Hartman v. State of Delaware et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION - Signed by Judge Sue L. Robinson on 9/10/12. (rwc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
WILLIAM E. HARTMAN,
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) Civ. No. 09-261-SLR
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Petitioner,
v.
MICHAEL DELOY, Warden,
and JOSEPH R. BIDEN, III,
Attorney General of the State
of Delaware,
Respondents.
William E. Hartmann. , Pro se petitioner.
Elizabeth R. McFarlan, Deputy Attorney General, Delaware Department of Justice,
Wilmington, Delaware. Counsel for respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
September JO ,2012
Wilmington, Delaware
~Nfo .• Distnct J~dge
I. INTRODUCTION
Petitioner William E. Hartmann ("petitioner") is a Delaware inmate in custody at
the Sussex Correctional Institution in Georgetown, Delaware. Presently before the
court is petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2254. (0.1. 1) For the reasons that follow, the court will dismiss his application.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
One night in August 2005, while petitioner's seventeen-year old daughter ..IH was
working at Rite-Aid, her friend CH decided to wait for JH at JH's home. (0.1. 9 at 2)
While CH was waiting, petitioner began touching CH on her arms, and eventually
touched her chest. (0.1. 9 at 2) CH became distressed, left the house, and went to the
Rite-Aid to see JH. CH told JH what happened, and ..IH revealed that her father had
been sexually assaulting her for some time. The two girls went to petitioner's sister's
home and told his sister what had occurred that night and what had happened in the
past. The police were called the next day, and petitioner eventually admitted that he
had both vaginal and oral sexual intercourse with his daughter on several occasions.
Petitioner stated that his sexual experiences with his daughter started in the fall of
2003, and that his daughter had always consented. Petitioner acknowledged that he
had intended to have sex with CH, believing that she wanted sex as well, but that he
was apparently mistaken. Id.
Petitioner was originally indicted on two counts of first degree rape, two counts of
second degree rape, and one count of unlawful sexual contact in the third degree.
However, the indictment was amended on the day of trial, and charged petitioner with
two counts of second degree rape in lieu of the first degree rape charges, and with one
count of fourth degree rape in lieu of the other originally charged count of second
.degree rape.
The one count of unlawful sexual contact in the third degree remained
unchanged. (D.1. 9 at 1); see Hartman v. State, 954 A.2d 910 (Table), 2008 WL
2723573, at *1 & n. 2 (Del. 2008). Petitioner's daughter was the victim of the rape
counts and his daughter's friend was the victim of the unlawful sexual contact charge.
A four-day trial ensued, after which a Superior Court jury found petitioner guilty of
all four charges. See Hartman, 2008 WL 2723573. On direct appeal, the Delaware
Supreme Court reversed the convictions and remanded the case, holding that petitioner
had been denied his right to self-representation. See Hartman v. State, 918 A.2d 1138,
,1139 (Del. 2007). Petitioner waived his right to a trial by jury for his re-trial, and
represented himself at the August 2007 bench trial where a Superior Court judge again
found him guilty on all four counts. See Hartman, 2008 WL 2723573, at *1 n.1 (Del.
2008). Petitioner was sentenced to thirty-three years of incarceration, followed by
probation. Id. at *1. Petitioner's convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct
appeal. Id.
Petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Delaware Superior
Court Criminal Rule 61 ("Rule 61 motion"), which was denied. See In re Hartman, 2009
WL 930657 (Del. Super. Feb. 5, 2009). Petitioner did not appeal that decision.
Petitioner timely filed a § 2254 application in this court. (D.1. 1) The State filed
an answer (D.1. 9). arguing that claim one fails to warrant relief under § 2254(d), and
that the remaining claims should be denied as procedurally barred.
