Pringle v. Astrue

Filing 32

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Chief Judge Gregory M. Sleet on 5/16/2014. (mdb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

SHARON KAY PRINGLE
Plaintiff,
C. A. No. 08-503-GMS

v.
MICHAEL ASTRUE,
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

I.

INTRODUCTION

On August 11, 2008, plaintiff Sharon Kay Pringle ("Pringle") appealed from a
decision of Michael J. Astrue, the Commissioner of Social Security (the
"Commissioner''), denying her application for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and
supplemental security income ("SSI") under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act
(the "Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433m, 1381-1383f. This Court has jurisdiction over the
matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Presently pending are cross-motions for summary judgment filed by Pringle and
the Commissioner. (D. I. 21, 26.) Pringle seeks an award of benefits in her favor or,
alternatively, to reverse and remand the Commissioner's decision. (D.I. 21.) The
Commissioner requests affirmance of his decision. (D. I. 26.) For the reasons set forth
below, Pringle's motion is granted, and the Commissioner's motion is denied. The
decision of the Administrative Law Judge is reversed, and this matter is remanded for
further findings and/or proceedings consistent with this Memorandum.

II.

BACKGROUND

On September 24, 2003, Pringle filed applications for Title II Disability Insurance
Benefits ("DIB'') and Title XVI Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"). (D.I. 10 at 16.)
Pringle claimed she had been disabled since November 3, 2002. (/d.) Following the
Social Security Administration's ("SSA") denial of her claim, both initially and upon
reconsideration, Pringle requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
("ALJ"). (/d. at 33, 38, 43.) A hearing before ALJ, Keith A. Stanley, occurred on May 9,
2005. (/d. at 488.) At the hearing, the ALJ heard testimony from Pringle and a
vocational expert ("VE"), Lisa Keen. (/d. at 487.) On July 19, 2005, the ALJ issued his
decision denying Pringle's claim for benefits, concluding she was not disabled under
sections 216(1) and 223 of the Social Security Act. (/d. at 25-26.) Subsequently, the
Appeals Council denied Pringle's request for review. (/d. at 8.) Thereafter, she
appealed the ALJ's decision to the United States District Court for the District of
Kansas. (/d. at 408.) After finding the ALJ erred in weighing the medical opinions, the
court reversed and remanded the ALJ's findings for further consideration. (/d. at 431.)
On August 25, 2005, Pringle filed a second set of applications for DIB and SSI
benefits, which claimed she had been disabled since July 19, 2005. (/d. at 442.) The
SSA again denied Pringle's claims, both initially and upon reconsideration, and Pringle
subsequently requested a hearing before an ALJ. (/d.) The ALJ, Edward Banas,
conducted a hearing on July 19, 2007, hearing testimony from Pringle, a VE, Jan D.
Howard-Reed, and Pringle's future daughter-in-law, Dawn Barresi ("Barresi"). 1 (/d.)

1

Two different spellings for Barresi are in the record. For consistency, this court is using the
spelling contained in the transcript of the hearing.

2

The ALJ found Pringle had been disabled within the meaning of 216(1) and 223(d) of
the Act since May 17, 2007. (/d. at 453.) However, the District Court's remand order
required further consideration of all medical opinions in the record, beginning on
November 3, 2002. (/d. at 390.) Thus, ALJ Banas held another hearing on April 8,
2008, where he heard testimony from Pringle, a VE, Christina L. Beatty-Cody, and
Barresi. (/d.) On April18, 2008, the ALJ reaffirmed Pringle was disabled as of May 17,
2007, but found Pringle was not disabled before that date. (/d. at 403.) After the ALJ's
decision became final, Pringle filed the present appeal under consideration to challenge
the ALJ's finding regarding her disability status prior to May 17, 2007. (D. I. 21.)

A.

Medical Evidence

To support her claim, Pringle produced medical records regarding her conditions.
The Court will summarize the relevant records.

1.

Dr. David E. Brown, D.O. (2/18/02-3/25/02) & Miami County
Medical (12/28/02-3/6/03)

Dr. Brown diagnosed Pringle with epigastric abdominal pain and chronic
dyspepsia on January 2, 2002 after she complained of severe abdominal pain that
required a visit to the emergency room one week prior. (D.I. 10 at 190.) Dr. Brown
found a large incarcerated ventral hernia, and diagnosed gastroesophageal reflux
disease and hemorrhagic gastritis, and recommended Prilosec therapy. (/d. at 188.)
He performed a ventral incarcerated herniorrhaphy to repair the ventral hernia on
February 12, 2002. (/d. at 164.) Pringle had "significant incisional pain" for six days
following the surgery. (/d.) Five weeks after the surgery, Dr. Brown reported she was
"progressing extremely well," and Pringle did not return for additional post-operative
check-ups. (/d. at 162.)

3

2.

Dr. Mark Holscher (1/28/02-10/15/03)

Dr. Holscher was Pringle's treating physician from January 28, 2002 through
October 15, 2003 (/d. at 252.) His annotations during office visits show GERD,
hypothyroidism, abdominal pain, diarrhea, and fibromyalgia. (/d. at 258, 261.) Pringle's
correspondence with Dr. Holscher's office detail ongoing complaints about stomach
pain and swelling. (/d. at 259, 263-64.) During a telephone conversation on September
24, 2003, Pringle requested temporary disability, and on forms later submitted to the
SSA, she listed Lactinex, Cholestyramine, Claritin, Singulair, and an albuterol inhaler as
the medications Dr. Holscher prescribed. (/d. at 259, 131.) In an undated memo, Dr.
Holscher stated Pringle was "unable to search for employment effectively at this time."
(/d. at 267.)

3.

Dr. Christopher Nichols, M.D. (4/14/03-6/4/03)

Dr. Holscher referred Pringle to Dr. Nichols, a gastrointestinal specialist, who
examined her on April14, 2003, and noted diffuse upper abdominal bloating, distention,
and acid reflux. (/d. at 235.) His report states Pringle has suffered from bloating and
distention since fall of 2002. (/d.) His examination revealed clear lungs, a regular heart
rate and rhythm, and mild depression. (/d. at 236.) In subsequent office visits, Pringle
complained of unchanged continual abdominal pain since beginning the Prilosec
regimen. Dr. Nichols diagnosed diverticulitis. (/d. at 233.) Diverticulitis had been
previously diagnosed during an emergency room visit on July 21, 2002 for severe
stomach pain, which resulted in four day hospital admission. (/d.)

4

4.

