Hartmann v. Warden Carroll et al

Filing 164

MEMORANDUM OPINION - Signed by Judge Sue L. Robinson on 3/12/13. (rwc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
DETLEF F. HARTMANN,
Plaintiff,

v.
WARDEN THOMAS CARROLL,
DAVID PIERCE, and IHOMA CHUKS,
Defendants.

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) Civ. No. 06-340-SLR
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Detlef F. Hartmann, James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware. ProSe
Plaintiff.
Catherine C. Damavandi, Deputy Attorney General, Delaware Department of Justice,
Wilmington, Delaware. Counsel for Defendants Thomas Carroll and David Pierce.
James Edward Drnec, Esquire, Balick & Balick, LLC, Wilmington, Delaware. Counsel
for Defendant lhoma Chuks.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Dated: March Jr, 2013
Wilmington, Delaware

I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Detlef R. Hartmann ("plaintiff'), an inmate at the James T. Vaughn
Correctional Center ("VCC"), Smyrna, Delaware, filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. He proceeds pro se and was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The
case proceeds on the corrected second amended complaint. (D.I. 46, 48) Presently
before the court are motions for summary judgment filed by defendants Thomas Carroll
("Carroll"), David Pierce ("Pierce") (together "State defendants"), and lhoma Chuks
("Chuks"). (D. I. 112, 118) The court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For
the reasons set forth below, the court will grant defendants' motions for summary
judgment.

II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this action against numerous defendants with a variety of claims.
Most defendants and claims have been dismissed. 1 (D.I. 12, 48, 108, 110, 125, 130)
On June 28, 2010, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Carroll, Pierce, and
Chuks, and judgment was entered in their favor on July 1, 2010. (D.I. 130, 131)
Plaintiff appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated
the judgment and remanded the matter for this court to address whether plaintiff was
competent within the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c), as well as to consider plaintiff's
request for counsel. (D.I. 132, 136) This court followed the directive of the Third Circuit
and, on August 9, 2012, found plaintiff competent within the meaning of Rule 17(c)(2)

1

0n March 30, 2012, the Third Circuit affirmed the June 28, 2010 dismissal of
unserved Department of Correction ("DOC) defendants Paul Howard ("Howard") and
Edward Johnson ("Johnson"). Powell v. Symons, 680 F.3d 301, 310 n.8 (3d Cir. 2012).

and denied plaintiff's request for counsel. 2 (D.I. 145, 146) In addition, the court gave
plaintiff an opportunity to file a supplemental response to defendants' motions for
summary judgment and gave defendants the opportunity to file supplemental replies.
(/d.)

The remaining allegations are that, on or about December 29, 2005 to April 19,
2006, State defendants delayed or denied plaintiff diagnosis and treatment for severe
throat pain and suffering. (D.I. 46, claim 2 ~ 6) On or about November 10, 2005 to the
date the corrected second amended complaint was filed, Pierce and Chuks failed to
provide professional prevention, diagnosis, and treatment for thyroid disease causing
plaintiff permanent injuries due to lack of proper nutrition and the intermittent
administration of medications. (/d.

at~

9) During medical interviews on April 11, 2006

and in September 2006, Chuks referred plaintiff to an endocrinologist, but a dismissed
defendant failed to transport plaintiff to the specialist. (!d. at ~ 10)
Plaintiff's medical records indicate that he received medical treatment during the
relevant time period. (D. I. 120, A27-61) He was seen regularly for chronic care issues,
EKG, blood pressure treatments, fasting labs, and investigation of his medical
grievances during the time period he claims to have suffered from sore throat and
thyroid problems. (/d. at A35-39)
Plaintiff's medical records indicate that he was prescribed, and received, either
Levoxyl or Synthroid prior to November 10, 2005 and until March 6, 2008. (D.I. 113, ex.
A; D.l. 157, ex. A) Levoxyl and Synthroid are indicated for the treatment of thyroid

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Piaintiff recently filed a motion for a mental health evaluation, evidentiary
hearing, and for counsel. (D. I. 163) The motion will be denied as moot.

