ITT Manufacturing Enterprises Inc. v. Cellco Partnership et al

Filing 600

MEMORANDUM OPINION re pending motions. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 11/6/12. (ntl)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
EXELIS INC.,
Plaintiff,

v.

C.A. No. 09-190-LPS

CELLCO PARTNERSHIP (d/b/a Verizon
Wireless), LG ELECTRONICS, INC., LG
ELECTRONICS USA, INC., and LG
ELECTRONICS MOBILECOMM U.S.A.,
INC., KYOCERA CORPORATION~
KYOCERA INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
KYOCERA WIRELESS CORP., and
KYOCERA COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
and QUALCOMM INC.,
Defendants.
Gregory B. Williams, Esq., FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP, Wilmington, DE.
James D. Berquist, Esq., J. Scott Davidson, Esq., Donald L. Jackson, Esq., DAVIDSON
BERQUIST JACKSON & GOWDEY, LLP, Arlington, VA.
Attorneys for Plaintiff Exelis Inc.
Paul E. Crawford, Esq., CONNOLLY BOVE LODGE & HUTZ LLP, Wilmington, DE.
JeffreyK. Sherwood, Esq., DICKSTEIN SHAPIRO LLP, Washington, DC.
Katie J.L. Scott, Esq., DICKSTEIN SHAPIRO LLP, Palo Alto, CA.
Attorneys for Defendants LG Electronics, Inc., LG Electronics USA, Inc., and LG
Electronics MobileComm U.S.A., Inc.; and Kyocera Corporation, Kyocera International,
Inc., Kyocera Wireless Corp., and Kyocera Communications, Inc.
John G. Day, Esq., Tiffany Geyer Lydon, Esq., Caroline Hong, Esq., ASHBY & GEDDES,
Wilmington, DE.
Edward C. Donovan, Esq., Christopher R. Nalevanko, Esq., KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP,
Washington, D.C.
Gregory F. Corbett, Esq., WOLF GREENFIELD & SACKS, P.C., Boston, MA.
Attorneys for Defendant Cellco Partnership (d/b/a Verizon Wireless).

Richard L. Horwitz, Esq., David E. Moore, Esq., POTTER ANDERSON & CORROON, LLP,
Wilmington, DE.
Keith R. Hummel, Esq., Roger G. Brooks, Esq., Teena-Ann V. Sankoorikal, Esq., CRAVATH
SWAINE & MOORE LLP, New York, NY.
Attorneys for Defendant Qualcomm Inc.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

November 6, 2012
Wilmington, Delaware

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STARK, U.S. District Judge:
Pending before the Court are numerous motions filed by Plaintiff and Defendants:
(1) Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment of no violation of35 U.S.C. § 305 (D.I. 491);
(2) Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment of no invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 112 (D.I. 495);
(3) Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment against Defendants' affirmative defenses (D.I. 497);
(4) Plaintiffs Daubert motion to preclude testimony of Defendants' proposed commercial
success expert (D.I. 482); (5) Plaintiffs Daubert motion to preclude the testimony of
Defendants' proposed technical expert (D.I. 493); (6) Defendants' motion for partial summary
judgment for Plaintiffs violation of35 U.S.C. § 305 (D.I. 478); (7) Defendants' motion for
partial summary judgment of invalidity (D.I. 486); (8) Defendants' motion for partial summary
judgment of non-infringement (D.I. 488); and (9) Defendants' Daubert motion to exclude the
testimony ofPlaintiffs commercial success expert (D.I. 484).
The Court heard oral argument on these motions, among others, on September 28, 2012. 1
See Motion Hr'g Tr., Sep. 28, 2012 (D.I. 561) (hereinafter "Tr.").
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Exelis Inc. ("Exelis" or "Plaintiff'), filed this patent infringement action against

Cellco Partnership, Qualcomm Inc., LG Electronics USA, Inc., LG Electronics, Inc., LG
Mobilecomm U.S.A., Inc., Kyocera Corp., Kyocera International, Inc., Kyocera Wireless Corp.,
and Kyocera Communications, Inc. (collectively "Defendants") on March 23, 2009. (D.I. 1)

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Also pending at the hearing were Plaintiffs Motion to Substitute Exelis Inc. as Plaintiff and
Reform the Caption (D.I. 465), and LGE and Kyocera's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment
on the Pleadings (Counts 30, 32 and 33) (D.I. 156). The Court's rulings on these motions are
reflected in prior orders. (D.I. 552, 563)
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Plaintiff alleges that Defendants infringe U.S. Patent No. 5,365,450 (the '"450 patent"), entitled
"Hybrid GPS/Data Line Unit for Rapid, Precise, and Robust Position Determination." (Id.)
The '450 patent has been litigated in this District before. See ITT Manufacturing Enterprises,
Inc. v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc. et al., 1:03-cv-1 086-GMS (the "Sam sung Litigation").
As part of the earlier litigation, Chief Judge Sleet issued a claim construction order. See
Samsung Litigation D.I. 124 ("Samsung Order"). 2 After the Samsung Litigation was resolved by
settlement, Chief Judge Sleet granted the parties' joint motion to vacate the Samsung Order. See
Samsung Litigation D.I. 256, 257.
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed for ex parte reexamination of the '450 patent by the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (the "PTO"). The PTO granted the reexamination request. During
reexamination, Plaintiff amended the original claims and added new claims 12-57. On February
3, 2009, the PTO issued a Reexamination Certificate allowing all fifty-seven claims.
Subsequently, Plaintiff initiated this patent infringement action.
The Court conducted a Markman hearing on January 28,2011. (D.I. 427) On December
29, 2011, the Court issued a Memorandum Opinion (D.I. 453) and Order (D.I. 454) construing
the disputed claim terms of the '450 patent.