Dr. Cedric B. Fortune, M.D. (Kansas Consultative Examination)
(12/11/03)

On December 11, 2003, Dr. Fortune conducted a state consultative physical
examination of Pringle. (/d. at 268.) Dr. Fortune noted asthma, ongoing heartburn, allover body pain, gastrointestinal issues, postural problems bending or stooping, and
lower back discomfort in his summary of her medical history. (/d.) He noted normal
heart and lung functions and an unremarkable liver, spleen, and kidney were reported.

(/d.) Dr. Fortune's orthopaedic exam revealed Pringle had no difficulty getting on or off
the exam table, exhibited normal range of motion, and mild difficulty walking on her
heels and toes. (/d. at 269.) He noted her efforts during the orthopaedic exam were
poor. (/d.) He reported Pringle was "alert and oriented to time, place, and situation."
(/d. at 269.) He did, however, conclude she embellished her symptoms. (/d.) His

diagnoses included shortness of breath with asthma, low back pain, reflux esophagitis,
generalized arthralgia, and obesity. (/d.) Despite these diagnoses, Dr. Fortune found
Pringle could "perform reasonable activities, including sitting, sta!"Jding, walking and
lifting," but noted difficulty standing for more than ten minutes. (/d.)

5.

RFC Assessment (12/17/03)

A state medical examiner subsequently relied on Dr. Fortune's findings to
determine Pringle's Residual Functional Capacity ("RFC"). (/d. at 270.) Regarding
exertionallimitations, the examiner-2 found she could occasionally lift and/or carry fifty
pounds, frequently lift and/or carry twenty-five pounds, stand, walk or sit for about six
hours in an eight hour workday. (ld. at 271.) Concerning postural limitations, the

2

Although the signature is unclear, it appears this state examiner was Tom Hawkins, M.D.

5

examiner assessed Pringle could only occasionally climb, but could frequently balance,
stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. (/d. at 272.) The examiner found no manipulative,
visual, or communicative limitations. (/d. at 273-74.) Based on her asthma, the
examiner did indicate she should avoid exposure to fumes, odors, dusts, gases, and
the like. (/d. at 274.) Following the medical examination report, Dr. Jeffrey L. Wheeler,
another state medical examiner, reviewed these findings and agreed with all noted
limitations. (/d. at 278-79.)

6.

Dr. Brian Hunt, M.D. (5/1/03-4/22/04)

Pringle's principal complaint while under Dr. Hunt's care related to diarrhea. (D.I.
10 at 396.) Dr. Hunt also prescribed medication to treat Pringle's depression. (/d.) Dr.
Hunt's treatment notes reference a fibromyalgia diagnosis, but do not explain the
origins or reasoning for that diagnosis. (/d.)

7.

Dr. Stanley Mintz (Psychological Evaluation 6/30/04)

Dr. Mintz performed a mental status examination on behalf of Disability
Determination Services ("DDS") on April 23, 2004. (D. I. 15 at 303.) In reviewing
Pringle's health issues, Dr. Mintz noted stomach tenderness and swelling, fibromyalgia,
hiatial hernia, allergies, asthma, depression, and daily diarrhea. (/d.) He described
"some inconsistency in terms of the medical complaints she mentions" and felt she
"may be augmenting medical and psychological complaints." (/d.) Pringle disclosed
her primary care physician at the time, Dr. Hunt, had prescribed Zoloft and related
increased depression since finding her deceased mother in their home. (/d.) Dr. Mintz
recorded Pringle's daily activities as taking her children to school, cleaning, and
cooking. (/d. at 304.) During the examination, he reported Pringle was "somewhat

6

slovenly in appearance" and did not appear "recently brushed or groomed." (/d.) His
other impressions of Pringle included dependency, tendency to "externalize blame,"
lack of work motivation, and entitlement to disability. (/d.) Dr. Mintz concluded Pringle
"appears capable of being able to relate reasonably well to co-workers and
supervisors," can understand "simple and intermediate instructions," and can
adequately concentrate on tasks. (ld. at 305.)
Dr. Lauren Cohen reviewed Dr. Mintz's examination to determine Pringle's
psychological limitations. (ld. at 308.) She categorized Pringle's limitations as not
severe, but noted Pringle suffered from depressive disorder and dependent personality
disorder. (/d. at 311, 315.) Nonetheless, Dr. Cohen noted neither condition resulted in
functional limitations to Pringle's daily life, social activities, or ability to concentrate. (/d.
at 318.)

8.

Dr. Karen Owen (5/18/04)

Pringle sought mental health care from Dr. Owen beginning May 18, 2004. (/d.
at 376.) Dr. Owen noted Pringle's depressed mood and recommended coping
mechanisms. (/d. at 366.) After four visits, Pringle stopped all therapy with Dr. Owen.
(/d. at 359.)

9.

Dr. John Spencer, M.D. (2/23/05-5/4/05)

Pringle began seeing Dr. Spencer as her primary physician on May 4, 2004 after
leaving Dr. Hunt's care. (/d. at 358.) During the first office visit, Dr. Spencer noted the
prior diagnoses of fibromyalgia, GERD, and irritable bowel syndrome. (/d.) He
recorded worsening pain, which concentrated in her knee, and resulted in reduced
physical activity and weight gain. He described the crepitation in her knees as "rather

7

severe." (/d.) To address her body and joint pain, Dr. Spencer prescribed Celebrex.
(/d.) On May 19, 2004, two weeks after her first appointment, Dr. Spencer ordered a

permanent disabled parking placard because of her arthritic, neurological, or orthopedic
condition, and submitted a form to the Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services
in Kansas. (/d. at 152, 384.) Therein, he reported Pringle's depression, fibromyalgia,
and GERD, as beginning in November 2002 and would last her lifetime, affecting her
ability to participate in training and employment. (/d. at 384) He explained her
difficulties in concentrating, standing, and sitting limited her work opportunities. (/d.)
Approximately six weeks later, Dr. Spencer examined Pringle again and noted
Celebrex caused stomach upset, which prevented any improvement in joint pain. (/d. at
357.) On August 4, 2004, Pringle complained of lower back pain resulting from a fall.
(/d. at 356.) She was previously seen in the emergency room, and prescribed

Hydrocodone and Flexeril for the injury. (/d.) Dr. Spencer prescribed Vioxx and
Skelaxin with instructions to continue with the Hydrocodone. (/d.) One week later, Dr.
Spencer again examined Pringle's lower back for complaints of persistent pain and
observed limited range of motion and tenderness. (/d. at 355.) In addition to the pain
medications previously prescribed, Dr. Spencer recommended physical therapy three
times per week. (/d.)
After a week of physical therapy, Pringle returned to Dr. Spencer reporting little
change. (/d. at 354.) He injected the sacroiliac region, which showed significant
tenderness with Depo-Medrol, and instructed her to continue with the pain medications.
(/d.) Dr. Spencer noted Pringle's difficulty in obtaining medications because of