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III. GOVERNING LEGAL PRINCIPLES
A. Exhaustion and Procedural Default
A federal court may consider a habeas petition filed by a state prisoner only "on
the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). One prerequisite to federal habeas review is that
a petitioner must exhaust all remedies available in the state courts. See 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b)(1). The exhaustion requirement is grounded on principles of comity to ensure
that state courts have the initial opportunity to review federal constitutional challenges
to state convictions. Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 192 (3d Cir. 2000). A petitioner
satisfies the exhaustion requirement by "fairly presenting" the substance of the federal
habeas claim to the state's highest court, either on direct appeal or in a post-conviction
proceeding, and in a procedural manner permitting the state courts to consider it on the
merits. See Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S.
346,351 (1989); Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506,513 (3d Cir. 1997).
A petitioner's failure to exhaust state remedies will be excused if state procedural
rules preclude him from seeking further relief in state courts. Lines v. Larkins, 208 F.3d
153, 160 (3d Cir. 2000); see Teague
V.
Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-98 (1989). Although
treated as technically exhausted, such claims are nonetheless procedurally defaulted.
Lines, 208 F.3d at 160; Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,750-51 (1991). Similarly,
if a petitioner presents a habeas claim to the state's highest court, but that court "clearly
and expressly" refuses to review the merits of the claim due to an independent and
adequate state procedural rule, the claim is exhausted but procedurally defaulted. See
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260-64 (1989).
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A federal court cannot review the merits of procedurally defaulted claims unless
.the petitioner demonstrates either cause for the procedural default and actual prejudice
resulting therefrom, or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will result if the court
does not review the claims. McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 260 (3d Cir. 1999);
Coleman v, 501 U.S. at 750-51. To demonstrate cause for a procedural default, a
petitioner must show that "some objective factor external to the defense impeded
counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule." Murray v. Carrier, 477
U.S. 478, 488 (1986). To demonstrate actual prejudice, a petitioner must show that the
errors during his trial created more than a possibility of prejudice; he must show that the
errors worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with
error of constitutional dimensions." Id. at 494.
Alternatively, if a petitioner demonstrates that a "constitutional violation has
probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent," Murray, 477 U.S. at
496, then a federal court can excuse the procedural default and review the claim in
order to prevent a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S.
446,451 (2000); Wenger v. Frank, 266 F.3d 218, 224 (3d Cir. 2001). The miscarriage
of justice exception applies only in extraordinary cases, and actual innocence means
factual innocence, not legal insufficiency. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623
(1998); Murray, 477 U.S. at 496. A petitioner establishes actual innocence by asserting
"new reliable evidence - -whether it be eXCUlpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy
eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence - - that was not presented at trial,"
showing that no reasonable juror would have voted to find the petitioner guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Hubbard v. Pinchak, 378 F.3d 333, 339-40 (3d Cir. 2004).
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B. Standard of Review
If a state's highest court adjudicated a federal habeas claim on the merits, the
federal court must review the claim under the deferential standard contained in 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d}, federal habeas relief may only be
granted if the state court's decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of
the United States," or the state court's decision was an unreasonable determination of
the facts based on the evidence adduced in the trial. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1} & (2); see
also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,412 (2000); Appel v. Hom, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d
Cir.2001). A claim has been "adjudicated on the merits" for the purposes of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d) if the state court decision finally resolves the claim on the basis of its
substance, rather than on a procedural or some other ground. Thomas v. Hom, 570
F.3d 105, 115 (3d Cir. 2009). The deferential standard of § 2254(d} applies even "when
a state court's order is unaccompanied by an opinion explaining the reasons relief has
been denied"; as recently explained by the Supreme Court, "it may be presumed that
the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or
state-law procedural principles to the contrary." Harrington v. Richter, _ U.S. _, 131
S.Ct. 770, 784-85 (2011).
When reviewing a habeas claim, a federal court must presume that the state
court's determinations of factual issues are correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1}. This
presumption of correctness applies to both explicit and implicit findings of fact, and is
only rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1);
Campbell v. Vaughn, 209 F.3d 280, 286 (3d Cir. 2000); Miller-EI v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.