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conditions. See www.levoxyl.com; www.synthroid.com. Plaintiff was given, and signed
for, thirty-day supplies of the medication. (/d.) The orders were renewed by varying
providers including Chuks. (/d.) On December 7, 2006, Dr. VanDusen changed
plaintiffs thyroid medication from Levoxyl to Synthroid. (D.I. 157, ex. A at 9) Chuks
changed plaintiffs thyroid medication on June 1, 2007, based upon lab work performed
on May 8, 2007 that showed abnormal levels of TSH. (ld. at ex. A at 11; ex. Bat 1-4)
Chuks discussed the lab work with Dr. VanDusen who agreed that the prescribed
amount of Synthroid should be reduced. (/d. at ex. B at 1) Chuks ordered follow-up
blood work, completed on July 26, 2007. (/d. at ex. Bat 5-6) Plaintiff's medication was
adjusted by Dr. McFall based upon the lab results. (/d. at 7) A third thyroid panel was
taken on September 5, 2007. (/d. at 7-8)
Plaintiff filed a grievance on November 10, 2005 complaining that he had not
received proper treatment for his thyroid condition and asked for a referral to a doctor of
osteopathic medicine. (D. I. 120, A19) His complaints were reviewed and it was
determined that plaintiff was receiving appropriate medications and that his lab test
results were within normal limits. (/d. at A23, 25) Plaintiff filed a grievance on
December 28, 2005 complaining of possible strep throat issues, but later reported that
his throat had improved. (/d. at A12) He was seen by medical on January 10, 2006 and
records indicate that he had no throat symptoms at that time. (/d. at A 15)
Carroll and Pierce are not medically trained. (D. I. 120, exs. 1, 2). Neither have
the authority to override medical diagnoses or opinions of Correctional Medical Services
("CMS"), the medical provider at the VCC during the relevant time period. (/d.) Carroll
had no knowledge of plaintiff's medical condition during the relevant time period. (D.I.

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120, ex. 1) Nor did he or Pierce have involvement in the diagnosis or medical treatment
of plaintiff. (/d. at exs. 1, 2) Letters written to Carroll and Pierce regarding medical
treatment are forwarded to the appropriate medical contact person. (/d.)
Ill. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The court shall grant summary judgment only if "the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56( c). The moving party bears
the burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 n.10 (1986). When

determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable
inferences in that party's favor. Wishkin v. Potter, 476 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2007). If
the moving party has demonstrated an absence of material fact, the nonmoving party
then "must come forward with 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial."' Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The
mere existence of some evidence in support of the nonmoving party, however, will not
be sufficient for denial of a motion for summary judgment; there must be enough
evidence to enable a jury reasonably to find for the nonmoving party on that issue. See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Moreover, a party opposing

summary judgment "must present more than just 'bare assertions, conclusory
allegations or suspicions' to show the existence of a genuine issue." Podobnik v. United
States Postal Serv., 409 F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

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477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)). If the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on
an essential element of its case with respect to which it has the burden of proof, the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at
322.

IV. ANALYSIS
Chuks moves for summary judgment on the grounds that she had no personal
involvement in the medical transportation issue and she was not deliberately indifferent
to plaintiff's medical needs. (D. I. 112) Her reply further argues for summary judgment
on the basis that there is no support in the record for any of plaintiff's claims, noting that
medical records refute plaintiff's claims. 3
State defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that the claims
raised against them are based upon a respondeat superior theory, they were not
deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's medical needs, and they have qualified immunity. 4
(D. I. 119) In their reply, they further argue for summary judgment on the basis that
plaintiff failed to come forward with any admissible evidence to support the claims
against them.
Plaintiff's initial response did not address the merits of the motion. Plaintiff's
supplemental response can be summarized as follows: (1) the medical records show
that he was prescribed and received wrong dosages of medication for his thyroid

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Chuks also notes that in his response, plaintiff has inappropriately raised new
claims in an attempt to avoid summary judgment. (D. I. 156, 1J1J2, 4)
4