Medicaid authorization delays. (/d. at 353.) Approximately one month later, Pringle

8

returned complaining of back problems, after another fall about three weeks earlier. (/d.
at 352.) While Dr. Spencer noted she was "doing okay," he continued prescribing
Hydrocodone. (/d.) During her next appointment two months later, Dr. Spencer
recorded "she is feeling a little better," but is "still having a lot of pain" and continued
with the Hydrocodone. (/d. at 351.) After four months without improvement, Dr.
Spencer ordered an MRI of the lumbosacral area. (/d. at 350.) The MRI, taken on
December 2, 2004, evidenced some disc desiccation and a possible annular tear at L5S1, without any bulge, protrusion, or extrusion. (/d. at 343.) After the MRI, Pringle
visited Dr. Saba from Fort Scott Orthopedic Services for her results and a physical
evaluation on December 10,2004. (D.I. 15 at 663.) Dr. Saba reported Pringle had
attended physical therapy eleven times and received a cortisone shot without
improvement. (/d.) Dr. Saba observed limited range of motion and facial expressions
revealing severe pain on motion. (/d.) Although he noted her symptoms suggested
herniation nucleolus pulposus ("HNP"), Dr. Saba concluded evidence of HNP was
lacking, and further commented "there were many signs suggesting symptoms
magnifications." (/d.) He attributed the back pain to a possible disk injury to the L 4/5
or L 5/S1, which did not warrant surgical intervention. (/d.) No follow up appointment
was scheduled, however Dr. Saba referred Pringle to a pain clinic. (/d.)
Pringle first visited the pain clinic on December 20, 2004, where Dr. Landers
administered a steroid epidural injection. (/d. at 681.) He reported straight leg motion
of seventy degrees and standing for approximately thirty minutes aggravated her back
pain. (/d.) Without noting any change in symptoms, Dr. Landers administered another
steroid epidural injection on December 27, 2004, and Dr. Pau, of the same pain clinic,

9

administered a caudal epidural on January 6, 2005. (/d. at 674, 677.) In letters to Drs.
Saba and Spencer, Dr. Pau reported no pain relief from the three injections, and since
Pringle was not a surgical candidate, recommended pain management using Neurontin.
(Id. at 666, 669.)

While attending the pain clinic, during an office visit, Dr. Spencer noted Pringle
was doing well, but acknowledged she remained on pain medications, and a cortisone
injection failed to alleviate her back pain. (D.I. 10 at 348.) On February 2, 2005, Dr.
Spencer increased the Neurontin dosage. (ld. at 347.) On February 23, 2005, Dr.
Spencer submitted a Medical Source Statement to ALJ Stanley noting the following:
Pringle could frequently lift and/or carry less than five pounds, occasionally lift and/or
carry five pounds, continuously stand and/or walk thirty minutes, stand and/or walk two
hours throughout an eight hour workday, sit continuously for thirty minutes, and sit for
two hours throughout an eight hour workday, but must lie down for thirty minutes every
two or three hours to alleviate pain. (ld. at 381-82.) He reported

Pring~e

could never

balance, crouch, or crawl, and could occasionally climb, stoop, kneel, reach, and
handle, and had difficulty concentrating while on Zoloft. (ld. at 382.)
On February 23, 2005, Dr. Spencer again increased the Neurontin dosage for
back and leg pain. (D. I. 15 at 725.) On May 4, 2005, Dr. Spencer noted significant
pain, although the Neurontin and Flexeril "seem[ed] to be helping some." (ld. at 724.)
Pringle returned to Dr. Spencer on September 14, 2005 complaining of burning in her
feet that worsens while standing. (ld. at 722.)

10

10.

Unsigned and Undated RFC Assessment

Another RFC assessment was conducted after Pringle requested
reconsideration of the denial of DIB and SSI benefits. (D. I. 10 at 323.) Although the
assessment reduces the weight she could occasionally lift to twenty pounds and
frequently lift to ten pounds, it contains no other changes. (/d.) The examiner also
noted Dr. Spencer's request for a disabled parking placard based on depression,
fibromyalgia, and GERD. (/d. at 324.) The examiner emphasized the lack of medical
evidence supporting a diagnosis of fibromyalgia, and no new evidence demonstrated
"any significant limitations" in Pringle's ability to "perform her day-to-day activities." (/d.)

11.

Consultative Psychological Examination (12/28/05}

Dr. Todd Schemmel performed a consultative psychological examination on
December 28, 2005. (D. I. 15 at 685.) He reported poor attention span and
concentration, adequate short-term memory, and below average long-term memory.
(/d. at 686.) He found Pringle "demonstrated her depression through a depressed
mood, slow thought processes, feelings of loss and sadness over the death of her
mother two years ago, low energy, tearfulness, and poor concentration." (/d.) Dr.
Schemmel suggested Pringle was "unlikely to encounter significant interference from
her depressive symptoms" if she returned to work. (/d.)

12.

Dr. Jeffrey T. MacMillan (4/3/06}

At some point during 2006, Pringle sought treatment from Dr. Jeffrey MacMillan.
(D.I. 15 at 741.) During a visit on March 6, 2006, Pringle explained she had almost
intolerable "progressively worsening low back pain." (/d. at 739.) Dr. MacMillan
prescribed Methadone for pain and ordered a lumbar spine diskogram, which revealed

11

mildly irregular disc margins at the L3-4 level without evidence of an annular tear, an
annular tear at the L4-5 level, and a small disc bulge at the L5-S1 level. (/d. at 739-40.)

13.

Dr. Franklin Ampadu (3/29/07)

On March 29, 2007, after Pringle moved to Delaware, she was evaluated by Dr.
Ampadu. (D.I. 15 at 765.) He summarized her previous diagnoses and recorded her
statement that despite complaints about persistent lower back pain, doctors could find
no severe problem. (/d.) While under Dr. Ampadu's care, Pringle suffered a nervous
breakdown and was treated for depressive disorder. (/d. at 761.) Dr. Ampadu
submitted a form to Delaware Health and Social Services, reporting Pringle could not
work in her usual occupation nor on a full-time basis. (/d.)
14. . Dr. Brian Simon (Psychological Evaluation 9/11/07)
Dr. Brian Simon conducted a psychological evaluation on September 11, 2007.
(/d. at 766.) Pringle advised she was applying for disability benefits because of

depression. (/d.) He listed her previously prescribed medications, including Atrovent,
Albuterol, Prednisone, Guaifensin, Zoloft, Tramadol, Tiamcinalone/HCTZ, Triampterine,
Gabapentin, Nexium, Acetaminophen, Flexeril, Naproxen, Hydrocodone, and Vicodin,
and noted previous diagnoses of asthma, fibromyalgia, arthritis, peripheral neuropathy,
and depression. (/d. at 767.) Her medications at that time included
Methylprednisolone, Singulair, Triamterene, Naproxen, Sertraline, Loratadine,
Labetalol, Cyclobenzaprine, Hydrocodone, Lunesta, Hyoscamine, Prevacid,
Gabapentin, and Tileptal. (/d.) Pringle related she had two ruptured discs and a
pinched nerve in her back. (/d. at 766.) She complained the prescribed medications
cause dry mouth, shakiness, forgetfulness, and blurred vision. (/d. at 767.) Dr. Simon

