Lamb v. Taylor et al
Filing
84
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GRANTING 64 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Raphael Williams, Stanley Taylor, State of Delaware Department of Correction. Signed by Chief Judge Gregory M. Sleet on 9/8/2011. (asw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRlCT COURT
FOR THE DISTRlCT OF DELAWARE
MARJORlE LAMB as next friend of
)
A.B. and J.B. and R.B.; and MARJORlE LAMB as )
Administratrix of the Estate of THOMAS BURNS, )
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
~
)
C.A. No. 08-324 (GMS)
)
)
STANLEY TAYLOR and
CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL SERVICES, et ai., )
)
Defendants.
)
MEMORANDUM
I. INTRODUCTION
The plaintiff, Marjorie Lamb ("Lamb"), filed this lawsuit against several defendants
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Delaware state law regarding decedent Thomas Bums
("Bums"). Bums committed suicide while incarcerated at the Howard R. Young Correctional
Institution ("HRYCI"). Lamb named Stanley Taylor ("Taylor"), Commissioner of the Delaware
Department of Correction ("DOC"), as a defendant and alleges violations of Bums'
constitutional rights. More specifically, the plaintiff alleges violations of civil rights under color
of state law for cruel and unusual punishment (Count I) and for failure to train and/or
maintenance of wrongful customs, practices, and policies (Count III). Presently before the court
is Taylor's motion for summary judgment. This motion has been fully briefed. For the reasons
that follow, the court will grant Taylor's motion for summary judgment.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Hospitalization Prior to Incarceration
Prior to incarceration at HRYCI, Bums was prosecuted and convicted by the State of
Delaware for forging judicial documents relating to a proceeding in Family Court. (D.1. 1, ~~
17-18.) After he failed to appear in court for sentencing, Bums became subject to a warrant for
his arrest. (Id.,
~
19.)
Subsequent to the issuance of the arrest warrant, on May 18, 2006, Bums was found
unresponsive at home by his sister. (D.!. 66 at A-3; D.1. 67 at B-63.) Bums was taken to
Christiana Hospital by ambulance, and the medic advised that Bums appeared to have ingested
morphine pills and alcohol. (Id.) Bums was admitted to the hospital with a "principal diagnosis"
of "[r]espiratory failure" and "secondary diagnoses" of "[a]spiration pneumonia, accidental
alcohol, [sic] and drug overdose, and supraventricular tachycardia." (D.1. 66 at A-I.)
On May 24, 2006, Bums was discharged from the hospital. (Id.) The discharge
summary reflects that Bums "was seen by Dr. Villars of Psychiatry." (Id.) Dr. Villars "felt that
the patient did not have a purposeful suicide attempts [sic]" and "that he did have substance
abuse and possibly depression." (Id.) The discharge summary also states that Bums was not
willing to talk about the doctor's findings and declined treatment. (Id.)
On that same day, due to outstanding arrest warrants, Bums was taken into custody by
the Delaware State Police and transported to the New Castle County Sheriffs Office. (D.1. 66 at
A-5 - A-6.) Bums was later admitted to HRYCI. (D.1. 66 at A-8.) At all times relevant to this
litigation, Correctional Medical Services ("CMS") was the corporation responsible for the
performance of medical services within HRYCI pursuant to a contract with the DOC. (D.1. 1, ~
8.)
2
B. Medical Care as an Inmate at HRYCI
Upon intake at HRYCI on May 24, 2006, Burns underwent an initial screening by CMS
personnel. (D.1. 66 at A-IO - A-IS.) During the screening, Burns denied any history of mental
illness and any history of suicide attempts. (Id.) Thereafter Burns was placed in the general
population. (Id. at A-IS.)
Four days later, on May 28, 2006, CMS personnel brought Burns to the infirmary after
receiving a phone call from the Delaware chapter of the National Alliance for Mental Illness
("NAMI-DE"). (D.1. 66 at A-16.) NAMI-DE reported that Burns had recently attempted
suicide. (ld.) A CMS nurse, Beth Klepacki, notified the CMS Mental Health Director, Deborah
Muscarella ("Muscarella"), about the call from NAMI-DE. (D.!. 67 at B-18.) By telephone,
Muscarella ordered the staff to place Burns under Psychiatric Close Observation ("PCO") Level
11.1 (Id.; D.1. 66 at A-16.)
