Cooper Notification Inc. v. Twitter Inc. et al

Filing 576

MEMORANDUM ORDER Denying 572 MOTION for Reconsideration filed by Cooper Notification Inc. Judgment is entered AGAINST Plaintiff, Cooper Notification, Inc., and FOR Defendants, Twitter, Inc., Everbridge, Inc., and Federal Signal Corp. The Clerk of the Court is directed to CLOSE the case. ***Civil Case Terminated. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 7/16/12. (ntl)

IN THE UNITED STATES PISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
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COOPER NOTIFICATION, INC.,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 09-865-LPS

v.

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TWITTER, INC., EVERBRIDGE INC.,
RAVE WIRELESS INC., and FEDERAL
SIGNAL CORP.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM ORDER
1.

Plaintiff Cooper Notification, Inc. ("qooper") requests reconsideration or

reargument, leave to file supplemental infringement •eports, and clarification of the Court's
claim construction in connection with the May 25, 2012 opinion (D.I. 568) ("Opinion") and
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Order (D.I. 569) granting Defendants' motions for s~mary judgment of non-infringement.
2.

Pursuant to Local Rule 7 .1.5, a motio* for reconsideration should be granted only
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"sparingly." The decision to grant such a motion lie~ squarely within the discretion of the
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district court. See Dentsply Int'l, Inc. v. Kerr Mfg.

cp., 42 F. Supp. 2d 385,419 (D. Del. 1999);
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Brambles USA, Inc. v. Blocker, 735 F. Supp. 1239, 1~41 (D. Del. 1990). These types of motions
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are granted only if the court has patently misunderst~od a party, made a decision outside the
adversarial issues presented by the parties, or made aln error not of reasoning but of
apprehension. See Schering Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 2$ F. Supp. 2d 293, 295 (D. Del. 1998);
Brambles, 735 F. Supp. at 1241. "A motion for recop.sideration is not properly grounded on a
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request that a court rethink a decision already made.'f Smith v. Meyers, 2009 WL 5195928, at *1
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(D. Del. Dec. 30, 2009); see also Glendon Energy Cq. v. Borough of Glendon, 836 F. Supp.
1109, 1122 (E.D. Pa. 1993). It is not an opportunity to "accomplish repetition of arguments that
were or should have been presented to the court previously." Karr v. Castle, 768 F. Supp. 1087,
1093 (D. Del. 1991). A motion for reconsideration ~ay be granted only if the movant can show
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at least one of the following: (i) there has been an intrrvening change in controlling law; (ii) the
availability of new evidence not available when the cpurt made its decision; or (iii) there is a
need to correct a clear error of law or fact to prevent tnanifest injustice. See Max 's Seafood Cafe

ex rei. LouAnn, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). However, in no instance
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should reconsideration be granted if it would not res~lt in amendment of an order. See Schering

Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d at 295.
3.

Having reviewed the parties' submissfons, the Court concludes that Cooper has

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not met the standards for reconsideration, or any of tfe other requested relief.
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4.

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Cooper first contends that it should b~ permitted to provide supplemental
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infringement reports (including on infringement undfr the doctrine of equivalents) to address the
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issues raised in the Court's May 25, 2012 Opinion. ~ccording to Cooper, its infringement
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expert, Dr. Vigna, "never had an opportunity to provfde an analysis specially tailored to the
aspect of the gateway message transmission limitati$ that was the basis for the Court's grant of
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summary judgment, because this position and accompanying argument was not raised until long
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after he submitted his report;" thus, Cooper continue~, "it would be manifestly unjust not to
allow Cooper to supplement its infringement report.'; (D.I. 572 at 4, 5) The Court has already
considered whether Cooper should be provided an o~portunity to provide a supplemental
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infringement report. (See Opinion at 21-22) For thelreasons explained in the Opinion, the Court
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is unpersuaded by Cooper's arguments. Cooper had bultiple opportunities to supplement Dr.
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Vigna's expert report, and/or seek to strike Defendants' non-infringement theory as untimely,
but chose not to avail itself of those opportunities.
5.

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Cooper next contends that the Court's1grant of summary judgment is grounded in
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a clear error of fact because it ignores substantial evi~ence of infringement by Defendants'
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accused systems even under the Court's construction1ofthe gateway message transmission
limitation. (D.I. 572 at 6-7) According to Cooper, dr. Vigna's expert reports, deposition
testimony, and declarations provide substantial evidehce that Defendants' accused systems meet
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the gateway message transmission limitation of the a$serted claims. The Court previously
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considered the evidence now re-raised by Cooper, an~ found no genuine dispute that the accused
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systems do not transmit the gateway messages identi~ed by Dr. Vigna to the user terminals as
required by Claim 12; instead, it is only the accused ~econd messages identified by Dr. Vigna
that are allegedly delivered to the end users in Defen1ants' accused systems. The Court again
rejects Cooper's contentions.
6.

Cooper next contends that the

Court'~

claim construction is based on clear legal

errors. The Court has considered Cooper's argumen~s and does not find them persuasive.
Moreover, the claim construction arguments now rai$ed by Cooper could have and should have
been raised during the summary judgment process. $ee Opinion at 6-7 ("[T]he Court agrees with
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Defendants that the parties' competing positions pre~ent a claim construction dispute as to the
proper meaning of the gateway message transmissio~ requirements of Claim 12, rather than an
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infringement dispute over the nature or operation of1he Defendants' accused systems."); see
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also generally Transcript of Summary Judgment Hr~. (D.I. 555) at 6 (Twitter's counsel: "The
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dispute ... on infringement is really one of claim co~struction. "), id. at 28 (Twitter's counsel
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describing issue as "pure claim construction"), id. at ~3 (counsel for Cooper stating, "So the
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mere fact that they're trying to revisit claim construct~on is apparent here.").
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7.

Finally, Cooper requests that the Cou~ clarify various aspects of its construction

of the gateway message transmission limitation. The I Court agrees with Defendants that
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clarification is unnecessary and unwarranted. At least some of the issues raised by Cooper are
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beyond the scope ofDefendants' summary judgmentlmotions and the Court's Opinion.
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8.

For the foregoing reasons, Cooper's r~quest for reconsideration or reargument,
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leave to file supplemental infringement reports, and 91arification of the Court's claim
construction (D.I. 572) is DENIED.
9.

Judgment is entered AGAINST Plaintiff, Cooper Notification, Inc., and FOR
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Defendants, Twitter, Inc., Everbridge, Inc., and Federal Signal Corp. The Clerk of the Court is
directed to CLOSE the case.

July 16, 2012

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