Johnson v. Morgan et al

Filing 60

MEMORANDUM OPINION re 55 motion for summary judgment. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 3/30/12. (ntl)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
RONALD JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
Civ. No. 09-007-LPS

V.

WARDEN PHIL MORGAN,
Defendant.

Ronald G. Johnson, Wilmington, Delaware, ProSe Plaintiff.
Kenisha L. Ringgold, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Delaware Department of Justice,
Wilmington, Delaware. Counsel for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

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March 30, 2012
Wilmington, Delaware

STARK, U.S. District Judge:
I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, Ronald Johnson ("Johnson"), a former inmate at the Howard R. Young

Correctional Institution ("HRYCI") in Wilmington, Delaware, filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and§ 1986 alleging violations ofhis civil rights. Johnson appears prose and has
been allowed to proceed in forma pauperis. (D.I. 4) Pending before the Court is Defendant
Warden Phil Morgan's ("Warden Morgan") Motion for Summary Judgment. (D.I. 55) The
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For the reasons that follow, the Court will
grant Warden Morgan's Motion for Summary Judgment.

II.

BACKGROUND
Johnson filed his Complaint on January 2, 2009. He alleges that he was illegally held at

the HRYCI on a false charge of violation of probation ("VOP") and that he wrote to Warden
Morgan on numerous occasions to correct the matter, to no avail. (D.I. 2)
On December 16, 2008, Johnson was arrested for offensive touching and two counts of
third degree assault following a complaint of domestic violence that occurred on December 9,
2008. (D.I. 56 at Al-3) Johnson was committed the HRYCI pursuant to two Justice ofthe Peace
Orders. (!d. at A5-6) One Order was based upon an active capias for fighting/disorderly

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conduct, Case No. L0-0611014094, and the other Order was based upon the December 9, 2009

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incident that resulted in the new counts of assault and offensive touching, Case Nos. LO-

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0812005967-001,002, and 003. (/d) Bail was set at two hundred thirty dollars, cash only, on
the outstanding capias and at five hundred fifty dollars ($550) secured bail on the assault ($250

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for each count) and offensive touching ($50) charges. (Jd at A5-6) A hearing for the

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outstanding capias was scheduled for December 17, 2008, and a hearing was scheduled for
December 18, 2008 on the assault and offensive touching charges. (Id at A5-6)
A disposition on the capias, Case No. L0-0611014094, dated December 17, 2008, states
"new agreement" "to be released." (Id at A 13) The Court of Common Pleas sent to the Central
Offender Records an updated disposition on the assault and offensive touching charges, Case
Nos. L0-0812005967-001, 002, and 003, dated December 18,2008, that indicated Johnson was
being held, bail was increased to a total of two thousand dollars ($2000) for all of the new
charges (up from the original $550), and trial was scheduled to begin on January 28, 2009. 1 (Id
at A14) Johnson's offender status sheet, dated December 18, 2008, indicated, in error, a VOP
charge, Case No. DACS00002, 0812008624. (D.I. 51 at ex. A)
During his deposition, Johnson testified that he "was getting arrested" for assaulting his
girlfriend, designated his sister and niece as his power of attorneys over his account, and readied

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for his arrest by giving his niece one thousand dollars for use towards bail. (Id at A7, A12)
When Johnson's niece and sister attempted to pay Johnson's bail, they were informed that

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Johnson had an outstanding VOP charge with a one thousand dollar cash bail. (Id at A17)
Because Johnson's offender status sheet of December 18, 2008 stated that, in addition to the
assault and offensive touching charges, he was being detained on the VOP charge with bail set at
one thousand dollars, the bondsman advised Johnson's relatives that they were required to pay
three hundred thirty-three dollars for the VOP charge in addition to the two thousand dollars

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Johnson was found guilty of assault in the third degree. (Id at A16)
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secured bond for the assault and offensive touching charges. 2 (D.I. 56 at A17) At no time did
Johnson's niece speak to any prison officials. (D.I. 59 at ex. A) Johnson was informed by the
bondsman that bail money paid for the VOP charge was non-refundable. (Jd.) According to
Johnson, his family could not afford to pay the non-refundable bail for the VOP charge, and he
told his family to "just hold off' and he would try to correct the error at the HRYCI. (D.I. 56 at
A12)
On a daily basis, and until his release, Johnson spoke to prison employees and wrote to
the Records Department, Warden Morgan, the Business Office, and Dover's Main Records
Department regarding the VOP charge. (!d. at A16) Johnson also wrote to the New Castle
County Family Court, the Kent County Family Court, the Public Defender, and the Public
Defender's Office. (!d. at A17) Johnson was repeatedly told by staff that everyone was aware of
his complaint, they had contacted the courts, and his complaint had been sent to the Dover
Records Department, but that he would not be released until the Records Department cleared his
record of the VOP charge. (!d. at Al8)
Johnson submitted a grievance on December 19, 2008, complaining that his offender
status sheet, in error, included a VOP charge. (!d. at A20) The grievance stated that Johnson had
never been on probation, had never been arrested for a VOP, and had never been arraigned on a
VOP charge. (!d.) The matter was investigated and a report issued on December 24, 2008. (!d.)
On December 31, 2008, the Clerk of the Justice of the Peace Court issued an order directed to the
Delaware Department of Correction that Johnson had met his obligation by posting bond and/or