12

observed Pringle's attention and concentration as fair and her speech normal. (/d.) He
noted she appeared to be nervous and shaky at times. (/d.) Pringle reported auditory
hallucinations of her mother since the time of her death. (/d.) Dr. Simon concluded
Pringle's "judgment and insight into her illness ... to be poor," and she "very likely
overstated [her] problems." (/d. at 767, 770.) Regarding employment, Dr. Simon
opined "it seems probably that she has encountered some significant problems being
able to work because of her psychiatric and medical problems," and was concerned
about her ability to handle stressful situations and relate to others in a working
environment. (/d. at 771.) On the Delaware Psychological Functional Capacities
Evaluation Form, Dr. Simon rated Pringle's ability to relate to other people as moderate,
her restriction of daily activities as moderately severe, her deterioration of personal
habits moderate, and her constriction of interests as moderately severe. (ld. at 772.)
Within the employment setting, Dr. Simon rated her ability to understand simple
instructions as mild, to carry out instructions under ordinary supervision as moderately
severe, to sustain work performance and attendance as moderately severe, to cope
with pressures of ordinary work as severe, and to perform routine tasks as moderately
severe. (ld. at 773.)

B.

Hearing Testimony
1.

Sharon Pringle's Testimony

During ALJ Banas' first hearing on July 19, 2007, Pringle testified she lived with
her son, his wife and grandchild in a multi-level home, with her bedroom on the main
floor. (/d. at 788.) Regarding household chores, Pringle folds laundry while seated.
(/d.) Although she has a driver's license, Pringle claimed to neither own nor drive a car.

13

(/d. at 789.) She has not been employed since November 2002, and did not believe

she could return to her previous jobs. (/d. at 789-90.) Pringle claimed sitting was
limited and she continually shakes. (/d. at 790.) She testified her depression worsened
despite the medication Zoloft, and she usually stays in bed or at home. (/d. at 790-91.)
She was uncomfortable around people, and was unable to handle any stress. (/d. at
795-96.)
When questioned by ALJ Banas about other health problems, Pringle testified
her asthma was well-managed by medication, but she avoided pollen, dust, and fumes.
(/d. at 791.) She has body pain from the neck down, with the severity varying daily. (/d.

at 791-92.) Pringle claimed a diagnosis of fibromyalgia, but no treatment for this
condition was prescribed. (/d. at 792.) Although she claimed extremely elevated blood
pressure, during an recent emergency room admission, her hypertension was generally
controlled. (/d. at 792-93.) Pringle testified her stomach swells after eating, requiring
her to sit and remove her pants for relief. (/d. at 793.) She could only stand for thirty
minutes and sitting was uncomfortable. (/d. at 794.) Pringle also testified she had a
pinched nerve in her back, which affected both legs and caused her to recently fall.
(/d.)
Regarding her daily activities, she has difficulty sleeping, causing her to nod off
during the day. (/d. at 797.) She is unable to do the things she used to, and typically
lays in bed or on the sofa. (/d.) She does not attend social events or religious
meetings. (/d.)
During the second hearing on April 8, 2008, Pringle testified she was only
technically employed in 2003 when she cared for her ailing mother. (/d. at 812.)

14

Pringle explained she did not feed or dress her mother because her mother could
perform such tasks. (/d. at 814.) Rather, Pringle explained she usually kept her mother
company. (/d.)
Pringle claimed to suffer from asthma, depression, and digestive problems since
2002. (/d.) She related a hospitalization for digestive problems before she began
caring for her mother. (/d. at 816.) After her mother's death, Pringle lived with her
father, helping him by answering the phone. (/d. at 819.) Her boyfriend and children
handle the household chores. (/d. at 820.) She has not lived alone since 2004. (/d. at
821.) Pringle claimed she could only walk for about half an hour and could not lift over
five pounds. (/d. at 816-17.) Regarding her mental state, Pringle related significant
depression, especially since her mother's death in 2004 and father's passing in 2007.
(/d. at 817-18.)

2.

Dawn Barresi's Testimony

During ALJ Banas's first hearing in July 2007, Barresi testified she has known
Pringle for approximately a year and a half and accompanied her to doctors'
appointments. (/d. at 799.) She claimed to drive Pringle everywhere. (/d.) Barresi did
not offer any significant testimony during the second hearing on April 8, 2008 because
she initially met Pringle in November 2005, and the period at issue involved the 20022005 time frame. (/d. at 823.)
3.

Vocational Expert's Testimony

A vocational expert, Howard-Reed, testified during the first hearing on July 19,
2007. (/d. at 801.) After acknowledging Pringle's previous employment as a nurse's
aid, general manager at Pizza Hut, and shift manager, the VE opined Pringle's

15

managerial and clerical skills were transferable to sedentary jobs. (/d.) In response to
ALJ Banas hypothetical of an individual having the same physical and emotional
ailments as Pringle, the VE explained an individual with the same limitations and
similar work history was not capable of employment. (/d. at 802.) ALJ Banas then
altered his hypothetical, stating the individual might be capable of performing simple
and routine sedentary work, with no exposure to dust or fumes, and required occasional
changes in position for postural comfort. (/d. at 803) In response, VE Howard-Reed
posited that individual was capable of employment, citing a sedentary security guard,
an assembler, and an order clerk as possible positions. (/d.)
Christina Beatty-Cody, another vocational expert, testified during the second
hearing on April 8, 2008. (/d. at 825.) After the VE reviewed Pringle's work history, ALJ
Banas inquired about the vocational impact depression and pain might have on an
individual's ability to perform similar jobs. (/d. at 827.) The VE advised a fifteen to
twenty percent reduction in productivity due to depression and pain, which would be
work preclusive. (/d. at 828.) ALJ Banas propounded a hypothetical individual with a
work history similar to Pringle's and a capacity for light level exertion, limited to simple
jobs that allowed occasional postural changes for pain relief, and did not entail
exposure to excessive pulmonary irritants. (/d.) The VE concluded an individual with
such limitations could obtain employment, including positions as a collator, photocopy
machine operator, or mail room clerk. (/d. at 829.)
C.