II.

LEGALSTANDARDS
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56( a). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

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The Samsung Order appears in the record of the instant case as D.I. 293 Ex. B.
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586 n.lO (1986). An assertion that a fact cannot be- or, alternatively, is- genuinely disputed
must be supported either by citing to "particular parts of materials in the record, including
depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations
(including those made for the purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or
other materials," or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence
of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the
fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(l)(A) & (B).
If the moving party has carried its burden, the nonmovant must then "come forward
with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587
(internal quotation marks omitted). A factual dispute is genuine only where "the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 411 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). "Ifthe evidence is merely colorable, or is not
significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Id. at 249-50 (internal citations
omitted); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 411 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (entry of summary
judgment is mandated "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden
of proof at trial"). On a motion for summary judgment, the Court will "draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or
weigh the evidence." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).
For issues on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving
party may seek summary judgment by relying "solely on the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Once such a motion is made,
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the nonmoving party's response must "go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by
the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." !d. (internal quotation marks omitted).

III.

PARTIES' CROSS-MOTIONS UNDER35 U.S.C. § 305
The parties have filed competing motions seeking summary judgment under

35 U.S.C. § 305. (D.I. 478, 491) Both motions raise the same issues: (1) whether Plaintiff
improperly broadened any claim during reexamination; and (2) whether Plaintiff sought
reexamination for an improper purpose.

A.

Section 305

Section 305 of the Patent Act provides:
In any reexamination proceeding under this chapter, the patent
owner will be permitted to propose any amendment to his patent
and a new claim or claims thereto, in order to distinguish the
invention as claimed from the prior art cited under the provisions
of section 301 ofthis title, or in response to a decision adverse to
the patentability of a claim of a patent. No proposed amended or
new claim enlarging the scope of a claim of the patent will be
permitted in a reexamination proceeding under this chapter.
Whether claims have been enlarged is a matter of claim construction, which presents a question
oflaw. See Quantum Corp. v. Rodime, PLC, 65 F.3d 1577, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1995).

B.

MPEP

The Manual ofPatent Examining Procedure (MPEP) explains that "(a] claim presented
in a reexamination proceeding 'enlarges the scope' of the claims of the patent being reexamined
where the claim is broader than each and every claim of the patent." MPEP § 2258.III.A
(emphasis added). According to the MPEP, the standard used to evaluate a claim presented

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during reexamination is the same standard that is used to evaluate claims for purposes of reissue.
See id. "A claim which has been broadened in a reissue as compared to its scope in the patent is

not a broadened reissue claim if it is narrower than, or equal in scope to, any other claim which

appears in the patent." MPEP § 1412.03.II (emphasis added).
C.

Claim Scope

Defendants contend that, during reexamination, Plaintiff improperly broadened certain
claims in violation of35 U.S.C. § 305. (See D.I. 479) At issue is the scope ofthe term "Satellite
Data Message block." According to Defendants, in the original patent; "Satellite Data Message
block" was limited to a block that is exactly 900 bits in length. After reexamination, however,
this Court construed "Satellite Data Message block" to mean blocks that are "900 bits or less"
(emphasis added) in length. In Defendants' view, this apparent change in scope requires the
Court to invalidate every claim that includes the term "Satellite Data Message block."
Plaintiff disagrees. According to Plaintiff, the term "Satellite Data Message block"
always covered blocks that are "900 bits or less" in length, and the scope of this term has not
changed in any way during reexamination. (D.I. 509)

In their cross-motions for summary judgment, both sides ask the Court to compare just
the scope of the original "Satellite Data Message block" term to the reexamined scope of the
same term. (D.I. 479 at 11, 18-19; D.I. 492 at 7) However, this may not be the correct standard
for evaluating whether a claim has been "broadened" within the meaning of Section 305. As
noted above, at least according to the MPEP, the proper comparison is between the reexamined
claim and "each and every claim ofthe [original] patent." MPEP § 2258.III.A (emphasis
added); see also id. § 1412.03.!!.
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Neither side has compared the scope of the reexamined patent claims to the scope of the
broadest pre-reexamination claim(s). This comparison was not addressed in the parties' briefs.
During oral argument, in response to the Court's inquiries, neither side was able to comment
meaningfully on the potential applicability of the MPEP to the Section 305 issue. (Tr. at 44-45,
51) While Defendants contended that "the facts ofthe case would [not] put [the Court] up
against that question" (id. at 51), the Court is not convinced this is so.
For example, even if this Court's construction of"Satellite Data Message block" has
resulted in reexamined claim 1 being broader than original claim 1, the reexamined claim 1 still
may not violate Section 305 if reexamined claim 1 is narrower than some other claim ofthe
original '450 patent. Original claim 10, for instance, does not require either a "Satellite Data

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Message block" or a "Satellite Data Message." Instead, original claim 10 requires "determining

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the position of a user of a GPS receiver for receiving GPS satellite signals containing GPS
broadcast data." The parties have not asked the Court to construe "GPS broadcast data," nor
have the parties provided the Court with the materials it would need in order to construe this

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term. On the present record, the Court is unable to rule out the possibility that the proper
comparison is between reexamined claim 1 and original claim 10 and that completion of this
comparison would require construction of"GPS broadcast data."
This uncertainty prevents the Court from granting either side's Section 305 summary
judgment motion. Instead, the Court will deny both motions without prejudice to renew
following trial in connection with any post-trial motions that may be filed. If one or both

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motions are renewed, the parties shall address the issues regarding claim scope identified in this

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Opinion.