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According to Johnson, the VOP charge actually belonged to an individual named James
J. Cameron. (D.I. 51 at ex. A; D.l. 56 at A17)
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paying a fine and costs due and directed that he be released from custody upon the presentation
the order. (Id at A23) The order referenced Kl - 0709009149: 001 Disord. Conduct. (Id) On
January 1, 2009, a lieutenant advised Johnson that the bail for the VOP charge had been
removed. (D.I. 51 at 4, D.l. 56 at AIO, A12) Johnson contacted his family, posted the two
thousand dollars bond on January 2, 2009, and was released. (Id at AIO, A15, A24-25)
Warden Morgan contends he had no knowledge that the Central Offenders Records had,
in error, placed a VOP charge in Johnson's offender status sheet. (D.I. 59 at Morgan aff.) In
addition, he states that he was not aware of any aspect of Johnson's claims. (!d) He had no
knowledge of the grievance submitted by Johnson or the events of which Johnson complains that
occurred between December 16, 2008 and January 2, 2009. (!d) Johnson's grievance did not go
past the informal resolution stage and was resolved upon Johnson's release; therefore, it was not
forwarded to Warden Morgan for review. (!d)

III.

LEGAL STANDARDS
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." 3 Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party has the initial burden of proving the absence of a genuinely

disputed material fact relative to the clams in question. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317 (1986). Material facts are those "that could affect the outcome" of the proceeding; "a

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Rule 56 was revised by amendment effective December 1, 2010. "The standard for
granting summary judgment remains unchanged," and "[t]he amendments will not affect
continuing development of the decisional law construing and applying these phrases." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56 advisory committee's note to 2010 Amendments.

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dispute about a material fact is 'genuine' if the evidence is sufficient to permit a reasonable jury
to return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir.
2011) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
The burden then shifts to the non-movant to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue
for trial. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Williams

v. Borough ofWest Chester, Pa., 891 F.2d 458, 460-61 (3d Cir. 1989). A non-moving party

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asserting that a fact is genuinely disputed must support such an assertion by: "(A) citing to
particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations ... , admissions, interrogatory answers, or
other materials; or (B) showing that the materials cited [by the opposing party] do not establish
the absence ... of a genuine dispute." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(l).
When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the Court must view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable
inferences in that party's favor. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007); Wishkin v. Potter,
476 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2007). A dispute is "genuine" only if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 24749; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586-87 ("Where the record taken as a whole could
not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine issue for
trial.'"). If the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of its
case with respect to which it has the burden of proof, the moving party is entitled to judgment as

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a matter oflaw. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

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IV.

DISCUSSION
Warden Morgan moves for summary judgment on the grounds that: (1) there was no

violation of Johnson's constitutional rights; (2) he is entitled to qualified immunity; (3) Johnson
fails to state a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1986; and (4) Johnson's claim of mental anguish
lacks an arguable basis in fact and law.

A.

42 U.S.C. § 1983

Warden Morgan argues that summary judgment is appropriate because there is no
evidence of record that he caused a constitutional violation. He contends that Johnson was
placed in detention pursuant to a facially valid warrant, and the continued detention was the
result of an inadvertent clerical error that placed the VOP charge on Johnson's offender status
sheet. Johnson responds that there remains a genuine issue of fact- whether Warden Morgan
had an obligation and duty to act and assist him in removing the VOP charge from his record,
with its one thousand dollar cash bond, and whether Warden Morgan neglected his duty.