The ALJ's Findings

The Social Security Administration uses a five-step sequential claim evaluation
process to determine whether an individual is disabled:

16

[The Commissioner] determines first whether an individual is currently
engaged in substantial gainful activity. If that individual is engaged in
substantial gainful activity, he will be found not disabled regardless of the
medical findings. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). If an individual is found not to
be engaged in substantial gainful activity, the [Commissioner] will
determine whether the medical evidence indicates that the claimant
suffers from a severe impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If the
[Commissioner] determines that the claimant suffers from a severe
impairment, the [Commissioner] will next determine whether the
impairment meets or equals a list of impairments in Appendix I of sub-part
P of Regulations No. 4 of the Code of Regulations. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520( d). If the individual meets or equals the list of impairments, the
claimant will be found disabled. If he does not, the [Commissioner] must
determine if the individual was capable of performing in his past relevant
work considering his severe impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). If the
[Commissioner] determines that the individual is not capable of performing
his past relevant work, then he must determine whether, considering the
claimant's age, education, past work experience and residual functional
capacity, he is capable of performing other work which exists in the
national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f).
West v. Astrue, C.A. No. 07-158, 2009 WL 2611224, at *5 (D. Del. August 26, 2009)

(quoting Brewster v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 581, 583-84 (3d Cir. 1986)). Based on the
factual evidence and the testimony of Pringle, Barresi, and the VE, ALJ Banas
determined Pringle was not disabled prior to May 17, 2007 and, therefore, was not
eligible for DIB or SSI. (D.I. 10 at 403.) His findings on January 8, 2008 are
summarized as follows:
1.

The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social
Security Act through September 30, 2008. (D.I. 15 at 476.)

2.

The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
July 19, 2005, the alleged onset date (20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b),
404.1571 et seq., 416.920(b) and 416.971 et seq.). (/d.)

3.

Since the alleged onset date of disability, the claimant has had the
following severe impairments: Fibromyalgia, asthma, hypertension,
degenerative disc disease, depression, somatization disorder, and
personality disorder (20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) and 406.920(c)). (/d.
at 477.)

17

4.

Since the alleged onset date of disability, the claimant has not had
an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part
404, Supart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d) and
416.920(d)). (/d.)

5.

After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned
finds that, prior to May 17, 2007, the claimant had the residual
functional capacity to perform light work as defined in the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles, except that the claimant was
limited to low stress jobs, defined as only occasional decisionmaking, with a sit/stand option, no concentrated exposure to
pulmonary irritants, and jobs which were simple and routine in
nature. (/d. at 478-79.)

6.

After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned
finds that, beginning on May 17, 2007, the claimant has had the
residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined in
the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, except that she is limited to
jobs with a sit/stand option, no concentrated exposure to
pulmonary irritants, jobs which are simple and routine in nature,
and jobs which involve no stress at all. (/d. at 482.)

7.

Prior to May 17, 2007, the claimant was capable of performing past
relevant work (20 C.F.R. § 404.1565 and 416.965). (/d. at 484.)

8.

Beginning on May 17, 2007, the claimant's residual functional
capacity has prevented the claimant from being able to perform
past relevant work (20 C.F.R. § 404.1565 and 416.965). (/d.)

9.

The claimant was born on July 15, 1962, and was 44 years old,
which is defined as a younger individual age 18-44, on May 17,
2007, the established disability onset date. As of July 15, 2007, the
claimant is a younger individual age 45-49 (20 C.F.R. § 404.1563
and 416.963). (/d.)

10.

The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to
communicate in English (20 C.F.R. § 404.1564 and 416.964). (/d.)

11.

The claimant has not acquired work skills that are transferable to
other occupations within the residual functional capacity
determined for the period beginning on May 17, 2007 (20 C.F.R. §
404.1568 and 416.968). (/d. at 485.)

12.

Beginning on May 17, 2007, considering the claimant's age,
education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there
18

are not a significant number of jobs in the national economy that
the claimant could perform (20 C.F.R. §404.1560©, 404.1566,
416.960(c), and 416.966). (/d.)
13.

The claimant was not disabled prior to May 17, 2007 (20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(f) and 416.920(f)), but became disabled on that date and
has continued to be disabled through the date of this decision (20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)). (/d.)

The ALJ's subsequent findings on April 18, 2008, incorporating the above findings, are
summarized as follows:
1.

The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social
Security Act through September 30, 2008. (0.1. 10 at 392.)

2.

The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
November 3, 2002, the alleged onset date (20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(b), 404.1571 et seq., 416.920(b), and 416.971 et seq.).
(/d.)

3.

Since the alleged onset date of disability, the claimant has had the
following severe impairments: Depression, asthma, fibromyalgia,
gastrointestinal problems, degenerative disc disease, and obesity
(20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)). (/d. at 393.)

4.

Since the alleged onset date of disability, the claimant has not had
an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part
404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d) and
416.920(d)). (/d. at 394.)

5.

After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned
finds that, prior to May 17, 2007, the date the claimant became
disabled, the claimant had the residual functional capacity to
perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) and
416.967(b) except that this work must have been simple and
routine in nature due to moderate concentration deficits, would
have to provide the option to occasionally change positions for
relief of postural discomfort, and would not entail excessive
exposure to pulmonary irritants due to the claimant's history of
asthma. (/d. at 395.)

6.

After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned
finds that, beginning on May 17, 2007, the claimant has had the
residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined in
19

20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a) and 416.9679a) except that she is limited
to jobs with a sit/stand option, no concentrated exposure to
pulmonary irritants, jobs which are simple and routine in nature,
and jobs which involve no stress at all. (/d. at 400.)
7.

Since the alleged onset date of disability, the claimant has been
unable to perform past relevant work (20 C.F.R. § 404.1565 and
416.965). (/d. at 401.)

8.

The claimant was born on July 15, 1962 and was 40 years old,
which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged
disability onset date (20 C.F.R. § 404.1563 and 416.963). (/d.)

9.

The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to
communicate in English (20 C.F.R. § 404.1564 and 416.964). (/d.)

10.

Prior to May 17, 2007, transferability of job skills is not material to
the determination of disability because using the MedicalVocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that the
claimant is "not disabled," whether or not the claimant has
transferable job skills. Beginning on May 17, 2007, the claimant
has not been able to transfer any job skills to other occupations
(See SSR 82-41 and 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2).
(/d.)

11.