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322,341 (2003)(stating that the clear and convincing standard in § 2254(e)(1) applies
to factual issues, whereas the unreasonable application standard of § 2254(d)(2)
applies to factual decisions).
IV. DISCUSSION
Petitioner's application presents the following four grounds for relief: (1)
petitioner was denied due process because the State failed to provide him certain
discovery materials; (2) petitioner's daughter and her friend were not credible witnesses
because their testimony was inconsistent with prior statements, they did not have the
capacity to observe what they testified to, and their vague testimony was unduly
prejudicial; (3) petitioner's daughter and her friend committed perjury; and (4)
petitioner's daughter consented to each alleged rape.
A. Claim One
In his first claim for relief, petitioner asserts that he was denied due process
because the State failed to provide the following discovery materials: his daughter's
interview; his own statements; a search warrant; squad car audio; and crime scene
photographs. The Delaware Supreme Court denied the argument as meritless.
Therefore, petitioner will only be entitled to habeas relief if the Delaware Supreme
Court's decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law.
A federal due process claim based on the prosecution's withholding of evidence,
or failure to produce evidence, is governed by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
A violation of Brady occurs when the government fails to disclose evidence materially
favorable to the accused, including both impeachment evidence and exculpatory
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evidence. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). In order to prevail on a
Brady claim, a petitioner must establish that: (1) the evidence at issue was favorable to
the accused, either because it was exculpatory or it had impeachment value: (2) the
prosecution suppressed the evidence, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) the
evidence was material. Stricklerv. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999); Lambert v.
Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210,252 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668
(2004)). A petitioner demonstrates materiality of the suppressed evidence by showing
a "reasonable probability of a different result." Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434
(1995). In tum, "a reasonable probability of a different result is accordingly shown when
the government's evidentiary suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the
triaL" Id.
In addressing petitioner's discovery violation claim, the Delaware Supreme Court
cited Jackson v. State, 770 A.2d 506 (Del. 2001), which cited and applied the standard
from Brady. Therefore, the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in petitioner's case is
not contrary to clearly established Federal law. See Fahy v. Hom, 516 F.3d 169,196
(3d Cir. 2008) (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's decision was not "contrary to" clearly
established Federal law because the court appropriately relied on its own state court
cases, which articulated the proper standard derived from Supreme Court precedent);
Williams, 529 U.S. at 406 ("[A] run-of-the-mill state-court decision applying the correct
legal rule from [Supreme Court] cases to the facts of a prisoner's case [does] not fit
comfortably within § 2254(d)(1)'s 'contrary to' clause").
Additionally, after reviewing the record within the aforementioned framework, the
court concludes that the Delaware Supreme Court's rejection of petitioner's
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"discovery/Brady" claim did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly
established Federal law. The Delaware Supreme Court denied the instant claim after
determining that petitioner's defense counsel from his first trial provided petitioner with
all discovery materials prior to his retrial, "with the exception of his daughter's interview
and the squad card audio." However, the Delaware Supreme Court then determined
that the squad car audio "did not appear to exist," and also explained that petitioner had
two different opportunities, prior to his retrial, to view his daughter's interview.
Petitioner has not presented any clear and convincing evidence in this
proceeding to rebut the Delaware Supreme Court's conclusion that there was no squad
car audio evidence, nor has he presented any evidence rebutting the Delaware
Supreme Court's findings that petitioner was either provided with the other evidence or
given an opportunity to view the other evidence. Therefore, in these circumstances, the
court concludes that the state courts' denial of petitioner's Brady claim does not warrant
relief under § 22S4(d){1).
B. Claims Two and Three
In his second claim, petitioner contends that the trial witnesses were not credible
because their testimony was inconsistent with prior statements; the witnesses did not
have the capacity to observe what they testified to; and their vague testimony was
unduly prejudicial. Petitioner's third claim alleges that the witnesses perjured
themselves, pointing to the inconsistencies in their testimony between the first and
second trials.