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D.

Purpose

Regardless of whether Plaintiff improperly broadened the scope of its claims in
reexamination, Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment of invalidity
under Section 305 also because Plaintiff initiated the reexamination for an improper purpose.
(D.I. 479 at 9-10) Specifically, Defendants contend that Plaintiff pursued reexamination for the
purpose of "fixing" the claim construction ruling issued by Chief Judge Sleet in the Sam sung
Litigation. Plaintiff denies this allegation. Plaintiff insists, instead, that it initiated the
reexamination for the proper purpose of addressing prior art asserted during the Samsung
Litigation and to correct typographical errors in the patent. (D.I. 492 at 14-16; D.I. 529 at 9) For
example, Plaintiff corrected the claim to provide antecedent basis for certain terms, which is
proper. Hence, Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on the grounds that the purpose of the
reexamination was proper.
Even taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Defendants, the Court agrees
with Plaintiff that no reasonable fact finder could conclude that Plaintiff violated Section 305 by
pursuing reexamination of the '450 patent for an improper purpose. Plaintiff has identified
several proper purposes for seeking reexamination and Defendants have not offered any evidence
-or, indeed, anything other than suspicion- to counter Plaintiffs contentions. Plaintiff was
entitled to seek reexamination to address prior art asserted in the Samsung Litigation and to
correct the typographical errors in the original patent claims. See Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead

Industries, Inc., 810 F.2d 1113, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (amendment to provide antecedent basis
does not change substantive scope of claims); In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1572 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (stating claims maybe amended or added to distinguish invention as claimed from prior

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art, or in response to decision adverse to patentability of a claim). The PTO found that the
reexamined claims should issue despite the prior art. Defendants have not come close to
producing clear and convincing evidence that the reexamined claims are invalid due to Section
305.
Hence, while the Court is denying the Section 305 motions without prejudice, if and
when those motions are renewed they will be limited to the issue of the scope of the reexamined
claims. Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment that the reexamination was not filed for an
improper purpose.

IV.

CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
OF VALIDITYIINVALIDITY UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 112
The parties have filed competing motions seeking partial summary judgment under 35

U.S.C. § 112. (D.I. 486, 495) These motions present issues of indefiniteness, written
description, enablement, and best mode.

A.

Defendants' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Under 35 U.S.C. § 112

Defendants seek partial summary judgment that: (1) certain claim terms are indefinite;
and (2) certain claims are invalid for lack of written description. (D.I. 486) The Court will deny
Defendants' motion on both grounds.
1.

Indefiniteness

The indefiniteness portion of Defendants' summary judgment motion focuses on two
claim terms: "processing means" and "connecting means." Both terms are written in "meansplus-function" format and have been construed by the Court. (D.I. 454) Defendants contend that
both claim terms recite functions implemented by a microprocessor, requiring disclosure in the

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specification of a corresponding algorithm. (D .I. 487 at 8-1 0) According to Defendants, no such
algorithm is provided in the specification, rendering invalid the claims in which these terms
appear. (!d. at 10-13)
"In cases involving a computer-implemented invention in which the inventor has
invoked means-plus-function claiming, [the Federal Circuit] has consistently required that the
structure disclosed in the specification be more than simply a general purpose computer or
microprocessor." Aristocrat Techs. Austl. PTY Ltd. v. Int'l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1333

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(Fed. Cir. 2008). Rather, a "computer-implemented means-plus-function term is limited to the
corresponding structure disclosed in the specification and equivalents thereof, and the
corresponding structure is the algorithm." !d. (internal quotation marks omitted). The
sufficiency of the disclosure of algorithmic structure must be judged in light of what one of
ordinary skill in the art would understand the disclosure to impart. See id. at 1337.

a.

"Processing Means"

The Court's claim construction for the "processing means" term is set forth below:

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1, 3, 4, and 17

"means at said mobile radio
station for processing said
Satellite Data Message block
from said earth-based source of
satellite position data to enable
said mobile radio station to
rapidly locate and access position
information from said earth
orbiting GPS satellites" (the
"Processing Means" term)

Function: "processing said Satellite
Data Message block from said earthbased source of satellite position data to
enable said mobile radio station to
rapidly locate and access position
information from said earth orbiting GPS
satellite"
Associated structure: "the
microprocessor of a controller element"

Defendants contend that the microprocessor identified as the associated structure must
be programmed with a specific algorithm in order to perform the recited "processing" and
"enabling" functions, but no such algorithm is found in the '450 patent specification. (D.I. 487 at
7) Defendants further contend that Plaintiffs expert, in his report and deposition testimony,
supports their position that such an algorithm is required. (!d. at 9) Defendants also cite
deposition testimony from one of the inventors, which they claim supports their view that the
specification does not set forth any specific algorithm for the microprocessor. (!d. at 11-12)
Plaintiff concedes that the "processing means" claim term requires special
programming, but contends that a corresponding algorithm is disclosed. (Tr. at 107) According
to Plaintiff, an algorithm may be expressed "in any understandable terms including as a
mathematical formula, in prose, or as a flow chart, or in any other manner that provides sufficient
structure." (D.I. 513 at 4) (citing Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1340
(Fed. Cir. 2008) ). Plaintiff contends that one of ordinary skill in the art would read the '450
specification as a whole as disclosing the necessary algorithm. (D.I. 513 at 5; Tr. at 105)
Plaintiff identifies specific portions of the patent (column 4line 29 through column 5 line 57,