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VOP

Char~:e

When bringing a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him
of a federal right, and that the person who caused the deprivation acted under color of state law.
See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Johnson does not suggest that his arrest was

constitutionally deficient or that Warden Morgan was involved in his arrest. Johnson was aware
that an arrest was imminent and he made arrangements for the payment of bail. It is clear from
the pleadings that Johnson's claims are based solely upon Warden Morgan's action, or inaction,
following his arrest and detention, after the issuance oflawful Commitment Orders. Johnson's
claim is that Warden Morgan ignored his complaints and failed to immediately investigate and

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remove the VOP charge that appeared in error on his offender status sheet that, in tum, would
eliminate the one thousand dollar bail associated with the charge. Johnson contends that, as a
result, he was wrongfully detained.
As the Supreme Court stated in Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 143-44 (1979),
Absent an attack on the validity of the warrant under which he was
arrested, respondent's complaint is simply that despite his protests
of mistaken identity, he was detained [over the long weekend].
Whatever claims this situation might give rise to under state tort
law, we think it gives rise to no claim under the United States
Constitution.
See also Mitchell v. Aluisi, 872 F.2d 577, 579 (4th Cir. 1989) (fact that Mitchell alerted arresting
officer that charges against him had been dropped was irrelevant, as police officers executing
arrest warrant need not debate every claim of innocence); Hargarten v. Dart, 2009 WL 103153
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 2009) (court's reliance on incorrect bond amount did not give rise to liability
of sheriff or executive director, absent connection to official custom or policy of defendants).
The Baker Court further stated that, "[g]iven the requirements that arrest be made only on
probable cause and that one detained be accorded a speedy trial, we do not think a sheriff
executing an arrest warrant is required by the Constitution to investigate independently every
claim of innocence, whether the claim is based on mistaken identity or a defense such as lack of
requisite intent." Baker, 443 U.S. at 145-46.
Just as an officer does not have a duty to independently investigate the claimed innocence
of a person arrested on a bench warrant, it follows that Warden Morgan should not be held
responsible for failing to personally investigate Johnson's claims that a VOP charge had been
entered in error. Nonetheless, an investigation took place once Johnson submitted his grievance,

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albeit not as quickly as Johnson wished, and Johnson was released once the State Court issued its
Order of Release.
Finally, the record reflects that Johnson was held pursuant to lawful commitments, his
niece held sufficient money for his cash bail, and it was Johnson who opted not to pay the bail
for VOP charge because he did not want to pay "non-refundable" money. Johnson chose to
remain at the HRYCI to "clear up" the matter rather than pay the bail for VOP charge and resolve
the matter after he was released. Based upon the foregoing, it cannot be said that Warden
Morgan violated Johnson's constitutional rights in the continued detention.

2.

Respondeat Superior/Personal Involvement

In addition, it is evident that Johnson named Warden Morgan as a defendant based upon
his supervisory position. It is well-established that a defendant in a civil rights action must have
personal involvement in the alleged wrongs in order to be liable, and such a defendant cannot be
held responsible for a constitutional violation in which he or she neither participated nor
approved. See Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 210 (3d Cir. 2007). "Personal involvement
can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and
acquiescence." Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). A§ 1983 claim
cannot be premised upon a theory of respondeat superior; instead, in order to establish liability
for deprivation of a constitutional right, a party must show personal involvement by each
defendant. See Brito v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 392 F. App'x 11, 14 (3d Cir. Aug. 18,
2010) (not published) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,29 S.Ct. at 1948-49); Rode, 845
F.2d at 1207).

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Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must show that each
Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948. Absent vicarious liability, each Government official,
his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct.
at 1949. "Thus, when a plaintiff sues an official under § 1983 for conduct 'arising from his or
her superintendent responsibilities,' the plaintiff must . . . prove not only that the official's
subordinates violated the Constitution, but that the official by virtue of his own conduct and state
of mind did so as well." Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1198 (101h Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, _U.S._, 131 S.Ct. 2150 (2011) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949). The factors
necessary to establish a § 1983 violation will vary with the constitutional provision at issue. See

id.
Under pre-Iqbal Third Circuit precedent, "[t]here are two theories of supervisory
liability," one under which supervisors can be liable if they "established and maintained a policy,
practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm," and another under which
supervisors can be liable if they "participated in violating plaintiffs rights, directed others to
violate them, or, as the person[s] in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in [their]
subordinates' violations." Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 129 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Supervisory liability may attach if the plaintiff shows that the
supervisor's actions were "the moving force" behind the harm suffered by the plaintiff. See
Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1117-18 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-54;
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989); Heggenmiller v. Edna Mahan Carr. Inst. for
Women, 128 F. App'x 240 (3d Cir. Apr. 11, 2005) (not published). "Particularly after Iqbal, the

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connection between the supervisor's directions and the constitutional deprivation must be
sufficient to demonstrate a plausible nexus or affirmative link between the [directions] and the
specific deprivation of constitutional rights at issue." Santiago, 629 F.3d at 130 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
The Third Circuit has recognized the potential effect that Iqbal might have in altering the
standard for supervisory liability in a § 1983 suit but, to date, has declined to decide whether
Iqbal requires narrowing the scope of the test. See Santiago, 629 F.3d at 130 n.8; see also
Argueta v. United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60 (3d Cir. 2011)

