
treatment once it was prescribed. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976) (prison
guards act with deliberate indifference by intentionally denying, delaying, or interfering with
inmate’s medical treatment in violation of Eighth Amendment); Atutis v. Harder, No. 9:21-CV715 (DNH/TWD), 2021 WL 12314320, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. July 20, 2021) (non-medical staff may
violate Fourteenth Amendment for indifference to medical needs by denying, delaying or
interfering with medical treatment). The Fourteenth Amendment standard set forth in Darnell
applies also to a pretrial detainee’s claims involving a denial in the provision of medical treatment
to a pretrial detainee. See, e.g., Roice v. County of Fulton, 803 F. App’x 429, 430, 432 (2d Cir.

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2020) (summary order) (applying Fourteenth Amendment Darnell standard to pretrial detainee’s
medical indifference claims).
For purposes of initial review, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently
suggests that he had serious need for medical treatment for his assault injuries and that Does 5 and
6 acted intentionally and recklessly to prevent his access to necessary medical treatment.
Accordingly, the Court will permit Plaintiff to proceed on his Fourteenth Amendment claims
against Officer Does 5 and 6 in their individual capacities for further development of the record.
Warden Martin
Plaintiff provides few facts about Warden Martin. He alleges only that Warden Martin
provided “false insight” about his health to his mother and emergency contact. Am. Compl., ECF
No. 17, ¶ 31. Plaintiff claims that he suffers “emotional and mental anguish” as a result of Martin’s
conduct. Id. ¶ 50. Even construing Plaintiff’s allegations as a Fourteenth Amendment claim of
deliberate indifference, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to support an inference that
Warden Martin acted with any awareness that his conduct posed a serious risk of harm to Plaintiff’s
mental health.
Nor can Plaintiff proceed against Warden Martin for his liability as a supervisor. In
Tangreti, the Second Circuit explained that “there is no special [pleading] rule for supervisory
liability,” and “a plaintiff must plead and prove that each Government-official defendant, through
the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” 983 F.3d at 618. Because
Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to suggest that Warden Martin had any direct involvement in a
violation of Plaintiff constitutional rights, Plaintiff has failed to state plausible grounds for relief
against him.

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Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim against Warden Martin is dismissed
as not plausibly alleged.
C.

Official Capacity Relief

Plaintiff seeks official capacity relief in the form of a declaratory judgment and an
injunction. Am. Compl., ECF No. 17, at 8–9.2 Plaintiff may only proceed for injunctive or
declaratory relief against a defendant in his or her official capacity if he alleges an ongoing
constitutional violation. See Va. Office for Prot. & Advoc. v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 254–55 (2011)
(citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). Here, Plaintiff’s allegations describe violations of
his rights that occurred in the past. In addition, Plaintiff is no longer housed at Corrigan. Notice
of Change of Address, ECF No. 22; see Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 272 (2d Cir. 2006)
(an inmate’s transfer from a correctional facility generally moots claims for declaratory and
injunctive relief against officials at that facility). Accordingly, any claims brought against any of
the Defendants in their official capacity are dismissed.
III.

CONCLUSION
The Court enters the following orders:
(1) The case shall proceed on Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims for (a) a Fourteenth

Amendment violation arising out of deliberate indifference to his health and safety against
Correction Officer Does 2 and 3, and Correctional Unit Driver Doe 4; and (b) Fourteenth
Amendment violation arising out of deliberate indifference to his medical needs against Correction
Officer Does 5 and 6.

2

Although not clear, to the extent he also asserts official capacity claims for monetary damages against
Defendants (all state employees), such claims are dismissed as barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Kentucky
v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985).

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All other claims, including official capacity claims, are DISMISSED without prejudice.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate Doe 1 and Warden Martin as defendants.
The case may not proceed to service on the Doe defendants because the Court cannot serve
the unidentified defendants without their names. Plaintiff may file a Notice, on or before January
10, 2025, to identify at least one Doe defendant by name.
If Plaintiff wishes to correct the deficiencies of his claims as identified by this Order, he
may also file a second amended complaint by January 10, 2025. Plaintiff is advised that any
second amended complaint will completely replace the prior complaints in the action, and that no
portion of any prior complaint shall be incorporated into his second amended complaint by
reference.
SO ORDERED this 22nd day of November, 2024, at Bridgeport, Connecticut.

/s/ Kari A. Dooley_____________
Kari A. Dooley
United States District Judge

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