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column ?lines 2 through 16, and Figures 2 and 4) as providing the requisite algorithm. (D.I. 496
at 16; D.I. 513 at 5; Tr. at 106-08) Plaintiffs technical expert has opined that this "algorithm" is
sufficient for purposes of one skilled in the art. (D.I. 490 Ex. 3 at 73-75)
Defendants respond that Figures 2 and 4 do not set forth a sufficient algorithm for the
processor of a controller. Rather, these figures generally relate to functions performed by the
GPS receiver. (Tr. at 95-96) Defendants further contend that there is no clear link between the
claimed functions and the disclosure of Figures 2 and 4.
At this stage of the proceedings, the Court is not persuaded by Defendants' contentions
that no algorithm for the "processing means" is disclosed in the '450 patent. Plaintiff's expert
will testify that one of ordinary skill in the art, reading the specification as a whole, would find in
the specified portions ofthe specification an algorithm. See generally Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at
1337 ("The sufficiency of the disclosure of algorithmic structure must be judged in light of what
one of ordinary skill in the art would understand the disclosure to impart."). There is a genuine
dispute of material fact that is not amenable to resolution by summary judgment. See e.g., Metro.
Life Ins. Co. v. Bancorp Servs., L.L.C., 527 F.3d 1330, 1338-39 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding that

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"conflict in [expert] declarations created a genuine issue of material fact that made summary
judgment inappropriate"); Ethyl Corp. v. Borden, Inc., 427 F.2d 206, 210 (3d Cir. 1970) (holding
that court may not resolve "disputed and relevant factual issues on conflicting affidavits of
qualified experts"). Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendants' motion for summary judgment
that the "processing means" claim term is invalid due to indefiniteness.

b.

"Connecting Means"

The Court's claim construction for "connecting means" is set forth below:

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5 and 24

"a controller means
connecting said satellite data
message block to said mobile
GPS receiver" (the
"Connecting Means" term)

Function: "connecting said satellite data
message block to said mobile GPS receiver"
Associated structure: "a controller element
which includes a microprocessor, modem,
autodialer, and transmit voice/data switch"

Defendants raise many of the same arguments for "connecting means" as for
"processing means," with particular focus on the "microprocessor" identified as part of the
associated structure. According to Defendants, the additional structural elements identified in the
Court's construction (modem, autodialer, transmit switch) only increase the complexity of the
algorithm that must be disclosed. (Tr. at 86-87) An adequate algorithm, in Defendants' view,
should provide at least "some indication ofhow [to] use[] the modem, how [to] use the
autodialer to reach the outside world ... and how you would mesh together and invoke at the
right time the modem, the autodialer and the transmit voice/data switch." (!d. at 87-88)

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With respect to "connecting means," Plaintiff contends, first, that no algorithm needs to
be disclosed. (D.I. 513 at 8) According to Plaintiff, the "connecting means" term comes within
the exception identified in In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litigation, 639 F.3d
1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011), which states that functions such as"connecting" can be "achieved by
any general purpose computer without special programming." In Katz, 639 F.3d at 1316, the
Federal Circuit held that "[a]bsent a possible narrower construction" of the terms "processing,"
"receiving," and "storing," the disclosure of a general-purpose computer was sufficient. In a
subsequent case, the Federal Circuit explained, "[i]n substance, claiming 'means for processing,'
'receiving,' and 'storing' may simply claim a general purpose computer, although in

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means-plus-function terms." Ergo Licensing, LLC v. CareFusion 303, Inc., 673 F.3d 1361,
1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 20 12). Alternatively, if an algorithm is required, Plaintiff contends that one
of ordinary skill in the art would find the specification to provide the necessary disclosure,
specifically at column 3 lines 1 through 6 and column 7lines 8 through 16. (D.I. 496 at 16)
Plaintiff's expert supports this contention. (D.I. 490 Ex. 13 at 75-76)
At this stage of the proceedings, in relation to the "connecting means" term, the Court
finds a genuine dispute of material fact both as to whether an algorithm must be disclosed and, if
so, whether one has been disclosed. This dispute is not amenable to resolution on summary
judgment. See e.g., Metro. Life, 527 F.3d at 1338-39. Accordingly, the Court will deny
Defendants' motion for summary judgment of indefiniteness with respect to the "connecting
means" term.

2.

Written description

Defendants also move for summary judgment on the grounds that claim 10 and all
claims which depend from claim 10 are invalid for lack of written description. (D.I. 487 at 16)
Whether a claim complies with the written description requirement of§ 112, paragraph 1, is a
question of fact. See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 962-63 (Fed. Cir.
2002). To satisfy the written description requirement, a patent specification must describe the
claimed invention in sufficient detail that "reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the
inventor had possession ofthe claimed subject matter as of the filing date." Ariad Pharms., Inc.
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010). An applicant shows possession of the

claimed invention by describing the claimed invention with all of its limitations using "such
descriptive means as words, structures, figures, diagrams, formulas, etc., that fully set forth the

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claimed invention." Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Defendants contend they are entitled to summary judgment because "no reasonable
juror could find that the claims are supported by an adequate written description." 3 (D.I. 487 at
17) However, as Defendants recognize, Plaintiff's expert report contains a lengthy analysis of
written description and concludes that claim 10 complies with the requirements of35 U.S.C.
§ 112. (D.I. 487 at 18-20) The parties have a genuine dispute of material fact which is not
amenable to resolution on summary judgment. See e.g., Metro. Life, 527 F.3d at 1338-39.
Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendants' motion for summary judgment on written
description.
B.

