Wooleyhan et al v. Cape Henlopen Board of Education et al

Filing 215

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Michael M. Baylson on 7/20/2011. (lid)

IN THE UN ITED STATES DISTRJCT CO URT
FOR THE DISTRJCTOF DELAWARE
ROGER D. WOOLEYHAN,

CIVIL ACnON

Plaintiff,
v.
CAPE HE LOPEN SCHOOL DISTRICT,
et al..

NO.

10-153

Defendants.
MEMORAND M REGARDING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Baylson , J.

l.

July 20, 2011

Introduction
On May 17,2011. the Court issued a Memorandum and entered an Order granting several

defendants summary judgment on various individual-capacity claims, I (Memo., ECF No. 199;
Order, ECF No. 200.) Plaintiff Roger D. Wooleyhan ('"Wooleyhan'') seeks partial

reconsideration orthe Coun's ruling

he asks the Court to reconsider its grant of qualified

immunity to Defendants John Yore ("Yore") and Dianne Mrazeck ("Mrazeck") from his

procedural due process claim (Mol., ECF No. 20 I.) He does not seck reconsideration of the
Court's same decision with regard to Robert Maull ("Maull''). QQJ After careful consideration

aflhe parties' briefs and reconsideration o[the Court's prior ruling, Ihe COlirt will den y
Wooleyhan's Motion.

The Memorandum outlines the ruJl history orthls case, including an explanation
orWoolcyhan's claims. These details will nOl be repealed here. ~ Memo. at 2- 13.)
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I J.

Standard of Review
Wooleyhan has filed a mOlion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) requesting the

Coun alter or amend its judgment. Yore and Mrazeck oppose the Motion (ECF No. 205), and
Wooleyltan filed a reply (ECF No. 209). A judgment may be altered or amended if the moving
pany shows (1) an intervening change In contro ll ing law, (2) the availability of new evidence that
was not available when the coun granled relief, or (3) the need to eorrect a clear error of law or
fact to prevent manifest injustice. Sg: Max's Seafood Cafe by Lou-Ann. Inc. v. Quinteros, 176
F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). Wooleyhan relies on <he third ground. (Reply at 2.)
III.

Parties' Contentions

Ln his Malian, Wooleyhan contends the Coun erred in its analysis by failing to separately
considerthe conduct of each Defendant in its qualified immunity analysis. See Grant v. City of
Pmsburgh, 98 F.3d 116, 122 (3d Cir. 1996) ("[C]rucial to the resolution of any assertion of
qualified immunity is a careful examination of the record . .. to establish, for the purposes of
summary judgment, a detailed factual description of the actions of each individual defendant ...
.t) He contends only Maull called Wooleyhan's parents and Yore and Mrazeck failed

10

advise

Wooleyhan ofltis offenses. Funher, Yore and Mrazeck should not be able to use Maull as a
shield without evidence they instructed Maull to ca ll or participated in the call wi Lh Wooleyhan 's
parents. Finally, even assuming notice to the parents was sufficient,. Wooleyhan was still
dcpnvcd or his opportunity to dispute the charges at a hearing because his parents were not

10

a

position to dispute the charges and the aller-the-fact parent meelings do nOl comply with Goss \

!

Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
Yore and Mrazeck oppose Wooleyhan's Motion ror several reasons. They contend a state
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statuie, Del. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 4112, extinguishes Wooleyhan's right to an education such that
he is not entitled to due process. They then argue that even i fthe statute does not have that
effcct, Yore and Mrazeck are entitled to qualified immunity for relying on section 4112. Further,
they argue they are entitled to qualified immunity for other reasons: there is no dispute of fact to
allow a reasonable jury to find Yore and Mrazeck knew Maull gave Wooleyhall inadequate
notice; it was reasonable for them to assume Maull gave Wooleyhan nolice in light of
Wooleyh::m's written statement; and Yore and Mrazeck acted reasonably bccause they knew
Maull called Wooleyhan ' s parents and then they met with Woolcyhan's parents.
In reply. Wooleyhan concedes it may be reasonable for administrators to provide nOUce to
parents, but not if the parents are not in a position to dispute the accusations. In that case, the
student is deprived of his opportunity to challenge the charges in a QQn hearing. Further,

~

mandates a hearing before removal except in limited circumstances, which do not exist in this
casco Finally, he argues section 4112 cannot immunize Yore and Mrazcck because federal 13\\
defines the process due, not state law.
IV.

