Krahn v. State Of Delaware

Filing 106

MEMORANDUM ORDER- denying 39 MOTION to Stay, denying 70 MOTION for Sanctions, denying 81 MOTION to Appoint Counsel, denying 86 MOTION to Amend/Correct, denying 105 MOTION for Writ of Mandamus, denying 92 MOTION for injunctive relief for medical assistance, denying 75 MOTION to Appoint Counsel, denying 79 MOTION to Appoint Counsel, denying as moot 74 MOTION for Leave to File, denying 71 MOTION to Appoint Counsel. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 10/13/2011. (lid)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

JEFFREY KRAHN,

Plaintiff,
: Civ. No. 10-140-LPS

v.
SCOTT MEIXELL, et ai.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM ORDER
At Wilmington this 13th day of October, 2011, having reviewed the file and considered
Plaintiffs pending motions (D.1. 39, 70, 71, 74, 75, 79, 81, 86, 92, 105);
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

Background. Plaintiff Jeffrey Krahn ("Plaintiff'), an inmate at the James T.

Vaughn Correctional Center ("VCC") in Smyrna, Delaware, filed this civil rights action pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He appears pro se and has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
(D.1. 9) The Court screened the complaint and amendments and the case proceeds on the
pleadings found at Docket Items 1 and 7 with excessive force claims against Defendants Scott
Meixell ("Meixell") and Christopher Albence ("Albence"). The Court dismissed the Amended
Complaint found at Docket Item 15.
2.

Motion to Stay. Plaintiffs Motion to Stay is DENIED. (D.1. 39) On March 21,

2011, Plaintiff filed a letter/motion to stay this matter based upon his mental condition. He
indicates that he needs assistance to prosecute his case. Since that time, Plaintiff has repeatedly
raised the issue of his mental condition. Recently, the Court directed Warden Perry Phelps

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("Phelps") to investigate Plaintiffs mental status and a report was provided to the Court on July
21,2011. More recently, on September 19,2011, Plaintiff filed a motion for injunctive relief for
medical assistance. (D.I. 92) Defendants responded to this motion on October 3, 2011, and
submitted a current psychological summary. (D.I. 101, 102, 103) Based upon the report,
psychological summary, and Plaintiffs recent filings, the Court sees no need to stay this case.
3.

Motion for Sanctions. Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions is DENIED. (D.1. 70)

Plaintiff takes exception to the response Defendants filed in opposition to his Motion for
Injunctive Relief and moves for Rule 11 sanctions. (D.1. 70) The Motion is frivolous.
4.

Requests for Counsel. Plaintiffs Requests for Counsel are DENIED without

prejudice to renew. (D.1. 71, 75, 79, 81) Plaintiff has previously moved for, and the Court has
denied, requests for appointment of counsel. (See D.I. 14, 33) Nothing has changed since the
Court last denied Plaintiffs request for counsel on February 18,2011. Moreover, it is evident
from Plaintiff s filings that he ably represents himself in this matter.
5.

Motions for Leave to Amend Complaint. Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to

Amend is DENIED as moot. (D.1. 74) Plaintiff moves to amend to add as defendants Delaware
State Police Investigator Mark Papili ("Papali"), Delaware Department of Correction
Commissioner Carl Danberg ("Dan berg"), the Delaware Department of Correction ("DOC"), the
Attorney General of the State of Delaware Beau Biden ("Biden"), Delaware Deputy Attorney
General Ophelia Waters ("Waters"), the State of Delaware ("State of Delaware"), and Phelps.
(D.1. 74) Plaintiff advises the Court in his most recent Motion to Amend (D.1. 86) that all other
Defendants in prior amendments "are dismissed due to lack of subject matter."

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6.

Plaintiffs Notice and Supplemental Pleading construed as a Motion for Leave to

File an Amended Complaint is DENIED. (D.I. 86) Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), a party
may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within 21 days after serving it; or, if the
pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, within 21 days after service of a
responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (t), whichever
is earlier. Otherwise, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written
consent or the court's leave. Rule 15 provides that a court should freely grant leave to amend
when justice so requires.
7.