Plaintiff's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Under 35 U.S.C. § 112

Plaintiff seeks summary judgment that: (1) certain claims are not invalid for lack of
written description or enablement; (2) the '450 patent does not fail to disclose the best mode; and
(3) certain claim terms are definite. (D.I. 496) The Court will deny Plaintiffs motion on all
three grounds.
1.

Written Description And Enablement

The chart below summarizes Defendants' written description and enablement defenses
for which Plaintiff now seeks summary judgment:

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l.··

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Defendants do not address the fact that the disputed language of claim 10 was present in the
original application. See MPEP § 2163.03 ("[T]here is a strong presumption that an adequate
written description ofthe claimed invention is present in the specification as filed."). Indeed,
claim 10 has twice been examined by the PTO: once during the original prosecution and again in
reexamination.
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"earth-based source" and "independent
source"

1-3, 5-6, and 9-57

written description

"satellite data message block"

1-3, 5-6, 12, 14-19, 21-24,
38-52, and 55-57

written description

"prior knowledge of receiver position to
resolve ambiguity in the time position of
the GPS solution"

10, 26-36, 44, 52, and 54

written description
and enablement

For all of the above-identified terms, Plaintiffs arguments largely amount to a criticism
ofDefendants' expert, accompanied by citations to the specification. (D.I. 496 at 4-10) Plainly,
the parties' experts reached opposite conclusions on issues of written description and
enablement. These defenses present genuine disputes of material fact which are not amenable to
summary judgment. See e.g., Metro. Life, 527 F.3d at 1338-39 (finding that "conflict in [expert]
declarations created a genuine issue of material fact that made summary judgment
inappropriate"). Accordingly, the Court will deny Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment with
respect to written description and enablement.

2.

BestMode

Plaintiff also seeks summary judgment with respect to best mode. Whether a claim
satisfies the best mode requirement of35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 2, presents a question of fact.
See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Assessing a best

mode defense requires inquiry into: "(1) whether the inventor subjectively considered a particular
mode of practicing the invention to be superior to all other modes at the time of filing the
application; and (2) whether the inventor adequately disclosed that superior mode." Liquid
Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., 449 F.3d 1209, 1223 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks

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omitted).
Plaintiff contends that Defendants have not satisfied either element of the best mode
test. (D.I. 496 at 10-14) Defendants' expert, citing record evidence, disputes Plaintiff's version
of the facts. (D.I. 514 at 18-20) The Court perceives a genuine dispute of material fact not
amenable to resolution by summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court will deny Plaintiff's
motion with respect to best mode.

3.

Defmiteness

Plaintiffs motion also seeks summary judgment that the "processing means" and
"connecting means" terms are definite. (See D.I. 496 at 14-17) For the same reasons that the
Court denied Defendants' motion for summary judgment of indefiniteness of these terms, the
Court likewise will deny Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment of definiteness of these terms.

V.

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF NON-INFRINGEMENT
Defendants seek summary judgment with respect to four issues relating to infringement:

(1) the "MS-Assist" mode of operation does not infringe; (2) claims 13 and 20 are not infringed;
(3) there is no infringement under the doctrine of equivalents; and (4) the doctrine of intervening
rights applies to each claim ofthe reexamined '450 patent. (See D.I. 488) For the reasons set
forth below, the Court will grant Defendants' motion on issues (1), (2), and (4) and deny as moot
Defendants' motion with respect to issue (3).

A.

The MS-Assist Mode Of Operation

The parties agree that, as a result of the Court's claim construction ruling (D.I. 454),
there is no dispute that the "MS-Assist" mode of operation does not infringe any claim of the

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'450 patent. (D.I. 515 at 2) Accordingly, the Court will grant summary judgment of no
infringement for every claim ofthe '450 patent with respect to the "MS-Assist" mode of
operation.

B.

Claims 13 and 20

The parties also agree that, as a result of the Court's claim construction ruling (D.I.
454), claims 13 and 20- which both require the transmission of a 900-bit Satellite Data Message
block- are not infringed. (D.I. 515 at 2) Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants' motion
for summary judgment of no infringement with respect to claims 13 and 20.

C.

Doctrine of Equivalents

Defendants seek summary judgment that the '450 patent is not infringed under the
doctrine of equivalents, as Plaintiffs technical expert did not address this doctrine in his expert
report. (D .I. 489 at 16-18) Plaintiff responds that the only "equivalents" issue (if it becomes
disputed) is whether data sent from the satellite is equivalent to data supplied over the cellular
network, a matter which is addressed in Plaintiffs expert's report. (Tr. at 161-62) Defendants
do not believe any equivalents issue exists for the Court to decide. (!d. at 163) As the Court
understands, Plaintiff is not seeking to offer evidence of infringement by equivalents other than
the narrow data transfer issue described in Plaintiffs expert report. Accordingly, the Court will
deny as moot Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the issue of the doctrine of
equivalents.

D.