The following day, on May 29,2006, Muscarella examined Burns and performed a
comprehensive mental health evaluation. (D.1. 66 at A-23 - A-24.) After completing the
evaluation, Muscarella lowered Burns' PCO status to Level 111.2 (ld.)
The next morning, on May 30, 2006, Burns was found dead in his cell. (D.1. 66 at A-31.)
Burns "hung himself from an exhaust vent with strips of a bed sheet." (ld.) A medical examiner
characterized the death as a suicide. (ld. at A-32.)
I There are three peo levels. (0.1.67 at B-95.) Level I is for inmates with high risk, and they have "1:1
observation and are confined in a cell wearing only a suicide gown." (Id.) Level II is for inmates with moderate
risk, and "they are confmed in a cell wearing only a suicide gown." (Id.) Here, "there is no longer 1: 1 observation,"
rather "the inmate is monitored on a staggered interval no greater than 15 minutes." (0.1. 67 at B-95 - B-96.) In
both Levels I and II, the inmates do not have "bed linens, personal items, writing utensils, plastic bags or eating
utensils." (Id.) Finally, Level III is for inmates with low risk, and ''they are confmed in a cell wearing a department
of correction uniform." (0.1. 67 at B-96.) Here, "an inmate is allowed to have bed linens and personal items." (Id.)
Like Level II, the inmate is monitored in intervals of no greater than 15 minutes. (Id.)
2 See footnote 1.
3
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) permits a party to move for summary judgment on
specified claims or defenses, in whole or in part? Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is
appropriate "ifthe movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact." (Id.)
The moving party bears the burden of proving that no genuine dispute as to any material fact
exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 n.lO (1986).
After the moving party has carried its initial burden, "the nonmoving party must come forward
with 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 586-87. More
specifically, "to defeat the [movant's] motion, the plaintiff' must introduce more than a scintilla
of evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for trial; she must introduce evidence from
which a rational finder of fact could find in her favor.'" Woloszyn v. County o/Lawrence, 396
F.3d 314,319 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 946 F.2d 1017, 1020
(3d Cir. 1991)). A party must adequately support an assertion that a fact is or is not genuinely
disputed, by "(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions,
documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including
those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
materials; or (B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a
genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the
fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The court must "view all underlying facts and all reasonable
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable" to the nonmoving party. Pennsylvania Coal
Ass 'n v. Babbit, 63 F.3d 231,236 (3d Cir. 1995). A genuine dispute of material fact exists "if
The legal standard reflects the revised language used in the 2010 amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See USCS Fed R. Civ. P. 56.
3
4
the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The substantive law identifies which
facts are material. Id. Therefore, "only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the
suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Id.
IV. DISCUSSION
Defendant Taylor contends that summary judgment is appropriate. Taylor moves for
summary judgment on the ground that in his capacity as Commissioner of the DOC "he had no
personal involvement in the suicide of Thomas Burns." (D.!. 65 at 4.) Taylor also asserts that
"the record is free of any dispute that the decedent was being seen and cared for by medical
personnel in the infirmary." (Id. at 5.) Taylor supports his position by providing record
evidence as reflected in the fact section above. Taylor also cites to the unpublished opinion,
Albert v. Yost, 2011 WL 2321471 (3d Cir. 2011), which holds "a prison administrator who
delegates medical care decisions to medical professionals does not have the requisite subjective
intent to harm the plaintiff or consciousness of a risk of serious harm.,,4 Id. at *4.
Plaintiff Lamb contends that summary judgment is precluded because she has introduced
sufficient evidence to support either one, or both, of her claims against Taylor. (D.!. 70 at 14.)
Lamb argues that there is sufficient evidence to support a civil rights claim against Taylor for
violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (Count I) and/or his failure to train and/or maintenance of wrongful customs, practices,
and policies (Count III). (Id.) Lamb supports her position by attempting to distinguish Yos~ and
The holding in Yost is based on a published opinion. See Spruill v. Gillis. 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004)
("[A]bsent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not
treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison official ... will not be chargeable with the Eighth Amendment scienter
requirement of deliberate indifference.").
5 Given that Yost is not a precedential case, the court will not discuss it at length. However, it is important to note
that Lamb's attempt to distinguish the case reduces to mere attorney argument. Lamb provides neither legal support
nor evidentiary support for her contentions. See DJ. 70 at 19-20.