It is well-settled that federal courts are not permitted "to redetermine [the]
credibility of witnesses whose demeanor has been observed by the state trial court, but
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not by them." Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434-35 (1983). Therefore, to the
extent these two claims merely challenge the credibility of the witnesses, they fail to
allege a proper basis for federal habeas relief.
However, even if these claims should be liberally construed as alleging federal
due process violations, they are unexhausted, because petitioner did not raise the
claims to the Delaware Supreme Court on direct or post-conviction appeal. At this
juncture, if petitioner attempted to obtain further review of the claims by filing a new
Rule 61 motion, the motion would be time-barred under Rule 61(i)(1) and barred by
Rule 61 (i)(4) as formerly adjudicated. In these circumstances, the claims must be
treated as procedurally defaulted, thereby precluding habeas review absent a showing
of cause and prejudice.
Although petitioner attempts to establish cause by alleging his lack of knowledge
regarding Delaware court procedures and rules, such ignorance does not constitute
cause in the procedural default context. See White v. Carroll, 416 F. Supp. 2d 270,282
(D. Del. 2006); see also Cristin v. Brennan, 281 F.3d 404,420 (3d Cir. 2002)("cause
cannot be based on the mere inadvertence of the petitioner or the petitioner's counsel
to take an appeal."). In the absence of cause, the court will not address the issue of
prejudice. Additionally, the miscarriage of justice exception to the procedural default
doctrine cannot be applied to excuse petitioner's default, because he has failed to
provide any new reliable evidence of his actual innocence. Accordingly, the court will
dismiss claims two and three as procedurally barred.
C. Claim Four
In his final claim, petitioner contends that he should not have been convicted of
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rape, because he presented a valid defense of consent regarding his sexual relations
with his daughter. According to petitioner, the fact that his daughter told him to wait
until she had finished whatever activity she was engaged in demonstrated her consent
to the sexual acts themselves.
To begin, the trial transcript reveals that petitioner's daughter and her friend
consistently testified that they did not consent to petitioner's advances. Thus, to the
extent the instant claim is merely a re-phrasing of petitioner's credibility arguments
asserted in claims two and three, it does not assert a proper basis for federal habeas
relief.
However, on direct appeal, petitioner alleged that his daughter consented to
having sex with him, and that he could only have been found guilty of incest. The
Delaware Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that
[ilt was within the prosecutor's discretion to charge [petitioner] in the Superior
Court under the rape statute rather than in the Family Court under the incest
statute. The evidence at trial was more than sufficient to support the Superior
Court's guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.
Hartman, 2008 WL 2723573, at *1. Given the similarity between petitioner's instant
argument and his appellate argument about his daughter's consent, the court
alternatively construes claim four as alleging that there was insufficient evidence to
support his rape convictions. 1
Even this liberal construction, however, does not aid petitioner in his quest for
relief. Given the Delaware Supreme Court's adjudication of claim four, the court must
11n light of the Delaware Supreme Court's explicit reference to the sufficiency of
the evidence, the court rejects the State's contention that any insufficient evidence
claim must be viewed as procedurally barred.
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review the claim under the deferential standard contained in § 2254(d) to determine if
the Delaware Supreme Court's decision was either contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly settled Federal law, or whether the state court's
decision was an unreasonable determination of the facts based on the evidence
adduced in the trial.
The clearly settled Federal law governing sufficiency of the evidence claims is
the standard articulated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 308 (1979). Pursuant to
Jackson, the relevant question for sufficiency of the evidence claims raised on habeas
review is "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 318-19.