Chuks joins in, and adopts all facts, exhibits and arguments of Pierce and
Carroll. (D .I. 122)

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condition; (2) Chuks acted with deliberate indifference when she changed his dose of
thyroid medication without sufficient facts to make a professional judgment, without
special training, and without performing a physical examination or new lab work, all of
which caused him injury; and (3) Chuks was aware of his medical condition through his
sick-call slips, grievances, and personal conversations. In addition, plaintiff contends
that he "is not capable and competent to do this legal case." 5 (See D. I. 155) Plaintiff'
supplemental response did not address the claims against State defendants.

A. Personal Involvement/Respondeat Superior
Chuks argues that the allegations of paragraph 10 of the corrected second
amended complaint fail to state a claim. She notes that, rather than establish a basis
for a finding of deliberate indifference, plaintiff alleges that Chuks made an appropriate
referral, but that someone else failed to transport him to the specialist. Chuks argues
that, because plaintiff has adduced no additional evidence to support this claim, it
should be dismissed. State defendants argue that they are entitled to judgment as a
matter of law because allegations against them lie under the theory of respondeat
superior.
"A defendant in a civil rights action 'must have personal involvement in the
alleged wrongs to be liable,' and 'cannot be held responsible for a constitutional
violation which he or she neither participated in nor approved."' Baraka v. McGreevey,

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This court has ruled that plaintiff is competent within the meaning of Fed. R. Civ.
P. 17(c). (See D.l. 146) In addition, plaintiff was sent to the Delaware Psychiatric
Center ("DPC") for an evaluation. Dr. Selig stated in 2011 that there was no psychiatric
issue for plaintiff to be housed at the DPC and that plaintiff does not have a treatable
psychiatric issue. (D. I. 160)

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481 F. 3d 187, 21 0 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted). "Personal involvement can
be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and
acquiescence." Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).
It is well established that supervisory liability cannot be imposed under § 1983 on
a respondeat superior theory. 6 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Monell v.
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
(1976); Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 n.14 (3d Cir. 1993). Purpose rather than
knowledge is required to impose liability on an official charged with violations arising
from his or her superintendent responsibilities. 7 Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 677. "Absent
vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable
for his or her own misconduct." /d. A plaintiff must show that an official's conduct
caused the deprivation of a federally protected right. See Kentucky v. Graham, 4 73
U.S. 159, 166 (1985).
Additionally, the filing of a grievance is not sufficient to show the actual
knowledge necessary for personal involvement, Rode, 845 F.2d at 1208, and

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ln Iqbal, the plaintiff alleged supervisory officials violated his rights because one
official was the "principal architect" of the policy, and another was "instrumental" in
adoption and execution of the policy. See id. at 669. The Supreme Court found the
allegations facially insufficient. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (quoting Robertson v. Sichel,
127 U.S. 507, 515-516 (1888), for the proposition that "[a] public officer or agent is not
responsible for the misfeasances or position wrongs, or for the nonfeasances, or
negligences, or omissions of duty, of the subagents or servants or other persons
properly employed by or under him, in the discharge of his official duties").
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1n light of Iqbal, it is uncertain whether proof of personal knowledge, with nothing
more, provides a sufficient basis to impose liability upon a supervisory official. See
Bayer v. Monroe Cnty. Children and Youth Services, 577 F.3d 186, 190 n.5 (3d Cir.
2009).

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participation in the after-the-fact review of a grievance is not enough to establish
personal involvement, see, e.g., Brooks v. Beard, 167 F. App'x 923, 925 (3d Cir. 2006)
(unpublished) (allegations that prison officials and administrators responded
inappropriately to inmate's later-filed grievances do not establish the involvement of
those officials and administrators in the underlying deprivation). See also Cole v.