The Third Circuit has adopted a liberal approach to the amendment of pleadings

in order to ensure that "a particular claim will be decided on the merits rather than on
technicalities." Dole v. Arco Chern. Co., 921 F.2d 484,486-87 (3d Cir. 1990). Amendment,
however, is not automatic. See Dover Steel Co., Inc. v. Hartford Accident and Indem., 151
F.R.D. 570, 574 (E.D. Pa. 1993). Leave to amend should be granted absent a showing of "undue
delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies
by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of the
allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc." Farnan v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182
(1962); see also Gran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 291 (3d Cir. 2000). Futility of amendment

occurs when the complaint, as amended, does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410,1434 (3d Cir. 1997). If the

proposed amendment "is frivolous or advances a claim or defense that is legally insufficient on
its face, the court may deny leave to amend." Harrison Beverage Co. v. Dribeck Importers, Inc.,
133 F.R.D. 463, 468 (D.N.J. 1990).

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8.

Here, there is futility of amendment. Plaintiff s proposed amendment seeks to

reinstate Phelps as a defendant. Phelps was originally named as a defendant and was dismissed
by reason of respondeat superior. (See D.I. 18) Plaintiff indicates that he wishes to raise a claim
against Phelps for conspiracy to retaliate, but the proposed amendment does not allege
conspiracy. Rather, the proposed amendment alleges violations of Plaintiff s right to due process
as a result of his placement in isolation. In addition, Plaintiff seeks to add claims that he has
been deprived of rehabilitation, employment, and education.
9.

With regard to the proposed conspiracy claim, the proposed amendment contains

legal conclusions without supporting facts, in derogation of the pleadings requirements of Iqbal
and Twombly. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, _U.S._, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). As to the proposed due process claim, in reviewing an alleged
due process violation, it must be determined whether the alleged violation implicates a
constitutionally protected property or liberty interest. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U. S. 472
(1995). "Liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment may arise from two sources­
the Due Process Clause itself and the laws of the States." Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466
(1983). In a prison setting, states may create protected liberty interests. These interests will be
generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an
unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force,
nonetheless imposes an atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484 (internal citations omitted). Notably,
neither Delaware law nor DCC regulations creates a liberty interest in a prisoner's classification
within an institution. See 11 Del. C. § 6529(e). Moreover, "'[a]s long as the conditions or

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degree of confinement to which [a] prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon
him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself
subject an inmate's treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.'" Hewitt, 459 U.S. at
468 (quoting Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976)).
10.

It has, thus, been determined that the transfer of a prisoner from one classification

is unprotected by "the Due Process Clause in and of itself," even though the change in status
involves a significant modification in conditions of confinement. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 468
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Lott v. Arroyo, 785 F.Supp. 508, 509 (E.D. Pa. 1991)
(plaintiff transferred from group home to correctional facility had no constitutionally enforceable
right to participate in work release program); Brown v. Cunningham, 730 F.Supp. 612 (D. Del.
1990) (plaintiffs transfer from general population to administrative segregation, without being
given notice and opportunity to challenge it, was not violation of plaintiff s liberty interest).
Plaintiff complains that his current housing assignment deprives him of the ability to participate
in certain programs. Even iftrue, the transfer did not violate Plaintiffs due process rights.
Accordingly, the decision to place Plaintiff in isolation housing cannot be viewed as falling
outside the scope of "the sentence imposed upon him [or] otherwise violative of the
Constitution. "
11.

Plaintiffs proposed claims alleging that he has been denied rehabilitation,

education, and employment fail as a matter of law. Plaintiff as an inmate has no constitutional
right to participation in particular rehabilitation programs. See Groppi v. Bosco, 208 F. App'x
113,115 (3d Cir. Dec. 12,2006) (not published); Abdul-Akbar v. Department a/Carr., 910
F.Supp. 986, 1002 (D. Del. 1995). Nor does Plaintiff have a right to a specific job, or even to

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any job. See James v. Quinlan, 866 F.2d 627,630 (3d Cir. 1989). Finally, Plaintiff, as an
inmate, has no constitutionally protected right to an education. See Flanyak v. Ross, 153 F.
App'x 810,812 (3d Cir. Oct. 13,2005) (not published).
12.

