Hansen v. EI DuPont De Nemours and Company

Filing 75

MEMORANDUM ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION re 71 Report and Recommendation and Granting 66 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by EI DuPont De Nemours and Company (CASE CLOSED). Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 9/27/11. (ntl)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
HARRY W. HANSEN,
Plaintiff,

v.

C.A. No. 09-266-LPS

E. I.. DUPONT DE NEMOURS AND
COMPANY
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM ORDER
At Wilmington this 27th day of September, 2011 :
Presently before the Court are objections to Magistrate Judge Thynge's Report and
Recommendation ("R&R") (D.L 71) regarding the motion for summary judgment filed by E. I.
DuPont De Nemours and Company ("Defendant") (D.I. 66). For the reasons discussed below,
the Court will overrule the objections and adopt Magistrate Judge Thynge's R&R.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Harry W. Hansen ("Plaintiff'), who proceeds pro se, filed the instant civil rights

action against Defendant on April 22, 2009. (D.I. 2) Plaintiff alleges Defendant discriminated
against him based on a perceived disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA"), 47 U.S.C. § 12132, and also asserts a state law claim for defamation.
On September 30, 2010, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. (D.L 66) On
February 9, 2011, Magistrate Judge Thynge issued the R&R, which recommended granting the
Defendant's motion for summary judgment. (D.l. 71 at 14) Specifically, the R&R concluded

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that Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA. (D.I. 71 at
8) The R&R also recommended entry of summary judgment for Defendant on Plaintiffs
defamation claim. (ld at 13) On February 18,2011, Plaintiff filed objections to the Report.
(D.I.72) Subsequently, on March 3, 2011, Defendant filed a response to Plaintiffs objections.
(D.L 74)

II.

LEGAL STANDARDS
When reviewing the decision of a magistrate judge on a dispositive matter, the Court

conducts a de novo review. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). A motion for
summary judgment is considered a dispositive matter; therefore, the findings and conclusions of
the magistrate judge in connection with such motions are reviewed de novo. Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b)(3). The Court may accept, reject, or modify the recommendations of the magistrate jUdge.

Id The Court may also receive further evidence or return the matter to the magistrate judge with
instructions for proceeding. Id
A party is entitled to summary judgment if a court determines that there are no genuine
issues of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56. In doing so, the Court must review all of the evidence and draw all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and should not make credibility
determinations or weigh the evidence. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255
(1986).

III.

DISCUSSION
Reviewing the R&R de novo, the Court concludes that Magistrate Judge Thynge did not

err in recommending that Defendant's motion for summary judgment be granted. Plaintiffs first
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four objections are based on factual allegations relating to Defendant's corporate policies, which
Plaintiff failed to raise before Magistrate Judge Thynge and which are unsupported by anything
in the record. (See D.l. 72) However, even if true, these factual assertions do not support
denying the motion for summary judgment. Specifically, Plaintiff has not raised any objection
indicating that Defendant regarded him as being disabled or that it discriminated against him on
that basis. The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Thynge that Plaintiff has failed to establish
that he was regarded as disabled or that Defendant took any adverse employment action because
of a disability. (D.!. 71 at 10) Therefore, the Court overrules Plaintiff's objections relating to the
ADA claim.
Plaintiff's fifth objection relates to his defamation claim. (D.l. 72) Specifically, Plaintiff
asserts "[w]here the defamatory oral statement imputes a crime, a cause of action for slander can
exist without proof of special damages (changing the wording of an e-mail, perjury, fraud)."
(D.I. 72) Although this is a correct statement of the law, it is inapplicable to the present case
because Plaintiff's complaint does not allege that crimes were imputed to him. Instead, as
Defendant points out, these are allegations Plaintiff has made against other DuPont employees.
(D.l. 74 at 6) The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Thynge's finding that Plaintiff has failed
to allege that there was a defamatory statement made for which there are recoverable damages.
(D.l. 71 at 13) Accordingly, the Court overrules Plaintiff's objection relating to the defamation
claim.

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IV.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

Plaintiffs objections to Magistrate Judge Thynge's Report and Recommendation

(OJ. 72) are OVERRULED.
2.

The Report and Recommendation (0.1.71) is ADOPTED.

3.

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (0.1.66) is GRANTED.

4.

The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this action.

UNITED "sTATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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