Sabina, 2007 WL 4460617 (W.O. Pa. Dec. 19, 2007); Ramos v. Pennsylvania Oep't of
Corr., 2006 WL 2129148 (M.D. Pa. July 27, 2006). Cf Wilson v. Hom, 971 F.Supp.
943, 947 (E.D. Pa. 1997), aff'd, 142 F.3d 430 (3d Cir. 1998) (prison officials' failure to
respond to inmate's grievance does not state a constitutional claim).
As to the medical transfer issue, there is no evidence of record of Chuks'
personal involvement. With regard to Pierce and Carroll, again, there is no evidence of
personal involvement in plaintiff's medical care and treatment. Plaintiff's submissions of
grievances do not give rise to the personal involvement of Pierce or Carroll and said
acts are insufficient to impute personal involvement to the defendants. It appears that
Pierce and Carroll were named as defendants based upon their supervisory positions
and, as discussed above, § 1983 liability cannot lie under a theory of respondeat
superior. Notably, the record does not reflect that defendants were aware of a risk of a
serious injury that could have occurred to plaintiff and purposefully failed to take
appropriate steps.
After reviewing the record, the court finds there is insufficient evidence to enable
a jury to reasonably find for plaintiff on the issue of whether the State defendants had
any personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violations discussed above.
Therefore, the court will grant State defendants' motions for summary judgment. The

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court will also grant Chuks' motion for summary judgment based on her lack of personal
involvement with regard to the transport issue.

B. Medical Needs
Plaintiff alleges that he was not provided adequate care for his throat and thyroid
conditions. Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that they were not
deliberately indifferent to plaintiffs medical needs.
The Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment
requires that prison officials provide inmates with adequate medical care. Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-105 (1976). In order to set forth a cognizable claim, plaintiff
must allege (i) a serious medical need and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that
indicate deliberate indifference to that need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104; Rouse
v. Plantier, 182 F .3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). A prison official is deliberately indifferent if
he knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and fails to take
reasonable steps to avoid the harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1 994). A
prison official may manifest deliberate indifference by "intentionally denying or delaying
access to medical care." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104-05.
"[A] prisoner has no right to choose a specific form of medical treatment," so long
as the treatment provided is reasonable. Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 138-140
(2d Cir. 2000). An inmate's claims against members of a prison medical department are
not viable under § 1983 where the inmate receives continuing care, but believes that
more should be done by way of diagnosis and treatment and maintains that options
available to medical personnel were not pursued on the inmate's behalf. Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. at 107. Additionally, "mere disagreement as to the proper medical

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treatment" is insufficient to state a constitutional violation. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d
218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Finally, prison administrators cannot be
deliberately indifferent "simply because they failed to respond directly to the medical
complaints of a prisoner who was already being treated by the prison doctor." Durmer
v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993). "If a prisoner is under the care of medical

experts ... a non-medical prison official will generally be justified in believing that the
prisoner is in capable hands." Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004)
(discussing Durmer, 991 F.2d at 69). "[A]bsent a reason to believe (or actual
knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a
prisoner, a non-medical prison official ... will not be chargeable with the Eighth
Amendment scienter requirement of deliberate indifference." /d. at 236.
The record reflects that plaintiff received medical care for his throat complaints
and his thyroid condition. In addition, the evidence of record does not support a finding
that Chuks was deliberately indifferent with respect to the treatment of plaintiff's thyroid
condition. As to the State defendants, it is undisputed that they do not provide medical
treatment to inmates. Absent evidence to the contrary, they were justified in believing
that plaintiff was receiving adequate medical care. Finally, plaintiff failed to provide
evidence to support his position that defendants were deliberately indifference to his
medical needs.
After reviewing the record, the court finds there is insufficient evidence to enable
a jury to reasonably find for plaintiff on the issue of whether defendants were

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deliberately indifference to his serious medical needs. Therefore, the court will grant the
defendants' motions for summary judgment. 8

V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the court will grant defendants' motions for
summary judgment and will deny as moot plaintiff's motion for a mental health
evaluation, evidentiary hearing, and for counsel.
An appropriate order will be entered.

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The court will not address the remaining issues raised in support of entry of
summary judgment.

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