Prior to May 17, 2007, considering the claimant's age, education,
work experience, and residual functional capacity, there were a
significant number of jobs in the national economy that the claimant
could have performed (20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c), 404.1566,
416.960(c), and 416.966). (/d.)

12.

Beginning on May 17, 2007, considering the claimant's age,
education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there
are not a significant number of jobs in the national economy that
the claimant could perform (20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c), 404.1566,
419.960(c), and 416.966). (/d. at 402.)

13.

The claimant was not disabled prior to May 17, 2007, but became
disabled on that date and has continued to be disabled through the
date of this decision (20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)).
(/d. at 403.)

20

Ill.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A.

Motion for Summary Judgment

Both parties filed motions for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56( c). In determining the appropriateness of summary judgment, the
court must "review the record as a whole, 'draw[ing] all reasonable inferences in favor
of the non-moving party[,]' but [refraining from] weighing the evidence or making
credibility determinations." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133,
150 (2000) (citation omitted). If the court determines that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,
summary judgment is appropriate. See Hill v. City of Scranton, 411 F.3d 118, 125 (3d
Cir. 2005) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)).

B.

Review of the ALJ's Findings

The court must uphold the Commissioner's factual decisions if they are
supported by "substantial evidence." 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). Substantial
evidence does not mean a large or a considerable amou.nt of evidence. Pierce v.

Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (citing Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S.
197, 229 (1938)). Rather, it has been defined as "more than a mere scintilla. It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate." Ventura v.

Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,
401 (1971 )).
Credibility determinations are the province of the ALJ, and should be disturbed
on review only if they are not supported by substantial evidence. Pysher v. Apfel, Civ.
A. No. 00-1309, 2001 WL 793305, at *2 (E. D. Pa. July 11, 2001) (citing Van Hom v.

21

Schweiker, 717 F.2d 871, 873 (3d Cir. 1983)). Thus, the inquiry is not whether the
court would have made the same determination, but rather, whether the
Commissioner's conclusion was reasonable. Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213
(3d Cir. 1988). In social security cases, this substantial evidence standard applies to
motions for summary judgment brought pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56( c). Woody v.

Sec'yofthe Dep'tofHealth & Human Serv., 859 F.2d 1156, 1159 (3d Cir. 1988).

IV.

DISCUSSION

After considering the record in this case, the parties' submissions and
arguments, and the applicable law, the court concludes that the ALJ's decision is not
supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, the court finds that the ALJ erred in
failing to properly weigh the opinions of Pringle's treating physician, and in failing to
account for all disabling conditions in his hypothetical question to the vocational expert.
The court will remand to correct the deficiencies and determine Pringle's disability
status for the additional claimed period of disability before May 17, 2007.

A.

Treating Physician's Medical Opinion

An examining doctor's written report setting forth medical findings in the doctor's
area of competence "may constitute substantial evidence." Richardson, 402 U.S. at
402. In determining the proper weight to give to such medical opinions, an ALJ is
required to weigh all evidence and resolve any material conflicts. See id. at 399.
Regarding such weight, the Third Circuit stated that "treating physicians' reports should
be accorded great weight, especially 'when their opinions reflect expert judgment based
on a continuing observation of the patient's condition over a prolonged period of time.'"

Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Rocco v. Heckler, 826

22

F.2d 348, 350 (3d Cir. 1987)). A treating physician's opinion is "entitled to substantial
and at times even controlling weight" if it is "well-supported by medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other
substantial evidence in [the claimant's] case record." /d. (quoting 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(d){2)}.
An ALJ, however, may reject a treating physician's opinion if it is based on
"contradictory medical evidence." Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 318 (3d Cir. 2000)
(citation omitted). In those instances, "[e)ven where there is contradictory medical
evidence, ... and an ALJ decides not to give a treating physician's opinion controlling
weight, the ALJ must still carefully evaluate how much weight to give the treating
physician's opinion." Gonzalez v. Astrue, 537 F. Supp. 2d 644, 660 (D. Del. 2008).
Further, "[t]reating source medical opinions are still entitled to deference and must be
weighed using all of the factors provided in 20 C.F.R. 404.1527 and 416.927." Social
Security Regulation ("S.S.R.") 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *4 (July 2, 1996).
It is improper for an ALJ to disregard a treating physician's medical opinion
based solely on one's own impression of the record and evaluation of a claimant's
credibility. See Morales, 225 F.3d at 318 ("The ALJ cannot ... disregard [a treating
physician's] medical opinion based solely on his own 'amorphous impressions, gleaned
from the record and from his evaluation of [the claimant]'s credibility."') (citation
omitted). Additionally, some explanation must be given "for a rejection of probative
evidence which would suggest a contrary disposition." Brewster, 786 F.2d at 585. It
can be appropriate to accept some evidence and reject the rest; however, all evidence
must be considered and a reason for rejection must be provided. See Stewart v. Secy

ofH.E.W, 714 F.2d 287,290 (3d Cir. 1983).
23

Here, the court finds the weight apportioned by the ALJ to Pringle's treating
physician's reports is not based on substantial evidence in the record. During the time
period at issue, Dr. Spencer primarily treated Pringle and Drs. Fortune and Mintz
performed Pringle's consultative physical and psychological examinations, respectively.
In his opinion, the ALJ explained he could not give Dr. Spencer's opinion either
"controlling" or "significant weight," but failed to specify how much weight, if any, Dr.
Spencer's opinion received. (D.I. 10 at 400.)
In weighing the medical opinions, the ALJ accurately explained that treating
source opinions may be entitled to controlling weight if the opinion is well-supported and
not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence on the record. (/d. at 399.)
Moreover, the ALJ explained even if the treating source opinion is not entitled to
controlling weight, the opinion must be evaluated using factors including: the length of
the examining relationship, the treatment relationship, supportability with the relevant
medical evidence, consistency with the record as a whole, the source's specialization,
and any other factors which tend to support or contradict the opinion. (/d. at 399-400.)
The ALJ stated he could not give Dr. Spencer's opinion controlling weight
because (1) the opinion is inconsistent with the other substantial evidence of record and
(2) the opinion is not supported by the relevant medical evidence. (/d. at 400.) In
making this determination regarding Pringle's physical condition, the ALJ exclusively
compared Dr. Spencer's opinion with that of Dr. Fortune, who conducted a physical
examination on December 11, 2003. (/d. at 397.) In his determination regarding
Pringle's psychological condition, the ALJ focused on Dr. Mintz's consultative
psychological examination on April 23, 2004. (/d. at 303.)