4
5
focusing heavily on inapposite cases such as Natale v. Camden County Correctional Facility,
318 F.3d 575 (3d Cir. 2003). Natale is not relevant to this summary judgment inquiry because in
that case the plaintiffs were challenging the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor
of defendant Prison Health Services ("PHS"). See Natale, 318 F.3d at 577. Natale's pertince in
this action was with regard to the summary judgment motion filed by defendant CMS because its
employees are classified as prison officials. 6 Natale does not, however, provide support against
the contention that Lamb cannot meet the legal standard applicable to Taylor in his capacity as a
prison administrator.
It is well established that "[b ]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to ... § 1983 suits,
a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own
individual actions, has violated the Constitution." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948
(2009). Indeed, "[a] defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the
alleged wrongs to be liable and cannot be held responsible for a constitutional violation which he
or she neither participated in nor approved." Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187,210 (3d Cir.
2007) (internal citations omitted). '''Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of
personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.'" Lewis v. Williams, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 62756, *30 (D. Del. June 10,2011) (quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195,
1207 (3d Cir. 1988». The "plaintiff must plausibly plead and eventually prove not only that the
official's subordinates violated the Constitution, but that the official by virtue of his own conduct
and state of mind did so as well." Id. at *31 (citations omitted). At this stage in the litigation, to
defeat Taylor's motion for summary judgment, Lamb '''must introduce more than a scintilla of
evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for trial; she must introduce evidence from which
a rational finder of fact could find in her favor. '" Woloszyn, 396 F.3d at 319.
6
See the court's order denying eMS' motion for summary judgment (D.1. 78).
6
Lamb asserts that Taylor had knowledge and was "well aware of purported defects in the
suicide prevention system in place." (D.I. 70 at 17.) Lamb emphasizes that Barkes v. First
Correction Medical Inc., 06-cv-ID4 (LPS), was filed against Taylor in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Delaware in 2006, and it "detailed defects in the DOC system that led to Mr.
Barkes's suicide." (ld.) The mere fact that Barkes was filed is not sufficient to meet Lamb's
evidentiary burden. Moreover, the evidence that Lamb argues is present in the Barkes case, is
not in the record in this action. Lamb does reference record evidence from Muscarella who
testified that "the medical contractor [CMS] used their own policies and procedures. It was only
afterwards that ... now we follow DOC policies and procedures." (D.I. 70 at 11-12; D.I. 67, Ex.
1 at B-27.) Despite this purported evidence in support of Lamb's position, it is not sufficient to
demonstrate Taylor's personal involvement as to the asserted claims. Thus, a reasonable jury
could not find in favor of Lamb as to her claims against Taylor. Therefore, summary judgment
is appropriate due to insufficient evidence regarding Taylor's personal involvement.
v. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the court will grant Taylor's motion for summary judgment. An
appropriate order will be issued.
Dated: September1: 2011
GE
7
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
)
MARJORIE LAMB as next friend of
A.B. and J.B. and R.B.; and MARJORIE LAMB as )
Administratrix of the Estate of THOMAS BURNS, )
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
)
C.A. No. 08-324 (GMS)
)
STANLEY TAYLOR and
)
CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL SERVICES, et ai., )
)
Defendants.
)
ORDER
WHEREAS, on July 1,2011, defendant Stanley Taylor ("Taylor") filed a motion for
summary judgment (D.I. 64);
WHEREAS, on July 20, 2011, plaintiff Marjorie Lamb filed a response to Taylor's
motion for summary judgment (D.I. 70);
WHEREAS, on August 1,2011, Taylor filed a reply in support of his motion (D.I. 73);
WHEREAS, the court having considered this pending motion, the response and reply
thereto, and the applicable law, concludes that the motion should be granted;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Taylor's motion for summary judgment (D.I. 64) is
GRANTED and the clerk is directed to enter JUDGMENT in favor of defendant aylor and
against the plaintiff. 1
DOE
[ There is no evidence of record showing defendant Taylor's personal involvement as to the asserted claims.
Inasmuch as there are no genuine issues of fact, a reasonable jury could not find in favor of the plaintiff as to these
claims. For the above reasons, the court will grant Tay lor's motion for summary judgment due to a lack of evidence
on personal involvement.
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