Disc uss ion
At the outset, the Court acknowledges that Wooleyhan may have valid arguments with

respect to the Court's qualified immunity analysis in light ofQrnru and Wooleyhan's contention
that his parents could not have adequately disputed the charges. After reconsideration, the Court
finds that even if a reasonable official could believe that notice to Wooleyhan's parents would
comply with the notice requirement ofGoss. ajury could find his parents were not in a position
to dispute the charges. Thus, Wooleyhan arguably was deprived of the opportunity for the
heanng required

in~.

Further, the Court agrees with Wooleyhun that the subsequent

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meetings with Wooleyhan 's parents, after he was removed from school. violate ~'s
instruction to conduct a hearing prior to removal.

See~,

419 U.S. at 582. Goss is clear that

the hearing should precede removal except in limited circumstances, and Defendants did not
argue on summary judgment that such limited circumstances existed or that they were aware
Wooleyhan posed a continuing danger or ongoing threat. See id. at 582-83; (Summ. J, Memo "
ECF No. 181 , at 13-22).
Nevertheless. Wooleyhan's Motion has given the Court the opportunity to consider an
alternative ground for summary judgment initially raised in Derendants' Summary Judgment
Memorandum. Specifically, the Court concludes that WooJeyhan has failed to show a genuine
dispute of material fact that would allow a reasonable jury to find Yore or Mrazeck acted with
sufficient intent to warrant liability under § 1983,
A.

Lega l Sta nd ards

In their original Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants argued that Wooleyhan
failed to show "a recognized liberty or property interest was intentionally or recklessly deprived
without adequate procedures." (Summ. J. Memo" ECF No. 181 , at 14 (citing Anspach v. City of
Philadelphia, 503 F.3d 256, 261 (3d Cir. 2oo7)).} Ahhough Anspach was a substantive due
process case, ~ Anspach, 503 F.3d at 261-71, the Court concludes Defendllnts properly raised
the issue of in ten I (Summ. J. Memo. at 14) and that Wooleyhan failed to show su1Ticiem facts in
the record to allow a reasonable jury to find Defendants acted with the requisite intent.
To succeed on a procedural due process claim, a § 1983 plaintifTmust show, at minimum,
gross negligence or recklessness. Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ" 587 F.3d 176,
196 (3d Cir. 2009};.ru; K.) . v. Dj •. QrVOllih & FamilyServs., 363 F. Supp. 2d 728, 739-40

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(D.NJ. 2005) ("The Third Circuit has permitted a cause of action based upon conduct which
alleges gross negligence."). Ordinary negligence is not sufficient. Chambers, 587 F.3d at 196;
~

Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332-33 (I 986)(concluding "lack of due care" does not

trigger due process protections). The party claiming a violation bears Lhe burden of showing the
requisite level of intent. Jordan \. Fox. Rothschild. O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1278 (3d
Cir. 1994).
Few courts, if any, have precisely defined

"hrfOSS

negligence" and "recklessness" in Lhe

context of a § 1983 claim for alleged violatIons of procedural due process. In other contexts, the

llurd Circuit has noted that gross negligence is a lower level of in ten I than tort-law recklessness.
which in tum is lower Lhan criminal-law recklessness or subjective deliberate indifference.