24

First, although Dr. Fortune's examination does contradict Dr. Spencer's opinion
relating to Pringle's physical limitations, Dr. Fortune's examination was rendered on
December 11, 2003, long before the record was complete and seven months before
Pringle fell and injured her back. (/d.) Such contradictory evidence that predates the
claimant's principal complaint, cannot outweigh a treating physician's opinion. See
Dougherty v. Astrue, 715 F. Supp. 2d 572, 583 (D. Del. 2010). Morever, Dr. Mintz's

psychological evaluation does not contradict Dr. Spencer's opinion because Dr.
Spencer did not diagnose Pringle's depression; Dr. Spencer noted Pringle's history of
depression and continued prescribing her Zoloft based on that previous diagnosis. (D. I.
10 at 382, 384.)
Second, the ALJ deemed Dr. Spencer's opinion inconsistent with the other
medical evidence on the record, such as Pringle's "benign MRI findings showing only
the possibility of a small annular disc bulge," and his notes that Pringle was "feeling a
little better'' or "doing okay." (/d. at 396, 400.) The Third Circuit, however, has
cautioned "a doctor's observation that a patient is 'stable and well controlled with
medication' during treatment does not [necessarily] support the medical conclusion that
[the patient] can return to work." Brownawe/1 v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 554 F.3d 352,
356 (3d Cir. 2008). Thus, contrary to the ALJ's assertions, Dr. Spencer's opinion is not
internally inconsistent. (D.I. 10 at 400.)
In addition, the record supports Dr. Spencer's opinion. Dr. Spencer's treatment
notes for his one-year treating relationship with Pringle indicate she suffered from a
number of physical impairments, including, among other things, joint pain, body pain,
GERD, crepitation in her knees, and back pain. (/d. at 358.) Moreover, although the
MRI showed no evidence of disc bulging, protrusion, or extrusion, the MRI did show
25

disc desiccation and a possible annular tear. (/d. at 343.) It is evident from Dr.
Spencer's record that, due to the severity of her condition, Pringle required the full
battery of treatment options, including physical therapy, injections, medications, and
referrals to specialists. (/d. at 347-51.) Despite such treatment, Dr. Spencer noted a
lack of improvement, continued prescribing Hydrocodone, and increased the dosage of
Neurontin. (/d. at 347.)
Third, the ALJ emphasized Pringle's reported daily activities are "inconsistent
with her complaints of severe and unrelenting pain." (/d. at 399.) Specifically, the ALJ
emphasized she "was able to take care of her personal needs, prepare simple meals
and do laundry with assistance, perform household chores, shop for groceries, and
drive locally." (/d.) At the first hearing, Pringle testified, however, she could only fold
laundry while seated, could not drive, became uncomfortable around groups of people,
nodded off during the day due to lack of sleep, and usually laid in bed or on the sofa
throughout the day. (D. I. 15 at 797.) Barresi testified she drove Pringle everywhere.
(/d. at 799.) At the second hearing, Pringle testified her boyfriend and children handled

the household chores and she had not lived alone since 2004. (/d. at 820-21.) For
these reasons, the court is not convinced the ALJ accurately characterized Pringle's
activities of daily living when he cited such as the partial basis for rejecting Dr.
Spencer's opinion. The court recognizes the ALJ was entitled to, and did, determine
Pringle's testimony concerning the intensity, persistance, and limiting effects of her
symptoms was not entirely credible. (D.I. 10 at 398-99.) The court is also cognizant of
its obligation to avoid second-guessing such credibility judgments. The court notes,
however, that it is improper for an ALJ to disregard a treating physician's medical
opinion based solely on his own impression of the record and his evaluation of a

26

claimant's credibility. See Morales, 225 F.3d at 318 ("The ALJ cannot, as he did here,
disregard [a treating physician's] medical opinion based solely on his own amorphous
impressions, gleaned from the record and from his evaluation of [the claimant]'s
credibility.").
The court finds that the ALJ so erred in this case. For the reasons above, the
court finds the ALJ failed to accord proper weight to the medical opinion and
assessment of Pringle's treating physician and, therefore, concludes the ALJ's decision
is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.
B.

Vocational Expert Testimony of Available Work

Pringle next asserts the ALJ erred by failing to include all her limitations in his
hypothetical. Hypothetical questions asked to a VE need only reflect the impairments
supported by the record. See McDonald v. Astrue, No. 07-4493, 2008 WL 4368226, at
*3 (3d Cir. 2008). Consequently, when a hypothetical is accurate, aVE's response
constitutes substantial evidence. See id. (citing Chrupcala v. Heckler, 829 F.2d 1269,
1276 (3d Cir. 1987)). Therefore, a VE's testimony is only valid if based on a
hypothetical question that accurately reflects a claimant's physical and mental
limitations. See Myers v. Comm'rof Soc. Sec., No. 08-2906,2009 WL 2445129, at *1
(3d Cir. 2009) (citing Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 1984)). When a
hypothetical question is deficient, remand is required. Alley v. Astrue, 862 F. Supp. 2d
352, 365 (D. Del. 2012). The Third Circuit has provided guidance regarding whether an
impairment must be included in the hypothetical:
Limitations that are medically supported and otherwise uncontroverted in
the record, but that are not included in the hypothetical question posed to
the expert, preclude reliance on the expert's response. [Second], and
[r]elatedly, the ALJ may not substitute his or her own expertise to refute
such record evidence. Limitations that are medically supported but are
27

also contradicted by other evidence in the record may or may not be
found credible-the ALJ can choose to credit portions of the existing
evidence but cannot reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong
reason. Finally, limitations that are asserted by the claimant but that lack
objective medical support may possibly be considered nonetheless
credible. In that respect the ALJ can reject such a limitation if there is
conflicting evidence in the record, but should not reject a claimed
symptom that is related to an impairment and is consistent with the
medical record simply because there is no objective medical evidence to
support it.

Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 554 (3d Cir. 2005).
Here, Pringle claims the hypothetical failed to account for limitations identified by
her treating physicians as well as limitations accepted by the ALJ. (D.I. 22 at 10.)
Specifically, she claims the hypothetical should have included difficulties with social
functioning due to depression and a low stress limitation. (/d.) In response, the
Commissioner argues the limitations left out of the hypothetical were not supported by
the record, and therefore were not required to be included in the hypothetical. (D. I. 27
at 14.)
At the ALJ's first hearing on July 19, 2007, he posed the following hypothetical to
the VE:
Now, going to a hypothetical individual, what if we have a hypothetical
individual, a younger individual with a high school education and a prior
work history similar to that of the Claimant, and what if this hypothetical
individual has all the symptoms and limitations that the Claimant stated
here today during the hearing that she has, would such a hypothetical
individual be capable of any jobs?
(0.1. 15 at 802.) The VE responded the hypothetical individual would not be capable of
any jobs because of her physical limitations and emotional problems. (/d.) The ALJ
then posed a second hypothetical, stating the hypothetical individual "might be capable
of performing work activity at a sedentary level of exertion." (ld. at 803.) In response,
the VE concluded the hypothetical individual would be capable of performing certain
28