Intervening Rights

Defendants contend that the doctrine of intervening rights should apply to every claim
of the '450 patent as a result of claim amendments made during reexamination. (See D.I. 489 at

17

8) Plaintiff concedes that intervening rights apply to all claims other than claim 1. (D.I. 515 at
5) With respect to claim 1, the Court agrees that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment
that intervening rights apply.
Intervening rights prevent a patentee from recovering pre-reexamination damages for
infringement of claims that were "substantively changed" during reexamination. See Laitram
Corp. v. NEC Corp., 163 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1998). A patentee can, however, recover
even pre-reexamination damages for claims that survive reexamination "without substantive
change." !d. In determining whether substantive changes have been made, a court must discern
whether the scope of the new claim is identical to the scope of the prior claim. See Slimfold, 81 0
F .2d at 1115. "If substantive changes have been made to the original claims, the patentee is
entitled to infringement damages only for the period following the issuance of the reexamination
certificate." Laitram, 163 F.3d at 1346.
Defendants make three arguments in support of their contention that claim 1 was
"substantively changed" during reexamination. (D.I. 489) First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff
narrowed the claim to require a "storing" limitation. Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiff
amended claim 1 to require (in response to a rejection) the "earth based source" to receive
satellite position data from the GPS satellites - in essence, an "origin" requirement that was not
present in original claim 1. Third, Defendants argue that Plaintiffbroadened claim 1 by adding
dependent claims specifying that the Satellite Data Message block of claim 1 is 900 bits in
length. 4

4

Defendants' argument with respect to broadening has already been addressed in connection with
their motion for partial summary judgment for violation of35 U.S.C. § 305.
18

Reexamined claim 1 is reproduced below. Plaintiffs amendments to claim 1 are shown
in strikethrough (deletions) and underline (additions):
1. In a global positioning system (GPS) in which a plurality of
earth orbiting GPS satellites transmit position information to
mobile radio stations on earth including a Satellite Data Message
block, the improvement comprising:

an earth based source of satellite position data for
all in-view GPS satellites including said Satellite
Data Message bloch block for each in-view
satellite for assisting one of said mobile radio
station stations to access position information from
said earth orbiting GPS satellites, wherein said earth
based source of satellite position data receives and
stores the satellite position data, including the
satellite data message block. from each of the inview GPS satellites, and an earth based
communication means coupled to said earth based
source of satellite position data,
means coupled to said mobile radio station for
connecting to said earth based communication
means to said earth-based source of satellite
position data for extricating said satellite position
data via said non-satellite earth based
communication means, wherein the satellite data
message block supplied by said earth based source
to said mobile radio station is extracted from said
stored satellite position data, and
means at said mobile for processing said Satellite
Data Message blocks block from said earth-based
source of satellite position data to enable said
mobile radio station to rapidly locate and access
position information from said earth orbiting GPS
satellite satellites.
Plaintiff contends that all of the above amendments were added only for sake of clarification and
did not result in any substantive change. (Tr. at 158-59) The Court disagrees.

19

I

First, original claim 1 did not require the earth-based source to "store" satellite position
data. Plaintiff argues that the Court may "infer" a storage requirement from the words
"extricating" and "source" in original claim 1. (D.I. 515 at 6-10) But nothing in the record
supports defining the word "extricating" to require storage. The Court has already construed
"source" to have its plain and ordinary meaning - a meaning which does not necessarily include
a storage function. (D.I. 453 at 52) The passage Plaintiff identifies in the specification as
containing the word "stores" does not provide a basis for limiting the claim in the manner
Plaintiff contends. (D.I. 515 at 9; Tr. at 157-58) Moreover, Plaintiff admits that this passage in
the specification refers only to a preferred embodiment (Tr. at 157) and that it would be "clear
legal error to limit the claims to the preferred embodiment" (D.I. 339 at 14) (citing

Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 913 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
Original claim 1 likewise did not require a specific "origin" for satellite position data.
During reexamination, the Examiner rejected claim 1 as anticipated by a Counselman reference
(U.S. Pat. No. 4,809,005). In response to this rejection, Plaintiff amended claim 1 to require
explicitly that "said earth based source of satellite position data receives and stores the satellite
position data, including the satellite data message block,from each of the in-view GPS

satellites." (D.I. 490 Ex. 3) (emphasis added) Plaintiff urged the Examiner that claim 1, as
amended, was distinguishable from Counselman because the "shore stations" in Counselman (the
alleged earth-based sources) did not receive satellite position data from the GPS satellite, but
instead obtained this data from an independent source. (D.I. 490 Ex. 3) (Amendment Under

§ 1.530 at 23-25) Plaintiff even submitted a Declaration from one of its inventors to explain this
distinction. (D.I. 490 Ex. 3) (Decl. of Ronald Bruno at 5-7) The Examiner was persuaded,

20

specifically referring to Plaintiffs argument as a reason for allowance. (D.I. 490 Ex. 3) (Notice
of Intent at 7) From this, no reasonable factfinder could conclude that the scope of claim 1 was
not "substantively changed" during the reexamination. See Laitram, 163 F.3d at 1348 (finding it
"difficult to conceive of many situations in which the scope of a rejected claim that became
allowable when amended is not substantively changed by the amendment").
Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court concludes
that the amendments to claim 1 were substantive in nature. Therefore, Defendants are entitled to
intervening rights with respect to all claims of the '450 patent. The Court will grant Defendants'
summary judgment motion on this ground.

VI.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
WITH RESPECT TO DEFENDANTS' AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
Plaintiff moves for summary judgment against the following affirmative defenses raised

by Defendants: (1) laches; (2) prosecution estoppel; (3) equitable estoppel; (4) waiver; (5) patent
misuse; 5 and (6) inventorship. (D.I. 497) 6 Defendants have not opposed Plaintiffs motion with
respect to prosecution estoppel, equitable estoppel, waiver, or inventorship. Accordingly, the
Court will grant summary judgment to Plaintiff with respect to these four affirmative defenses.
For the reasons below, the Court also will grant Plaintiffs motion with respect to laches but will
deny without prejudice Plaintiffs motion with respect to patent misuse.

5

The patent misuse defense was raised only by the LGE and Kyocera defendants.