In this case, petitioner admitted that he started having sex with his daughter
when she was sixteen, but he argued that the sexual acts did not constitute rape
because his daughter consented to them. After hearing the testimony and viewing the
victim's demeanor and emotional state, the Superior Court judge presiding over
petitioner's bench trial found petitioner guilty of second and fourth degree rape. More
specifically, the Superior Court judge concluded that petitioner intentionally engaged in
sexual intercourse with his daughter without her consent, by using force, intimidation,
threats, and his status as her father.2 (D.1. 11, Exh. B119 in Motion to Affirm, Hariman
v. State, No. 485,2007). The Superior Court judge explained that he made a credibility
2The judge stated that petitioner "basically created a sex slave," and that he did
what he "wanted with her by force or intimidation, by threats of harm. [Petitioner] broke
[his] daughter so that [he] could have her when [he] wanted her." Id. at B121-B122.
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determination based on the testimony provided and on the victim's demeanor and
emotional state. Id. at 8120.
Viewing this record within the framework established in Jackson, the court
concludes that petitioner's daughter's testimony provided ample evidence from which a
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of second and fourth
degree rape and, specifically, that she did not consent to the sexual acts. 3 Additionally,
the court defers to the trier of fact's credibility determinations. For these reasons, the
court concludes that there was sufficient evidence to support petitioner's convictions for
second and fourth degree rape. Accordingly, the court will deny claim four because the
Delaware Supreme Court's decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable
application of, Jackson, nor did it involve an unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence presented.
V. PENDING MOTION
During the pendency of this proceeding, petitioner filed a document titled "motion
to amend." (0.1. 14) To the extent the motion attempts to amend petitioner's original
application by adding a new double jeopardy claim, the court will deny it. The motion to
amend was filed well-outside the one-year limitations period applicable to § 2254
applications, and it seeks to add an entirely new claim to petitioner's § 2254 application
that does not relate back to the claims asserted in the original timely § 2254 application.
Accordingly, the court will not permit the amendment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), (c);
3The judge stated that petitioner "basically created a sex slave," and that he did
what he "wanted with her by force or intimidation, by threats of harm. [Petitioner] broke
[his] daughter so that [he] could have her when [he] wanted her." Id. at B121-B122.
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see also Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644 (2005); United States v. Duffus, 174 F.3d 333,
336-37 (3d Cir. 1999)(finding that a new ineffective assistance of counsel claim
asserted in a motion to amend after AEDPA's limitations period had already expired did
not relate back to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim asserted in the original
timely habeas petition); United States
V.
Thomas, 221 F.3d 430, (3d Cir. 2000)("Under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c), an amendment ... clarif[ying] or amplif[ying] a claim or theory in
the petition may, in the District Court's discretion, relate back to the date of the petition
if and only if the petition was timely filed and the proposed amendment does not seek
to add a new claim or to insert a new theory into the case").
However, to the extent the motion merely attempts to supplement petitioner's
original application with additional "facts," or constitutes a response to the State's
answer, the court will permit the supplementation. The court notes that it has
considered any "supplemental" information contained in said motion during its review of
the instant application.
VI. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Finally, the court must decide whether to issue a certificate of appealabilty. See
3d Cir. L.A.R. 22.2 (2011). The court may issue a certificate of appealability only when
a petitioner makes a "substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This showing is satisfied when the petitioner demonstrates "that
reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the denial of a
constitutional claims debatable or wrong." Slack
V.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484
(2000).
Further, when a federal court denies a habeas application on procedural grounds
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without reaching the underlying constitutional claim, the prisoner must demonstrate that
jurists of reason would find it debatable: (1) whether the application states a valid claim
of the denial of a constitutional right; and (2) whether the court was correct in its
procedural ruling. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.
For the reasons stated above, the court concludes that petitioner's habeas
application must be denied. Reasonable jurists would not find this conclusion
debatable. Consequently, petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right, and a certificate of appealability will not be issued.
VII. CONCLUSION
For foregoing reasons, the court will deny petitioner's application for habeas
relief filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. An appropriate order will be entered.
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