~

Ziccardi v. City of Philadelphia, 288 F.3d 57, 66 n.6 (3d Cir. 2002) (considering substantive due
process claim based on liberty interest in bodily integrity). In Ziccardi, the Third Circuit
concluded the proper standard for "gross negligence or arbitrariness that shocks the conscience"
requires proof that the defendant consciously disregarded a great risk that serious haml would
result from his or her conduct. See id. Actual knowledge of the risk may not be necessary where
the risk is obvious. Sec Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 310 (3d Cir. 2006) (discussing intent
requirement of state-created danger theory for substanlive due process claim).
According to other sources. gross negligence is "[a] conscious, voluntary act or omission
in reckless disregard of a legal duty and Lhe consequenccs to another party." Black 's Law
Dictionary 1062 (8th ed. 2004). Reckless disregard, in tum, is "conscious indifference to Ihe
consequences of an act."

rd. at 506.

These standards require some conscious act by the defendant, that is some awareness of

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his or her conduct (or Jack theroof) and the wrong or hann that it may cause to anOlher. With
these standards in mind, the Court considers whether any genuine dIsputes of material fact exist
that would allow a reasonable jury to find Yore or Mra1..cck acted with gross negligence in
violating Wooleyhan's right to procedural due process.2

B.

Analysis

After the opportunity to reconsider the record in this case, the Court concludes
Wooleyhan has failed to show facts that would allow ajury to conclude the conduct ofVore and
Mrazeck amounts to gross negligence. Because recklessness is a higher level of intent than gross
negligence, the Court need not consider whether DefendanlS' conduct was reckless.

~

Ziccardi, 288 F.3d at 66 n.6 (noting gross negligence is lower level ofintentthall tort·law and
criminal·law recklessness).
The Court identified the conduct of Yore and Mrazeck in the Factual Background seclion
of its Memorandum as follows:
"Mrazcck, an assistant principal, is the administrator who suspended
Wooleyhan pendmg an investigation. She did not speak to any of the panies
involved prior to suspending Wooleyhan and d.id not review any of the statements.
According to Mrazeck, the suspension was 'open·ended' and ' [clould have been
for any number [of days]. ' Mrazeck issued a suspension notice, but did not
include the basis for or the length of the suspension. d.id not provide copics of
Jester' s discipline referral, and did not advise Wooleyhan ofms right to appeal.
Mrazeck does not believe the video shows Wooleyhan elbow Jester.
Yore, the principal at the lime of the incident, testified that he spoke with
WooJeyhan and Pineda on the date of the incident. Yore did not watch the video
prior to Wooleyhan's suspension, instead relying on Jester' s referral as Lhe
'primary piece of evidence.' ... "
(Memo. at 8·9 (citations omiued).) Relevant to this Motion, the Court concluded there was a

2
The Court stated the appropriate standard of review for summary judgment 111 its
Memorandum and will not repeal it here. (Memo. at 13·15.)

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genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Wooleyhan received notice oflhe accusDtions
against him.

lliL. at 27-28.)

The Court rejected Defendants' argument Wooleyhan received

constructive notice lliL. at 27 n. 15), and detcnnined that Wooleyhan's and Mau11's recollection of
the events of October 24. 2008 did not support a finding that Wooleyhan received actual notice
(id. at 28; see id. at 3 ("Wooleyhan does nOl mention meeting with Yore on October 24."» .
Nonetheless, the Court noted that Maull infonned Wooleyhan's mother of Wooleyhan's alleged
conduct and that Yore and Mrazcck met with Wooleyhan's parents at subsequcnl mcetings
before finalizing the suspension. (Id. at 49.) Ultimately. the Court concluded Yore, MrolZeck,
and Maull are entitled to qualified immunity for this claim, but djd not consider their alternative
argument that Wooleyhan could not show they acted with the requisite intent. (ld.: ~ Summ. J
Memo. at 14.)
Nothing else in the record would allow a reasonable jury to find that Yore and Mrazcck
are gujlty of anything more than ordinary negligence. Wooleyhan complains that they both failed
to give him notice of the accusations against him and an opportunity to dispute the charges,
despite knowing he disputed the charges. (PI's Answering Br., ECF No. 184, at 4.) Further, and
as previously indicated, Mrazeck did not indicate on Wooleyhan's suspension notice the reason
ror or the length orthe suspension. (Sealed App .. ECF No. 96, at 291.) Instead, Mrazeck
suspended Wooleyhan "pending review." C!QJ In fact, he did not speak with either Yore or
Mrazeck lhe entire day. (School Dcfs. App., ECF No. 180, at 12-13.) And when Mrazeck spoke
with Wooleyhan's mother, she implied she had seen the video of the incident though she did not
watch it until the following Monday. (Compare Pl.'s School Defs. App., ECF No. 184, at 165.
with School Ders. App. at 61.)