6

At oral argument, Plaintiffs counsel also mentioned an "unclean hands" defense. (Tr. at 145)
However, that defense is not specifically addressed in either party's briefs, so the Court does not
view it as a subject raised by the pending motions.
21

A.

Laches

To succeed on a laches defense, Defendants must prove two elements: (1) the patent
owner unreasonably and inexcusably delayed initiating an action for patent infringement; and
(2) Defendants suffered material prejudice as a result. See A. C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides

Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Because Defendants bear the burden of proof
on the issue oflaches, in order to survive a motion for summary judgment Defendants must
produce sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at
587. Defendants have not met that burden.
The relevant time period for purposes of laches is 2006 to 2009. 7 The '450 patent was
in reexamination during much of that time period. (D.I. 498 at 5-6) Plaintiff contends that the
pendency ofreexamination is a legitimate excuse for purposes oflaches. See e.g., Vaupel

Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 878 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
("Patentees should be encouraged to avoid litigation when their patents are being reevaluated in
the PTO rather than being forced into premature litigation on penalty of being held to have been
guilty of laches."). The Court agrees. The three-year delay attributable to the pendency of the
reexamination was reasonable and excusable.
Laches also requires that Defendants have suffered some material prejudice as a result

7

During oral argument, Defendants' counsel argued that the relevant time period should begin
from issuance of the patent in 1994 and extend to the filing of the instant lawsuit in 2009. (Tr. at
150-51) The Court disagrees. The MS-Based mode of operation is now the only mode accused
of infringement. That mode did not exist until 2006. Plaintiff cannot be found to have "delayed"
a patent infringement lawsuit - the first element of a laches defense - during a period when the
accused product or service did not exist. Moreover, Defendants' Answering Brief conceded that
the relevant time period for purposes oflaches with respect to the MS-Based mode is 2006-2009.
(D.I. 518 at 2)
22

ofPlaintiffs delay. See Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1032. Defendants contend that, had this lawsuit
been filed in 2006, they would have designed around the claims. (Tr. at 152) Instead, during the
three-year period in which Plaintiff delayed bringing its case, Defendants made substantial
investments into the market. (!d.)
Defendants have failed to adduce sufficient evidence from which a reasonable
factfinder could find prejudice of a kind necessary for Defendants to prevail on their affirmative
defense of laches. It is undisputed that Defendants knew of the '450 patent as early as 2006,
when Plaintiff warned them of a potential lawsuit. (D .I. 498 at 6) Defendants could have
redesigned their products at that time, rather than risk a potential infringement lawsuit sometime
after the reexamination. Instead, Defendants knowingly and voluntarily chose to proceed with
their products.
Accordingly, the Court will grant Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment of no laches
with respect to the MS-Based mode of operation.

B.

Patent Misuse

Plaintiff also seeks summary judgment with respect to Defendants' patent misuse
defense. (D.I. 498 at 8-9) Plaintiff contends that Defendants have not provided any evidence to
support a finding of patent misuse. (!d.) Defendants respond that their patent misuse defense is
directly intertwined with their allegations of inequitable conduct, and inequitable conduct has
been bifurcated. (D.I. 518 at 3) Defendants request that the Court deny Plaintiffs motion
without prejudice and afford Defendants an opportunity to take discovery on patent misuse along
with inequitable conduct, following the forthcoming trial. (!d.)
The Court will grant Defendants' request. Hence, the Court will deny Plaintiffs
23

motion without prejudice to Plaintiffs ability to renew it after Defendants are provided an
opportunity to take discovery on patent misuse and inequitable conduct.

VII.

THEDA UBERT MOTIONS

For the reasons stated below, the Court will deny all three of the parties' Daubert
motions.

A.

The Daubert Standard

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 requires that expert testimony be: ( 1) based upon
sufficient facts or data; (2) the product of reliable principles and methods; and (3) the reliable
application ofthose principles and methods to the facts of the case. "Where there is a logical
basis for an expert's opinion testimony, the credibility and weight of that testimony is to be
determined by the jury, not the trial judge." Breidor v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F .2d 1134,
1138-39 (3d Cir. 1983). Under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., "a court should consider
(1) whether a theory or technique can be (and has been) tested; (2) whether the theory or
technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of
error; and (4) whether it is generally accepted in the scientific community." 509 U.S. 579, 59394 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). If an expert's testimony is permitted at trial, its
weight and credibility may be challenged through "[v]igorous cross examination, presentation of
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof." !d. at 596.

B.

Defendants' Daubert Motion to Exclude the
Testimony of Plaintiff's Commercial Success Expert

Plaintiff seeks to introduce evidence of commercial success through its proposed
expert, Dr. Kerr, as part of its rebuttal to Defendants' contention that the '450 patent is invalid

24

due to obviousness. 8 Defendants seek to exclude Dr. Kerr's testimony. (D.I. 484)
The commercial success of a product embodying a patented invention is a secondary
consideration that can be used to rebut an allegation that the invention was obvious. See Arkie
Lures, Inc. v. Gene Larew Tackle, Inc., 119 F.3d 953, 957 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("In Graham the
Supreme Court explained that the public and commercial response to an invention is a factor to
be considered in determining obviousness, and is entitled to fair weight.") (citing Graham v.
John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1966)). To establish non-obviousness based on an
invention's commercial success, a patentee must offer evidence showing a nexus between the
product's commercial success and the claims of the patent. See Tokai Corp. v. Easton Enters.,
632 F.3d 1358, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("A nexus must exist between the commercial success and
the claimed invention."). Whether commercial success exists is a question of fact. See Graham,
383 U.S. at 17.
Defendants present two arguments in support of their motion. First, Defendants argue
that Dr. Kerr has not established a sufficient nexus between the success of the accused products
and the claimed invention. 9 (D.I. 485 at 7-8; Tr. at 129-30) According to Defendants, the
accused products embody many other inventions (e.g., the ability to make calls, send text
messages, play music, connect to the internet, etc.), and these other inventions are the reason for
their products' commercial success. (D.I. 485 at 8; Tr. at 130) Second, Defendants contend that
Dr. Kerr has not undertaken the requisite claim-by-claim analysis. (D.I. 485 at 12)