sedentary jobs, such as a sedentary security guard. (/d.) At the ALJ's second hearing
on April 8, 2008, he provided a different hypothetical:
So if we have a hypothetical individual who's a younger individual with a
high school education and prior work history similar to that of the claimant
and if this hypothetical individual suffers from a combination of physical
and mental problems so that she is limited to less than a full range and
has pain and depression that reduce her productivity to maybe about 25,
there's a 25 percent reduction in her ability to sustain and maintain work,
would that be work preclusive?
(/d. at 828.) The VE responded this hypothetical individual would be precluded from

work. (/d.) The ALJ then altered his hypothetical, specifying the individual "might be
capable of performing work activity at a light level of exertion" with a few limitations: the
jobs had to be "simple" and "routine in nature," "provide an option to occasionally
change positions for relief of postural discomfort," and "not entail exposure to excessive
pulmonary irritants." (/d.) The VE stated this hypothetical individual could perform
employment such as a collator. (/d. at 829.) Based on these hypotheticals, the ALJ
concluded Pringle could perform light work, as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b),
before May 17, 2007, and only sedentary work, as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a),
beginning on May 17, 2007. (D.I. 10 at 395, 400.)
The ALJ, however, noted Pringle had been diagnosed and treated for depressive
disorder prior to 2007, both by her treating physicians and the state consultative mental
examiner, Dr. Mintz. (/d. at 393, 396.) Following these diagnoses, Pringle sought
treatment for depression from Dr. Karen Owen beginning on May 18, 2004. (/d. at
376.) Pringle was also admitted to the emergency room at Christiana Care a few days
prior to the first hearing, where she was treated for depressive disorder and was told
she was having a nervous breakdown. (/d. at 523-24.)

29

Based on these facts, the ALJ could not exclude "uncontroverted" and "medically
supported" limitations from the hypothetical. See Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 554. Even if
treating physicians and state examiners differed as to the degree of Pringle's
depression, there exist no medical opinions on the record that deny she suffers from
some kind of depressive disorder; thus, the ALJ could not rely on conflicting evidence in
the record to justify excluding a depressive disorder from the hypothetical. See id.
Because the ALJ based his findings regarding Pringle's working capacity on a deficient
hypothetical, the court finds it was not based on substantial evidence. See Chrupcala,
829 F.2d at 1276. Thus, remand is required. Alley, 862 F. Supp. 2d at 365.

C.

Disability Onset Date

The onset date of disability is determined from the medical records and reports
and other similar evidence, which requires the ALJ to apply informed judgment. SSR
83-20. The ALJ should consider factors including the claimant's allegations, work
history, and the medical evidence in the record when making this determination. /d.
The onset date is defined as "the first day an individual is disabled as defined in the Act
and the regulations." /d. For the same reasons as set forth above regarding the ALJ's
weighing of the medical evidence and limitations included within the VE's hypothetical,
the court finds the ALJ's determination of the disability onset date to be in error.

Pringle relies on a series of cases to support the proposition that the ALJ should
have used medical expert testimony to establish the onset date. (D.I. 22 at 14.)
However, this reliance is misplaced because these cases refer only to slow progressive
impairments wherein the onset date must be inferred. Allen v. Barnhart, 471 F.3d 396,
403 (3d Cir. 2005); Newell v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 347 F.3d 541, 548 (3d Cir. 2003);
30

Walton v. Halter, 243 F.3d 703, 708-09 (3d Cir. 2001 ). Here, Pringle does not suffer

from a slow progressive impairment and the onset date does not need to be inferred
because the record contains medical opinions dating back to 2002.
Alternatively, the Commissioner argues the ALJ's onset date is supported by
substantial evidence. (D. I. 27 at 18.) The Commissioner asserts "a combination of Dr.
Simon's psychological evaluation of Plaintiff and Dr. Ampadu's disability certification
provide a medical basis." (/d.) After these diagnostic findings, the ALJ determined
Pringle could not handle any stress at work, compared with the light stress he deemed
her capable of handling before such findings. (/d.)
Although the ALJ is entitled to use his informed judgment based on the
claimant's alleged onset date, the claimant's work history, and the medical evidence in
the record, the above findings that the ALJ improperly weighed the medical evidence
and failed to include the appropriate impairments within the VE's hypothetical
necessitate a finding that the onset date was mistakenly calculated because the ALJ
based the onset date on weighing the medical evidence and the VE's response to his
hypotheticals.
D.

Integrity of the Record

Finally, Pringle claims the record before the court lacks the requisite integrity to
allow proper judicial review. (D.I. 22 at 5.) The ALJ must sufficiently establish the
record to allow the court to properly review his findings. Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700,
705-06 (3d Cir. 1981 ). Further, the ALJ's decision should be "accompanied by a clear
and satisfactory explication of the basis on which it rests." /d. at 704.
Here, the Commissioner moved to remand the case to the Social Security
Administration after failing to produce an administrative record to the court. (D.I. 4.)
31

The Commissioner then moved to reopen the case two years later. (D.I. 6.) The
Commissioner filed a record with the court on August 5, 2010. (D.I. 9.) After Pringle
moved for summary judgment, the Commissioner filed an amended record on July 19,
2011. (D.I. 12, 14.) The court then directed Pringle to file another motion based on the
amended record. (D.I. 21.) Pringle argues the duplicate records and delays indicate
"the record was still not complete, and that its integrity had been so compromised by
delays, errors, and omissions, that no attempt at reconstruction could assure that the
record presented to the court was the same record that was actually before ALJ
Banas." (D. I. 22 at 5.) In response, the Commissioner contends Pringle's argument
"appears to be nothing but a five-page diatribe criticizing the agency for a delay in
certifying a complete administrative record in this matter, as well as an attempt to create
confusion where there is none." (D. I. 27 at 13.)
Although the delays and renumbering of exhibits within the records may have
created confusion or inconvenience, Pringle fails to point to any authority supporting the
proposition that such confusion or inconvenience requires remand. Pringle had the
opportunity to review both records and file timely motions accordingly. Further, all
medical evidence on which the ALJ relied is readily discoverable within the record.
Therefore, there exists no basis to remand this case based on the integrity of the
record.

32

V.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, (1) Pringle's motion for summary judgment is granted

in part; (2) the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment is denied; (3) the decision
of the ALJ is reversed; and (4) the matter is remanded for further findings and
proceedings consistent with this Memorandum.

Dated:

May~. 2014

33