Owens-Ali v. Pennell et al

Filing 49

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 1/18/2012. (lih)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
USHANGO OWENS-ALI, a/k/a Ushango Owens,
Plaintiff,
: Civ. No. 09-556-LPS

v.
CHAPLAIN FRANK C. PENNELL, et aI.,
Defendants.

Ushango Owens-Ali, James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware, Pro Se Plaintiff.
Devera Breeding Scott, Deputy Attorney General, Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington,
Delaware. Counsel for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

January 18,2012
Wilmington, Delaware

~5~iS~dge:

I.

INTRODUCTION
PlaintiffUshango Owens-Ali ("Plaintiff'), an inmate at the James T. Vaughn

Correctional Center ("VCC") in Smyrna, Delaware, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.c.
§ 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5. (D.I. 2, 3) He appears pro se and has been granted leave to proceed
without prepayment of fees. Presently before the Court are Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment and Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute. (D.I. 45, 47) For the reasons set forth
below, the Court will grant the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute and will deny as moot
the Motion for Summary Judgment.

II.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed the instant action alleging Defendants violated his constitutional rights

when they denied his religious dietary requests. (D.I. 2, 3) In addition, Plaintiff alleges that he
was transferred from the Howard R. Young Correctional Institution to the VCC, and placed in
administrative segregation, in retaliation for his requests. (Id.)
The Court screened the Complaint and dismissed several Defendants. (D.I. 12) The
remaining Defendants answered the Complaint and discovery proceeded. Plaintiff served several
discovery requests upon Defendants and, on July 27,2010, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel
and an entry of appearance to present his motion. (D.1. 40, 41) The Court denied the Motion to
Compel on February 18, 20 11. (D.I. 44) In the interim, on January 13, 20 11, the Court had
entered a scheduling order that provided a discovery deadline of July 15,2011. (D.I. 43) The
order also provided a deadline to file motions for summary judgment on or before August 15,

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2011, with answering briefs due on or before August 29,2011 and reply briefs due on or before
September 6,2011. (Id.) In denying Plaintiffs Motion to Compel, the Court noted that
discovery deadlines had been extended to July 15,2011 and, therefore, Plaintiff had sufficient
time to conduct additional discovery so long as he complied with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. (D.I. 44) Nonetheless, Plaintiff did not conduct additional discovery or take any
action subsequent to July 27,2010.
On August 15, 2011, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (D.I. 45)
Plaintiff did not file a response or any documents in opposition to the motion. On September 7,
2011, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute. (D.I. 47) Again, Plaintiff
did not file a response or any documents in opposition.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), a court may dismiss an action "[f1or failure of the

plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with [the Federal Rules] or any order of court." Although
dismissal is an extreme sanction that should be used only in limited circumstances, dismissal is
appropriate if a party fails to prosecute the action. See Harris v. City ofPhiladelphia, 47 F.3d
1311,1330 (3d Cir. 1995).
The Court considers six factors in determining whether dismissal is warranted: (1) the
extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the
failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness;
(4) whether the conduct of the party was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions
other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of such other sanctions; and (6) the
meritoriousness of the claim or defense. See Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 747 F.2d

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863,868 (3d Cir. 1984); see also Emerson v. Thiel Coli., 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002);

Huertas v. United States Dep't ofEduc., 408 F. App'x 639 (3d Cir. Dec. 13,2010) (not
published).
The court must balance the factors and need not find that all of them weigh against
plaintiff to dismiss the action. See Emerson, 296 F.3d at 190; Hicks v. Feeney, 850 F.2d 152,
156 (3d Cir. 1998); Curtis T Bedwell & Sons, Inc. v. International Fidelity Ins. Co., 843 F.2d
683,696 (3d Cir. 1988).

IV.

DISCUSSION
The Court finds that the Poulis factors warrant dismissal of Plaintiffs case. First, as a

pro se litigant, Plaintiff is solely responsible for prosecuting his claim. See Hoxworth v. Blinder,
Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 912, 920 (3d Cir. 1992). Second, Defendants are prejudiced by
Plaintiffs failure to prosecute. Prejudice occurs when a plaintiffs failure to prosecute burdens
the defendant's ability to prepare for trial. See Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218,222-23
(3d Cir. 2003). Here, Plaintiffs failure to take any action in this case since June 2010 impedes
Defendants' ability to prepare their trial strategy.
As to the third factor, there is a history of dilatoriness, as Plaintiff did not respond to the
Motion for Summary Judgment or the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute. As to the
fourth factor, since Plaintiff has taken no action for a lengthy period of time, the Court is unable
to discern whether his failure to prosecute is willful or in bad faith. As to the fifth factor, there
are no alternative sanctions the Court could impose that would have any effect. Because Plaintiff
proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis, it is doubtful that monetary sanctions would be effective,
if even appropriate.

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As to the sixth factor, the merits ofthe claim, the evidence of record indicates that
Defendants appear to have a meritorious defense. Defendants appear to lack the personal
involvement necessary to impose liability on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. In addition, the evidence
of record does not indicate that Defendants placed a substantial burden upon Plaintiff s ability to
exercise his religion in violation ofRLUIPA. (See D.1. 46 at exhibits)
Given Plaintiffs failure to take any action in this case since July 2010, to respond to
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and to Defendants' Motion for Failure to Prosecute,
as well as the unlikelihood of success on the merits of his claim, the court finds that the Poulis
factors weigh in favor of dismissal.

v.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court will grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to

Prosecute. (D.1. 47) The Court will deny as moot Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
(D.1. 45)
An appropriate Order follows.

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