("To date, we have refrained from answering the question of whether Iqbal eliminated- or at
least narrowed the scope of- supervisory liability because it was ultimately unnecessary to do so
in order to dispose of the appeal then before us."); Bayer v. Monroe County Children and Youth
Servs., 577 F.3d 186, 190 n.5 (3d Cir. 2009) (stating in light of Iqbal, it is uncertain whether

proof of personal knowledge, with nothing more, provides sufficient basis to impose liability
upon supervisory official). Hence, it appears that, under a supervisory theory of liability, and
even in light of Iqbal, personal involvement by a defendant remains the touchstone for
establishing liability for the violation of a plaintiffs constitutional right,4 Williams v.
Lackawanna County Prison, 2010 WL 1491132, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 2010).

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'"Supervision' entails, among other things, training, defining expected performance by
promulgating rules or otherwise, monitoring adherence to performance standards, and responding
to unacceptable performance whether through individualized discipline or further rulemaking."
Sample, 885 F.2d at 1116. "For the purpose of defining the standard for liability of a supervisor
under § 1983, the characterization of a particular aspect of supervision is unimportant." Id at
1116-17.
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Turning to the instant case, there is a paucity of evidence with regard to Johnson's claim
of Warden Morgan's personal involvement. Warden Morgan was not the individual responsible
for preparing Johnson's offender status report that erroneously included the VOP charge. While
Johnson indicates that he wrote to Warden Morgan, the record contains no letters directed to
Warden Morgan and, according to Warden Morgan, he was unaware of Johnson's dilemma.
Johnson asserts that Warden Morgan did not investigate his complaint yet, as discussed above,
Johnson's complaint was investigated once he submitted a grievance on the issue. The
investigation was conducted by other prison officials, not Warden Morgan.
With regard to Warden Morgan's supervisory position, Johnson argues that he is the
highest and chief authority of the HR YCI and he had the authority to release him. He further
argues that Warden Morgan's staff ignored his complaints. A reasonable jury could not find in
favor of Johnson based upon supervisory liability because there is no evidence of record that:
(1) identifies an existing custom and practice that created an unreasonable risk of harm to
Johnson, (2) Warden Morgan was aware that this unreasonable risk existed; (3) Warden Morgan
was indifferent to that risk, and (4) the failure to immediately investigate the VOP charge
resulted from Warden Morgan's failure to employ that supervisory practice or procedure. See
e.g., Sample, 885 F.2d at 1118. For the above reasons, the Court will grant Warden Morgan's

Motion for Summary Judgment.

B.

42 U.S.C. § 1986

Warden Morgan moves for summary judgment on the§ 1986 claims on the grounds that
Johnson has failed to state a claim. Johnson responds that Warden Morgan violated his rights
under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and§ 1986. Johnson's claim pursuant to§ 1986 fails as a matter of law.
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A cognizable 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim is a prerequisite to stating a claim under§ 1986.

See Robison v. Canterbury Vill., Inc., 848 F.2d 424,431 n.IO (3d Cir. 1988); Brawer v.
Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 841 (3d Cir. 1976). Johnson refers to 42 U.S.C. § 1985 in his response
and, presumably, relies upon § 1985(3), since § 1985(1) and (2) are not implicated in any way in
his allegations. Section 1985(3) prohibits conspiracies to deprive a "person or class of persons of
the equal protection ofthe laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the law." The
Supreme Court has interpreted the language of§ 1985(3) as "requiring that the conspirators'
actions be motivated by an intent to deprive their victims of the equal protection of the laws."

Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 725 (1983). It is well-settled that "intent to deprive of equal
protection, or equal privileges and immunities, means that there must be some racial, or perhaps
otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action." !d. at
726.
Here, there is no evidence of record that Warden Morgan treated Johnson differently due
to his race. Nor is there evidence of an agreement or understanding among Warden Morgan and
others to violate Johnson's constitutional rights or to discriminate against him under§ 1985. No
reasonable jury could find that Warden Morgan violated Johnson's rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985 and, therefore, Johnson cannot prevail on his theory pursuant to§ 1986.
Accordingly, the Court will grant Warden Morgan's motion for summary judgment as to
the claim raised pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1986 claim.

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V.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court will grant Warden Morgan's Motion for Summary

Judgment. 5 An appropriate Order follows.

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Because Johnson's constitutional rights were not violated, the Court sees no need to
address the issues of qualified immunity and emotional distress.
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