8

Dr. Kerr's analysis is not being presented for damages purposes, as the issue of damages has
been bifurcated.
9

Dr. Kerr's commercial success conclusion is based on Defendants' sales of the accused
products. (D.I. 511 at 4)
25

In response, Plaintiff contends that Defendants are attempting to impose a burden

beyond that required by the law. (D.I. 511 at 1) Plaintiff explains that, in 2006, the industry
moved away from older modes of operation (MS-Assist) to the current "MS-Based" mode, which
is the mode now accused of infringement. (Tr. at 139-40) According to Plaintiff, Dr. Kerr's
report details the reasons for this industry-wide shift, as well as other evidence necessary to
establish the requisite nexus. Plaintiff also argues that, as part of its prima facie case, it is not
required to rebut the possibility that the sales of the accused products are attributable to other
features. See Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorf!Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1392-93 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) ("A requirement for proof of the negative of all imaginable contributing factors would
be unfairly burdensome, and contrary to the ordinary rules of evidence."). With respect to a
claim-by-claim analysis, Plaintiff contends that Dr. Kerr has properly relied on the conclusions
reached by Plaintiffs technical expert. (D.I. 511 at 7)
The Court concludes Defendants' challenges to Dr. Kerr's analysis present issues of
weight and credibility, to be determined by the fact finder, rather than issues of admissibility. At
trial, Defendants can challenge Dr. Kerr's opinions through cross-examination and the
presentation of contrary evidence. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596. The Court is not persuaded
that it should exclude Dr. Kerr's testimony.

C.

Plaintiff's Daubert Motion to Preclude the Testimony
of Defendants' Proposed Commercial Success Expert

Plaintiff moves to exclude the testimony ofDefendants' rebuttal commercial success
expert, Dr. Leonard. (D.I. 482) Plaintiff contends that Dr. Leonard's report applies the wrong
standard for commercial success, one that is significantly higher than required by case law. (D.I.

26

482 at 5; Tr. at 142) Plaintiff further contends that Dr. Leonard did not undertake an independent
analysis of any data, so his opinion adds little value. (D.I. 482 at 7)
Defendants respond that Dr. Leonard's testimony is entirely appropriate for a rebuttal
expert. Defendants claim that Dr. Leonard undertook an analysis of economic principles and
applied those principles to the facts of the case. (D.I. 519 at 4-5) According to Defendants, it
was not necessary for Dr. Leonard independently to confirm the numbers provided in Dr. Kerr's
report. (Tr. at 135-36)
The Court concludes that the parties' disputes go to the weight of the evidence, which is
a matter for the jury. Plaintiff will be free to challenge Dr. Leonard's opinion through crossexamination and presentation of contrary evidence. The Court will not exclude Dr. Leonard's
testimony.

D.

Plaintiff's Daubert Motion to Preclude the
Testimony of Defendants' Proposed Technical Expert

Plaintiff also seeks to preclude the testimony of Defendants' technical expert, Dr. Pratt.
(D.I. 493) The focus ofPlaintiffs motion is Dr. Pratt's analysis of two "means-plus-function"
terms, which the Court has construed. 10 (D.I. 454) According to Plaintiff, Dr. Pratt applied
different claim constructions for purposes of infringement and validity. (D.I. 494 at 2)
Specifically, for infringement purposes, Dr. Pratt construed the two terms to require a specific
algorithm, while, for validity purposes, Dr. Pratt applied the Court's claim construction. In

10

The means-plus-function terms at issue in Plaintiffs motion are: (1) "means at said mobile
radio station for processing said Satellite Data Message block from said earth-based source of
satellite position data to enable said mobile radio station to rapidly locate and access position
information from said earth orbiting GPS satellites;" and (2) "a controller means connecting said
satellite data message block to said mobile GPS receiver."
27

Plaintiffs view, this discrepancy renders Dr. Pratt's testimony unreliable, requiring exclusion.
(Id. at 7)

In response, Defendants explain that it is Dr. Pratt's opinion that each claim containing
the disputed means-plus-function terms is indefinite because there is no corresponding algorithm
disclosed in the specification. (D.I. 520 at 9; Tr. at 124-25) However, should the Court find that
no specific algorithm is required, Dr. Pratt further believes that the claims are still invalid in view
of the prior art identified in his report. (Tr. at 124-25) In other words, Defendants offer Dr.
Pratt's analysis of prior art as an alternative theory of invalidity. With respect to infringement,
Defendants concede that Dr. Pratt's theory is limited to his findings on indefiniteness- Dr. Pratt
did not compare the accused devices to the claims as construed by the Court. (D.I. 520 at 9; Tr.
at 125-26)
The Court finds nothing improper in Defendants' approach. During trial, both parties
will present expert testimony regarding the algorithm (or lack thereof) disclosed in the '450
patent specification. Dr. Pratt's testimony -like that of all experts- will be limited to that which
has been previously disclosed in his expert report, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26. The Court will not exclude Dr. Pratt's testimony as Plaintiff requests.

VIII.

CONCLUSION
An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be entered.

28