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Although Yore claims he spoke with Wooleyhan on October 24 , 2008 (see Pl. ' s School
Defs. App. al 27), Wooleyhan does nol mention meeting with him. Instead, Wooleyhan claims
that Yore improperJydeJegated his duty to investigate and sus pend. Assuming the truth orlhl5

claim, Yore intended someone to provide the notice and opponunity required

under~. ~

PI. 's School Defs. App. al 19.) Goss. however, does not designate the proper "disciplinarian" in
all cases, and actual authority is a matter of state law, nOl federal due process.

~ Q.QM, 419

U.S. at 582-84; Shuman v. Penn Manor Sch. Dis!., 422 F.3d 141 , 15011.4 (3d Cir. 2005). This is
not evidence thai Yore consciously disregarded a risk of harm to Woolcyhan - because it
indicates he intended someone to notify Wooleyhan (as required by.QQn) - but that he may have
negligently assigned the responsibility to someone who did not meet his expectations and then
failed to follow-up.

QQn docs not require Yore and Mrazeck to conduct as thorough an investigation as
WooJeyhan suggests. See ~ 419 U.S. at 583 ('"To impose in each case even truncated trialtype procedures might well overn!helm administrative facilities ... and . .. cost more than it
would save in educational effectiveness.') Goss requires only "some kind of notice and ...
~

kind of hearing. Id . al 579. Funher. as the Coun previously concluded, the additional fact

of pending criminal charges does not change the requ,ircments under Goss. (Memo. at 26-27.)
Whether Yore and Mrazeck acted unreasonably is a question of ordinary negligence.
Although there is sufficient evidence in the record to allow a jury to conclude they acted
unreasonably under the circumstances, Wooleyhan has not identified anything in the record that
would allow ajury to find that Yore or Mrazeck acted with gross negligence by consciously
disregarding their duties under ~ or consciously disregarding the risk of harm to Wooleyhan .

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Rather, the record suggests Mrazeck believed Maull provided notice to Wooleyhan's parents and
that Yore assigned other administrators to handle the situation. (PI. 's School Defs. App. at 19,
73.) Although there is a genuine dispute whether Maull did provide notice, Wooleyhan points to
nothing in the record to suggest Yore and Mrazeck aeted with gross negligence. Rather, any
faIlure resulted from oversight and alack of communication: Yore thought Mrazeck or Maull
would provide notice, Maull thought Yore or Mrazeck would provide notice, and Mrazeck
thOUght Maull had already provided notice.
At most, and construed in the light most favorable to Wooleyhan, it appears both Yore
and Mrazeck simply neglected their duties
school ' s disciplinary process.

~

not only under federal law, but also according to the

PI's Answering Br. at 20-21 .) But ordinary negligence does

not establish a constitutional tort, see Chambers. 587 F.3d at 196, and failure to abide by school
policy does not implicate constitutional concerns, ~ Shuman, 422 F.3d at 150 11.4. Wooleyhan
may ha\-e benefitted from and been entitled to better process, but that does not make the process
he did receive grossly negligent
After a thorough review of the record, the Court concludes Wooleyhan has not sho\\'n a
genuine dispute of material fact Ihat Yore and Mrazeck aCled with anything more than ordinary
negligence. Therefore, Yore and Mrazeck are entitled to summary judgmCDt on his § 1983
procedural due process claIm.
V.

Co nclu sion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will d eny Wooleyhan's MOlion for Reconsideration .

An appropriate Order will follow.
O :'Todd 10·153 Wooleyhan v. Cape Ileniopen (DE)\Woolcyhtln . Mol to Recon.iI(ier Memo · FlNAL"..pd
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