Motion for injunctive relief for medical assistance. Plaintiff s motion for

injunctive relief is DENIED. (D.1. 92) Plaintiffs letter/motion for injunctive relief states that
mental health personnel will no longer talk to him. The letter expresses suicidal ideation wherein
Plaintiff states that he is depressed, wants to die, is sorry to be alive, and is tired of crying and
wants to go to heaven. The Court ordered Defendants to respond to the Order and they submitted
their response along with a current psychological summary.
13.

"A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy that should be granted only

if: (l) the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) denial will result in irreparable harm to
the plaintiff; (3) granting the injunction will not result in irreparable harm to the defendant; and
(4) granting the injunction is in the public interest." NutraSweet Co. v. Vit-Mar Enters., Inc., 176
F.3d 151,153 (3d Cir. 1999). Because of the intractable problems of prison administration, a
request for injunctive relief in the prison context must be viewed with considerable caution. See
Abraham v. Danberg, 322 F. App'x 169, 170 (3d Cir. Apr. 24,2009) (not published) (citing Goff

v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518,520 (8th Cir. 1995)).
14.

Following his letter to the Court, two psychologists attempted to interview

Plaintiff on September 27,2011, but Plaintiff did not want to speak to them. They observed that
Plaintiff was oriented to all spheres, that he appeared frustrated and angry in mood and tone, but
they did not detect unusual or bizarre behavior. The two psychologists then met with Plaintiff on
September 29,2011. He was oriented to all spheres, maintained adequate eye contact, and his

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thought process was obsessive/preservative. Plaintiff spoke about the injustice of his conviction,
and his mood was angry with an affect appropriate to mood. He denied suicidal ideation or plan
but stated that, if the injustice imposed upon him was not remedied, he would want to end his
life. The psychologists opined that Plaintiff did not appear to be an imminent threat to himself or
others, but that he should be monitored regularly for any further deterioration in his mental
status. (D.I. 103)
15.

Plaintiff has not demonstrated the likelihood of success on the merits. He

receives mental health treatment and his mental condition is monitored regularly. Notably,
Defendants took immediate action upon learning that Plaintiff advised the Court of his suicidal
ideation. There is no indication that, at the present time, Plaintiff is in danger of suffering
irreparable harm. Nor has he demonstrated the likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable
harm to justify the issuance of injunctive relief.
16.

Petition for Writ of Mandamus. Plaintiff s Petition for Writ of Mandamus

construed as a Motion for Injunctive Relief is DENIED. (D.I. 105) The Court notes that the
Motion is a "fill-in-the blank" form. Plaintiff seeks relief from "oppressive action" by Phelps.
Plaintiff asserts, in a conclusory manner and without supporting facts, that Phelps "runs a
haphazard institution, allowing employees to operate autonomously and without regard for the
law, the rules of the United States Supreme Court or the constitutional rights ofthe prisoners, or
the public at large." For relief he seeks: (1) removal of restrictions placed upon his First
Amendment right to correspond; (2) restoration of "thirty (30) days forfeited by the institution's
disciplinary committee;" (3) delivery of all correspondence, legal material, and law books

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without any form of delay or censorship; and (4) punitive damages and such other relief as
warranted by the Court.
17.

Plaintiff has not demonstrated the likelihood of success on the merits. While

Plaintiff seeks specific forms of relief, nothing in his Motion indicates a deprivation of
constitutional rights. For example, there are no allegations that he has been denied the right to
correspond, that he has been denied his right to access to the courts, or that an unlawful
punishment resulted in the loss of good time credits. Nor do the allegations indicate that, at the
present time, Plaintiff is in danger of suffering irreparable harm. The Motion is baseless.

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